Judgment :- The Order of the Court was as follows : The Management of the petitioner Mills has filed this writ petition against the Deputy Commissioner of Labour and an individual praying to issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records of the first respondent dated August 24, 1992 made in W.C. No. 249 of 1990 and quash the same. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner would submit that the petitioner Mill was established in the year 1982, when the area in which it was located was not covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act (ESI Act) that by Notification dated March 27, 1986, the said Act was extended to the area; that by notice dated April 24, 1987, the Employees' State Insurance Corporation informed that the petitioner's establishment was covered under the E.S.I. Act with effect from April 1, 1986 and a code number was also allotted to the petitioner's establishment and on and from the date of coverage, the petitioner was making contribution to the Corporation in respect of the persons employed by the petitioner. The further case of the petitioner as pleaded in the affidavit is that one B. Srinivasan joined the Mills as a trainee on December 7, 1987 and on December 17, 1987, he met with an accident and died on the spot and the accident occurred during the course of employment, that on January 12, 1988, the father of the deceased employee, the second respondent herein, has filed an application under the Workmen's Compensation Act claiming a sum of Rs. 53, 760 as compensation; that the petitioner stated in his counter that the deceased was an insured person under the E.S.I. Scheme and the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act would not be applicable within the meaning of Secs. 53, 760 as compensation; that the petitioner stated in his counter that the deceased was an insured person under the E.S.I. Scheme and the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act would not be applicable within the meaning of Secs. 53 and 61 of the E.S.I. Act; that the petitioner also filed an Interlocutory Application in the said proceedings praying the first respondent herein to decide the maintainability of the claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act as a preliminary issue before embarking upon the merits of the case, in which the first respondent made an order dated July 25, 1989 stating that the decision could be given only after going into the merit of the case under the Workmen's Compensation Act; that aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner herein filed W.P. No. 10982 of 1989 and the said writ petition was dismissed on November 10, 1989 with an observation that the authority will decide the issue of whether the deceased worker was an insured person under the E.S.I. Act; that the case having been renumbered as W.C. No. 249 of 1990 and on holding a full enquiry, the first respondent delivered the order on August 24, 1992, holding that since the contributions were paid only on August 30, 1988, the deceased was not an insured person within the meaning of the E.S.I. Act and hence the authority under the Workmen's Compensation Act got jurisdiction to entertain the claim and consequently Sec. 53 of the E.S.I. Act had no application to the present case and aggrieved, the petitioner has come forward to file this writ petition seeking the relief extracted supra, on certain grounds such as those brought forth in the grounds of writ petition.During arguments, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner besides, emphasising the pleadings of the writ petition particularly to the bar created under Sec. 53 of the E.S.I. Act and Sec. 61 of the E.S.I. Act, which defines the 'insured person' by virtue of which a person becomes insured even if the contribution becomes payable in respect of that person and hence the deceased employee clearly came within the purview of the E.S.I. Act and would pray for the relief sought for in the writ petition. On the contrary, the learned Counsel for the respondents would cite a judgment of this Court delivered in P. L. Vellaichamy v. Union of India and others, (1994-III-LLJ (Suppl)-514) (Mad) for the proposition that the parents are the dependents of the deceased employee and they are entitled to claim compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 wherein it is held at p. 516 : "The widowed mother of the deceased worker is a dependent within the meaning of Sec. 2(d)(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The fact that the widowed mother has deserted deceased worker and is living with a Muslim gentleman does not disentitle to claim as dependent. The Act does not prescribe any such restriction. If she is the widowed mother, she is entitled to claim as a dependent, whether she was actually depending on the earnings of the deceased worker or not. Whereas under other clauses a condition has been imposed that the claimant should be either wholly dependent or partly dependent on the earnings of the deceased worker at the time of his death in order to be a dependent." The other judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents is one delivered in Nathamuni Gounder and another v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary, Labour and Industries Department, (1986-II-LLJ-423)(Mad) wherein it is held at p. 424 : "Even if a statute denies a right of appeal, that statute cannot be held to be a bad legislation. If legislature thinks in a particular case that no appeal should be provided or the right of appeal which it provided should be exercised in a particular manner and subject to certain conditions, that legislation has always been countenanced to be a proper legislation. The reason behind this is, the right of appeal is a creature of statute and its exercise, its scope and its results shall always be controlled by the provisions of the statute which creates that right. On the basis such right does not provide for effective alternative remedy, there is no warrant to entertain the writ petition." Yet another judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents is a recent one delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 222 of 1999, dated December 15, 1999 wherein it is held : "4. On the basis such right does not provide for effective alternative remedy, there is no warrant to entertain the writ petition." Yet another judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents is a recent one delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 222 of 1999, dated December 15, 1999 wherein it is held : "4. As rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge, the application for registration was submitted after the death of the employee, the registration was granted thereafter and the Return of Declaration form was also given to the employer subsequently. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, we do not think that there was proper registration and that the dependents were exclusively entitled to the benefits of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The learned single Judge is justified in remitting the matter to the Commissioner for proper determination of the issue. Sec. 53 of the Act has no application and the Commissioner has to decide and dispose of the application, in accordance with law ......" Assessing the case of the petitioner as pleaded in the writ petition and having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned Counsel for both, the pertinent question that is to be solved is whether the bar created under Sec. 53 of the E.S.I. Act is operative in the case of the second respondent initiated against the petitioner Management on account of the death of his son in an accident that occurred in the course of employment in the petitioner Mills. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour, the first respondent herein, having conducted an elaborate enquiry into the facts and circumstances encircling the whole case and framing five issues, such as,(i) Whether the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has jurisdiction to entertain this claim in view of Sec. 53 and Sec. 61 of the E.S.I. Act ? (ii) Whether the deceased employee is a workman as defined under the Workmen's Compensation Act ? (iii) Whether the accident to the deceased employee on December 17, 1987 which resulted in his death arose out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent ? (iv) What, if any, is the quantum of compensation payable to the dependents of the deceased employee ? (v) Whether the respondent is liable to pay the compensation, if any as determined above ? (iv) What, if any, is the quantum of compensation payable to the dependents of the deceased employee ? (v) Whether the respondent is liable to pay the compensation, if any as determined above ? and in proper consideration of the materials placed on record would not only hold the deceased employee as the "workman" as defined under the Workmen's Compensation Act but also an 'employee' in the petitioner Mill as on the date of accident and that the deceased employee was drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 600 and having his own calculations, would determine the compensation payable to the dependent of the deceased employee at Rs. 54, 053 further directing the petitioner to deposit the said amount with him within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order. For the question of bar under Sec. 53 of the E.S.I. Act also, the first respondent has arrived at his own conclusion, accepting the bar created under Sec. 53, but factually dissecting whether the deceased employee was an 'insured person' under the E.S.I. Act at the time of the accident resulting in his death and elaborately going into the documents placed before him and ultimately rejecting Ex. R. 2, xerox copy of the Declaration Form under Regulations 11 and 12 in respect of B. Srinivasan, wherein it was indicated that on December 7, 1987 it was signed, branding the same as not genuine. The first respondent has further remarked that subsequent to the death of the deceased employee, the management arranged to have the contributions under the E.S.I. Act to be paid. Based on such evidence placed on record and in the light of the discussions held the first respondent would ultimately conclude that at the time of accident, which resulted in the death of the deceased employee, the petitioner had not paid any contribution under the E.S.I. Act in respect of its employees including deceased employee, that it is not that contributions were not paid but also that the management had no intention to pay the contribution. Into such valid decision arrived at, based on the evidence placed on record, by the first respondent in his impugned proceeding, this Court is not expected to interfere with especially when there is sufficient evidence placed on record before the authority concerned based on which he has arrived at the conclusion. Into such valid decision arrived at, based on the evidence placed on record, by the first respondent in his impugned proceeding, this Court is not expected to interfere with especially when there is sufficient evidence placed on record before the authority concerned based on which he has arrived at the conclusion. Only if such conclusions are arrived at on no evidence, this Court can interfere with and the decision that is arrived at in the case in hand by the first respondent is not one of such nature for this Court of judicial review to cause its interference and hence on this point also, the petitioner Management fails. The order passed by the first respondent in W.C. No. 249 of 1990 dated August 24, 1992 holds good in all fours so as to call for no interference of this Court into the same as it is prayed on the part of the petitioner in the writ petition.For all the discussions held and in result, the above writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. The Petitioner is hereby required to pay an amount of Rs. 54, 053 (Rupees Fifty four thousand fifty three only) to the second respondent with interest at 12% p.a. from the date of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madurai i.e. from August 24, 1992 to the date payment coupled with a cost of Rs. 2, 000 (Rupees Two thousand only) within thirty days from the date of receipt of this order by the petitioner. Consequently, W.M.P. No. 21314 of 1992 is also dismissed.