JUDGMENT P. K. TRIPATHY, J. —This application under Sec. 438 of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, ‘the Code’) has been filed by eight petitioners. It is the admitted position that by the date of application i.e., 18.2.1998 charge-sheet in the case had already been submitted, inter alia, against petitioners 1, 5, 6 and 7 showing each of them as absconders. It is also the admitted position that charge-sheet was not submitted against petitioners 2, 3, 4 and 8. As it reveals from the case diary, on 31.12.1997 the investigating officer made the endorsement that he submitted the charge-sheet on that date for the offences under Secs. 147, 148, 323, 325, 379, 506/149, IPC. The aforesaid bail application as well as the investigation relates to G.R.Case No. 2347 of 1997 of the Court of S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar arising out of Balipatna P.S.Case No. 112 of 1997. 2. Mr. S.S.Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argued for considering the prayer for anticipatory bail of the aforesaid petitioners notwithstanding the above noted fact that half of them have not been chargesheeted and the re¬maining petitioners have not only been chargesheeted but have been shown as absconders in the charge-sheet. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that prayer for anticipatory bail can be entertained even after submission of charge-sheet and, therefore, their applications may be allowed. Learned Additional Standing Counsel on the other hand argued that after submission of charge-sheet reasonable apprehension of arrest goes away until the cognizance taking Magistrate exercises his judicial mind to find out whether a prima facie case is made out and if cognizance of offence is taken then whether to issue summons or warrants. In any event, he argued, when the Magistrate remains in seisin of the matter relating to securing attendance/appearance of the accused in the criminal proceeding, the normal procedure for bail under Sec. 437 or 439 of the Code will apply and not the provi¬sion under Sec. 438, Cr.P.C. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the cases of Hatanath Behera v. State of Orissa and another, 1994 (I) OLR 51 = 1994 (7) OCR 41; Puran Singh v. Ajit Singh and another, 1986 Cri.L.J. 1303 and also referred to paragraph 19 in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 . v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 . On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State relied on the cases of Mohan Behera and two others v. State, 59 (1985) CLT 110 and Md. Muzafar Hossain Khan v. State of Orissa, *(1990) 3 OCR 77 besides the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra). 4. It is not a contention at dispute that an application under Sec. 438 of the Code takes care of cases of pre-arrest bail involving non-bailable offences and Sections 436, 437 and 439 deal with cases of bail after arrest or appearance, as the case may be. Section 167(2) of the Code provides for release on bail of the person detained in custody in case of default of the investigating officer to complete investigation within the statu¬tory period. Section 389 of the Code provides for bail pending appeal by a convicted person. The concept of the legislature, as it appears, with due research and circumspection, is a comprehen¬sive one to safeguard the situation from either side at every stage from the date of initiation of an investigation till ulti¬mate termination of criminal trial and the appeal and revision thereof. For grant or refusal of bail the parameters have been prescribed not only in the statute but also the guidelines pro¬pounded through judicial pronouncements. 5. When it relates to a pre-arrest bail undoubtedly Section 438 of the Code is the only provision. According to learned counsel for the petitioner an application for pre-arrest bail is not confined to the stage of filing of charge-sheet but such an application is legally permissible to be entertained even after filing of charge-sheet. In that respect, he has referred to and relied upon the above noted decisions. 6. In the case of Smt. Sheik Khasim Bi (supra) the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that prayer for anticipatory bail can be entertained even after taking cognizance of offence by the Magistrate and issue of warrant of arrest. Similar view has been expressed by a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Puran Singh (supra). Similar view has been expressed by a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Puran Singh (supra). In the case of Hatanath Behera (supra) learned Single Judge of this Court after referring to the case of Mohan Behera (supra) record¬ed that : “It was held that if a Magistrate has already taken cognizance of an offence and has issued a non-bailable warrant, the stage for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court or the Court of Sessions for an order for anticipatory bail is already over. Interpreting the provision of Sec. 438, Cr.P.C. this Court observed that the section envisages three stage : Sub-sec. (1) enables a person for making an application for anticipatory bail when he reasonably apprehends his arrest in respect of accusation of commission of a non-bailable offence; Sub-sec. (2) enumerates the conditions which may be imposed by the Court while making an order under Sec. 438(1); Sub-sec. (3) pertains to the execution or implementation of the order passed under Sub-sec. (1). This Court further observed that the first part of Sub-sec. (3) man¬dates the police officer to release the person on bail pursuant to an order made under Sub-sec. (1) and the second part of the said sub-section obligates the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence to issue bailable warrant only instead of non-bailable warrant against the person in whose favour an order under Sub-sec. (3) would come into play only after an order under Sub-sec. (1) and the second part of the said sub-section obligates the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence to issue bailable warrant only instead of non-bailable warrant against the person in whose favour an order under Sub-sec. (3) would come into play only after an order under Sub-sec. (1) has been passed.” Thereafter referring to the citations relied upon by the peti¬tioner in the cases of Smt. Sheik Khasim Bi (supra) Puran Singh (supra) and Ramsewak v. State of M.P., 1979 Cri.L.J. 1485 it was held that : “After giving my anxious consideration to the entire matter, I am of the view that it will be rational and reasonable to hold that though there is no lack of power in the High Court or the Court of Session to consider an application for anticipatory bail filed after cognizance of the offence has been taken and/or warrant of arrest has been issued against the appellant, the Court should not readily entertain such an application and if the Court is satisfied that a case for grant of bail is made out, it will be opt and proper to direct the accused to surrender in the Court of the Magistrate on a specified date granting a short time and giving him interim protection against arrest by execution of the warrant till then or to direct the police officers arresting the accused to produce him before the Magistrate who will consid¬er his application for bail.” 6. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the case of Mohan Behera. In that case considering a similar question, the provision of law and the ratio in the case of Bhramar alias Bhramarbar Mohapatra and another v. State of Orissa, Vol. 51 (1981) CLT 391 and also the ratio in the case of Gurubaksh Singh (supra) this Court held that prayer for anticipatory bail is not entertainable after filing of charge-sheet and issue of process by the cognizance taking Magistrate. As noted above in the above noted case of Bhramar also same principle was canvassed by this Court. In the case of Gurubaksh Singh (supra), as rightly men¬tioned in the case of Mohan Behera (supra), it has not been propounded by the apex Court that application for anticipatory bail can be entertained even after filing of charge-sheet and issue of process. In the case of Gurubaksh Singh (supra), as rightly men¬tioned in the case of Mohan Behera (supra), it has not been propounded by the apex Court that application for anticipatory bail can be entertained even after filing of charge-sheet and issue of process. Observation made and finding recorded in para¬graph 19 in that judgment is relating to the observation of the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court that power under Sec. 438 should not be exercised where legitimate case for remand to police custody under Sec. 167(2) is made out or a case relating to leading to discovery under Sec. 27 of the Evidence Act. In that respect the relevant discussion and finding recorded by the apex Court is of no relevance to adjudicate the issue involved in this case. It is needless to mention date according to the rule of precedents the view expressed in the cases of Bhramar alias Bhramarbar Mohapatra and Mohan Behera (supra) still holds the field and that is binding on this Court. In another decision of this Court in the case of Sri Ashok Kumar and others v. State of Orissa, * (2000) 18 OCR 81 after referring to the above noted cases and the case of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharash¬tra, AIR 1996 SC 1042 honourable Sri P.K.Mohanty, J. has been pleased to observe that : “In view of the decision of the apex Court and of this Court referred to in the preceding paragraphs, there is no escape from the conclusion that the powers of the Court of Session and of the High Court under Sec. 438(1) Cr.P.C. can be invoked by a party at a stage when there is reason to apprehend that he may be arrested in respect of acquisition for a non-bailable offence when the investigation is in progress and the police has neither completed its investigation nor filed the charge-sheet. The Magistrate neither has taken cognizance nor issued process against the person. Once this is done, the stage of invoking the power of the Court of Session or of High Court is over.” 7. Section 438 of the Code has been brought to the statute book with the dominant intention of saving a person from undue harassment by police arrest for personal vindictiveness with false accusation. Once this is done, the stage of invoking the power of the Court of Session or of High Court is over.” 7. Section 438 of the Code has been brought to the statute book with the dominant intention of saving a person from undue harassment by police arrest for personal vindictiveness with false accusation. As has been observed by the Law Commission in its report as well as it is apparent from the deliberation made in the Parliament such tendency are more probable in case of political or business rivalry or groupism. Be that as it may, the principle of anticipatory bail has been laid down in the case of Gurbaksh Singh by the apex Court in an authoritative pronounce¬ment and has provided a check and balance quideline for its proper use and elimination of abuse of discretion. In the lan¬guage of their Lordships “a wise exercise of judicial power inevi¬tably takes care of the evil consequence which are likely to flow out of its intemperate use. Every kind of judicial discretion, whatever may be the nature and the matter in regard to which it is required to be exercised has to be used with due care and cau¬tion. In fact, the awareness of the context in which the discre¬tion is required to be exercised and of the reasonable foresee¬able sequence of its use, is the hallmark of a prudent exercise of a judicial discretion.” 8. So long as an investigation is pending if there is allegation against a person or the investigation is directed against him with collection of incriminating materials he may have reasonable apprehension, regarding his arrest by the inves¬tigating authority. Thus keeping that sequence in mind in the criminal justice system legislatures have provided the power under Sec. 438 for considering anticipatory bail application. After an investigation is completed and a charge-sheet is submit¬ted either showing the accused being on bail or as an absconder the investigating agency does not take steps for arrest of the accused until the final form is considered by the cognizance taking Magistrate for taking cognizance or otherwise in accord¬ance with law. Therefore, at that stage, unless process under Sec. 204 is issued by the Court, there cannot be any apprehen¬sion, whatsoever, regarding arrest. When the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and issues summons, there does not exist any apprehension of arrest. Therefore, at that stage, unless process under Sec. 204 is issued by the Court, there cannot be any apprehen¬sion, whatsoever, regarding arrest. When the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and issues summons, there does not exist any apprehension of arrest. After being prima facie satisfied about existence of a prima facie case if process is issued in the form/shape of warrant by the cognizance taking Magistrate the apprehension of arrest at that stage is taken care by Sections 437 and 439 of the Code. Thus, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process the matter relating to grant or refusal of bail is thereafter squarely governed by the provision under Sec. 437 and if necessary under Sec. 439 of the Code and Section 438 of the Code is wholly irrelevant that stage. 9. In the case of Bimaladak and others v. State, 1997 Cri.L.J. 1969 a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held that : “28. In our view, neither Section 437 nor 438 of the Cr.P.C. is a supplemental provision to each other nor the same can be interpreted to be a proviso to each other. They are independent of each other having different field for their applicability. Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has no universal application which only could be ap¬plied in the restrictive field. It does not provide any discre¬tion for the Court to enlarge a petitioner on anticipatory bail which is available in Section 437. 29. xxx xxx xxx 30. According to the rule of construction, the expression ‘reason to believe’ should be construed with the aim, object and scheme of Section 438. The inflammatory allegations having their pedestal on falsity, mala fide, and motive afford considerable grounds to be enlarged on anticipatory bail as the object of it is to protect an individual from humiliation and harassment. Thus, the expression “reason to believe” must be the belief of reasonable mind where the petitioner or the individual is immune. The reason to belief never contemplates nor it accords any licence to any individual to commit the offence and to seek protection within the realm of Section 438. Thus, the expression “reason to believe” must be the belief of reasonable mind where the petitioner or the individual is immune. The reason to belief never contemplates nor it accords any licence to any individual to commit the offence and to seek protection within the realm of Section 438. The expression ‘reasonable belief’ fosters a belief of genuine apprehension of arrest of an allegation which prima facie is unsubstantial and made with a sinister motive, the object being to malign a person where his arrest by prosecuting agency is immediate than remote. But when a non-bailable offence has been committed by an accused, such ‘reason to believe’ or apprehension of arrest can never be equated with the genuine belief of apprehension of arrest proceeding from prima facie substantial material entitling him to pre-arrest bail. The section can never be used by any individual to culti¬vate his rights when he is prima facie liable for an accusation and does not commensurate with his innocence. Reasonable belief is not colourable belief.” 10. The above discussion thus leads this Court to record the finding that the scope of Section 438 is different and distin¬guishable from the sequence in which an application under Secs. 437 or 439 can be entertained. An application for bail under Sec. 438 can be entertained when the petitioner satisfies about rea¬sonable apprehension of arrest. That apprehension expressed by the petitioner can be examined and appreciated if it is filed before submission of charge sheet inasmuch as after submission of charge-sheet the mode of securing the attendance of the accused is guided by the Court’s order and at that stage voluntarily or suo motu police does not take any action to arrest the offender. 11. So far as the present case is concerned, as has been noted at the outset of this judgment, in the charge-sheet peti¬tioner No. 2, Basanta Kumar Nayak, petitioner No. 3, Fakir Singh, petitioner No. 4, Gandu Swain and petitioner No. 8, Akshya Kumar Patra have not been arrayed as accused and there is no acceptable material before this Court to reasonably construe that there has been an attempt by the police to arrest them. So far as petition¬er No. 1, Hemanta Kumar Nayak petitioner No. 5, Bibhuti Bhusan Satpathy, petitioner No. 6, Batu Nayak and petitioner No. 7, Pravakar Bhoi are concerned, charge-sheet has already been filed showing them as absconders. So far as petition¬er No. 1, Hemanta Kumar Nayak petitioner No. 5, Bibhuti Bhusan Satpathy, petitioner No. 6, Batu Nayak and petitioner No. 7, Pravakar Bhoi are concerned, charge-sheet has already been filed showing them as absconders. There also exists a prima facie case against each of them for the offences alleged. 12. In view of what has been discussed and found above peti¬tioners’ prayer for anticipatory bail stands rejected and accord¬ingly the criminal misc. case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.