Kinjal Electricals Private Limited v. Union of India
2000-03-03
V.KANAGARAJ
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- The Order of the Court is as follows :- From the above batch of writ petitions, W.P. No. 15054 of 1992 has been filed praying to issue a writ of Certiorari calling for the records before the Collector of Customs and Central Excise (Appeals), Customs House, Madras-1 ending with its order bearing Nos. C. 3/1644 to 1648 of 1989 dated 20-10-1989 and quash the same. 2.The other writ petitions in W. P. Nos. 15055 to15059 have been filed by the same petitioner praying to issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the third respondent, the Assistant Collector of Customs (Refund), Customs House, Madras to refund the sums of Rs. 73, 229/-, Rs. 82, 624.64, Rs. 81, 054.84, Rs. 78, 944.19 and Rs. 1, 90, 237/- respectively collected in excess without jurisdiction or without the authority of law in respect of Bill of Entry Cash Nos. D. 922 dated 19-10-1984, C. 735 dated 26-6-1984, C. 638 dated 18-10-1985, D. 1334 dated 23-1-1986 and D 1535 dated 1986 respectively. 3.So far as the W.P. No. 15054 of 1992 is concerned, what the petitioner submits as his case in the affidavit filed in support of the said writ petition is that the petitioner firm imported consignments of PVC Electrical Insulation Tape under different Bills of Entry, the assessable values of which are respectively Rs. 1, 66, 431/-, Rs. 1, 84, 430/-, Rs. 1, 80, 926/-, Rs. 1, 76, 304/- and Rs. 1, 79, 469/- resepectively dated 19-10-1984, 26-6-1985, 18-10-1985, 23-1-1986 and 26-5-1986; that the assessment was made under Heading 39.19 of CTA and 39.19 of C.E.T. and Customs duty charged was Basic @ 100% + Auxiliary @ 40% + CVD @ 40%; that on the basis of Department's assessment the payment of Customs duty was made in respect of Bills of Entry and against each of the bill entry, respectively and excess amount of Rs. 73, 229.64, Rs. 82, 624.64, Rs. 81, 054.84, Rs. 78, 944.19 and Rs.
73, 229.64, Rs. 82, 624.64, Rs. 81, 054.84, Rs. 78, 944.19 and Rs. 1, 90, 237/- have been collected, for which the petitioner submitted refund claim application; that the Collector of Customs and Central Excise (Appeals) held that the goods imported by the petitioner's firm were classifiable under Tariff heading No. 85.46 of CET as per his order dated 7-3-1989, said to be based on the judgment passed by the CEGAT in the case of Chitra Poly Coats (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur as confirmed by the Apex Court; that the Refund Applications were filed before the Assistant Collector claiming the excess amount paid under mistake of law/fact. 4.The further submissions of the petitioner are that previously regarding the refund of the duty collected by the Cstoms Officers was obviously outside the Customs law and hence the limitation under Section 27 of the Customs Act will not apply; that the refund applications were filed before the Assistant Collector for refund of the sum of Rs. 5, 06, 090.30 which was rejected by the Assistant Collector on ground that the application was not received within six months from the date of payment of the duty and hence barred under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962; that the appellate authority, the Collector of Customs and Central Excise also dismissed the appeal relying on the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Miles India Ltd. v. Collector of Customs reported in that the order of rejection is arbitrary and without jurisdiction and infringes the petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; that further the collection of the duty is without authority of law and the respondents have no jurisdiction to withhold this amount; that there is no justifiable ground to keep the amount, which was collected, without jurisdiction or without authority of law; that the order of the Assistant Collector and the Collector of Customs cannot be sustained and since any such collection would be without jurisdiction and without any authority of law, the question of claim being barred under Section 27 will not arise. With these and such other averments, the petitioner would pray for the relief as extracted herebefore. 5.So far as the other writ petitions in W.P. Nos.
With these and such other averments, the petitioner would pray for the relief as extracted herebefore. 5.So far as the other writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 15055 of 1992 to 15059 of 1992 are concerned, all these writ petitions have been filed by one and the same petitioner praying for the issue of Writ of Mandamus and the grounds as set out in the accompanying affidavits which are the same as that of the W.P. No. 15054 of 1992 traced herebefore and the only differentiation is that W.P. No. 15054 of 1992 has been filed praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari to issue a Writ of Mandamus. To clarify, W.P. No. 15054 of 1992 prays for quashing the order passed by the appellate authority made in C. 3/1644 to 1648 of 1989 dated 20-10-1989 whereby the refund of separate amounts collected respectively in excess, which are the subject matters of the other five writ petitions above. Since all the above six writ petitions are inter-connected on one and the same question of quashing the order passed by the second respondent, appellate authority, and to direct the third respondent to refund the said sums alleged to have been paid in excess they are hereby jointly heard and this common order is passed. 7.In the counter affidavit, besides denying the averment contained in the writ petition, it would also be specifically mentioned that the Bill of Entry No. 922 dated 19-10-1984 belongs to a different importer; that as the claim for refund itself has not been filed with respect to the four bills of entry, no question of rejection of claim would arise; that since there is no reference or any speaking order passed by the Assistant Collector of Cusoms, filing an appeal is improper; that the claim has to be filed within six months from the date of payment of the duty; that if the duty is paid under protest on the order of the Assistant Collector of Customs, then the time-limit of 6 months does not apply; that in the instant case, there is no proof of duty being paid under protest nor has there been any claim filed within six months so as to become entitled to claim the refund of excise duty and that Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 is relevant since it is this provision which prescribes the limitation.
8.The further submissions in the counter affidavit are that the importer, since being a limited company, is a separate entity under the Companies Act, 1956 and hence the appeal has to be made only by the company and not by its individual employees or members of the Borard of Directors; that when the refund is not made to the company, the fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(3) of Sri Parveen Jain are not affected and hence he has no remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution at all. On such and other grounds, the respondents would pray for dismissing the writ petition. 9.During arguments, the focal point of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is regarding Section 27 of the Customs Act dealing with claim for refund of duty. Section 27 of the Customs Act postulates : (relevant to this case alone is extracted)Any person claiming refund of "(1) any duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty - paid by him in pursuance of an order of assessment; or (a) borne by him, (b) may make an application for refund of such duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty to the Assistant Commissioner of Customs or Deputy Commissioner of Cusotms - in the case of any import made by any individual for his (a) personal use or by Government or by any educational research or charitable institution or hospital, before the expiry of one year; in any other case, before the expiry of six months, (b) from the date of payment of duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty, in such form and manner as may be specified in the regulations : PROVIDED FURTHER that the limitation of one year or six months, as the case may be, shall not apply where any duty and interest, if any paid on such duty has been paid under protest." 10.From the above, it is relevant to note that the petitioner, being a limited company, would fall under the category '(b)' and hence it should have made an application for refund before the expiry of six months from the date of payment of the duty. But, the exemption from such limitation has been granted to the persons who paid such duty under protest.
But, the exemption from such limitation has been granted to the persons who paid such duty under protest. 11.It is an open case of the petitioner that it has not claimed the refund within the stipulated period of six months and the only point that is to be proved on the part of the petitioner is that he paid the duty under protest. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner would cite the communication of the petitioner with the respondents at a later stage stating thereby that he paid the duty under protest, still, the test is whether the petitioner, at the time that it paid the duty, paid the same under protest or not? Absolutely, no proof or evidence comesforth nor placed before this Court for the petitioner having paid the duty under protest so as to become eligible to make a claim of refund of duty already paid.12.In the above circumstances, since the petitioner is not eligible to claim the refund of the duty paid already, the order passed by the second respondent is fully on justifiable reasons and no interference of this court, as sought for by the petitioner in all the above writ petitions, is called for. In result, all the above writ petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. No. 21432 of 1992 is also dismissed.