JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, CJ.—This petition is filed by the petitioner for an appropriate direction to Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishvavidyalaya, respondent herein to consider the case of the petitioner for admission to three years Basic Sciences Undergraduate Programme in the category of Wards of Freedom Fighter for the academic session 2000-2001. A prayer is also made to direct the University to condone shortage of lectures in the event of there being any delay on the part of the petitioner in getting admission. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he is citizen of India and is grand-son (on maternal side) of one Bhagat Ram, who was a Freedom Fighter. On April 11, 1991, (Annexure PA), the State of Himachal Pradesh, issued a letter regarding grant of certain facilities to the wards of Freedom Fighters. It was inter alia stated in the said communication that certain benefits were granted by the State Government to Freedom Fighters and their families vide a departmental letter No. SA-Fin. E(F) 4-23/86 dated October 15, 1986. By a letter at Annexure PA, however, it was clarified that the benefits which are being given earlier by the State Government to sons/grand-sons of Freedom Fighters would also be extended to maternal grand-sons/grand daughters, if the Freedom Fighters have no son. According to the petitioner, he is grand-son on maternal side of Freedom Fighter Shri Bhagat Ram. It is also his case that though said Bhagat Ram had sons, they had not sought admission and the admission was applied only by the petitioner, maternal grand-son of Shri Bhagat Ram. In this circumstance, he was entitled to be considered eligible and his application ought to have been decided by the University on merits. It was also his case that necessary certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra, showing Shri Bhagat Ram as a Freedom Fighter was also annexed. Since the petitioner was not called for interview, he made a representation, which was replied by the University stating therein that since Freedom Fighter Shri Bhagat Ram had left sons, the case of the petitioner was not covered by the letter issued by the Government (Annexure PA) and, hence, the petitioner was not eligible and his case could not be considered for giving admission to Basic Sciences Undergraduate Programme. The petitioner was accordingly informed vide a letter, dated August 1, 2000 (Annexure PD). The petitioner was accordingly informed vide a letter, dated August 1, 2000 (Annexure PD). The petitioner being aggrieved by the said communication, approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 3. We have heard Mr. Rajiv Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Counsel for the respondent-University. 4. Mr. Sharma contended that the impugned letter dated April 11, 1991 (Annexure PA), issued by the Government as well as the consequential action taken by the respondent-University vide its letter dated August 1, 2000 (Annexure PD), informing the petitioner about the Government decision that he was ineligible and his case could not be considered are illegal and unlawful. It was submitted that the action of the University and letter dated April 11, 1991, is ultra vires and unconstitutional being arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. It was urged that in the facts and circumstances, the Court may read the said provision being inclusive of grand-sons and grand-daughters on maternal side so that the decision can be treated as intra vires and constitutional. The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex. When certain benefits are conferred by the State Government by taking a policy decision, it is not open to the State to extend those benefits in favour of grand-sons and grand-daughters on paternal side alone depriving those benefits to similarly situated class, namely grand-sons and grand-daughters on maternal side, creating artificial classification on sex. Such an action would be clearly hit by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5. Mr. Thakur, on the other hand, supported the action taken by the University by filing an affidavit-in-reply. It was stated that a decision was taken by the State Government and was adopted by the University It was submitted that the action cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. It was also submitted that an identical question arose before this Court in Ishan Pandit v. State of H.P. and others, AIR 1999 HP 1, and the action of the State was held to be legal, valid and constitutional. It was, therefore, urged that the ratio laid down in Ishan Pandit, governs the field and the petition is liable to be dismissed. Moreover, the action was taken by the State Government, which was adopted by the University. It was, therefore, urged that the ratio laid down in Ishan Pandit, governs the field and the petition is liable to be dismissed. Moreover, the action was taken by the State Government, which was adopted by the University. The State has not been made a party to the petition. The State is not only proper party but also necessary party to the petition and in absence of State, the petition is liable to be dismissed. Finally, it was submitted that the prospectus was issued in April, 2000, and all persons were made aware of the relevant clauses mentioned in the said prospectus. The petition was filed as later as on August 21, 2000 and, thus, there is waiver and acquiescence on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court and on that ground also, the petition does not deserve admission. 6. Our attention was passed by the learned Counsel for the parties on the several decisions. It may not be necessary to refer to all of them. We may, however, refer to some of them. 7. In Ishan Pandit, a direct question arose before a Division Bench of this Court and it was decided against the petitioner in a similar situation. In that case, a petition was filed by the petitioner seeking declaration that definition of ward of Freedom Fighter be declared unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory. A direction was sought against the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for admission to MBBS/BDS course as against the seat reserved for ward of Freedom Fighter. In that case too, the petitioner claimed himself to be son of Tek Ram Sharma and Smt. Sunita Sharma. Mother of the petitioner was daughter of one Sita Ram, resident of Village Dhalaya, PO Jabri, Tehsil and District Shimla, who was a Freedom Fighter. Thus, the petitioner was grandson on maternal side of a Freedom Fighter. For admission and entrance test for professional courses of MBBS/BDS in different colleges for the academic session 1998-99, applications were invited. According to the petitioner, he fulfilled the requisite qualifications. He, accordingly made an application for the reserved quota of ward of Freedom Fighter. Thus, the petitioner was grandson on maternal side of a Freedom Fighter. For admission and entrance test for professional courses of MBBS/BDS in different colleges for the academic session 1998-99, applications were invited. According to the petitioner, he fulfilled the requisite qualifications. He, accordingly made an application for the reserved quota of ward of Freedom Fighter. His case was, however, not considered on the ground that he could not said to be a ward of Freedom Fighter as defined by the Government since according to the instructions of the State Government, which were reflected in the prospectus, the definition of ward of Freedom Fighter was to mean and include children/grand children (only from paternal side) of Freedom Fighters. The petitioner, being grand-son of Shri Sita Ram on maternal side, could not be said to be a ward of Freedom Fighter. 8. After notice was issued, the respondents appeared. An affidavit-in-reply was filed contesting the claim of the petitioner and it was argued that a decision was taken by the Government in the form of a letter No. GAD-F-6(F)4-12-871II dated April 11, 1991, according to which the daughters sons/daughters of Freedom Fighter were entitled to the benefit subject to the condition that such Freedom Fighter had no son. The application of the petitioner was sent to the Joint Secretary to the Government for clarification and the Commissioner-cum-Secretary (GAD) to the Government affirmed the instructions issued. Since the petitioner did not fulfil the requirement, his case was rightly not considered. The action was, therefore, in accordance with law and the petition was liable to be dismissed. 9. In the light of the controversy, the Division Bench of this Court was called upon to decide whether the action of the State Government was in accordance with law. Considering several judgments on the point, including a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Shekhar Chander v. State of H.P. ILR 1982 HP 733, the Court observed : ".....The State Government while periodically reviewing the reservation policy has resolved to extend the benefit of reservation of one seat in respect of political sufferers to the children and grand children of political sufferers and confining the extension of such benefit to the grand children on the paternal side of the Freedom Fighter. Keeping in tune with the said decision of the Government the prospectus reviewing committee which undertook the settlement of prospectus in April 1985, has chosen to adopt a definition in the following terms: Freedom Fighter is a person as declared by the Himachal Pradesh Government. Wards means and includes children/grand children (only from paternal side) of the Freedom Fighter. As pointed out earlier, though this definition seems to have been adopted and incorporated in all subsequent years there was some omission in carrying out the subsequent decisions taken and the clarification issued to the same which is in the following terms: Benefits given by the Government to the sons/grand-sons of a Freedom Fighter should be given to the daughters sons/daughters subject to the condition that the Freedom Fighter may not be having a son. Even de hors the clarification issued, the object underlying the reservation in favour of the ward of the Freedom Fighter seems to be to directly benefit the Freedom Fighter and his family and in our view there is no difficulty in appreciating or understanding or even comprehending the object and purpose behind such reservation being only to benefit a Freedom Fighters family. It is common knowledge that a daughter of a Freedom Fighter, after her marriage, gets herself transplanted into the family of her husband and cannot, therefore, be claimed to be a part of the family in its real sense of the Freedom Fighter her father at least for any thing relating to her children. The family of the son is normally and invariably in the well accepted notion or concept of a family in vogue is treated for all purpose as the family of a person concerned particularly when the grand children are concerned. In this case we find there is no unreasonableness or arbitrariness involved in the Government resolving or intending to primarily benefit the children on the male side of the Freedom Fighter namely, the grand children on the paternal side. We are unable to appreciate or accept the stand taken for the petitioner that the grand children on the paternal side comprehend within it and should be so construed as to include the grand children through the daughter of the Freedom Fighter also. We are unable to appreciate or accept the stand taken for the petitioner that the grand children on the paternal side comprehend within it and should be so construed as to include the grand children through the daughter of the Freedom Fighter also. The fallacy underlying such a plea is the attempt to trace the paternal relationship not in relation to the candidate or the ward concerned but to the Freedom Fighter. In the matter of availing the benefit of reservation the paternal side has to be viewed from the aspect of the candidate concerned and not from the angle of the mother of the candidate whose parents may be the Freedom Fighters. Therefore, we are of the view that the reservation in respect of the ward of a Freedom Fighter with the definition incorporated, therefore, cannot be said to be solely and strictly based on a discrimination on the basis of sex but on the other hand it purports to give effect to the laudable object of benefiting the Freedom Fighters family when it comes to the question of extending the benefit to the grand children on the paternal side through the sons of the Freedom Fighter concerned." The Court then proceeded to state : ".....If the clarification subsequently issued by the State Government in this behalf is also taken into account, the so called plea of discrimination also appears to be insignificant inasmuch as in case where-ever the Freedom Fighter has no son the benefit is extended to the children of the daughters also and viewed thus., as rightly contended for the respondents by the learned Advocate General, the scheme of reservation as engrafted with the definition of the ward of Freedom Fighter with the subsequent clarification thereto make it as a provision which more shows a preference among the grand children of a Freedom Fighter first in favour of the grand children through the son and only in the absence of the son the benefit is extended to the grand children of the daughter. In our view, the said classification made among the grand children of a Freedom Fighter cannot be said to be either palpably unreasonable or so arbitrary or wholly irrelevant for the object of reservation as to shock conscience of the Court in dealing with the same in exercise of its powers of judicial review, particularly when the object of such reservation is obvious and it is meant to directly and primarily benefit the family as such of the Freedom Fighter." 10. Thus, holding the action of the State Government to be legal and valid, the Court held that the policy decision taken by the State Government was not ultra vires, unconstitutional, arbitrary or unreasonable. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. 11. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that some of the judgments were, no doubt, considered by the Division Bench as they were cited when Ishan Pandit was decided. Other cases, relevant on the point decided by the Apex Court or by other High Courts, could not be considered as the attention of the Court was not invited to those decisions. In these circumstances, the question has now again requires to be considered by this Court. 12. In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza and others, AIR 1981 SC 1829, the Supreme Court considered the legality and validity of certain regulations framed by Air India Corporation under the Air India Corporation Act, 1953. The validity of those regulations was challenged on the ground that they were arbitrary and discriminatory. Some of the regulations were held to be ultra vires by the Apex Court. 13. It may, however, be stated that Nargesh Meerza was considered by the Division Bench in Ishan Pandit. Moreover, it was indicated by the Supreme Court that a provision under which services of Air Hostesses employed by Air India were liable to be terminated on the ground of her pregnancy, could be said to be a callous and cruel act, an open insult to Indian Womanhood, the most sacrosanct and cherished institution. Such a provision was extremely detestable and abhorrent to the notions of a civilised society It was unethical/unreasonable and arbitrary and hence it was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 14. Such a provision was extremely detestable and abhorrent to the notions of a civilised society It was unethical/unreasonable and arbitrary and hence it was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 14. In Valsamma Paul (Mrs.) v. Cochin University and others, (1996) 3 SCC 545, it was held by the Supreme Court that a person would not be deprived of benefits if she enters into an inter-caste/inter-religion marriage and a provision taking away such benefits on the ground that she had married to a person of inter caste or inter religion cannot be said to be reasonable or in consonance with law. It was also observed that our Constitution speaks of secularism and egalitarian order and foundation of socialistic democratic republic. Under such a Constitution every provision must be reasonable. If it is unreasonable and arbitrary, it is open to challenge. The Court also considered Preamble of the Constitution, Directive Principles of State policy, concept of human rights and held that if the provisions are against the fundamental principles, they can successfully be challenged in a competent Court. 15. In C. Masilamani Mudaliar and others v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil and others, (1996) 8 SCC 525, the Apex Court observed that various provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, must be construed harmoniously consistent with the constitutional goal of removing gender-based discrimination and effectuating economic empowerment of Hindu females. It was hoped that it was expected of the Government to take appropriate proceedings so that there is equality of status and opportunity which also forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. 16. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759, certain guidelines were issued by the State Government with a view to protect working women being sexually harassed or molested. The scope of judicial review was also highlighted by the Court. 17. Reference was also made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Miss C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1868, wherein it was indicated that there cannot be sex discrimination in employment in Government service and a provision requiring permission before marriage and denial of employment to married woman cannot be sustained. 18. 17. Reference was also made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Miss C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1868, wherein it was indicated that there cannot be sex discrimination in employment in Government service and a provision requiring permission before marriage and denial of employment to married woman cannot be sustained. 18. In M/s. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company Ltd. v Audrey D Costa and another, AIR 1987 SC 1281, it was observed by the Apex Court that under the provisions of Equal Remuneration Act, equal payment must be made to both, men and women performing the same or similar work and there should not be discrimination. If it would be so, it would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 19. Strong reliance was placed on Savita Samvedi (Ms) and another v. Union of India and others, (1996) 2 SCC 380. In that case, the appellants before the Supreme Court were a married daughter and a father. The father was in service of the Railway Administration. While in service, he was allotted a quarter by Railway Administration. Appellant No. 2 was having two sons, but none of them was residing in Delhi nor any of them was Railway employee. Appellant No. 1 was a married daughter and appellant No. 2 was to be looked after by appellant No. 1. She, therefore, made an application for allotment of quarter, which was earlier occupied by her father. The request was turned down by the Railway Administration on the ground that there was a Railway Board Circular dated August 11, 1992, whereunder allotment of quarter was permitted on certain terms and conditions. The relevant part provided if any railway servant retired from service, his or her son, unmarried daughter, wife, husband or father might be allotted railway accommodation out of turn on fulfilment of certain terms and conditions. Since appellant No. 1 was a married daughter, her case was not covered by the circular, and, therefore, she was not considered eligible and quarter could not be allotted to her. The action of Local Administration was challenged on the ground that it was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was contended that the provision must be held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. The action of Local Administration was challenged on the ground that it was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was contended that the provision must be held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. In the alternative, a submission was made that it should be construed so as to read down not only unmarried daughter but also married daughter by which the provision could be held intra vires and constitutional. 20. Upholding the contention and including other categories not mentioned in the Circular, the Court stated : "The retiring officials expectations in old age for care and attention and its measure from one of his children cannot be faulted, or his hopes dampened, by limiting his choice. That would be unfair and unreasonable. If he has only one married daughter, who is a railway employee, and none of his other children are, then his choice is and has to be limited to that railway employee married daughter. He should be in an unfettered position to nominate that daughter for regularisation of railway accommodation. It is only in the case of more than one children in railway service that he may have to exercise a choice and we see no reason why the choice be not left with the retiring officials judgment on the point and be not respected by the Railway authorities irrespective of the gender of the child. There is no occasion for the Railways to be regulating or bludgeoning the choice in favour of the son when existing and able to maintain his parents. The Railways Ministrys Circular in that regard appears thus to us to be wholly unfair, gender-biased and unreasonable, liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. The eligibility of a married daughter must be placed on a par with an unmarried daughter (for she must have been once in that state), so as to claim the benefit of the earlier part of the Circular, referred to in its first paragraph, above quoted." 21. Referring to a decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay Bench in OA No. 314 of 1990, the Court observed that the case was of gender discrimination and the decision must be brought in accord with Article 14 of the Constitution. Referring to a decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay Bench in OA No. 314 of 1990, the Court observed that the case was of gender discrimination and the decision must be brought in accord with Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court also observed that it would be appropriate if over and above the classes mentioned in the Circular, even married daughters also be included therein. Accordingly, the relief was granted in favour of the appellants. 22. Our attention was also invited by the learned Counsel to a decision of the High Court of Rajasthan in Jani Bai v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1989 Raj. 115. In Jani Bai, under the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954, certain Government lands were to be allotted to eligible persons residing in Rajasthan. According to the relevant rules framed by the Government, only adult son was entitled to such allotment of land and daughter was not considered eligible. The application of the petitioner was, therefore, rejected. The said action was challenged, inter alia, being violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. When the matter reached before the High Court, it was held that to save from vice of unreasonableness and arbitrariness, the word son occurring in the Rules must be read as issue so as to include both male and female child avoiding discrimination and holding the provision to be intra vires and constitutional. 23. In paragraphs 20 and 21, the Division Bench observed as under: "There is yet another aspect of the matter. It is a case where permanent allotment of the surplus Government land given earlier on temporary cultivation lease has to be made by the Government as property of the Government and not as property of the temporary cultivation lease holder. It is only when the temporary cultivation lease holder is not entitled to get such land under his temporary lease allotted to him that the question of surplus land left after making a permanent allotment to the lease holder arises. It is at this stage of allotment by the Government of Government land that this question of discrimination on the ground of sex alone arises. It is well settled that the distribution of State largesse cannot be made in violation of right to equality. It is at this stage of allotment by the Government of Government land that this question of discrimination on the ground of sex alone arises. It is well settled that the distribution of State largesse cannot be made in violation of right to equality. The State must ensure that it gives equal opportunity to persons equally eligible for obtaining the State largesse on equal terms to avoid infringement of the right to equality guaranteed under the Constitution. Viewed at from this angle also, it is obvious that in allotment df the surplus Government land under these Rules, the State cannot confine the grant only to the male issue of the temporary cultivation lease holder denying the same to the female issue who is otherwise equally eligible and similarly placed as the male issue for getting allotment of the land under these Rules. This aspect also justifies the application of the ordinary rule of construction contained in Section 14 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, according to which the word importing masculine gender must be taken to include females also. The result is that the word son in these provisions must be read as issue to include females also. Unless the above construction is made, Rule 4(4) and Rule 13(5)(b) would be rendered invalid which consequence is to be avoided for obvious reasons. The construction made by us will result in upholding these provisions as valid and this is sufficient reason for making this construction. We accordingly hold that the word son importing masculine gender used in Rules 4(4) and 13(5)(b) of 1975 Rules shall be read as issue to include females also i.e. also an adult daughter; and similarly the words "his/he" shall include "her/she". This is how the Rules 4(4) and 13(5)(b) shall be construed from the beginning of the enactment of these Rules." 24. On the basis of above decisions, particularly, the decisions to which the attention of earlier Division Bench was not invited, the Counsel contended that the matter requires consideration. It was urged that if the benefit will not be extended to grand-sons and grand-daughters of Freedom Fighters on maternal side, the provision must be held arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable being violative of Articles 14 and 19. In these circumstances the Court may include even that class to save the provision from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. 25. It was urged that if the benefit will not be extended to grand-sons and grand-daughters of Freedom Fighters on maternal side, the provision must be held arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable being violative of Articles 14 and 19. In these circumstances the Court may include even that class to save the provision from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. 25. It is true that some of the decisions were not cited before the earlier Division Bench. At the same time, however, the fact remains and it cannot be disputed that the decision of the State Government was very much before the Court and was challenged on the ground that it was unconstitutional being arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory. In fact, the argument before the Court was that definition of ward of Freedom Fighter was very much restrictive and such definition could not have been given by the State Government in the light of constitutional provisions. Under the said definition, ward meant and included children/grand children (only from paternal side) of the Freedom Fighter. It was only in the affidavit-in-reply that it was clarified by the State Government that thereafter the Government issued another letter on April 11, 1991, wherein it was clarified that if the Freedom Fighter himself had no son, then grandsons and grand-daughters {DHOTRAS and DHOTRIS) on maternal side also would be considered to be the ward within the meaning of ward of Freedom Fighter. Thus, in our opinion, the ratio laid down in Ishan Pandit squarely applies in the instant case. When a decision has already been arrived at by a Division Bench of this Court, in our opinion, it is not open for us to take a different view. The Court after considering several decisions held that such an action could not be said to be illegal or contrary to law. It was further observed that the State Government has power to issue such Circular. Having periodically reviewed the decisions, it was subsequently modified and such action on the part of the State Government could not be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court was also of the view that the underlying object of such policy decision was also legal and proper. Having periodically reviewed the decisions, it was subsequently modified and such action on the part of the State Government could not be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court was also of the view that the underlying object of such policy decision was also legal and proper. The purpose behind issuing such letter was that normally after marriage a daughter gets herself transplanted in the family of her husband and, hence, she cannot claim to be part of family in its real sense of Freedom Fighter. She, therefore, cannot claim all benefits, which have been granted to the family of Freedom Fighter. In the light of said reality of life, this Court held that the policy decision of the State Government to extend benefits as ward of Freedom Fighter in favour of sons and grand-sons cannot be held to be illegal, arbitrary or unreasonable. In view of the fact that thereafter in April 11, 1991, the earlier decision was modified and in absence of wards on paternal side, wards on maternal side have also been included and the earlier letter was to some extent relaxed. If earlier policy decision was held to be legal and valid, in our opinion, by no stretch of imagination, subsequent decision can be said to be ultra vires or unreasonable. 26. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, no case has been made out by the petitioner and the petition deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly dismissed. In view of the fact that we are following Ishan Pandit and dismissing the petition, we do not deal with other points, namely, whether the State Government is a necessary party to the petition and in absence of State Government, the petition is liable to be dismissed or not. CMP No. 1062/2000 27. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, the present application is also dismissed. Petition dismissed.