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2000 DIGILAW 261 (KAR)

COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, BANGALORE v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

2000-03-24

H.N.TILHARI

body2000
H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed by the 2nd defendant. Heard Sri R. A. Kulkarni, holding brief for Sri R. S. Hegde, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Chandrashekar, holding brief for Sri P. Krishnappa, learned counsel for second respondent and Sri M. Ramaiah, learned government Advocate for first respondent. ( 2 ) THIS appeal arises from the judgment and decree dated 12-2-1997 delivered in o. s. No. 4477 of 1989 by ii additional city civil judge, wherein the trial court has decreed the plaintiffs suit declaring the plaintiff-respondent to be the owner of the land in question and declaring the preliminary and final notification dated 2-2-1989 under Land Acquisition Act read with bda act to be illegal and inoperative. According to the trial court, the final notification has been issued almost after a period of more than 10 years from issuance of the preliminary notification and so it held both the notifications to be bad and inoperative and granted decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2 i. e. , appellant and respondent 1, from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff, over the suit property. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that no suit could be filed nor be entertained by the civil court challenging the preliminary and final notifications issued under the Provisions of the Bangalore development authority act read with Land Acquisition Act of 1894. Learned counsel submitted that the trial court has answered issue No. 7 in favour of the plaintiff upon illegal and wrongful basis. Learned counsel further submitted that Section 9 of the CPC provides that all suits regarding civil rights are no doubt maintainable unless the cognisance thereof is barred either expressly or by necessary implication. It is submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of state of Bihar dhirendra kumar and others, and in Laxmi Chand and others v Gram Panchayat, kararia and others, has held that the civil court's jurisdiction is barred by necessary implication. It is submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of state of Bihar dhirendra kumar and others, and in Laxmi Chand and others v Gram Panchayat, kararia and others, has held that the civil court's jurisdiction is barred by necessary implication. Learned counsel contended that the trial court has gpne into the question whether the 2nd notification under Section 6 read with Section 19 if has been issued after expiry of 10 or 11 years, is illegal and null and void and it opined that it is illegal as it has not been issued within the reasonable period and so the civil court has jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that this approach of the court was just like putting the cart before the horse, that it decided the matter and then it said about court's jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondent contested this contention. He submitted that Section 64 of the Bangalore development authority act provides for a suit being filed against the persons under the act. He submitted that similar provision has been made in the Land Acquisition Act as well. ( 4 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions. In my opinion, the Supreme Court has considered the whole scheme under the land acquisition act and it has been made applicable in the matter of acquisition under the Bangalore development act by Section 36 of the b. d. a. act. When that act is applicable then the principle laid down in the following two decisions will apply with utmost force to the present case. In the case of state of bihar, supra, their lordships of Supreme Court observes as under:"3. The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether ad interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the act and delivered to the beneficiary. The Provisions of the act are designed to acquire the land by the state exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The state is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements contained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the act as amended by act 68 of 1984. The state is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements contained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the act as amended by act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration under Section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the state is entitled to authorise the land acquisition officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Section 11-a now prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 years from the last date of publication envisaged under Section 6 of the act. In an appropriate case, where the government needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power under Section 17 (4) of the act and dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-a. Thereon, the state is entitled to issue notice to the parties under Section 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the state is entitled to take immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise, it would take possession after the award under Section 12. Thus, it could be seen that the act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9 of the CPC stands excluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6, except by the high court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable". similarly in the case of laxmi chand, supra, their lordships considered the question as to whether the suit is maintainable in the civil court or not and laid down as under:"it is seen that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 gives jurisdiction to the civil court to try all civil suits, unless barred. The cognisance of a suit of civil nature may either expressly or impliedly be barred. The procedure contemplated under the act is a special procedure envisaged to effectuate public purpose, compulsorily acquiring the land for use of public purpose. The cognisance of a suit of civil nature may either expressly or impliedly be barred. The procedure contemplated under the act is a special procedure envisaged to effectuate public purpose, compulsorily acquiring the land for use of public purpose. The notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the act are required to be published in the manner contemplated thereunder. The inference gives conclusiveness to the public purpose and the extent of the land mentioned therein. The award should be made under Section 11 as envisaged thereunder. The dissatisfied claimant is provided with the remedy of reference under Section 18 and a further appeal under Section 54 of the act. If the government intends to withdraw from the acquisition before taking possession of the lands procedure contemplated under Section 48 requires to be adhered to. If possession is taken it stands vested under Section 16 in the state with absolute title free from all encumbrances and the government has no power to withdraw from acquisition. 3. It would thus be clear that the scheme of the act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognisance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. The civil court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the act. The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the constitutional courts, viz. , the high court and the Supreme Court under their plenary power under articles 226 and 136 respectively with self-imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary power. Barring thereof, there is no power to the civil court". ( 5 ) THIS principle laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on the court and therefore, I am of the view that the trial court was not justified in entertaining the suit. In my view, there is much force in the contention of the appellant that the plaintiffs suit was not maintainable, wherein the plaintiff has sought the following reliefs:" (A) declaring that the preliminary notification No. Hc. In my view, there is much force in the contention of the appellant that the plaintiffs suit was not maintainable, wherein the plaintiff has sought the following reliefs:" (A) declaring that the preliminary notification No. Hc. alao/13/bda/78-89, dated 2-6-1978 and published in the Karnataka gazette, dated 31-7-1978 and issued by the defendant and the final notification bearing No. Hud/505/mnx/88, dated nil and published in the Karnataka gazette dated 2-2-1989 and issued by the defendant relating to the plaint suit schedule lands which are proposed to be acquired for the formation of the layout called "hennur road and bellary road, iii stage" are illegal and void and besides they have rendered themselves infructuous and inoperative under law, as the proposed scheme has not been executed by the defendant so far as required under the Provisions of the bda Act, 1976. (b) for consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their officials in any way interfering or dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit schedule lands and the existing constructions thereon and from demolishing the existing constructions over the suit schedule lands of the plaintiff. (c) grant such other reliefs together with costs of the proceedings in the interest of justice, equity and law". as the suit was not maintainable and entertainable by the civil court, the decree that has been passed in favour of the plaintiff is also illegal and without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the respondent at this stage, submitted that he may be given liberty to file the writ petition. There is no question of liberty being given by this court as the remedy is always available to him. ( 6 ) IN view of the above, the appeal is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court is set aside and the suit is dismissed as not maintainable. While allowing the appeal it appears just and proper to observe that if there are any constructions then the bda will not demolish the same for 30 days to enable the plaintiff either to demolish themselves or to avail proper remedy. After the expiry of this period the authorities may proceed in accordance with law. --- *** --- .