Judgment :- K. Narayana Kurup, J. The 2nd respondent in the Writ Petition, viz., Project & Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation" is the appellant The appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge allowing the Writ Petition and granting an injunction restraining the appellant/ corporation and the 2nd respondent herein - the State Bank of Travancore, hereinafter referred to as the 'Bank' from invoking and making payment under the Bank guarantee No. 26/92 without the consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BDFR). 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the Writ Appeal are as follows: The appellant/ corporation entered into an export contract on 22.3.1992 for supply of Bison & Lynx ACSR (Aluminium. Conductor Steel reinforced) and steel earth wire to Zimbabve (S.A.) Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) for an approximate value of Rs. 20 crores. The appellant/ corporation in turn assigned to the 1st respondent company the said export order for supply and delivery of Bison & Lynx ACSR and steel earth wire to Zimbabve Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). An associate ship agreement as evidenced by Ext. P3 was entered into between the appellant Corporation and the 1st respondent company setting out the respective rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties. In terms of Ext. P3 contract the 1st respondent company required the 2nd respondent Bank to provide for a mobilisation advance of Rs. 2 crores for procurement of raw materials. Towards security for the due payment of the amount advanced, the 1st respondent company furnished a bank guarantee No. 26/92 for Rs. 2,25,00,000/-, issued by the Kundara Branch of the Bank. Subsequent amendments were made which are evidenced by Exts. P4, P4(a) and P4(b). In course of time, the 1st respondent company became a sick company and by virtue of S.18(4) read with S.19(3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, the Board sanctioned the scheme for rehabilitation of the 1st respondent company in its meeting held on 5.10.1989. The company is now functioning under that sanctioned scheme. For the successful implementation of the scheme, the Board has issued instructions to various Authorities throughout the country to waive accrued penalties/ liquidated damages arising out of delay/ default in delivery schedules etc. and price revision of their past un remunerative contracts. The company is now functioning under that sanctioned scheme. For the successful implementation of the scheme, the Board has issued instructions to various Authorities throughout the country to waive accrued penalties/ liquidated damages arising out of delay/ default in delivery schedules etc. and price revision of their past un remunerative contracts. The company having defaulted in the matter of performance of their part of the contract as alleged by the appellant/ corporation, the latter invoked the bank guarantee provided by the company by attempting to encash the same. According to the 1st respondent company, the appellant/ corporation is not entitled to invoke the bank guarantee for certain alleged default on their part in contravention of Ext. P3 agreement between the parties. It is not necessary to go into those details since injunction prayer is pressed solely on the basis of the provisions of S.22(1) of the Act. The appellant/ corporation has filed a counter contending, inter-alia, that the bank guarantee being an independent unconditional contract they have every right to invoke the guarantee without referring to the terms of the original contract between the parties. A reply affidavit has been filed by the company reiterating the original contentions and controverting the contentions raised by the appellant/ corporation in the counter-affidavit. A learned Single Judge on a consideration of the rival contentions and on an interpretation of S.22(1) of the Act as amended by Act 12/1994 allowed the Original Petition granting injunction restraining the appellant/ corporation and the 2nd respondent Bank from invoking and making payment under the Bank guarantee. Hence this appeal by the Corporation. 3. Heard counsel on both sides. Hence this appeal by the Corporation. 3. Heard counsel on both sides. Leaned counsel for the appellant/ corporation contended that the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge on S.22(1) of the Act as amended by Act 12/94 is not sustainable, the guarantee given by the Bank to the appellant/ corporation is not guarantee coming within sub-s.(1) of S.22 of the Act as amended by Act 12/94, that the guarantee given by a bank is an independent and autonomous contract whose enforcibility is a matter between the beneficiary (appellant/ Corporation) and the Bank alone and that the party at whose instance or for whose benefit it was given is not in the picture once the guarantee is given by the bank, that the appellant/ corporation is not liable to be restrained from invoking the bank guarantee in question or the 2nd respondent Bank. liable to be restrained from making payment under the amendment made to sub-s.(1) of S.22 of the Act, that the said amendment, bars only a suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company, that in the instant case there is no suit and no suit is necessary to invoke a bank guarantee and therefore, the bank is liable to pay the amount covered by the bank guarantee the moment the beneficiary calls upon the bank to pay etc. Per contra, it is contended that while amending S.22 the legislature has used the omnibus expression "any guarantee" with the full knowledge that bank guarantee is also a form of guarantee and intended to extend the protective umbrella of the statutory coverage to such bank guarantees as well. 4. Having considered the respective contentions advanced by the parties we are not persuaded to interfere with the judgment under appeal. The Parliament enacted the Act under Entry 52, List 1 of the Vllth Schedule to the Constitution to make special provisions with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings, the speedy determination by a Board of Experts of the preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such companies and for the enforcement of the measures so determined and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. S.22 has been incorporated in the Act which provides for suspension of legal proceedings, contracts etc. S.22 has been incorporated in the Act which provides for suspension of legal proceedings, contracts etc. This section provides that none of the following proceedings could be proceeded with except with the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority: 1. Proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company. 2. Proceedings for execution against the properties of the industrial company. 3. Proceedings for distress against any of the properties of the industrial company. 4. Like proceedings against any of the properties of the industrial company. 5. Proceedings for the appointment of a receiver in respect of the properties of the industrial company. The statutory provision as it stood then was construed by the Apex Court in the decision reported in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. & Ann (£1993) 2 SCC 144) in the context of S.29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the right conferred on the Financial Corporation by S.29 of the said Financial Corporation Act, 1951 will be barred since it is not a legal proceeding but merely an action permitted by statute. In paragraph 10 of the judgment the Supreme Court held that the purpose and object of this provision viz. S.22(1) of the Act is clearly to await the outcome of the reference made to the BIFR for the revival and rehabilitation of the sick industrial company and that the words "or the like" which follow the words "execution and distress" are clearly intended to convey that the properties of the sick industrial company shall not be made the subject matter of coercive action of similar quality and characteristic till the BIFR finally disposes of the reference under S.15 of the Act. It was further held that the Legislature has advisedly used an omnibus expression "the like" as it could not have conceived of all possible coercive measures that may be taken against a sick undertaking. It was also held that the word "proceedings" in S.22(1) of the Act cannot be given a narrow or restricted meaning to limit the same to legal proceedings as such a narrow meaning would run counter to the scheme of the law and frustrate the very object and purpose of S.22(1) of the Act. 5. It was also held that the word "proceedings" in S.22(1) of the Act cannot be given a narrow or restricted meaning to limit the same to legal proceedings as such a narrow meaning would run counter to the scheme of the law and frustrate the very object and purpose of S.22(1) of the Act. 5. However, the Legislature found the provisions of the Act to be inadequate and therefore amended the same by the Amendment Act, 1993 extending the bar to the following categories of cases with effect from 1.2.1994 (vide Amendment inserted by Act 12/94): 1. Suit for recovery of money against the industrial company. 2. Suit for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company. 3. Proceedings/ suit for the enforcement of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advances granted to the industrial company. The effect of S.22(1) of the Act read in the light of the amendment makes the position abundantly clear that no proceedings for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further except with the consent of the Board or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. Therefore, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the agreement between the parties or any law, if the industrial company is a sick company falling under the Act and if there is a scheme sanctioned by the Board which is under implementation, then, invocation or payment under any guarantees which will include a bank guarantee as well, could only be with the consent of the Board or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. It is not disputed that the 1st respondent is a sick industrial company. It is also not disputed that a scheme sanctioned by the Board is under implementation. The appellant/ corporation has advanced money to the company and the Bank has issued a bank guarantee to secure repayment of money. The phraseology of the Section, viz., S.22(1) of the Act admits of no doubt that the transaction and the guarantee in question squarely fall within the ambit of "any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company" as provided therein. The appellant/ corporation has no case that it has obtained the consent of the Board for invoking the bank guarantee. The appellant/ corporation has no case that it has obtained the consent of the Board for invoking the bank guarantee. Under the facts and circumstances thus noticed none of the contentions raised by the appellant/ corporation is liable to be countenanced. The statutory bar is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, we have no hesitation in repelling the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/ corporation. 6. That apart we have to take note of the fact that the statute in question should be interpreted applying the "mischief rule" by considering the following matters: 1. What was the law before the coming into force of the Act? 2. What was the mischief which was sought to be remedied? 3. What is the remedy that the Act has provided? 4. What is the reason for providing the remedy? In this case until the law was amended in 1993 it did not extend its protection to guarantees and in order to extend' he same the Legislature has included "any guarantee" in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company, also to the Section. In the ruling reported in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh (AIR 1955 SC 830) it has been held that "where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence." In the decision reported in K.P. Varghese v. Income tax Officer, Ernakulam (AIR 1981 SC 1922) it is held as follows: "It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established England as far back as 1584 when Heydon 's case (1584) 3 Co. rep-7a was decided that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general four things are to be discerned and considered: "(1) What was the common law before the making of the Act, (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide (3) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and (4) The true reason of the remedy, and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy". In In re Mayfair Property Company, (1898) 2Ch 28, Lindley, M.R. in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon's case." The rule was reaffirmed by Earl of Halsbury in Eastman Photographic Material Company v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marlcs,1&9& AC 571 in the following words: "My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the Statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to the ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy. These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion". This Rule being a Rule of construction has been repeatedly applied in India in interpreting statutory provisions". 7. The aforesaid decision on the rule of interpretation assumes importance in the context of the contention of the appellant that only a suit is barred and that the invocation of the bank guarantee is not barred. In the light of the rule of interpretation which is now noticed and construing the Section in its setting, it can be seen that an interpretation excluding bank guarantee from the purview of the Section would lead to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose and intentment of the enactment. The Court in its competence can adopt a construction by ironing out creases but will stop short of altering the material with which the Act is woven. The Court in its competence can adopt a construction by ironing out creases but will stop short of altering the material with which the Act is woven. Thus interpreted any proceeding for the winding up of the company or for execution, distress or the like against any of me properties of the company and any proceeding or suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the company will also be barred except with the consent of the Board. Of course, learned counsel for the appellant would rely on the decision reported in Madalsa International Ltd. v. Central Bank of India (AIR 1998 Bombay 247) wherein it has been held in paragraph 22 that "restriction will have to be read on strict interpretation as they affect the valuable rights". That decision is of no assistance to the appellant as it runs counter to the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in (1993) 2 JSCC 144 noted supra wherein it has been held that S.22(1) cannot be given a narrow or restricted meaning as such a narrow meaning would run counter to the scheme of the law and frustrate the very object and purpose of S.22(1) of the Act Likewise, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in M/s. Keshari Steels v. M.P. Electricity Board (AIR 1999 MP 83) is also of no assistance since it has been decided applying the law which governs the invocation of bank guarantee. 8. Thus, on the whole we are of opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that by virtue of the amended provision of S.22(1) of the Act the Ist respondent company is entitled to an injunction restraining invocation or payment under the bank guarantee. We find no infirmity in the judgment appealed against. Accordingly, we uphold the same and dismiss the Writ Appeal.