All these five civil revisions were heard analogously as per earlier order of this Court and these are being disposed of by this common judgment and order as all the points raised in the petitions are identical. 2. Heard Mr. SR Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. HA Sarkar and Mr. S. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr.P.C Barpujari, learned counsel along with Mrs E. Kakoti, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The facts in brief are that the respondent-plaintiffs (herein after referred .to as the plaintiffs) are the owner of the suit premises and the defendant-petitioners are all tenants of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs instituted Title Suit No.53 of 1994, Title Suit No.54 of 1994, Title Suit No.55 of 1994, Title Suit No.62 of 1994 and Title Suit No. 14 of 1997 against the defendant-tenants praying for eviction from the suit premises on the ground of bonafide requirement, defaulter, suit premises are required for reconstruction as they are old and dilapidated. The defendant-tenants contested the suit by filing their written statement and also adduced evidences. The relationship of the landlord with the tenants was not in dispute. On conclusion h of the trial of the suits, the trial Court held that the ground of bonafide requirement and that the suit premises are required for reconstruction/repair etc have not been established. However, the trial Court found that the defendants-tenants are defaulter as they failed to pay the rent in time in the manner required and as such all the suits were decreed. The defendant-petitioners thereafter preferred Title Appeal No.15 of 1995, Title Appeal No.2 of 1997, Title Appeal No.14 of 1997. Title Appeal No.20 of 1996 and Title Appeal No.21 of 1996, and the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Hailakandi dismissed the appeals affirming the judgment and decree of eviction passed by the trial Court and hence, the present revisions. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Bhattacharjee, has submitted that the plea of defaulter has not been established, on the contrary, the tenants could prove that they were not defaulters and the due rent was paid/deposited as required and the finding of the Court below is due to the misreading of the defence case and the evidence adduced by the defendants. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. PC Barpujari, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, submits that as the concurrent finding of fact by the Courts below that the defendant-petitioners are all defaulters, there is no scope for interference by the High Court in these revisions to set aside the above concurrent finding as scope for interference in such cases is very narrow and limited. The learned counsel has referred to various decisions of the Apex Court and of this Court as regards the scope of interference in the revision under section 115 of CPC. In the case of Sher Singh vs. Joint Director, Consolidation, AIR 1978 SC 1341 , On consideration of earlier decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: “13. The position that emerges from these decisions is that section 115 of the CPC empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters: (a) that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to have exercised jurisdiction; or (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provisions of law, or with material irregularity by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. And if the High Court is satisfied that there is no error in regard to any of these three matters, it has . no power to interfere merely because it differs from the conclusions of the subordinate Court on questions of fact or law.” 6. In the case of Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan vs. Tuffail Mohammed, AIR 1991 SC 455 , the Apex Court held - “3. It is well settled position in law that under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and cannot set aside the concurrent findings of the Courts below by taking a different view of the evidence. The High Court is empowered only to interfere with the findings of fact if the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of 8 the material evidence on record by the Courts below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction.” 7. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction.” 7. The above proposition of law was followed by this Court in the case of Taher Ali vs. Jhumarmal Jain, (1985) 1 GLR 180 and in the case of State of Tripura & others vs. Dr. Nilratan Majumder, 1997 (1) GLT 641 (1997 (1) GLJ 243). 8. In view of the above, let us examine the matter in hand. In Title Suit No. 52 of 1994, the plaintiffs' allegation was that the tenant has not paid rent since March, 1994. The case of the defendant was that the rent for March, April and May, 1994 was paid in the subsequent months but no rent receipt was issued and the rent for June, 1994 onwards was deposited in the Court. In Title Suit No.62 of 1994, the plaintiffs alleged that the tenant has stopped payment of rent since January, 1990. The defendant-tenant has deposed that they paid rent upto April, 1995 for which the rent receipt was issued by the plaintiffs and after April, 1995, they have been depositing rent in the Court, one rent receipt has been produced and marked as Ext A which shows payment of rent for the month of November, 1989, but no rent receipt for the payment from January, 1990 has been produced afterwards. In Title Suit No.54 of 1994, the plaintiffs claims was that the rent of the suit premises since 1.2.94 has not been paid. The defendant-tenant took the plea that as the plaintiff refused to receive the rent, it was deposited in the Court. However, the defendant-tenant has produced a receipt, which is marked as Ext B, to show that rent from June, 1994 was deposited, but the defendant failed to produce any proof or challan or any other documents to show the depositing of rent from February, 1994 to May, 1994. Likewise, in Title Suit No.55 of 1994, the allegation was of non-payment of rent from 1.1.94 and the defendant-tenant , took the similar plea but he produced documents showing depositing of rent from June, 1994 which are marked as Ext A to T, but no challan from June, 1994 to May, 1994 was produced. Likewise, in Title Suit No.55 of 1994, the allegation was of non-payment of rent from 1.1.94 and the defendant-tenant , took the similar plea but he produced documents showing depositing of rent from June, 1994 which are marked as Ext A to T, but no challan from June, 1994 to May, 1994 was produced. In Title Suit No.53 of 1994, the plaintiffs case was that the rent from 1.1.94 to 31.5.94 was not paid and thereafter the rent was deposited in the Court. Although the defendant-tenant claimed that he had paid rent for the above period, but as he failed to establish the same, the Court held that the tenant was a defaulter for the above period. 9. The above pleas of default were considered by the appellate Court who after thread-bare discussion of the evidence on record and analysis of the materials on record, affirmed the finding of the trial Court that the tenants were defaulters. It was also observed that as per the terms of the agreement under which the tenants were entitled to premises the, rent was payable within forthwith of the current month. But the tenants did not lead any evidence to show that the rent was offered to landlord within due time and it was refused. The plaintiffs stated that he did not issue any printed receipt, but the evidence on record shows that he has issued kachcha receipts, some of them have been produced and exhibited in the Court. The trial Court, thereafter, rejected the plea regarding non-issue of receipts. On perusal of the evidence on record, I find that the concurrent finding of fact regarding the default is based on the evidence on record and the Courts below have given reasons for accepting the said plea of the plaintiffs. There is no misleading or non leading of evidence and the finding does not suffer from any perversity, as a matter of fact, this Court finds no scope to take any other view of the matter in view of the evidence on record. 10. In the result, I find absolutely no merit in these revision petitions and accordingly all the revision petitions stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.