JUDGMENT - V.K. BARDE, J.:---The petitioner was first, appointed as Assistant Teacher in the school run by respondent No. 2 as per the order dated 29-8-1979 and he resumed duties from 1-9-1979. It was appointment on temporary basis. His services were discontinued after the expiry of one year. However, again, by order dated 17-6-1980, he was appointed as Assistant Teacher in the school of respondent No. 2 and his services stood terminated again as per the order dated 1-4-1982. He was relieved from the duty on 1-5-1982. The petitioner was again appointed as Assistant Teacher as per the order dated 9-6-1982 on temporary basis. However, he was relieved from service with effect from 29-4-1983, because the Secretary of respondent No. 2 Society issued the orders of termination of his service. 2. Being aggrieved by this last order, the petitioner filed appeal before the School Tribunal, Pune. The Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal by his judgment and order, dated 9-2-1984, held that the order relieving the petitioner from service dated 29-4-1983 was illegal and invalid. However, considering that the petitioner was a temporary employee, the learned Presiding Officer directed the Management to pay one month's salary to the petitioner by referring to the provisions of Rule 28(1) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Rules"). Being aggrieved by this order, the present writ petition is filed. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner was in service of respondent Institute since 1-9-1979. Only technical breaks were given in his service to show that he was a temporary employee. But he was thrice reappointed and, therefore, it should be presumed that the petitioner was permanent employee of respondent Institute and, in such circumstances, his service cannot be terminated without following the proper procedure; and, here, the Institute had not followed the proper procedure. His services were terminated suddenly. 4. The other point argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that on 5-8-1982, a show cause notice was served on the petitioner by the Secretary of the Institute, alleging that he had committed certain misconduct. His explanation was sought within the period of seven days and it was further informed to him that on receiving his explanation, the Institute will take proper decision in the matter. His explanation was sought within the period of seven days and it was further informed to him that on receiving his explanation, the Institute will take proper decision in the matter. Thereafter, even though the petitioner submitted his explanation, no charge-sheet was served on him, no departmental enquiry was held as contemplated under the said Rules and his services were terminated treating him as a temporary employee. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that there is live connection between the show cause notice alleging misconduct and the order of termination of service and, therefore, there is stigma on the career of the petitioner. The order of termination is, therefore, void. The petitioner ought to have been given the relief of reinstatement as well as full backwages. 5. Shri V.J. Dixit, learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 4, has argued that though the petitioner was given appointments one after another, every time he was appointed as temporary Assistant Teacher for a period of one year and on expiry of that period, his services were terminated. So it cannot be said that the petitioner is in continuous service of the Institute since 1-9-1979. The last such appointment was as per the order dated 9-6-1982. It was again an appointment on temporary basis for the period of one year and, therefore, his services were terminated at the end of April 1983. This termination order has nothing to do with show cause notice issued to the petitioner. The service stood terminated because of the expiry of the period for which the petitioner was appointed and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed. The learned Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal has rightly applied Rule 28(1) of the said Rules directing that the petitioner be paid one month's salary on account of the termination of his service. So, no interference is necessary. 6. It does appear from the documents filed on record that every time the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on temporary basis and his services were terminated; and after a gap, he was being reappointed. So, no interference is necessary. 6. It does appear from the documents filed on record that every time the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on temporary basis and his services were terminated; and after a gap, he was being reappointed. The last such order was dated 9-6-1982 wherein it is mentioned that his appoinment was for the period from 17-6-1982 to 30-4-1993, Exhibit E of the Paper Book; and relying on this appointment order, the learned Counsel for the respondents has argued that services of the petitioner stood terminated on 30th April, 1983 as per this appointment order. 7. Rule 28(1) of the said Rules reads as follows : "(1) The services of a temporary employee other than on probation may be terminated by the Management at any time without assigning any reason after giving one calendar month's notice or by paying one month's salary (pay and allowances, if any) in lieu of notice. In the case of an employee entitled to vacation the notice shall not be given during the vacation or so as to cover any part of the vacation or within one month after vacation." 8. The learned Counsel for the respondents, therefore, has argued that as the appointment of the petitioner was only till 30th April, 1983, there was no question of giving him any notice before termination of his service. By the expiry of the period of appointment, his service stood terminated. The notice was not given by committing breach of the provisions of Rule 28(1) of the said Rules, because the services stood terminated before the beginning of the Summer Vacation and, such circumstances, the order of termination is quite proper and legal. 9. On the face of it, this argument appears very convincing and the approach appears very innocent. But, here, the method of working of the Institute must be taken into consideration. From 1-9-1979, every time, the petitioner is being appointed on temporary basis and every time, his services are being terminated, and he is being reappointed. Why this procedure is followed is best known to the Institute. There is no explanation to this effect either before the School Tribunal or in this Court, as to why the appointments were being made in this manner. Why this procedure is followed is best known to the Institute. There is no explanation to this effect either before the School Tribunal or in this Court, as to why the appointments were being made in this manner. It appears that to deprive the petitioner from claiming any permanency and taking advantage of the unemployment in large number of the qualified persons as teachers, this method was being followed to suit the purpose of the Institute. So, keeping in background this situation, further developments are to be considered. 10. The petitioner was served with show cause notice. The English translation of that show cause notice is at Exhibit H of the Paper Book. The petitioner was called upon to give his explanation regarding the alleged misconduct. However, no further steps were taken to hold enquiry against the petitioner as per the provisions of Rules 36 and 37 of the said Rules. When the institute was really aggrieved because of the conduct of the petitioner, then, in ordinary course, the enquiry ought to have been held and then proper orders could have been passed regarding termination of the services of the petitioner if he was found guilty. It appears that to avoid the procedure of holding enquiry, the respondent institute resorted to this method of terminating his service, by keeping him in employment till 30th April, 1983. There is definitely live connection between the show cause notice issued on 5-8-1982 and the order of relief of the petitioner from services on 30th April, 1983. The learned Presiding Officer, therefore, has rightly held that the termination of service of the petitioner was illegal and void. 11. In this respect, I would like to rely on the observations made by the Apex Court in the matter of (V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab others)1, reported in 2000(2) SCALE 233 . In paragraph 7, it is observed : "A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice." 12. Here, it appears that the Management of the Institute was very much annoyed because of the alleged misconduct of the petitioner. The show cause notice was served on him and thereafter, the services of the petitioner stood terminated. Here, it appears that the Management of the Institute was very much annoyed because of the alleged misconduct of the petitioner. The show cause notice was served on him and thereafter, the services of the petitioner stood terminated. The principles of natural justice were not followed in this case. The petitioner may be temporary, or, may be in the service of the respondent institute for a fixed period but, when such a show cause notice is issued, then definitely there is stigma on his career and he has every right to wiped off that stigma by facing the departmental enquiry and putting up his case. Such opportunity was not given to him. Therefore, respondents Nos. 1 to 4 cannot hide behind the appointment order to claim that the termination is innocuous. So, from every angle, it is very clear that the petitioner was relieved from his services by way of punitive action and by casting a stigma on his career. In such circumstances, the provisions of Rule 28(1) of the said Rules cannot be resorted to. There is no question of paying only one month's salary to let the respondent Institute off the hook. 13. So, the directions given by the learned Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal that the respondents should pay only one month's salary and then to regularise the termination of service of the petitioner would not be sufficient and proper. 14. In this case, respondents Nos. 1 to 4 have filed affidavit and have contended that the petitioner obtained service in another school with effect from 26-6-1984 and, at present, he is working as teacher in that school. The certificate issued by the Secretary, Sahyadri Bahujan Vidya Prasarak Samaj, Sangamner, District Ahmednagar, is produced on record with the affidavit in reply as Exhibit R-II. 15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner worked on monthly salary of Rs. 225 from June 1984 to June 1985; then on Rs. 250 during 1985-86; then on monthly salary of Rs. 275 from 1986-87; and on monthly salary of Rs. 300 from 1987-88 and 1988-89; and from 1989 onwards, he is paid full salary, as per the Rules. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that this happened because, in the beginning, the school did not receive the grants. 250 during 1985-86; then on monthly salary of Rs. 275 from 1986-87; and on monthly salary of Rs. 300 from 1987-88 and 1988-89; and from 1989 onwards, he is paid full salary, as per the Rules. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that this happened because, in the beginning, the school did not receive the grants. As and when the school started receiving full grants, the petitioner was paid full salary and he has also referred to the document filed on record by the respondents, which indicates that the school was not receiving grants from June 1984 to September 1988; then, during the period from October 1988 to February 1989, 50 per cent, grants were given to the school during the period from March 1989 to February 1990, 75 per cent, grants were given, and from March 1990, the school is receiving 100 per cent grants. 16. If all these circumstances are considered, two things come before the Court. One, that the petitioner is not without employment, and in that case, there is no need to pass any order of reinstatement. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also concedes to this position that the order of reinstatement in the respondent institute is not being pressed. However, he contends that the petitioner is entitled to full backwages of the period from 30th April 1983 till June 1989, when he started to receive full salary in the other institute. The respondent-institute has paid one month's salary to the petitioner as per the directions of the School Tribunal. So, the petitioner received the salary till 31st May, 1983. He obtained service one year thereafter, that means from June 1984. So, for one year from 1-6-1983 to 25-6-1984, the petitioner was without any service; and for that period, the petitioner is entitled to full backwages from the respondent institute. 17. Considering the statements made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner at the Bar; and the situation which the petitioner had to face, I direct that the petitioner be paid salary of the period from July 1984 to May 1989, after deducting the salary which he has received from the other institute, as per the pay scale to which he was entitled to during that period; and the petitioner will not be entitled to any backwages for the period from June 1989 onwards. 18. Hence, this writ petition is partly allowed. 18. Hence, this writ petition is partly allowed. The order of relief of the petitioner from service with effect from 30th April, 1983 is held illegal and void. However, as the petitioner has received alternative service, the direction for reinstatement of the petitioner is the service of the respondent institute is not being given. The petitioner be paid full backwages of the period from June 1983 to June 1984; and thereafter the petitioner be paid salary as per the pay scale to which he was entitled to during the period from July 1984 to May 1989, after deducting the amount of salary monthly paid to him by the Sahyadri Bahujan Vidya Prasarak Samaj, Sangamner's Amruteshwar Vidyalaya, Sangamner Khurd respondent No. 2 is directed to calculate all dues payable to the petitioner and to pay the same within the period of three months from this date. Rule made absolute accordingly. No. order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----