JUDGMENT Phukan, J.-Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 3.10.1997 passed by the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1611/97. By the impugned judgment, the High Court set aside the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate-16th, Calcutta passed in case No. C/1661/96. 3. Briefly stated the facts are as follows: The appellant issued a cheque for Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lacs) in favour of respondent No. 1. The cheque was presented to the banker which was returned on 2nd August, 1996 with the remarks "Insufficient Fund". Thereafter within 15 days of return of the cheque, respondent No. 1 gave a notice of demand as required under proviso (b) to Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as amended, for short the Act. As the appellant failed to meet the demand, a complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate. On perusal of the above notice, the Magistrate was of the view that the demand made in the notice being higher than the amount of the cheque, notice was bad in view of an earlier decision of the High Court. Respondent No. 1 approached the High Court by filing the revision petition which was allowed by the impugned order and the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate was set aside. The High Court was of the view that the decision of the High Court on which reliance was placed by Magistrate was distinguishable. The High Court held that as in notice, respondent No. 1 clearly demanded the cheque amount, the notice was a valid one and accordingly set aside the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate. 4. We have heard Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sanjiv Sen, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Dilip Sinha, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 - the State of West Bengal. 5. The only question for consideration by us is whether the notice in question issued under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Act was valid or not. We extract below Section 138 and 139 of the Act : "138. Dilip Sinha, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 - the State of West Bengal. 5. The only question for consideration by us is whether the notice in question issued under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Act was valid or not. We extract below Section 138 and 139 of the Act : "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., funds in the account-Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punlished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both : Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case, may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice." (Emphasis supplied) "139. Presumption in favour of holder.-It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole, or in part, of any debt or other liability." 6. We have to ascertain the meaning of the words "said amount of money" occurring in clause (b) and (c) to the proviso to Section 138. We have to ascertain the meaning of the words "said amount of money" occurring in clause (b) and (c) to the proviso to Section 138. Reading the Section as a whole we have no hesitation to hold that the above expression refers to the words "payment of any amount of money" occurring in main Section 138 i.e. the cheque amount. So in notice, under clause (b) to the proviso, demand has to be made for the cheque amount. Dr. Dhawan, learned senior counsel has urged that Section 138 being a penal provision has to be construed strictly. We may refer the decision of this Court in M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala1. This Court considered the rule of construction of a penal provision and quoted with approval the following passage of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Dyke v. Elliot2. The passage runs as follows: "No doubt all penal Statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say, the Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included if thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has a right to say that the thing charged although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment. But where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and the Court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other instrument." 7. There is no ambiguity or doubt in the language of Section 138. Reading the entire Section as a whole and applying commonsense, from the words, as stated above, it is clear that the legislature intended that in notice under clause (b) to the proviso, the demand has to be made for the cheque amount. According to Dr. There is no ambiguity or doubt in the language of Section 138. Reading the entire Section as a whole and applying commonsense, from the words, as stated above, it is clear that the legislature intended that in notice under clause (b) to the proviso, the demand has to be made for the cheque amount. According to Dr. Dhawan, the notice of demand should not contain anything more or less than what is due under the cheque. 8. It is well settled principle of law that the notice has to be read as a whole. In the notice, demand has to be made for the "said amount" i.e. cheque amount. If no such demand is made the notice no doubt fall short of its legal requirement. Where in addition to "said amount" there is also a claim by way of interest, cost etc. whether the notice is bad would depend on the language of the notice. If in a notice while giving up break up of the claim the cheque amount, interest, damages etc. are separately specified, other such claims for interest, cost etc. would be superfluous and these additional claims would be severable and will not invalidate the notice. If, however, in the notice an omnibus demand is made without specifying what was due under the dishonored cheque, notice might well fail to meet the legal requirement and my be regarded as bad. 9. This Court had occasion to deal with Section 138 of the Act in Central Bank of India & Anr. v. M/s. Saxons Farms & Ors.3 and held that the object of the notice is to give a chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission. Though in the notice demand for compensation, interest, cost etc. is also made drawer will be absolved from his liability under Section 138 if he makes the payment of the amount covered by the cheque of which he was aware within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice or before complaint is filed. 10. In Section 138 legislature clearly stated that for the dishonored cheque the drawer shall be liable for conviction if the demand is not made within 15 days of the receipt of notice but this is without prejudice to any other provision of the Act. 10. In Section 138 legislature clearly stated that for the dishonored cheque the drawer shall be liable for conviction if the demand is not made within 15 days of the receipt of notice but this is without prejudice to any other provision of the Act. If the cheque amount is paid within the above period or before the complaint is filed the legal liability under Section 138 will cease and for recovery of other demands as compensation, costs, interest etc., a civil proceeding will lie. Therefore, if in a notice any other sum is indicated in addition to the "said amount" the notice cannot be faulted, as stated above. 11. Drawing out attention to Section 139 of the Act, Mr. Dhawan has urged that in the notice in addition to "said amount" other demands are made the presumption as contemplated under Section 138 would operate. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel as Section 139 has to be read with Section 138 and reading both the Sections together it would appear that presumption would arise only in respect of the "said amount". We extract below the relevant portion of notice : "I, therefore, by means of this notice call upon you to pay the amount of Rs. 20,00,000/- along with the incidental charges of Rs. 1,500/- spent on the cheque on its presentation and also Rs. 340/- as notice charges within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt thereof, failing which my clients shall take necessary legal steps against you holding you liable for all costs and consequences thereof, which please note." 12. In the notice in question the "said amount" i.e. the cheque amount has been clearly stated. Respondent No. 1 had claimed in addition to the cheque amount, incidental charges and notice charge. These two amounts are severable. In the notice it was clearly stated that failure to comply with the demand necessary legal steps will be taken up. If respondent No. 1 had paid the cheque amount he would have been absolved from the criminal liability under Section 138. Regarding other claims, a civil suit would be necessary. 13. We are, therefore, do not find any merit in the present appeal and accordingly dismissed. (C.R.) Appeal dismissed. ************* ORDER Delay condoned. 2. Heard counsel on both sides. If respondent No. 1 had paid the cheque amount he would have been absolved from the criminal liability under Section 138. Regarding other claims, a civil suit would be necessary. 13. We are, therefore, do not find any merit in the present appeal and accordingly dismissed. (C.R.) Appeal dismissed. ************* ORDER Delay condoned. 2. Heard counsel on both sides. Learned counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh has contended before us that an application for grant of exemption under Section 20(1)(b) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is not maintainable once the excess land has been declared and the excess land has vested in the State under Section 10, in as much as the declarant cannot be said to be "holding" the land any longer. Reliance is placed on Section 2(1) which defines the words `to hold . 3. We are unable to accept the above contention. The scheme of the Act is that any person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit has to file a declaration under Section 6. Vacant land is defined in Section 2(q) as not including land on which construction is not permissible under building regulations, land occupied by building, before the due date or under construction. Section 2(q) defines urban land as urban land which is referred to as such in master plan etc. but does not include agricultural land. As to what is the relevant master plan there are some decisions of this Court. Detailed procedure is specified in the Act as to how individuals, families, firms, companies etc. are to file declarations. As to what is to be done if land is held in different capacities or land with limited rights, like lessee, mortgagee etc. various provisions are made. Section 4(9) deals with person holding land with building and other vacant land. Section 4(9) has been the subject matter of some decisions of this Court. 4. All these provisions require detailed computation based on the facts of each case. In addition, the effect of several judgments of the Courts are to be considered by the authority. Section 4(9) deals with person holding land with building and other vacant land. Section 4(9) has been the subject matter of some decisions of this Court. 4. All these provisions require detailed computation based on the facts of each case. In addition, the effect of several judgments of the Courts are to be considered by the authority. Therefore, it is obvious that at the time when the declaration is filed a person may or may not be in a position to know definitely whether he can be said to be in possession of the excess vacant land or not, or even if he can believe he is possession of excess land, how much land is liable to be surrendered exactly. This is because of the fact as pointed above, there are various provisions in the statute which provide statutory deductions and computation and unless the final computation is made, it is indeed difficult to say whether there is excess or even if there is excess, as to what is the extent of the excess land. Unless the quantum of excess land, after the statutory deductions etc. is arrived at, one cannot, in our opinion, decide whether to surrender the excess land or to seek exemption either under Section 20(1)(a) or Section 20(1)(b) or apply under Section 21 or Section 22. 5. For example, the ceiling limit in Hyderabad (from where this case arises), is 1000 sq. metres. Even if there are buildings within the property, one has to file a declaration if the total extent is more than 1000 sq. metres and claim exemption as per statutory deductions. He may claim that after deducting various areas as permitted by the statute, he need not surrender any land. The competent authority may or may not accept the statutory deductions claimed, like appurtenant land etc. and may determine excess. The declarant has a right of appeal. The appellate authority may accept or reject or modify the orders. It may turn out that the excess, in a given case, is (say) only 20 sq. metres. It is obvious that it is a case for exemption for it will not be useful for government to allot such a small piece of land to weaker sections. In yet another case, the excess may be 500 sq. It may turn out that the excess, in a given case, is (say) only 20 sq. metres. It is obvious that it is a case for exemption for it will not be useful for government to allot such a small piece of land to weaker sections. In yet another case, the excess may be 500 sq. metres or more and a declarant may be prepared to construct buildings for weaker sections under Section 21 or Section 22 may be invoked. In yet another case, a declarant may claim that exemption is necessary in public interest under Section 20(1)(a) or because of grave hardship, under Section 20(1)(b). 6. In our view, it is only after the excess land is actually determined under Section 10 that a person can know the exact extent of excess land in his holding and think of asking for exemption. There may, of course, be some cases where the extent is so large that a claimant may be able to seek exemption even at the time of filing the declaration but even in those cases, he cannot be definite about the actual extent of excess land. 7. Learned counsel, however, relied upon the definition of the words "to hold" in sub-section (1), of Section (2) to contend that once the final declaration is made and the excess vacant land has vested in the State, the person does not `hold the excess land and no application for exemption under Section 20 can be filed since Section 20 contemplates filing an application by a person who "holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling area". Section 2(1) states : "unless the context otherwise requires, ........................................ to hold with its grammatical variations, in relation to any vacant land means: (i) to own such land; or (ii) to possess such land as owner or as tenant or as mortgagee or under an irrevocable power of attorney or under a hire purchase agreement or partly in one of the said capacities and partly in any other of the said capacity or capacities. 8. 8. The definition of the words "to hold" in section 2(1) is relevant at the time of computation of the ceiling area and at the stage of the preliminary determination of excess and the final determination, under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, the excess is to be determined on the basis of the land permitted by the Act to be held by a person. 9. But, the word "hold" in Section 20(1)(a) or Section 20(1)(b) cannot, in our opinion, have the same meaning that can be attributed to it as in Section 2(1). The very definition in Section 2(1) states that the sub-section applies unless there is anything in the context which suggests a different meaning to be given. In our view, in the context of Section 20(1)(a) and Section 20(1)(b), the definition given in Section 2(1) cannot be applied. The reason is that such a construction will make section 20 unworkable and otiose. We have pointed out above that it is not possible to make any meaningful application for exemption under Section 20(1)(a) or (b) unless the exact quantum of excess is determined under Section 10 after following the various provisions of the Act relating to statutory deductions and mode of computation. If the contention of the State referred to above is to be accepted, then the peculiar position will be as follows. As stated by us, before the excess is determined, a person will not able to seek exemption because he does not know what is the actual excess land hold and once the excess is determined, he cannot apply because he is not holding the excess land. Thus, the entire object of Section 20 will be frustrated. That is why we say that the definition of the words to hold in Section 2(1) cannot be applied in the context of Section 20(1)(a) or Section 20(1)(b). 10. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the State that an application for exemption can be maintained only before the excess is determined under Section 10. In our view, the scheme of the Act is to the contrary. The view taken by the High Court following the decision of this Court in T.R. Thandur v. Union of India and Ors.1, Darothi Clare Parreira (Smt.) and Ors. In our view, the scheme of the Act is to the contrary. The view taken by the High Court following the decision of this Court in T.R. Thandur v. Union of India and Ors.1, Darothi Clare Parreira (Smt.) and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.2 and State of A.P. represented by Secretary to Govt., Revenue Department, Hyderabad v. Valluru Venkateswara Rao3 does not call for any interference. 11. We dispose of the Special Leave petition accordingly. We do not consider it necessary to interfere with the judgment of the High Court which held that Section 20 application is maintainable even if filed after an order of vesting of excess land passed under Section 10. (C.R.) SLP disposed of accordingly. ************ Parallel Citations of other Journals : Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal & Anr. , 2000(1) Supreme 405 : 2000(1) JT 493 : (2000) 2 SCC 380 : AIR 2000 SC 828 : 2000(2) Comp. L.J. 40 : 2000 SCC (Crl.) 414 : 2000 Crl. L.J. 1391 : 2000(1) Crimes 207 : 2000(1) Cur. Crl.R. 183 : 2000 ISJ (Banking) 275 : (2000) 100 Comp. C. 444 : 2000 Bank J. 298 : 2000 (1) JCCC 166 00071