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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 269 (MP)

Memdiwala Oil Industries v. Additional Commissioner Of Sales

2000-03-14

N.K.JAIN

body2000
ORDER N.K. Jain, J. 1. By this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-assessee seeks to impugn : (i) the proceedings of reassessment initiated under Section 19(1) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (for short, "the Act"), for the second time by issuing notice (annexure C) ; (ii) the order of reassessment dated October 17, 1984, passed by respondent No. 2--the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore ; and, (iii) the order dated June 15, 1992 (annexure E), passed in revision by respondent No. 1--the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore. 2. The petitioner, a partnership firm, was originally assessed to sales tax for the period November 4, 1975 to October 22, 1976 by the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore, vide order dated September 30, 1977 (annexure A). The assessing authority reassessed the petitioner under Section 19(1) of the Act vide order dated August 27, 1982 (annexure B), according to which, tax assessed on a turnover of Rs. 95,147 was alleged to have escaped from the first assessment (vide annexure A). Even so, fresh proceedings for a second reassessment of the turnover for the same period were re-started and a notice (annexure C) under Section 19(1) of the Act was served on the petitioner and an ex parte order of assessment (annexure D) was passed on October 17, 1984 by respondent No. 2. This second reassessment was for a turnover of Rs. 13,56,929, which, according to the assessing authority had escaped assessment or tax from the original order of assessment dated September 30, 1977 (annexure A). Feeling aggrieved by the said second reassessment, the petitioner came in revision under Section 39(1) of the Act, before the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore (respondent No. 1). The revision was mainly grounded on the statutory bar of limitation. The objection was, however, overruled by the respondent No. 1 and the revision was dismissed vide order dated June 15, 1992 (annexure E). 3. The main question raised in this petition is of limitation and it is contended that the second notice issued under Section 19(1) of the Act was barred by limitation as it was issued after the expiry of 5 years from the date of the original order of assessment. 3. The main question raised in this petition is of limitation and it is contended that the second notice issued under Section 19(1) of the Act was barred by limitation as it was issued after the expiry of 5 years from the date of the original order of assessment. As against it, the learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned notice and orders and it was contended that the said period of limitation is to be computed from August 27, 1982, the date on which first reassessment order (annexure B), was passed. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that this petition must succeed. The question involved in this petition stands concluded by the two decisions of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Jeewa Khan [1978] 42 STC 95 ; (1970) 3 VKN 51 and J.K. Textiles v. Additional Sales Tax Officer, Circle No, 3, Rajwada, Indore [1984] 57 STC 95. In both these decisions it was held that the expression "order of assessment", occurring in Section 19(1) of the Act, cannot be regarded as including within its meaning, an order of reassessment. 5. It is curious to note that the learned Additional Commissioner in his order (annexure E) has referred to both these decisions and tried to distinguish the same by referring to the unamended provision of Section 19(1) which was then in force when the assessments referred in these two decisions were made. Section 19(1) was amended by the Act No. 20 of 1964 and the words "assessment period" were substituted by the words "date of assessment order". The reasoning given by the learned Additional Commissioner, I find, is totally misconceived. 6. The decisions in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Jeewa Khan [1978] 42 STC 95 (M.P.) ; (1970) 3 VKN 51 and j.K. Textiles v. Additional Sales Tax Officer, Circle No. 3 Rajwada, Indore [1984] 57 STC 95 (MP) clearly turn on the interpretation of the expression "order of assessment", as occurring in the amended provision of Section 19(1). In the. present case we are concerned with this very expression and the ratio in the said two decisions would thus govern the disposal of the present case. Even otherwise the amendment shall not make any material difference. In the. present case we are concerned with this very expression and the ratio in the said two decisions would thus govern the disposal of the present case. Even otherwise the amendment shall not make any material difference. In the unamended provision, the expression, "assessment period" would only mean that the period of limitation is to be computed from the date of the expiry of the assessment period while under the present provision the period is to be computed from the date of assessment order. In both the cases the word "assessment" would mean the original assessment made under Section 18. 7. The learned Additional Commissioner has also referred to a Supreme Court decision in Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. H.R. Sri Ramulu [1977] 39 STC 177. Again reference to the ratio of this decision was misconceived. The apex Court in this case was dealing with the question of limitation for exercise of powers of revision under Section 21(2) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957. Similar provision, Section 39, exists in the M.P. Act of 1958. In Karnataka Act, 4 years period of limitation was prescribed for exercising revisional powers from the date on which the order under revision was passed. In M.P. Act, 3 years limitation period is prescribed. It is in the context of the said revisional powers under the Mysore Act, that the apex Court has held that the period of limitation is to be computed from the date of the order of reassessment not from the date of the original assessment. The ratio in the H.R. Sri Ramulu case [1977] 39 STC 177 (SC) was clearly not available in the instant case where the revisional authority was required to interpret Section 19(1) not Section 39 of the Act. 8. I thus conclude that the period of limitation of 5 years prescribed under Section 19(1) for the purpose of second reassessment was to be computed from the date of the order of original assessment made under Section 18 not from the date of order of first reassessment. In view of the matter, the reassessment proceedings in this case initiated by the notice (annexure C) were clearly barred by limitation. The order of reassessment dated October 17, 1984 (annexure D) was thus vitiated in law. The order (annexure E) passed in revision also deserves to be quashed. 9. In the result this petition is allowed. In view of the matter, the reassessment proceedings in this case initiated by the notice (annexure C) were clearly barred by limitation. The order of reassessment dated October 17, 1984 (annexure D) was thus vitiated in law. The order (annexure E) passed in revision also deserves to be quashed. 9. In the result this petition is allowed. The notice (annexure C), and orders (annexures D and E) are all quashed. No order is, however, made as to the costs of this petition. Security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner after verification.