Judgment : The landlady is the revision petitioner. She sought eviction of the respondent under Secs.10(3)(a)(i) and 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) in R.C.O.P.No.252 of 1987 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Tiruchirappalli. 2. The case of the landlady as set out on the petition was as follows: The respondent is a tenant in respect of the front portion of the building, namely door No.4, Paathakadai Lane, Chinna Chowk, Tiruchirapalli, consisting of two rooms, kitchen and bath room on a monthly rent of Rs.150 payable on or before 5th of every succeeding month. She is a gosha woman living in a rented building. She has three grown up daughters. She requires the entire building including the portion in the occupation of the respondent bona fide for her own occupation. She has already got one of the tenants S.S.Raj vacated and that portion is remaining vacant. She is not able to occupy the property as it is impossible to use the property without getting the other portion also vacated. She has already obtained eviction through Court against one Hanifa and at the time of filing eviction petition the petition was pending before the Appellate Authority. The portion in the occupation of the respondent is also required so that it will be able to occupy the entire building. The requirement is bona fide genuine and it is not with any ulterior motive. On this requirement for own occupation the respondent is liable to be evicted. .3. The portion in the occupation of the respondent is also required so that it will be able to occupy the entire building. The requirement is bona fide genuine and it is not with any ulterior motive. On this requirement for own occupation the respondent is liable to be evicted. .3. The respondent resisted the petition inter alia on the grounds that the petitioner is not a gosha woman; that she is not adopting partha system; that she is not living in a rented building; that the requirement is not bona fide that the allegation that she got one S.S.Raja vacated is false, but he vacated the building as he found it inconvenient for his use; that as he was threatened with forcible trespass on the property, he had to file a suit; that she required the entirety of the building had not been specifically raised in the notice issued prior to the eviction petition and that only after reply from the respondent a new plea has been stated in the petition; that the petitioner demanded enhanced rent and the respondent having refused to pay the same, the eviction petition came to be filed. 4. Thelearned Rent Controller framed necessary points for consideration and on the oral and documentary evidence held that though a case under Sec.10(3)(a)(i) of the Act had not been made out a case under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act had been made out; that the petitioner required the entirety of the building for her own occupation and for the members of her family; that the relative hardship to the respondent would not outweigh the advantage to the revision petitioner; that the revision petitioner was entitled to an order of eviction. The respondent filed R.C.A.No.11 of 1994 before the Appellate Authority namely, the Subordinate Judge, Trichy, who, by his judgment dated 9. 1996 allowed the appeal filed by the respondent, setting aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and dismissed the application for eviction. Aggrieved, the present revision petition has been filed. 5. Mr.M.Ravi, learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the Appellate Authority, having found that the requirement was bona fide and that the relative hardship that would be caused to the tenant would not outweigh the advantage to the landlady, allowed the appeal and dismissed the eviction petition. Aggrieved, the present revision petition has been filed. 5. Mr.M.Ravi, learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the Appellate Authority, having found that the requirement was bona fide and that the relative hardship that would be caused to the tenant would not outweigh the advantage to the landlady, allowed the appeal and dismissed the eviction petition. On the solitary ground that the revision petitioner has not specifically pleaded in the petition that the advantage to the landlady would outweigh the hardship caused to the tenant by reason of her asking to vacate the property. The learned counsel relied on a number of decisions in support of his contentions regarding lack of pleadings and in particular, the following judgments: 1. Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas , A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1449; 2. B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal , (1998) S.C.C. 138; 3. J.Jermons v. Aliammal and others J.Jermons v. Aliammal and others J.Jermons v. Aliammal and others , (1999)7 S.C.C. 382 . 6. Per contra, Mr.M.N.Padmanabhan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent contended that the absence of pleading in the instant case is fatal to the case of the revision petitioner and when admittedly, there is no pleading regarding the relative hardship and the advantage of the landlady, the Appellate Authoritys view was perfectly justified in throwing out the eviction petition. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the following judgment. 1. P.Annakkili Ammal & another v. H.C.Hussain and another P.Annakkili Ammal & another v. H.C.Hussain and another P.Annakkili Ammal & another v. H.C.Hussain and another , (1984)1 MLJ. 340 ; 2. Radhakrishnan v. Seethalakshmi , (1988)1 L.W. 67; 3. Krishnaswami v. Arumugam , (1993)1 MLJ. 122 ; 4. T.S.Sethuraman v. J.Nagalakshmi and another T.S.Sethuraman v. J.Nagalakshmi and another T.S.Sethuraman v. J.Nagalakshmi and another , (1997)III C.T.C. 339 7. Before proceeding further, let us find out whether the authorities below have indeed gone into the question as to the relative hardship and entered a finding. But it is enough if we notice the finding of the Appellate Authority in this connection. Before proceeding further, let us find out whether the authorities below have indeed gone into the question as to the relative hardship and entered a finding. But it is enough if we notice the finding of the Appellate Authority in this connection. In page No.8 of his judgment the Appellate Authority has observed as follows: The conclusion is inescapable that a case has been clearly made out for additional accommodation of the revision petitioner; that the revision petitioner did not own a house of her own and she was residing in a rented premises. The Appellate Authority has concurred with the finding of the Rent Controller that the revision petitioner bona fide required the property for additional accommodation. It is on record that the respondent had not shown that his children were studying in neighbouring school; that if he were to vacate the property, serious hardship would be caused to him that he had not established as to whether no other property would be easily available to him for occupation. The respondent had also admitted that if the dividing wall of the portions in the occupation of the respondent and the vacant portion adjacent thereto is removed, the entire portion could be used as a single unit. In these circumstances, the hardship caused to the respondent will not outweigh the advantage to the revision petitioner. One other important aspect which is to be noticed is that the eviction petition is of the year 1987. More than 12 years have elapsed and it is very unlikely that the children of the respondent will still be going to school. As already noticed, the respondent has not denied that the revision petitioner was residing in a rented premises. Thus, a case has been clearly made out for eviction of the respondent. This is subject to the finding relating to the absence of pleadings regarding relative hardship and the consequences thereon. No doubt, there is no specific averment in the petition regarding the relative hardship that may be caused to the tenant as to the advantage that may be gained by the landlady. It is only in this connection the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent relies on the judgment of K.A.Thankkachalam, J. (as the learned Judge then was) in Krishnaswami v. Arumugham Krishnaswami v. Arumugham Krishnaswami v. Arumugham , (1993)1 MLJ. It is only in this connection the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent relies on the judgment of K.A.Thankkachalam, J. (as the learned Judge then was) in Krishnaswami v. Arumugham Krishnaswami v. Arumugham Krishnaswami v. Arumugham , (1993)1 MLJ. 122 and submits that in order to decide this question of hardship, there must be proper pleadings in the petition and in the absence of such pleadings the petition for eviction has to be dismissed. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in case this Court did not agree with the view expressed by K.A.Thanikachalam, J. (as the learned Judge then was), in Krishnaswamys case, then it is proper to refer the matter to a Division Bench. Before deciding this aspect, let me refer to the decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel in Radhakrishnan v. Seethalakshmi , (1988)1 L.W. 67 wherein it has been held as follows: “There is one other ground on which the landlord should fail, in this revision petition. He has not at all pleaded in the petition about the relative hardship that would be caused to the parties nor proved the fact that the relative hardship would be more on his part than on the part of the tenant. Sec.10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 contemplates that the landlord should prove that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord.” 8. In P.Annakkili Ammal and another v. H.C.Hussain and another P.Annakkili Ammal and another v. H.C.Hussain and another P.Annakkili Ammal and another v. H.C.Hussain and another , (1984)1 MLJ. 340 : 97 L.W. 116 Ratnam, J. (as the learned Judge then was) dealing with a similar question has observed that though the proviso directing the rejection of an application under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act is in the nature of the instruction addressed to the Rent Controller to do so if the Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that the hardship that may be caused to the tenant by an order of eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord, yet in order to enable the Rent Controller to give effect to the proviso, it would be necessary for the purpose of plead so and place necessary materials in support thereof, as otherwise, the question of relative hardship cannot be satisfactorily decided. The learned Senior Counsel lays stress on the words that would be necessary for the purpose to plead so. In another case in T.S.Sethuraman v. J.Nagalakshmi T.S.Sethuraman v. J.Nagalakshmi T.S.Sethuraman v. J.Nagalakshmi (1997)3 C.T.C. 339 K.Govindarajan, J has referred to various decisions of the point and observed that for maintaining the petition under Sec.10 (3)(c) of the Act for additional accommodation, relative hardship should be pleaded and established. In paragraph 10 of the judgment the learned Judge has stated as follows: “The relative hardship can be decided only on the basis of the facts which should be available in the pleadings and in the evidence. So, only on the basis of the said pleadings and evidence, the Rent Controller can satisfy that the hardship to be caused to the tenant by granting eviction would outweigh the advantage to the landlord and on that basis the eviction petition has to be selected. So, this crucial aspect could be characterised as a special instance in the matters arising out of Sec.10 (3)(c) of the Act. There should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting the decree for eviction would out weigh the advantage to the landlord. Such a special prescription has been specifically provided for so as to avoid the unnecessary hardship to the tenant. Therefore it has become imperative for the authorities under the case arising to of Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act to give a specific finding whether the hardship which the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice-versa. Unless it is decided by the authorities, the enquiry in regard to the petition arising under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act is vitiated.” In The Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society, etc. v. C.T.Uthandi The Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society, etc. v. C.T.Uthandi The Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society, etc. v. C.T.Uthandi , (1998)2 MLJ. 745 R.Balasubramanian, J. has held that lack of pleadings on the part of the landlord regarding the relative hardship does not affect his case and that in any event no prejudice to the tenant is caused. 9. If we have a look at the pleadings paragraph 4 reads as follows: “The petitioner is a gosha woman. She is now living in a rented building. She has got three grown-up daughters. 9. If we have a look at the pleadings paragraph 4 reads as follows: “The petitioner is a gosha woman. She is now living in a rented building. She has got three grown-up daughters. She requires the entire building including the portion in the occupation of the respondent bona fide for her own occupation. In fact, she has got one of the tenants, viz., S.S.Rajan, vacated and the same remains vacant. But the petitioner could not occupy the same as the occupation is impossible without getting the other portion vacated. The petitioner has already obtained eviction through court against Haneefa and the matter is now pending before the appellate authority. The portion in the occupation of the respondent is also required so that the petitioner will be able to occupy the entire building. The requirement is bona fide, genuine and is not with any ulterior motive. On this ground of requirement for own occupation, the respondent is liable to be evicted.” In so many words there is no reference to hardship that may be caused to the tenant or the advantage to the landlady. But, then in Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Ramanlal Ranchhoddas Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Ramanlal Ranchhoddas Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Ramanlal Ranchhoddas , A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1449 dealing with the ‘pleadings’ under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “The High Court was also in error in assuming that the landlord in a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement is supposed to have pleaded his own comparative hardship in the plaint itself. Sec.13(2) comes into play at the stage when the court is satisfied that the ground contained in clause (g) of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.13 of the Act has been made out. It is at that stage that the court has to examine the question of comparative hardship. It was thus not necessary to plead in the plaint itself. Often the parties at the stage of recording of evidence of bona fide personal requirement also lead evidence as to the comparative hardship of the landlord or the tenant. It is at that stage that the court has to examine the question of comparative hardship. It was thus not necessary to plead in the plaint itself. Often the parties at the stage of recording of evidence of bona fide personal requirement also lead evidence as to the comparative hardship of the landlord or the tenant. But such averments are not required to be pleaded in the plaint itself to give cause of action to the landlord to enable him to file a suit for eviction of the tenant on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement.” S.S.Subramani, J. in G.R.Ragupathy v. Dr.K.Sankar, etc. G.R.Ragupathy v. Dr.K.Sankar, etc. G.R.Ragupathy v. Dr.K.Sankar, etc. , (1996)2 L.W. 494 has referred to a number of decisions and has observed as follows: “The object of pleading is only to put the parties on notice, of the real matter in issue. But, if the parties are already aware of the real matter in issue and they have also joined in issue over the same, the lack of pleadings can never be treated as a ground to reject the claim. Pleadings before Rent Controller cannot be given that much of importance given to pleadings in a suit before civil court. Proceeding before a Rent Control Court is summary in nature and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not fully made applicable to the extent provided under the statute. We must further note that the Rent Control Court is not a civil court and the Act itself is more or less a self contained Code, so far as the relationship of landlord and tenant is concerned.” It is not as if the respondent is not aware of the qualifications to seek his eviction. 10. As already noticed, except for the decision of K.A.Thanikkachalam, J. (as the learned Judge then was) the other decisions do not say that the eviction petition has to be thrown out on the ground of want of pleadings. So far as the judgment of K.A.Thanikkachalma, J. is concerned in view of the decision in, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1449, the alleged lack of pleading in the instant case cannot be put against the revision petitioner. So far as the judgment of K.A.Thanikkachalma, J. is concerned in view of the decision in, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1449, the alleged lack of pleading in the instant case cannot be put against the revision petitioner. Though this decision of the Supreme Court was cited before the Appellate Authority for absolutely no valid reasons, the Appellate Authority has observed that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court does not apply to the facts of the present case. In my view, the stress is more on the duty of the authorities under the Act and in fact Ratnma, J. (as the learned Judge then was) in, (1984)1 MLJ. 340 , has referred to this aspect very clearly. The relevant portion has already been extracted. Even in the above judgment P.Annakkili Ammals case, the learned Judge has concentrated more on the necessary materials in support of the relative hardship. My reading of the relevant provisions is justified will be evident from the decisions of the Supreme Court in B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal , (1998) S.C.C. 138 and in J.Jermons v. v. Aliammal and others J.Jermons v. v. Aliammal and others J.Jermons v. v. Aliammal and others , (1999)7 S.C.C. 382 where the Supreme Court with particular reference to Tamil Nadu Act after referring to proviso to Sec.10(3)(e) of the Act held that “the consideration of the proviso is mandatory” In the other decision of the Supreme Court, it has been held as follows: “The authority who considers the eviction petition under clause (c) of Sec.10(3) of the Act has to record the finding under the provision and in the absence of such a finding the order of eviction cannot be sustained.” Thus, the emphasis is more on the duty of the authorities than on the pleadings and in any event, after the decision of the Supreme Court in, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1449, it cannot be held that the specific pleadings regarding comparative hardship is a mandatory requirement. It is therefore unnecessary to refer the matter to a Bench, nor it is necessary to remand and the matter to the Appellate Authority to enter a finding as, according to me, the Appellate Authority has also accepted the case of the revision petitioner that the hardship caused to the tenant will not outweigh the advantage to the landlady. It is therefore unnecessary to refer the matter to a Bench, nor it is necessary to remand and the matter to the Appellate Authority to enter a finding as, according to me, the Appellate Authority has also accepted the case of the revision petitioner that the hardship caused to the tenant will not outweigh the advantage to the landlady. Under these circumstances, the decision of the Appellate Authority reversing the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller cannot be sustained. The civil revision petition stands allowed and the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller restored. The tenant will have six months time to quit and deliver vacant possession subject to his filing an affidavit of undertaking with the usual default clause, within a period of two weeks from today. There will be no order as to costs.