Judgment Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.:---The conspectus of the case. These proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have been initiated by operators of Cable Television, in the cities of Mumbai and Pune. The petitioners seek to challenge the constitutional validity of an amendment to the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923, as a result of which a tax has been imposed on the entertainment provided by the Cable TV network. The amendments to the provisions of the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923 were introduced initially by Ordinance 7 of 1998 which was subsequently replaced by an Act of the State Legislature. 2.The petitioners receive signals from head operators and channel operators and distribute them to customers or end users who possess T.V. sets at their residences or at other places. The signals are received and distributed by the petitioners through the means of cables. THE PROVISIONS OF THE BOMBAY ENTERTAINMENT DUTY ACT, 1923 AS AMENDED. 3.The Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923 ("the Act") imposes a duty on entertainment and the charging provisions of the Act is section 3. Sub-section (4) of section 3 which came to be introduced by an amendment of 1998, provides that there shall be levied and paid by the proprietor entertainment duty at the specified rate per television set which receives radio frequency signals for exhibition of films or moving pictures or series of pictures with the aid of any type of antenna or apparatus for securing transmission through the cable net work or cable television. Sub-section (4) of section 3 is material for the purpose of the present petition and provides as follows : "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) or in any other provisions of this Act, there shall be levied, and paid by the proprietor to the State Government, the entertainment duty at the rate specified in the table below per television set which receives radio frequency signals for exhibition of films or moving pictures or series of pictures with the aid of any type of securing transmission through cable net work or cable television attached to it." "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) or in any other provisions of this Act, there shall be levied, and paid by the proprietor of the State Government, the entertainment duty at the rate specified in the table below, per television set, which receives radio frequency signals for exhibition of films or moving pictures or series of pictures with the aid of any type of antenna or any other apparatus for securing transmission through cable network or cable television attached to it." TABLE SerialAreaAmount of entertainment duty to be paid per T.V. set per month. 123 1. Within the limits of all Municipal Corporation and Cantonments.Rs. 15/- 2. Within the limits of all "A" and "B" Class Municipal Councils.Rs. 10/- 3. Within the limits of any other areas not covered by entries 1 and 2.Rs. 5/-. 4.The expression "entertainment" has been defined in sub-clause (a) of section 2 of the Act as follows":- "entertainment includes any exhibition, performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted for payment, or in the case of television exhibition with the aid of any type of antenna with a cable net work attached to or cable television, for which persons are required to make payment by way of contribution or subscription or installation and connection charges or any other charges collected in any manner whatsoever but does not include magic show. Explanation: For the purposes of this clause- (1) the expression 'exhibition' includes any exhibition by cinematograph including video exhibition or television exhibition with the aid of any type of antenna with a cable network attached to it or cable television." 5.The expression "cable television" is similarly defined by Clause (a-a) of section 2 of the Act as follows :- "cable television" means a system organized on payment by a connection holder of any contribution or subscription or installation or connection charges collected in any manner whatsoever, for exhibition of films or moving pictures or series of pictures by means of transmission of television signals by wire where subscriber's television set is linked by metallic coaxial cable or optic fibre cable to a central system called the head-end, by using a video cassette or disc or both, recorder or player or similar such apparatus on which pre recorded video cassettes or discs or both are played or replayed and the films or moving pictures or series of pictures which are viewed and heard on the television receiving set at a residential or non-residential place of a connection holder." 6.The expression "payment for admission" is defined in Clause (b) of section 2 which reads as follows : "Payment for admission" in relation to the levy of entertainments duty includes ....... (vi) any payment made by a person by way or contribution or subscription or installation and connection charges or any charges collected in any manner whatsoever for Television Exhibition with the aid of any type of antenna with a cable net work attached to it or cable television." 7.As stated earlier, sub-section (4) of section 3 provides that entertainment duty shall be paid by the proprietor to the State Government. The expression "proprietor" for the present purposes is defined by Clause (c) of section 2 to include, "in relation to an entertainment", "any person" responsible for, or for the time being in charge of, the management of providing cable connections from any type of antenna or cable television. Section 4-B of the Act makes provision for assessment of entertainment duty. THE SCOPE OF THE CHALLENGE IN THE PETITIONS 8.The provisions of the Amending Act as a result of which the aforesaid amendment were sought to be introduced in the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923 are sought to be impugned by the petitioners. Section 4-B of the Act makes provision for assessment of entertainment duty. THE SCOPE OF THE CHALLENGE IN THE PETITIONS 8.The provisions of the Amending Act as a result of which the aforesaid amendment were sought to be introduced in the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923 are sought to be impugned by the petitioners. The grounds of challenge, as evidenced in the petitions, are briefly, as follows :- (i) The petitioners challenge the legislative competence of the State Legislature to impose an entertainment duty with respect to the cable television net work. The petitioners rely on Entry 31 of the union list of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which reads as follows :- "Posts Telegraphs, Telephones, Wireless, Broadcasting and other like forms of communications." Parliament has enacted the Cable Television Network (Regulation) Act, 1995 to control and regulate the cable network in the country. Section 3 of the Act requires cable operators to register under the provisions of the Act. The petitioners submit that the power to legislate in respect of cable T.V. is vested in Parliament and the law enacted by the State Legislature in the present case is without legislative competence: (ii) The second submission urged is that even assuming that the State Legislature had the authority to legislate in the manner in which it has in the present case, that could have been done only by an independent legislation and not by means of amending the existing legislation which deals purely with public entertainment, namely Bombay entertainment. (iii) Section 2(a) of the Act defines the expression "entertainment" to include any exhibition, performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted for payment. The petitioners have submitted that since admission on payment is a decisive factor in the activity sought to be taxed no duty can be imposed where the element of payment for admission is absent. (iii) Section 2(a) of the Act defines the expression "entertainment" to include any exhibition, performance, amusement, game or sport to which persons are admitted for payment. The petitioners have submitted that since admission on payment is a decisive factor in the activity sought to be taxed no duty can be imposed where the element of payment for admission is absent. (iv) The duty is impugned on the ground that it violates the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on their business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution since, according to the petitioner, the Government is compelling the petitioners to collector the duty from and users: (v) The petitioners impugn the validity of the duty on the ground that even if it be held that the customers and the T.V. set holders are liable to pay the duty imposed on the basis of the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923 that is purely a matter between the respondent-State and the customers or T.V. set holders. The petitioners have stated in paragraph 18 of the first petition that "it is an earnest and sincere desire of the petitioners not to intervene in the plans of the respondents to charge and recover any such duties directly from customers or the T.V. set holders". The objection of the petitioners, however, is that they "do not want to do the job as collector of duties from the customers and to pay the same to the respondents as it is purely a matter between the respondents and the T.V. set holders". According to the petitioners, the imposition and collection of dues is a sovereign function of the State and that function cannot be delegated to any individual by the State. Similarly a delegation of power to collect tax cannot be foisted on the individual by the State. (v) The petitioners also seek to challenge circulars which have been issued by the State Government. THE JUDGEMENTS OF THE MADRAS HIGH COURT AND THE SUPREME COURT IN REGARD TO THE TAMIL NADU ENTERTAINMENT TAX ACT, 1939 9.In dealing with the correctness of the submissions urged before us it must, at the outset, be noticed that the question in issue is no longer res integra but has substantially been covered by a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Mr. Justice M. Srinivasan (as the learned Judge then was) and Mr. Justice M. Srinivasan (as the learned Judge then was) and Mr. Justice S.S. Subramani, in which the validity of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Entertainment Tax Act, 1939 as amended by Act 37 of 1999 was considered. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in its judgment dated 1st December, 1994 disposed of a batch of writ petitions (W.P. No. 10013 of 1994 and connected petitions) between the Tamil Nadu Cable Television Operators and Government of Tamil Nadu. The Madras High Court upheld the validity of the provisions relating to the imposition of entertainment duty in respect of the Cable Television network. The judgment of the Madras High Court was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Madras High Court in (A. Suresh v. State of Tamil Nadu)1, reported in 1997(1) S.C.C. 319 . THE TAMIL NADU ACT 10.In view of the fact that the judgment of the Madras High Court has been upheld by the Supreme Court, it would be necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Entertainments Tax Act and of the two judgments which upheld its validity. The Tamil Nadu Entertainments Tax Act as amended contains similar definitions of the expressions "Cable Television" "television exhibitions" "entertainment" and "proprietor" in Clauses (2-B), 11, 4 and 9 of section 3. These definitions are extracted herein below for covenience of reference: "Cable television" means a system organized for television exhibition by using a Video Cassette or disc or both, recorder or player or similar such apparatus on which pre-recording video cassettes or discs or both are played or replayed and the films or moving pictures or series of pictures which are viewed and heard on the television receiving set at a residential or non residential place of a connection holder". "Television Exhibition" means an exhibition with the aid of any type of antenna with a cable net work attached to it, or cable television, of a film, or moving picture, by means of transmission of television signals by which subscribers' television sets at residential or non residential place are linked by metallic coaxial cable or optic fibre cable to a central system called the head-end." "Entertainment" means a horse race or cinematograph exhibition to which persons are admitted on payment or television exhibition for which persons are required to make payment by way of contribution, or subscription, or installation or connection charges or an other charges collected in any manner whatsoever . Explanation: For the purpose of this clause and other provisions of this Act, 'cinematograph exhibition' includes exhibition of film on television screen through video cassette recorded and through cable television network." "Proprietor" in relation to any entertainment means a licensee of cinematograph exhibition under the Tamil Nadu Cinema (Regulation) Act, 1955 (Tamil Nadu Act IX of 1955) or the licensee of an exhibition of cinematograph film on Television Screen through Video Cassette Recorder or through Cable Television Net work under the Tamil Nadu Exhibition of Films on Television Screen through Video Cassette Recorders (Regulations) Act, 1984 (Tamil Nadu Act 7 of 1984) or any person providing Television Exhibition and includes the State Government, any local authority or any person responsible for the management thereof. The Charging section, section 4-D of the Act provides as follows :- "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 4 and 7, there shall be levied and paid to the State Government a tax (hereinafter referred as the entertainment tax) calculated at forty percent of the amount collected by way of contribution or subscription or installation or connection charges or any other charges collected in any manner whatsoever for television exhibition. (2) The tax levied under sub-section (1) shall be recoverable from the proprietor." THE CHALLENGE BEFORE THE MADRAS HIGH COURT. 11.These provisions were challenged on the ground that :- 1) The State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the law.' 2) In view of the Cable Television Net work (Regulation) Ordinance 9 of 1994 and the Act thereafter enacted by Parliament, the State Legislature was not competent to enact the Act in question; 3) The Act violated the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 4) The Act did not impose a tax on entertainment but was a piece of colorable legislation and a fraud on legislative power: 5) The Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it did not impose a tax on Doordarshan and those entities which own a dish antenna including hotels and other organisations, and the Act treated unequals as equals as the levy was the same with reference to rural operators as well as urban operators. 6) The tax sought to be levied is on private enjoyment of entertainment and not upon public entertainment. 7) The rate of tax was exorbitant and unreasonable; and 8) The provision for security deposit is an unreasonable restriction on the cable T.V. operators might to carry on their business. THE JUDGMENT OF THE DIVISION BENCH OF THE MADRAS HIGH COURT 12.The Divisions Bench of the Madras High Court rejected the petition and upheld the constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu enactment. The findings conclusions of the Madras High Court can be summarised thus :- (i) The Court held that the State Legislature was competent to enact a law levying and imposing the duty of entertainment in respect of the cable television net work. The Court held that Entry 62 of the State list in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution was the specific entry which dealt with "tax on luxuries including tax on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling". The expression "entertainment" according to the Court, could not be given a narrow interpretation restricted to the circumstances which prevailed at the time of the framing of the Constitution without reference to later developments. The entries of taxation in the 7th Schedule to the Constitution are separate and distinct from other entries in the Schedule. The enactment in question was a fiscal enactment and since there was a specific entry, Entry 62, of the State list which dealt with a tax on entertainments, Entry 31 of the union list dealing with the posts and telegraph was not attracted and would not govern the situation; (ii) The Court rejected the submission that there was any repugnancy between the law enacted by the legislature of the State of Tamil Nadu and the Central Act dealing with the Cable Television Net Work. The law enacted by Parliament dealing with the Cable Television net work did not impose a tax on entertainment nor did it deal with the imposition of any such tax. The Tamil Nadu Act felt squarely within the scope of Entry 62 of the State list. Hence neither the doctrine of occupied field nor of repugnancy would apply; (iii) The freedom of speech of Cable T.V. Operators under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution was not curtailed by a tax on entertainment; (iv) The Tamil Nadu Act was not a piece of colorable legislation. The submission of the petitioners that this was not a tax on entertainment since it was levied on installation or connection charges or other charges collected for television exhibition was rejected by the Court, holding that whatever amount was paid by the viewer to the Cable T.V. Operators for installation, connection or for transmission of programs was intended only as a payment for enjoying the entertainment. The tax was levied on such payment alone. The Madras High Court followed the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra)2, reported in 1988(3) Bom.C.R. 642 : A.I.R. 1989 Bom. 250 in which this Court had rejected the submission that the tax imposed at the rate of Rs. 500/- per machine per month on the total number of machines installed in Video Game Parlors by section 3(1)(a) of the Bombay Entertainments Tax Act, 1923 was a tax on the machine and not on entertainment. This Court had held that the tax was not on the ownership of the machine or on its possession but in substance it was a tax on entertainment. Following the view taken by this Court, the Madras High Court held that the tax continued to be a tax on entertainment even though it was imposed at a flat rate on television sets. Similarly the Court held that the tax was one on entertainment and was not imposed on any individual because he was engaged in a trade, calling, profession or employment. (v) One of the submissions urged before the Madras High Court was that the Cable T.V. Operators did not provide only entertainment programs and a large amount of programming was of an instructive or educational nature. (v) One of the submissions urged before the Madras High Court was that the Cable T.V. Operators did not provide only entertainment programs and a large amount of programming was of an instructive or educational nature. Consequently, it was urged that the legislation was colorable in the sense that the tax was imposed in regard to programming which did not possess an entertainment value. In this regard the High Court held that the object of the Act was to raise revenue for the State and the pith and substance of the legislation was referable to Entry 62 of the State list of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. Since the substance of the statute related to topic which was within the competence of the legislature, the legislation must be held to intra vires even if it may incidentally encroach upon the subjects not within the competence of the legislature. Following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Geeta Enterprises and others v. State of U.P.)3, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1098 the Madras High Court held that the expression "entertainment" has been used in a wide sense to include within its ambit entertainment of any kind including one which may be purely educative. Consequently, even if a major part of the programming transmitted by the Cable T.V. operators is educative or informative that will not invalidate the levy of the duty of entertainment as defined by the Act. (vi) The Madras High Court rejected the submission that the true object and purpose of the Act was to indirectly benefit and Cinema Theatres because the flourishing of the Cable T.V. business had adversely affected the Motion Picture Industry. The Court held that the motive of the legislature was irrelevant. The doctrine of colorable legislation did not involve a question of the bona fides of the legislature but relates to the competence of the legislature to enact a particular law. If the legislature is competent to enact the law the motive which impelled it do so is irrelevant; (vii) The Court held that the Cable T.V. Operators provided entertainment to customers by transmitting programs through a dish antenna. The activities of the Cable T.V. Operators fall within the definition of the expression "Television Exhibition" under the Act. If the legislature is competent to enact the law the motive which impelled it do so is irrelevant; (vii) The Court held that the Cable T.V. Operators provided entertainment to customers by transmitting programs through a dish antenna. The activities of the Cable T.V. Operators fall within the definition of the expression "Television Exhibition" under the Act. Hence it could not be contended that the levy is not an entertainment duty and, it could not be considered to be a piece of colorable legislation or a fraud on the legislative power. (viii) The Madras High Court also repelled the challenge to the constitution validity of the Act under Article 14. The argument before the Court was that the Tamil Nadu Act did not tax Doordarshan and while it taxed cable operators, it did not tax persons who could afford to purchase their own Antenna and establishments such as Hotels which purchase their own Antennae. The High Court dismissed this challenge on the ground that persons who make their own private entertainment by the installation of Dish Antenna belong to a class which was different from Cable T.V. Operators who make a profit by using Dish Antenna by providing enjoyment to their customers. Similarly Doordarshan which transmits television signals to the public without charging, was held to belong to different class. (ix) The rate of tax of 40 percent of the amount collected by way of contribution, subscription, installation or connection charges or any other charges collected for television exhibition was not exorbitant or unreasonable. The Court held that sufficient material had not been placed before it to justify the submission that the rate of tax was unreasonable or confiscatory. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT 13.The judgment of the Madras High Court was carried in Appeal to the Supreme Court and was affirmed in A. Suresh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1997(1) S.C.C. 319 . The Supreme Court in a judgment delivered by Mr. Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy agreed with the reasons and conclusions of the High Court on all the issues. The Supreme Court held that it was thus not necessary to deal with all the submissions except the submissions relating to (i) freedom of speech and expression (ii) Colorable legislation and (iii) the rate of tax. Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy agreed with the reasons and conclusions of the High Court on all the issues. The Supreme Court held that it was thus not necessary to deal with all the submissions except the submissions relating to (i) freedom of speech and expression (ii) Colorable legislation and (iii) the rate of tax. The Supreme Court noted the submission of the petitioners that Cable T.V. Operators not only show films on their network but also relay programs broadcast by Doordarshan, B.B.C. C.N.N. and other similar network. The argument was that the entertainment part of programming is barely 10 per cent and by levying tax at the rate of 40 percent on the collections of Cable T.V. Operators the entire burden was being cast upon them. The submission was that it was not possible for the operators to survive if a rate of tax as high as 40 per cent was maintained. It was urged that the immediate and direct effect of the taxation would be to affect Cable T.V. Operators in respect of their fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression. In dealing with this contention, the Supreme Court held that while providing entertainment was a facet of the exercise of the fundamental right to free speech and expression, Cable T.V. Operators carried on a business, the business, of providing entertainment through the media of Video Cassettes or Disks with the help of a V.C.R., Disc player or similar apparatus. The Court held that even if an activity involved the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and expression there was no reason why the business aspects of the activity should not be subject to tax. So long as the tax did not transgress into the field of the freedom of speech and did not stifle speech it did not become unconstitutional. The Supreme Court followed its judgment in the case of (Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India)4, reported in 1985(2) Supreme Court Cases 641 and rejected the submission of the petitioners in the following words: "For a proper appreciation of the appellants contentions, it is necessary to examine the nature of the activity carried on by the appellant. The appellant are carrying on the business of providing entertainment. The appellant are carrying on the business of providing entertainment. Their main activity is to show films and other material using the Video Cassette or Disc with the help of a V.C.R. disc player or a similar apparatus. By means of cables, the T.V. sets in the home of the subscribers are linked to their apparatus with a view to enable the subscriber to receive the programme relayed by the appellants. For this service, each subscriber is charged a particular amount every month. This is their business. It may be true that providing entertainment is a form of exercise of freedom of speech and expression. It is quite likely that they also relay the programmes broadcast by Doordarshan and other T.V. network and some of them may be informative in nature or educational in character but the fact remains that their activity is a combination of two rights i.e. business and speech sub-clauses (g) and (a) of Clause (1) of Article 19. There is no reason why the business part of it cannot be taxed. If tax can be levied upon entertainment provided by cinemas, if taxes can be levied upon the Press, it is un-understandale why the appellants' activity cannot be taxed. Certainly, the appellants cannot claim that their activity is of more significance to society than that of the press. Where the freedom of speech gets interwined with business it undergoes a fundamental change and its exercise has to be balanced against societal interest. In Secy. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal one of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.) stated the proposition, flowing from the decided cases, in the following words : (S.C.C. p. 297, para 201). "Providing entertainment is implied in freedom of speech and expression by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution subject to this rider that where speech and conduct are joined in a single course of action, the free speech values must be balanced against competing societal interests." The arguments that the rate of tax was disproportionately high was similarly rejected with the following observations: "We are inclined to agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu. The reason given by the State for imposing tax at the rate of 40 per cent is duly explained by the State and we do not see any flaw in it. The reason given by the State for imposing tax at the rate of 40 per cent is duly explained by the State and we do not see any flaw in it. Since the appellants also carry on business it is their duty to share the burden of the State by paying taxes like any other business. The entertainment tax is an indirect tax. It is meant to be and is passed on to the consumer i.e., subscriber. In the case of indirect taxes, levy at more than 100 per cent of the value of the goods is not unknown e.g., in the case of customs and Central excise duties. As a matter of fact, even in the case of direct taxes, levy at the rate higher than 50% is a regular feature. Ofcourse, these are instances not involving free speech right and stand upon a different plane." The submission that it was discriminatory not to bring Doordashan within the scope of tax on entertainment was also rejected by the Supreme Court as follows : "We are also unable to see any substance in the grievance that taxes are only levied upon them and not upon Doordarshan. We do not think that there can be any comparison between Doordarshan and the appellants. Doordarshan is a governmental organisation which is supposed to act in furtherance of public interest. It is not a business carried on by the Government. The revenues collected by it by permitting advertisements are only intended to defray part of the huge expenditure the Government incurs on establishing and maintaining the broadcasting system throughout the country. By no stretch of imagination can the appellants claim any similarity with Doordarshan." THE TAMIL NADU AND MAHARASHTRA ACTS 14.The judgments of the Madras High Court and of the Supreme Court substantially cover the scope of the controversy sought to be raised in the present proceedings. The provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu Act are pari materia with those in the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923. Like the Tamil Nadu Act under section 3(2)(b), the Maharashtra Act contains a definition of "Cable Television". The Maharashtra Act defines the expression "entertainment" in section 2(a) in terms which are similar to the definition of the same expression in section 3(4) of the Tamil Nadu Act. Like the Tamil Nadu Act under section 3(2)(b), the Maharashtra Act contains a definition of "Cable Television". The Maharashtra Act defines the expression "entertainment" in section 2(a) in terms which are similar to the definition of the same expression in section 3(4) of the Tamil Nadu Act. The expression "Proprietor" which is defined in section 3(9) of the Tamil Nadu Act finds a counterpart in section 2(c) of the Maharashtra Act. Undoubtedly, there are differences in the language and wording. The substance is, however, markedly similar and the tax is sought to be imposed on entertainment, in this case, the entertainment provided through the medium of cable T.V. The taxing provision of the Tamil Nadu Act, section 4(e) is also substantially similar to the taxing provision of the Maharashtra Act. However, it be noted that though the tax under both the statutes is on the entertainment provided by cable television, under section 3(4) of the Maharashtra Act, a flat rate of duty is imposed per television set which receives radio frequency for exhibition of films or moving pictures with the aid of any type of antenna or apparatus for securing transmission through the cable net work. Section 3(4) of the Maharashtra Act while levying a flat rate makes a distinction between the rates impossible in respect of areas falling within (1) Municipal Corporation/Cantonments (2) Municipal Councils and (3) other areas. THE CHALLENGE BEFORE THIS COURT AFTER THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MADRAS HIGH COURT. 15.The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners conceded that a substantial part of the controversy in dispute in the present case is covered by the judgments of the Madras High Court and the Supreme Court. In the written submissions which have been filed in these proceedings, by learned Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No. 1467 of 2000, it has been conceded that the State has legislative competence to enact the law in question. Similarly in regard to the argument relating to "repugnancy and occupied field" the written submissions set out that the broad reasoning of the Madras High Court is correct and the Cable T.V. Network (Regulation) Act, 1985 enacted by Parliament and the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923, operate in different fields. Similarly in regard to the argument relating to "repugnancy and occupied field" the written submissions set out that the broad reasoning of the Madras High Court is correct and the Cable T.V. Network (Regulation) Act, 1985 enacted by Parliament and the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923, operate in different fields. The challenge of the petitioners is that (i) the cable operators' right to business by virtue of their licence under the Central Act seems to be adversely affected and subject to punitive measures under the State Act. To that extent, it is contended, there is a repugnancy between the provisions of the two Acts; (ii) the Act constitutes colorable legislation. The petitioners submit before us that the Madras High Court did not accept the argument that the tax was on a cable connection and not on entertainment, relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of Ramesh v. The State, A.I.R. 1989 Bom. 250 where it was held that the tax was a tax on entertainment and not a tax on the machine. In the submission of the petitioners their argument is a "completely different argument", the argument being that the Act attempts to shift the incidence of tax on cable operators and thus constitutes colorable legislation. The petitioners also rely on the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in A.I.R. 1993 Raj. 197 (Shiv Cable v. The State)5, in which it was held that the tax imposed on cable operators as illegal since the viewers were not admitted to entertainment (iii) The next submission of the petitioner is that there is an absence of nexus between the Act and its object, and the petitioners rely on a judgment of this Court reported in (Ramesh Waman Toke v. State of Maharashtra)6, A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 345 in support of the submission that a hypothetical basis of a number of persons capable of enjoying the show cannot be taken as a rational, or reasonable basis for the imposition of tax. The judgment of the Madras High Court held that the decision of his Court in A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 345, stands implicity overruled by the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Venketeshwara Theatre v. The State)7, reported in A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 197. The judgment of the Madras High Court held that the decision of his Court in A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 345, stands implicity overruled by the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Venketeshwara Theatre v. The State)7, reported in A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 197. The submission of the petitioners on this aspect is (a) that the judgment of this Court still governs with reference to cable connections at homes; (b) that the Madras Judgment was in error in considering that the Supreme Court tacitly overruled the Bombay judgment; (c) that the judgment of this Court emphasizes that if there is no entertainment at all, there can be no tax and it is this aspect which continuously holds the field. The State Act is awarding to the submission illegal as it seeks to transfer the incidence of the Act from the cable viewers who are actually benefiting from the entertainment to the cable operators who merely provide connection and transmit signals. (iv) The levy of tax and its collection partake the colour of a sovereign function of State. The State may farm out its function of Tax Collection but this can be done only through a separate piece of legislation intended for that purpose alone and not within the four corners of a law relating to tax on entertainment. (v) The incidence of tax must still remain on the viewer of the entertainment, and the impugned amendment seeks to shift the burden on the cable operators making them penally liable if the viewer does not pay and (vi) There appears to be no basis for the calculation of the amount of tax due and this violates basic ingredients of taxing statutes that the tax must be certain. THE TENABILITY OF THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS A. The impact of the judgment of the Supreme Court 16.In considering the correctness of the submissions urged at the Bar on behalf of the Cable T.V. operators, it would be worthwhile to notice at the outset that the petitioners concede in certain areas such as legislative to urge in certain areas such legislature competence and the freedom of speech and expression, that the view adopted by the Madras High Court is correct. However, according to the petitioners, in certain other areas such as the nexus between the Act and its object, the judgment of the Madras High Court does not express the correct position in law. Still in another area, namely, the issue of the occupied field, the petitioners accept that the judgment of the Madras High Court expounds the correct position in law but submit that the argument advanced by them is a slightly different argument which was not urged before the Madras High Court. 17.We hold that in view of the fact that the decision of the Madras High Court has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal, it would neither be open nor permissible to the petitioners to urge before this Court that the decision of the Madras High Court was not correct on the points which it decided, or that the point the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in its judgment reported in 1997(1) S.C.C. 319 agreed with the reasons and the conclusions arrived at by the Madras High Court. This being the position, it is not open to the petitioners now to urge that the position in law which has been accepted by the Madras High Court requires reconsideration by this Court. In paragraph 5 of its judgment in A. Suresh's case the Supreme Court summarized the submissions which were urged behalf of the Cable T.V. Operators who had approached the Madras High Court. While agreeing the reasoning and the conclusions of the Madras High Court the Supreme Court identified 3 areas in which, while affirming the judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court considered if fit to deal with the submissions urged before the Court. These were contentions 3, 4 and 7, relating to (i) the freedom of speech and expression (ii) the Madras Act being a piece of colorable legislation and (iii) the Rate of tax being confiscatory. The challenge on the ground of Article 19(1)(a) was rejected by the Supreme Court. The petitioners before us have not pressed that ground. The petitioners however seek to urge before us the submission in regard to the act being a piece of colorable legislation. The challenge on the ground of Article 19(1)(a) was rejected by the Supreme Court. The petitioners before us have not pressed that ground. The petitioners however seek to urge before us the submission in regard to the act being a piece of colorable legislation. We are of the firm view that bearing in mind the fact that a similar Act was found by the Madras High Court not to suffer from the vice of being piece of colorable legislation and the judgment of the Madras High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court it would not be open to the petitioners now to urge that the decision of the High Court in that case is erroneous or that what is urged by the petitioners before us was not considered either by the Madras High Court or the Supreme Court. This course of action is clearly not open to the petitioners. In fact and in substance the attempt of the petitioners before us is to reagitate issues which came to be settled by the Madras High Court which decision was confirmed in Appeal by the Supreme Court. This exercise is impermissible and is not open to the petitioners. 18.Having said this, we will briefly deal with the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioners. Having given our anxious considerations to them we find that there is no substance in the challenge. B. The Nature of the Levy in the present case: a duty on entertainment. 19.Entry 33 of the State list to the 7th Schedule inter alia deals with 'Theatres, Dramatic Performances, Entertainments and Amusements'. Entry 62 of the State list is entitled 'Tax on Luxuries including tax on entertainments, amusement, betting and gambling". Interpreting Entry 62 of the State List. 20.The entries in the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, it is well settled, have to be given an interpretation of width and amplitude and must include all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can reasonably and fairly be said to be comprehended in them. 21.The entries in the three lists to the 7th Schedule do not constitute a source of power but are fields of legislation. The power to legislate is given by Article 246 of the constitution. The position in law is equally well settled that in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the fields of legislation dealing with taxation are dealt with separately from other subjects. The power to legislate is given by Article 246 of the constitution. The position in law is equally well settled that in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the fields of legislation dealing with taxation are dealt with separately from other subjects. The Constitution empowers the State Legislatures to impose a tax on entertainments. 22.The constitution is an organic document and the vision of the Founding fathers cannot, by a process of artificial construction, be frozen at the scientific knowledge and technology which was available at the point of time when the Constitution was drafted. The vision of those who framed the Constitution was broad enough to reflect that as the generations would unfold, the Constitution would have to be interpreted to meet new circumstances and problems. Cable T.V. and the progressive evolution of technology in the Electronic age is thus not outside the taxing powers of the States. In so far as entertainment which is provided by instruments of modern technology is concerned, the State Legislatures clearly have the power to impose a tax on such entertainment and that in our view is what is being imposed by the State Legislature in the present case. 23.The duty which is imposed in the present case is a duty on entertainment. The duty is imposed at a certain rate per T.V. set which receives radio frequency signals for the exhibition of films or moving pictures with the aid of an Antenna or other apparatus for securing transmission through the cable network. The taxing event is thus entertainment. The duty is imposed with reference to every television set connected to the cable net work and the collection of duty is made through the proprietor. That is the plain consequence of section 3(4) of the Act. 24.In section 2(a) the expression "entertainment" has been defined to include, in the case of television, exhibition with the aid of any type of antenna with a cable net work attached to it or cable television for which persons are required to make payment by way of contribution or subscription or installation or connection charges or any other charges collected in any manner whatsoever. The expression "exhibition" is defined for the purpose of section 2(a) to include exhibition through the television with the aid of antenna and with cable net work attached to it or cable television. The expression "exhibition" is defined for the purpose of section 2(a) to include exhibition through the television with the aid of antenna and with cable net work attached to it or cable television. Section 2(b) similarly defines payments for admission to include contribution, subscription, installation and connection charges and all other charges collected for television exhibition with the aid of antenna with a cable network attached to it or cable television. Section 2(g) defines "place of entertainment" to include a house, building, tent or any other place where relevant records pertaining to the management of providing cable connections from any type of antenna or cable television are kept. Section 2(c) defines "proprietor" to include a person responsible for or for the time being incharge of management of providing cable connections from any type of antenna or cable television. These provisions clearly amplify the nature of the duty sought to be imposed in relation to the entertainment provided by the Cable T.V. network. THE MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION "ENTERTAINMENT" 25.The Cable T.V. net work provides entertainment. In so far as common perceptions or ordinary understandings are a guide to legislative interpretation, entertainment is what the cable T.V. is perceived to provide. The expression "entertainment", it is now well settled, includes entertainment of any form or description. In Geeta Enterprises v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1983 Supreme Court 1098, the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the expression "entertainment" in the context of the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937. Section 2(3) of the Act defines the expression to include any exhibitions, performance, amusement, game or support to which persons are admitted for payment. The Court held that the expression "entertainment" is neither a scientific nor a technical term and its meaning must be that as popularly understood or as understood in common parlance. Referring to the meaning of the expression "entertainment" as defined in Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Words and Phrases, amongst other dictionaries the Supreme Court held thus its judgment. The Court held that the expression "entertainment" is neither a scientific nor a technical term and its meaning must be that as popularly understood or as understood in common parlance. Referring to the meaning of the expression "entertainment" as defined in Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Words and Phrases, amongst other dictionaries the Supreme Court held thus its judgment. "A perusal of the various shades aspects forms and implications of the word "entertainment" as defined in the aforesaid books clearly leads to an irresistible inference that the word "entertainment" has been used in a very wide sense so as to include in its ambit, entertainment of any kind including one which may be purely educative." (Para 7) 26.From this judgment of the Supreme Court it is thus clear that in the context of a duty on entertainment, the expression "entertainment" cannot be understood in a restrictive sense but must be given a width of meaning which the legislature has understood while using the expression. Indeed, the wide meaning of the expression "entertainment" is to be utilised even when interpreting the scope of Entry 62 of the State list of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. A sense of that width must permeate the legislative meaning. D. TAX ON ENTERTAINMENT CAN BE ON THE PROVIDER OR THE RECEIVER. 27.The next point to be noticed is that it is a well settled principle of law that a tax on entertainment can be imposed by the legislature on the person providing entertainment as, indeed on the person receiving entertainment. In other words, there is no reason to preclude the legislature from imposing the tax on the person who provides entertainment. Those who receive entertainment are exigible to tax. Those who provide it are similarly, not immune to the taxing net. 28.This was decided by the Supreme Court in the (Western India Theatres Ltd. v. The Cantonment Board, Pune Cantonment)8, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 582. Those who receive entertainment are exigible to tax. Those who provide it are similarly, not immune to the taxing net. 28.This was decided by the Supreme Court in the (Western India Theatres Ltd. v. The Cantonment Board, Pune Cantonment)8, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 582. In that judgment the Supreme Court while interpreting a similar entry, Entry 50 of the 7th Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, helds as follows : ".........In view of this well established rule of interpretation there can be no reason to construe the words 'taxes on luxuries or entertainments or amusements' in Entry 50 as having a restricted meaning so as to confine the operation of the law to be made thereunder only to taxes on persons receiving the luxuries, entertainment, or amusements. The entry contemplates luxuries, entertainments, and amusements as objects on which the tax is to be imposed. If the words are to be so regarded, as we think they must, there can be no reason to differentiate between the giver and the receiver of the luxuries, entertainments, or amusements and both may, with equal propriety, be made amenable to the tax." (emphasis supplied) 29.Learned Counsel for the petitioners sought to place reliance on the judgment of this Court Ramesh Waman Toke v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1984 Bom. 345 in support of his submission that the basis on which tax can be validly levied is the fact of entertainment and if there was no entertainment at all which was actually held the tax could not be imposed. The Madras High Court in the judgment which has been referred to earlier came to the conclusion that the judgment of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1984 Bom. 345 must be regarded as having been implicitly overruled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 1993(3) Supreme Court Cases 677. 30.The judgment of the Supreme Court in Venkateshwara Theatre will be considered by us shortly. But at the present stage it would be necessary to state that the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners to the effect that the judgment of this Court in A.I.R. 1984 Bom. 345 (supra) still holds that field, is entirely erroneous. 30.The judgment of the Supreme Court in Venkateshwara Theatre will be considered by us shortly. But at the present stage it would be necessary to state that the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners to the effect that the judgment of this Court in A.I.R. 1984 Bom. 345 (supra) still holds that field, is entirely erroneous. Before the Supreme Court in (Express Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat)9, reported in A.I.R. 1989 Supreme Court 1949, the following passage of the judgment of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1984 Bom. 345 was cited. "In our view this is not a tax on entertainment at all which the State Legislature is entitled to levy under Item 62 of the State list. In order that the entertainment duty should amount to a tax on entertainment it should be levied on entertainment which is actually held and not on entertainment which is theoretically capable of being held. Looking to the provisions which have been examined in detail it is clear to us that the said provisions do not take into account entertainment that is actually held by the owner of the video exhibition. The basis on which tax can be validly levied is the fact of entertainment. The taxing event is the entertainment. If there is no entertainment at all, the question of levying entertainment tax in exercise of the legislative powers conferred upon the State Legislature does not arise at all. If the Act purports to levy tax on notional entertainment then the exercise of that taxing power must be held to be ultra vires the Constitution. This is exactly what has happened in the instant case." 31.The view of the law which was taken by this Court in A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 345 was held to be erroneous by the Supreme Court in the Express Hotels case. In paragraph 8 of the judgment in the Express Hotels case, Mr. Justice Venkatachaliah (as the learned Chief Justice then was) disapproved the observations of this Court in the following words. "With due respect to the High Court, the interpretation that commended itself to the High Court would unduly restrict the scope of the Legislative entry. On such an interpretation, it might be possible for a person to go further and contend that no entertainment was actually derived. "With due respect to the High Court, the interpretation that commended itself to the High Court would unduly restrict the scope of the Legislative entry. On such an interpretation, it might be possible for a person to go further and contend that no entertainment was actually derived. The concept of 'luxuries' in the legislative entry takes within it everything that can fairly and reasonably by said to be comprehended in it. The actual measure of the levy is a matter of legislative policy and convenience. So long as the legislation has reasonable nexus with the concept of 'luxuries' in the broad and general sense in which the expressions in legislative tests are comprehended, the legislative competence extends to all matters 'with respect to' that field or topic of legislation." The submission, therefore, based on the judgment of this Court in A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 345 must be rejected. 32.The judgment of the Supreme Court in Express Hotels expressly lays down that the actual utilisation or actual consumption of the luxury, that being a case of luxury tax, is not essentially for the taxable event to occur. A luxury which is capable of being used as such can be subject to tax. The learned Chief Justice speaking for the constitution Bench placed the matter thus in Express Hotels. "The taxable event need not necessarily be the actual utilisation or the actual consumption, as the case may be, of the luxury. The contention, in substance, is that the means of providing luxury, by itself, does not provide the nexus between the taxing power and the actual and not merely a notional or potential, consumption or utilisation of the luxury. As an instance of what can be said to be fairly and reasonably comprehended in a legislative Entry, reference may be made to the "notional" income, for purposes of a tax on income, of a person, from a house-property in his own personal occupation or a property, not actually let. In that context this Court said "that which can be converted into an income can be reasonably regarded as giving rise to income". See (Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of India)10, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 907. A luxury which can reasonably be said to be amenable to a potential conception does provide the nexus. In that context this Court said "that which can be converted into an income can be reasonably regarded as giving rise to income". See (Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of India)10, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 907. A luxury which can reasonably be said to be amenable to a potential conception does provide the nexus. If the provider of the luxury is also independtly amenable to the tax, the further restriction on the power suggested by the argument tends to cut into the plenitude of the field of legislation. If the idea of "luxuries" is required to be so wide as to comprehend in it, every aspect which can fairly and reasonably be said to be embraced by it, then, the taxing power cannot be limited to or conditioned in the manner suggested. Once the legislative competence and the nexus between the taxing power and the subject of taxation is established the other incidents are matters of fiscal policy behind the taxing law. The measure (of) the tax is not the same thing as and must be kept distinguished from, the subject of the tax." 33.This judgment of the Supreme Court provides a complete answer to the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioners with reference to the judgment of this Court in A.I.R. 1984 Bombay 345. The judgment of this Court referred to above no longer holds the field. Following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Express Hotels we hold that the expression "entertainment" for the purpose of the Constitution as well as the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923 is wide enough to comprehend within it all aspects of the concept which can be reasonably and fairly regarded as comprehended by it E. THE ELEMENT OF NEXUS-THE TAXING EVENT AND THE MEASURE OF TAX. 34.State legislature clearly has the legislative competence to enact the legislation in question. The taxing power is with regard to entertainments. The taxing power is not conditioned by the actual providing of entertainment. The subject matter of the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923, particularly section 3(4) which is under consideration, is entertainment provided through the cable T.V. net work. There is a clear nexus between the taxing power and the subject of taxation. Once that nexus is established, the other incidents of section 3(4) are matters of fiscal policy. Entertainment is the taxing event. There is a clear nexus between the taxing power and the subject of taxation. Once that nexus is established, the other incidents of section 3(4) are matters of fiscal policy. Entertainment is the taxing event. The legislature has imposed a duty per television set which receives radio frequency signals for exhibitions of films or moving pictures with the aid of any type of antenna or any other apparatus for securing transmission through cable net work or cable television attached to it. This latter part of section 3(4) provides the measure of the tax. The measure of the tax in the instant case has clearly a reasonable nexus with the nature of the levy, namely, the duty on entertainment. The television set which is connected to the cable net work is an instrument for providing entertainment. Consequently, the measure of the tax in the present case cannot be regarded as alien to the nature of the levy which is a duty on entertainment. 35.In relation to taxing legislation, it is a well settled principle of law that there are three different facets of the levy (i) the taxing event (ii) the measure of the tax; and (iii) the incidence of the tax. The measure of the tax cannot be equated with the taxing event and is distinct from it. The legislature has the discretion in structuring a fiscal levy to devise a suitable measure of the tax so long as the measure chosen by the legislature is not completely alien to the nature of the levy or so as to change or alter the basic nature of the levy. The distinction between the taxing event and the measure of the tax has been enunciated in several judgements of the Supreme Court. In the context of a luxury tax under Entry 62 of the State list to the 7th Schedule the Supreme Court made that distinction in the Express Hotel's case, (supra). Mr. Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah (as the learned Chief Justice then was) while delivering the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in (M/s. Ujgar Prints etc. v. Union of India)11, A.I.R. 1989 Supreme Court 516 placed the matter on principle as follows :- "The essential and conceptual nature of the tax is to be kept clearly distinguished from both the extent of the power to impose and the stage at which the tax is imposed. v. Union of India)11, A.I.R. 1989 Supreme Court 516 placed the matter on principle as follows :- "The essential and conceptual nature of the tax is to be kept clearly distinguished from both the extent of the power to impose and the stage at which the tax is imposed. Though the levy is on the production or manufacture of the goods, the imposition of the duty could be at the stage which the law considers most convenient to impose as long as a rational relationship with the nature of the tax is maintained." Similarly in paragraph 34 of the judgment the Court has held as follows :- "The standard adopted as the measure of assessment may throw light on the nature of the levy but is not determinative of it. When a statutory measure for assessment of the tax is contemplated, it "need not contour along the lines which spelt out the levy itself" and a "broader based standard of reference may be adopted for the purposes of determining the measure of the levy". Any statutory standard which maintains a nexus with the essential character of the levy can be regarded as a valid basis for assessing the measure of the tax." 36.There is indeed a long line of precedent on the subject in which the same view has been taken. This includes the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in (R.R. Engineering v. Zilla Parishad, Bareilly)12, A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 1088. In that case, the learned Chief Justice speaking for the Court held thus :- "It may be, and is often so, that the tax on circumstances and property is levied on the basis of income which the assessee receives from his profession trade, calling or property. That is, however, not conclusive on the nature of the tax. It is only as a matter of convenience that income is adopted as a yardstick or measure for assessing the tax. As pointed out in a reference under Government of Ireland Act, 1936 A.C. 352 the measure of the tax is not a true test of the nature of the tax." The element of nexus between the nature of the tax (a duty on entertainment) and the measure of the tax (a rate per T.V. set receiving signals through the cable network) clearly does exist in the present case. F. THE LATITUDE ALLOWABLE TO THE LEGISLATURE IN TAXING STATUTES ARTICLE 14. 37.The legislature in matters relating to taxation and fiscal policy is entrusted with a wide degree of discretion. Courts have acknowledged that in designing fiscal or economic policy a certain degree of imperfection cannot be excluded. Perfection in the matter of tax legislation is a goal which eludes the policy makers. That, however, is not a reason to regard the measure as constitutionally invalid. While considering any challenge to tax legislation on the ground of Constitution, it would be well to bear in mind the dictum of the Supreme Court in (The State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambika Mills Ltd.)13, 1974(3) S.C.R. 760 where Mr. Justice Mathew, speaking for the Supreme Court held thus : "Statutes are directed to less than universal situations. Law reflects distinctions that exist in fact or at least appear to exist in the judgment of legislators those who have the responsibility for making law fit fact. Legislation is essentially empiric. It addresses itself to the more or less crude outside world and not to the neat, logical models of the mind. To recognize marked differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard practical differences and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic." "In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events-self-restraint can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability." This judgment was cited with approval in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Federation of Hotel Restaurant (supra) where the Constitution Bench held thus :- "It is now well settled that though taxing laws are not outside Article 14, however, having regard to the wide variety of diverse economic criteria that go into the formulation of a fiscal policy legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, subject-matter, events, etc. for taxation. The tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are, accordingly, less rigorous. for taxation. The tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are, accordingly, less rigorous. In examining the allegations of hostile, discriminatory treatment what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. A legislature does not as an old saying goes, have to tax everything in order to be able to tax something. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law would not be discriminatory. Decisions of this Court on the matter have permitted the legislatures to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes, so long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes." 38.Finally, reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993(3) Supreme Court Cases 677 where the Supreme Court upheld a tax on entertainment on Cinemas under the Andhra Pradesh Entertainments Tax Act, 1939. The Supreme Court upheld the imposition of tax on the basis of a percentage of gross collection capacity per show, held. Though earlier the tax was on the basis of the actual number of persons admitted to each show it was held to be open to the legislature to adopt a percentage of the gross collection capacity per show as the basis or measure. In paragraphs 21 and 22, of its judgment the Supreme Court while upholding the tax held thus : "Since in the present case we are dealing with a taxation measure it is necessary to point out that in the field of taxation the decisions of this Court have permitted the legislature to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes, as long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes. ..... "Reference, in this context, may also be made to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, wherein justice Stewart speaking for the majority has observed: "No scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex area in which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause." We reject the challenge on the ground of Article 14. G. SEPARATE LEGISLATION WAS NOT REQUIRED 39.One of the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioners is that if the State Legislature sought to impose a duty on the entertainment provided through the cable T.V. net work, this should have been done by means of separate legislation and not by amending the provisions of the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, 1923. This submission is without merit. The submission of the petitioners is based neither on precept nor on precedent relating fiscal legislation. Once the State Legislature is held to possess legislative competence in the area of imposing a tax on entertainment, in which form the Act is to be given the shape of law lies within the discretion of the legislature. There is no reason why the legislature must as a principle of constitutional law be required to enact separate legislation and not an amending Act as was done in the present case. Topics of legislation covering a group of fiscal matters are often grouped or enacted together. The shape in which the law will be enacted, whether by way of fresh legislation or an amendment to existing law, is a matter of form. The submission of the petitioners is thus liable to be rejected. H. THE SOVEREIGN FUNCTION ARGUMENT 40.We also do not find any substance in the submission that by the legislation in question the State Legislature has delegated its sovereign function in relation to the tax on entertainment as defined by the Act on the Cable T.V. Operators. The tax has been imposed by legislation enacted by the competent legislature. The charge of tax, the measure of tax and the method of assessment and collection are all prescribed by the Act. The legislature when it imposes tax can provide a convenient point of collection for the tax. The legislature could legitimately have taken the view while enacting the law, that the point at which the tax should be collected should be the proprietor or the Cable T.V. Operator. The legislature when it imposes tax can provide a convenient point of collection for the tax. The legislature could legitimately have taken the view while enacting the law, that the point at which the tax should be collected should be the proprietor or the Cable T.V. Operator. This is a matter of administrative convenience since, the collection of tax from thousands, if not millions, of individual subscribers would be administratively cumbersome. The individual Cable T.V. Operator may be able to shift the burden of the tax on the subscriber to whom he charges for installation, connection, subscription or other purposes. These are the matters which did not affect the legality or the constitutional validity of the taxing statute. Consequently there is no substance in the submission that by the impugned measure the legislature has abdicated the sovereign function of the State of the levy of taxation. ARTICLE 19(1)(g) 41.Having given our anxious consideration to the challenge that the levy in the present case violates the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, we do not find any substance therein. For one thing, it must be noted that the petitioner have not furnished any material whatsoever in support of the plea that the tax imposes an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on their business. All business is exigible to tax. Cable T.V. Operators are no exception. In the Federation of Hotel Restaurant case (supra) while dealing with a similar submission, the Supreme Court held thus : "A taxing statute is not per se a restriction on the freedom under Article 19(1)(g). The policy of a tax, in its effectuation, might, of course, bring in some hardship in some individual cases. But that is inevitable, so long as law represents a process of abstraction from the generality of cases and reflects the highest common-factor. Every cause, it is said, has its martyrs. Then again, the mere excessiveness of a tax or even the circumstances that its imposition might tend toward the diminution of the earnings or profits of the persons of incidence does not per se, and without more, constitute a violation of the rights under Article 19(1)(g)." 42.The right of Cable T.V. Operators to carry on business under a licence issued by the Central Act. (The Cable T.V. Network Regulation Act, 1995) is not adversely affected by the imposition of a duty on entertainment by the State Act. The Central Act is a regulatory enactment. The State Act is a taxing measure and does not impinge upon the regulatory provisions of the Central Act. The Circulars issued by the State Government are an administrative implementation of the provisions of the Act. The imposition of the levy and its assessment for collection are provided for by the Act itself. The circulars have to be so construed and need not detain us any further. 43.In the circumstances, we do not find any substance in the challenge to the imposition of entertainment duty under the Bombay Entertainment Duty Act, 1923 in respect of entertainment provided through the medium of Cable T.V. The State legislature has brought within the net of taxation an activity which clearly involves the provision of entertainment. The State Legislature is competent to levy a tax on entertainment, which is what the entertainment duty in the present case is. The State enactment does not encroach upon the Parliamentary enactment namely, the Cable T.V. Network Regulation Act, 1995. The legislature in structuring the levy has maintained the element of nexus required to ensure that the tax does not encroach upon a prohibited area. The measure of the tax does not disturb the element of nexus in the present case. Like other forms of business, Cable T.V. is exigible to taxation. The State Legislature has been cognizant of new forms of technology which provide fresh avenues of entertainment. The Court in the exercise of the power of judicial review cannot question the wisdom or the policy of taxing statutes. We do not find any substance in the challenge to the constitutional validity of the entertainment duty in the present case. 44.The petitions will stand dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----