JUDGMENT 1. The respondent writ petitioners came to this Court invoking the concept of equal pay for equal work. Their writ petition was allowed. State has come in appeal. 2. The respondents-Writ petitioners were appointed as Dawasaz. They are looking after the Indian System of Medicine. The administrative department of the respondent writ petitioners is Health and Medical Education Department. It was the case of the writ petitioners that they are working in the farflung rural and urban dispensaries A Dispensary is normally equipped with a Medical Officer described as Vaid, a Dawasaz and also a Nursing Orderly. The presence of Dawasaz is said to be indispensable in every Hospital and Dispensary which is governed by the Indian System of Medicine. The petitioners, as indicated above came to this, Court seeking parity with their counter parts working in the Allopathic Hospitals. Their counter-parts are said to be working as Medical Assistants and Pharmacists. They came to this Court with a plea that the minimum qualification prescribed for the post of Dawasaz is Matriculation. They have also to undergo one years compulsory training. For this training, a prescribed syllabus has been indicated. During this training, they have to undergo training in almost all the subjects of Medical Science. Therefore, written examination is taken. Diplomas are awarded by the Directorate of Indian System of Medicines. Visa-vis their post, it was indicated that a Dawasaz has not only to distribute drugs but also dresses the wounds of the patients. This job is done under the supervision of doctors. They are also called upon to inject life saving drugs to the patients through the medium of syringes. As to how the syringes, needles and dressing material is to be kept in a sterilized form, is also one of the duties of the respondents writ-petitioners. They, accordingly sought parity with their counterparts known as Medical Assistants. It was submitted that there is absolutely to treat them differently. 3. A learned Single Judge of this Court on the appreciation of the material placed on the file and while taking into consideration the duties which are being performed by Dawasaz looking after the Indian System of Medicine and a Medical Assistant deputed to look after the Allopathic System of Medicine came to the conclusion that the two i.e. Dawasaz and Medical Assistants are performing the same duties. Denial of similar grade to Dawasaz was held as violative of Article 14 and 16 of the constitution. 4. The principle of equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by our constitution to a fundamental right. This however is not a ground to non-suit the petitioner. When Article 39(d) is read it does indicate the Constitutional aim is that State shall not deny to any citizen equality before law. Equality clause as enshrined in Article 14 of the constitution would become meaningless to a vast majority of people who look forward to the protective umbrella of Article 14, 19 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India. The idea is to ensure that the employees with the same status experience and seniority received equal treatment when they are doing similar work. 5. The abstract principle of equal pay for equal work has nothing to do with equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This was so said by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi vs. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 1113 and State of Punjab vs. Joginder Singh AIR 1963 SC 913. In Randhir Singh vs. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 879 the Supreme Court of India taking note of the preamble to Constitution of International Labour Organisation which recognised the concept of "equal remuneration for work of equal value" came to a conclusion that the concept of equal pay for equal work is deducible from Article 14,16and39(d). This concept assumed concrete shape when in Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India 1993(3) SCT137, the Supreme Court observed that although the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" does not come within the sweep of Article 14 of the Constitution as an abstract doctrine, but if any classification is made relating to the pay-scale and such classification is unreasonable and/ or if unequal pay is based on no classification then Article 14 will at once be attracted and such classification would be liable to be set at naught. In such a situation equal pay can be directed to be given for equal work. In such a situation equal pay can be directed to be given for equal work. In other words, where unequal pay has brought about a discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution, it will be a case where concept of "equal pay for equal work" as envisaged by Article 14 of the Constitution can be invoked. If the classification is proper and reasonable and has a nexus to the subject sought to be achieved the doctrine of equal pay for equal work would not have any application even though the persons doing the same work are not getting the same pay. In short so long as it is not a case of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution, the abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work as envisaged by Article 39(d) of the Constitution, has no manner of application, nor is it enforceable in view of Article 27 of the Constitution. Dhirendra Chamoli vs. State of U.P. (1986) 1 SCC 637 was cited as a case of equal pay for equal work as envisaged by Article 14 and not of the abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work. 6. In P.K. Ramachandra Lyer and Others Vs. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 541. Petitioners were working as Professors in a specified grade. Fresh advertisements were issued. These were in a revised pay scales. Even though the advertisements were cancelled, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners were entitled to revised pay scales. The court elaborated the concept underlying the Constitution at intendment under Article 39(d) and was of the view that the principle of equal pay for equal work is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to the cases of unequal scales of pay bases on classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. It was held that in the case in hand was a glaring example of discriminatory treatment accorded to old experienced and highly qualified hands with an evil eye and unequal hand and the guarantee of equality in all its pervasive character must enable the Supreme Court to remove discrimination and restore fair play in action. It was held that in the case in hand was a glaring example of discriminatory treatment accorded to old experienced and highly qualified hands with an evil eye and unequal hand and the guarantee of equality in all its pervasive character must enable the Supreme Court to remove discrimination and restore fair play in action. It was observed: "No attempt was made to sustain the scales of pay for the post of Professor on the doctrine of classification of existing incumbents as being distinct and separate from newly recruited hand with flimsy change in essential qualification would be wholly irrational and arbitrary. The case of the petitioners for being put in the revised scale of Rs.1100-1600 from the date on which newly created posts of Professors in sister disciplines in IVRI and other institutes were created and filed in. In revised scale is unanswerable and must be conceded". 7. Where differentiation is sought to be justified on grounds of dissimilarity of responsibility, confidentiality and relationship with public there may be some rational nexus. Thus in Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Others AIR 1988 SC 1291, where the Stenographers (Grade I) who were attached with the officers sought parity with the pay scale of Stenographers attached to the Joint Secretaries and Officers above that rank, the claim was negatived. It was observed: "In this case the differentiation has been sought to be justified in view of the nature and the types of the work done, that is, on intelligible basis. The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work. Some more sensitive, some requiring more fact some less it varies form nature and culture of employment. The problem about equal pay cannot always be transplanted into a mathematical formula. If it has a rational nexus with the object to be sought for, as reiterated before a certain amount of value judgement of the administrative authorities who are changed with fixing the pay scale has to be left with them and it cannot be interfered with by the Court unless it is demonstrated that either it is irrational or based on no basis or arrived at malafide either in law or infact. In the light of the averments made and in the facts mentioned before, it is not possible to say that the differentiation is based on no rational nexus with the object sought for to be achieved". It was further observed; "Equal pay for equal work is a fundamental right. But equal pay must depend upon the nature of the work done. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work, there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgement by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of services. So long as such value judgement is made bonafide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation. Such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is important to emphasise that equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution. But it follows naturally that equal pay for unequal work will be negation of that right". 8. Again in the case of Purshotam Lal vs. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1088, it was held that implementation of the revised pay scale in a particular category of servants from a date later than recommended by the Pay Commission and non-implementations of its report in respect of some of persons amounts to violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench in Laljee Dubey vs. Union of India AIR 1974 SC 252. Again reiterated the same principle. The basic principle on which differentiation would not amount to discrimination violative of either Article 14 or Article 16(1) of the Constitution are well settled. Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at the root by arbitrary state action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It is attracted where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. The principle underlying the guarantee is that all persons in similar circumstances shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws must be applied equally and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regard the subject matter of either administrative action or legislation, their position is substantially the same. The principle underlying the guarantee is that all persons in similar circumstances shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws must be applied equally and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regard the subject matter of either administrative action or legislation, their position is substantially the same. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation or administrative mandate. The classification must however be founded on an intelligible basis which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have rational nexus with the object to be achieved by the differentiation made in the stature of order in question. In other words, there ought to be some connection between the basis of classification and the object of the classification. The question of discrimination cannot be decided in isolation. In addition to the principle of equal pay for equal work" the pay structure of the employees of the Government should reflect many other social values. There is a need for evolution and implementation of a scientific national policy of income, wages and prices. 9. In P. Savita V. Union of India AIR 1985 SC 1124 the Supreme Court was dealing with senior draughtsmen doing the same work and discharging the similar functions and duties. They were classified into two groups, on the basis of seniority with two different pay scales. The question was whether it was discriminatory. It was held that it was. The Supreme Court reiterated that a group of draughtsmen entitled to higher scale of pay was not selected by any process nor is it based on any merit cum seniority basis, but is based only on seniority cum fitness. Moreover, it was found that the senior draughtsmen divided into two groups were in the same department doing identical and same work. It was not a case of different grades created on the grounds of higher qualification either academic or otherwise or an entitlement by any other criteria. Thus the classification between the two groups of senior draughtsmen was without any basis. 10. In Dhirendra Chameli vs. State of UP. It was not a case of different grades created on the grounds of higher qualification either academic or otherwise or an entitlement by any other criteria. Thus the classification between the two groups of senior draughtsmen was without any basis. 10. In Dhirendra Chameli vs. State of UP. (1986) SCC 637 the Supreme Court was concerned with the casual workers on easily wages basis engaged by the Govermment in different Nehru Yuvak Kendras in the country performing the same duties as performed by the regular class IV employees against the sanctioned strength. The claim was allowed with certain directions on the basis of the facts found. See also in this connection Union of India vs. R.G. Kashikar,AIR1986SC431. 11. In M.P. Singh vs. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 488 the Supreme Court on the facts of that case found that among the employees of the Central Bureau of Investigation, there were two classes of officials namely deputationists and non-deputationists amongst Sub-Inspectors, Inspectors and Deputy Superintendent of Police. There was discrimination among the two groups with regard to payment of special pay. Special pay related to arduous nature of duties to be performed. Whether they belong to the category of deputationists or non-deputationists payment of different rates of special pay, it was held in the facts of the case, that it did not pass the test of reasonable classification. 12. In Mackinnon Machenzie and Co. Ltd. vs. Audrey DCosta (SLP(Civil) No. 1265/87 decide-don March, 26,1987 AIR 1987 Sc 1281, the question was the different treatment between male and female Stenographers. But their differentiation was based on the ground of sex. It was struck down. It was held to be violative of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution. 13. In Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 879 and later in Dhirendra Chameli vs. State of UP. (1986) 1 SCC 637, Surinder Singh vs. Engineer-in-chief CPWD, AIR 1986 SC 584, Bhagwan Dass vs. State of Haryana AIR 1987 SC 2049, Jaipal vs. State of Haryana AIR 1988 SC 1504 and P. Savita vs. Union of India AIR 1985 SC 1124 the Supreme Court implemented the principle of "equal pay for equal work". (1986) 1 SCC 637, Surinder Singh vs. Engineer-in-chief CPWD, AIR 1986 SC 584, Bhagwan Dass vs. State of Haryana AIR 1987 SC 2049, Jaipal vs. State of Haryana AIR 1988 SC 1504 and P. Savita vs. Union of India AIR 1985 SC 1124 the Supreme Court implemented the principle of "equal pay for equal work". The Court granted relief on the principle of equal pay on the basis of same or similar work performed by two classes of employees under the same employee even though the two classes of employees did not constitute the same service. But in all the aforesaid cases relief was granted only after it was found that discrimination was practised in giving different scales of pay in violation of the equality clause enshrined under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" is no abstract one, it is open to the State of prescribed different scale of pay for different cadres, having regard to nature, duties, responsibilities and educational qualifications. Different grades are laid down in service with varying qualifications for entry into particular grade. Higher qualification and experience based on length of service are valid consideration for prescribing different pay scales for different cadres. The application of doctrine arises where employees are equal in every respect, in educational qualifications, duties, functions and measure of responsibilities and yet they are denied equality in pay. If the classification for prescribing different scales of pay is founded on reasonable nexus the principle will not apply. But its classification is founded on unreasonable basis it would violate Article 14 and 16 of the constitution and the principle of "equal pay for equal work" must have its way. In a number of decisions the Supreme Court claim for equal pay for equal work has been negatived on the ground that the different pay scales prescribed for persons doing similar or same work is permissible on the basis of classification founded on the measure of reasonabilities, educational qualifications, experiences and other allied matters. 14. In State of U.P.V.J.P.ChaurasiaAIR1989 SC19, the Supreme Court negatived the claim of Bench Secretaries for equal pay for equal work on the basis of reasonable classification based on merit experience and seniority though both set of employees were performing the similar duties and having similar responsibilities. 14. In State of U.P.V.J.P.ChaurasiaAIR1989 SC19, the Supreme Court negatived the claim of Bench Secretaries for equal pay for equal work on the basis of reasonable classification based on merit experience and seniority though both set of employees were performing the similar duties and having similar responsibilities. In Mewa Ram Kanojia vs. All India institute of Medical Sciences, AIR 1989 SC 1256, the Supreme Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner for parity in pay on the application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" on the ground of reasonable classification on the basis of educational qualifications. 15.In view of the above decisions one can say that where two classes of employees perform identical or similar duties and carry out the same functions with the same measure of responsibility having same academic qualifications, they would be entitled to equal pay. If the State denies them equality in pay, its action would be violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and the Court will strike down the discrimination and grant relief to the aggrieved employees but before such relief is granted the Court must consider and analyse the rationale behind the State action in prescribing two different scales of pay. If on an analysis of the relevant posts, the Court finds that the classification made by the State in giving different treatment to the two classes of employees is founded on rational basis having nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, the classification must be upheld. Principle of "equal pay for equal work" is applicable among equals, it cannot be applied to unequals. Relief to an aggrieved person seeking to enforce the principle of equal pay for equal work can be granted only after it is demonstrated before the Court that invidious discrimination is practised by the State in prescribing two different scales for the two classes of employees without there being any reasonable classification for the same. If the aggrieved employees fail to demonstrate discrimination, the principle of "equal pay for equal work" cannot be enforced by Court in abstract. The question what scale should be provided to a particular class of service must be left to the executive and only when discrimination is practised amongst the equals, the Court should intervene to undo the wrong and to ensure equality among the similarly placed employees. The question what scale should be provided to a particular class of service must be left to the executive and only when discrimination is practised amongst the equals, the Court should intervene to undo the wrong and to ensure equality among the similarly placed employees. The court however cannot prescribe equal scales of pay for different classes of employees. 16. The Supreme Court in the case of V. Markendeya and other vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, AIR 1989 SC 1308 held that the case of graduate overseers had all along been treated as separate entity from the non-graduate supervisors and they had been drawing different pay since long. The Constitution Bench had already recorded findings that two sets of officers, namely graduate supervisors and non-graduate supervisors did not belong to the same class of service and unequal treatment relating to promotion is justified on the basis of educational qualification. Therefore the classification made between the graduate supervisors and non-graduate supervisors is reasonable and the State Government did not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution in prescribing different scales of pay for them. 17. In Dr. O.Z. Hussain Vs. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 311 it was held that allowances such as book allowance, risk allowances, conveyance allowance and higher degree allowance admissible to doctors in medical wing is Directorate of Health Services should also be paid non-medical group scientists. 18. In Paras Nath and another and Mamman Singh and others vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 SC 298 classification of semiskilled workers as unskilled workers was held to be invalid. Thus Diary Mates, Junior Plant Operators and semi-skilled operators were placed in the category of Sweepers, Chowkidars and Malis unskilled worker. It was held that semi skilled workers could not be classified as un-skilled. Employees joining project before a particular date were given compensatory allowance. This was denied to others. This was held to be discriminatory in State of Rajasthan vs. Gurcharan Singh Grewal and Others AIR 1990 SC 1760. 19. Similarly payment of higher grades to employees merely on the ground that they were at headquarters were held to be discriminatory in Gopika Ranjan Choudhary, General Secretary of Union of Assam Rifles Non-Gazetted Employees, North East Region vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1212. 19. Similarly payment of higher grades to employees merely on the ground that they were at headquarters were held to be discriminatory in Gopika Ranjan Choudhary, General Secretary of Union of Assam Rifles Non-Gazetted Employees, North East Region vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1212. Where Air-conditioned coach attendants of Northern Railway were denied over-time allowance but others were paid, it was held to be discriminatory in Abid Hussain and Others vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 820. 20. In R.D. Gupta and Others etc vs. Lt. Governor Delhi Adm. and others etc AIR 1987 SC 2086, it was held that all the ministerial staff working in the NDMC are entitled to get pay scales as per SS Committee Report and likewise all of them are entitled to be given ex-gratia payment to only the staff working in the electricity wing and the water wing cannot be legally sustained as it suffers from the vice of discrimination. 21. Thus, even though the principle of equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by our constitution to be a fundamental right it is definitely a constitution goal. There is no doubt that principle of equal pay for equal work is not longer an abstract Utopian mirage yet there must be intrinsic reliable cogent evidence to show that the two posts regarding which parity is sought are identical and carry the same degree of responsibility. Once this is shown then equality clause will step in and equal protection of law would become a reality. 22. In Daily Rates Casual Labourers played under P&T Department through Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1987 SC 2342, the denial of minimum pay in pay-scales of regularly employed workmen-casual labourers was held to be violative of the concept of equal pay for equal work. Reliance was placed on the decision given in Dhirendra Chamelis case (supra) wherein similar view was taken with regard to employees working in Nehru Yuvak Kendras. 23. Employees working as vaccinators and immunisiors on daily wages for more than eight years were denied the salary and allowances payable to regularly employed doing same type of work. This was held to be bad in Delhi Municipal Karamchari Ekta Union (Regd.) Vs. 23. Employees working as vaccinators and immunisiors on daily wages for more than eight years were denied the salary and allowances payable to regularly employed doing same type of work. This was held to be bad in Delhi Municipal Karamchari Ekta Union (Regd.) Vs. P.L.S. Singh and others AIR 1988SC519.it was observed that there is no justification for the corporation extracting the same amount of work from the workmen concerned on payment of daily wages at rate lower than the minimum salary which is being paid to other workmen who have been recruited regularly even though the workmen involved in the case had been working for a number of years. Nearly six years had lapsed from the date of the reference but without any change in the attitude of the corporation. 24. Again employees working as a contingent paid staff of Income Tax Department were held entitled to minimum pay in pay scales, See U.P. Income Tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association vs. Union of India and others, AIR 988 SC 517. 25. Some bank employees were promoted earlier while other employees were promoted late. Both groups of promotees were doing same type of work. Higher wages were given to one group of promotees from back date. It was held that this benefit cannot be denied to others See U.P. Rajya Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1990 Sc 495. 26. Classification on revised pension formula between pensioners on basis of date of retirement was held to be violative in D.S. Nakara and others vs. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130. It was held that Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled viz., (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the grouped and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Statute in question (See : Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. S.R. Tendulkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 at p. 547). 27. The classification may be founded on differential basis according to objects sought to be achieved but what is implicit in it is that there ought to be nexus i.e.. 27. The classification may be founded on differential basis according to objects sought to be achieved but what is implicit in it is that there ought to be nexus i.e.. casual connection between the basis of classification and object of the statute under consideration. It is equally well settled by the decisions of Supreme court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. 28. Thus the fundamental principle is that Article 14, forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation which classification must satisfy the two tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. 29. In the matter of grant of family pension it was held in J.S. Rukmani vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1985 SC 785 that there is no warrant for making distinction between widows of one class of government servants and the widows of another class merely on the basis of the place where the government servant last served at the time of superannuation. It was observed: "............although in both cases the government servant served the same State namely, the former State of Madras and superannuated before the reorganisation of the States. We are therefore of the view that the restrictive limitation imposed by the Government Order dated 18th March, 1982 conferring the benefit of family pension to the members of the family pension of only those government servants who last served at a place falling within the territories of the successor State of Tamil Nadu must be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and hence unconstitutional and void". 30. The option given to the railway employees covered by provident fund scheme to switch over to pension scheme from specified cut-off date is not discriminatory. See: Krishna Kumar vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1990 SC 1782. 31. 30. The option given to the railway employees covered by provident fund scheme to switch over to pension scheme from specified cut-off date is not discriminatory. See: Krishna Kumar vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1990 SC 1782. 31. In Deeki Nandan Prasad vs. State of Bihar AIR 1971 Sc 1409, it was held by the Supreme Court: "The payment of pension does not depend upon the discretion of the Government but is governed by the relevant rules and anyone entitled to the pension under the rules can claim it as a matter of right". 32. In Smt. Poonam vs. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC it was pointed out at p. 1198. "Where the government servant rendered service to compensate which a family pension scheme is devised, the widow and the dependant minors would equally be entitled to family pension as a matter of right". 33. Since pension is linked with past service and the avowed purpose of the pension rules Is to provide sustenance in old age, distinction between marriage during service and marriage after retirement appears to be indeed arbitrary. This view was expressed in Smt. Bhagwati vs. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2088. 34. Daily rates or casual employees are not entitled to wages for days they do not work. See: Union of India vs. Rajinder Kumar Sharma, AIR 1933 SC 1317. 35. In State of M.P.V. Pramod Bhartiya, AIR 1993 SC 286 it was held that it is not enough to say that qualification are same not it is enough to say that schools are the same status. It is also not sufficient to say that the service conditions are similar. The question is whether they discharge similar duties, functions and responsibilities. It was said that it would be evident from this definition that the stress is upon the similarity of still, effort and responsibility when performed under similar conditions. It was observed: "We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. The respondents (original petitioners) have failed to establish that their duties, responsibilities and functions are similar to those of the non-technical lecturers in Technical Colleges. It was observed: "We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. The respondents (original petitioners) have failed to establish that their duties, responsibilities and functions are similar to those of the non-technical lecturers in Technical Colleges. They have also failed to establish that the distinction between their scale of pay and that of non-technical lecturers working in technical schools is either irrational and that it has no basis, or that it is vitiated by malafides, either in law or in fact see the approach adopted in Federation case (AIR 1988 SC 1291). It must be remembered that since the plea of equal pay for equal work has to be examined with reference to Article 14 the burden is upon the petitioners to establish their right to equal pay or the plea of discrimination as the case may be. This burden the original petitioners (respondents herein) have failed to discharge". 36. It was accordingly held that the grades payable to non-technical lecturers in technical schools are not required to be given to lecturers in non-technical schools. 37. In National Federation of State MFC (Physical Education) Teachers Association and others vs. Union of India, 1993(2) SCT196(SC) : AIR 1993 SC 369 the facts were that a National Discipline Scheme was started under the scheme for instituting discipline and imparting training in mass drill among the younger generation in the refugee camps and colonies. The scheme was thereafter transferred to the Ministry of Education. It was enlarged to cover a number of high schools. A new programme known as National Fitness Corps was formed. It was decided that the NDS instructors could function in the schools under the administrative control to the State Government. They would be transferred to the State and merged with the cadre of physical education teachers of the respective States. Pursuant to this, the Central Government informed the State to take over the administrative control of the NFC teachers and absorb them in the State service into equivalent cadre and any expenditure on the staff was to be reimbursed by the Government. Since the scheme was introduced in the middle schools classes, namely classes V to XI and not in the primary classes, physical instructors urged that they cannot be fixed on the pay scales as applicable to primary school teachers. Since the scheme was introduced in the middle schools classes, namely classes V to XI and not in the primary classes, physical instructors urged that they cannot be fixed on the pay scales as applicable to primary school teachers. There were no scales one for primary school teachers and another for secondary school teachers. It was held: "Where the responsibilities are different and the nature of work is also different physical instructors cannot be heard to contend that they will be entitled to the scale of pay as is applicable to secondary school teachers was a mere coincidence that the revised pay scale of Junior Grade I instructors was equivalent to that of primary teachers of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan. They did not have the essential qualification to be taken in service in Central Schools as Physical Education Teachers, therefore, could not be given their pay scales, regardless of the fact that they were doing the duties of physical education teachers". 38. As a matter of fact gradation based on qualification is permissible. Mewa Ram Kanojia vs. All India Institute of Medical Science and Others AIR 1989 SC 1256. In such case principal of equal pay for equal work cannot be applied, State of UP. vs. J.P. Chaurasis, AIR 1989SC19. 39. Part-time lecturers working for more than everyday compared to regularity appointed lecturers are entitled to be paid according to minimum of pay-scales prescribed for regularly appointed lecturers. The fact they were not gainfully appointed elsewhere was taken note of Vijay Kumar vs. State of Punjab AIR 1994 SC 265. The decision given in State of Punjab vs. Surinder Kehtar, 1992(1) SCT 489 was distinguished as in that case they were seeking absorption and regularisation. 40. In Board of Trustees for the port of Calcutta vs. Achintya Kumar Mohan Lal, 1993(3) SCT270 (SC): AIR 1994 SC 2278 employees of non-statutory canteens in Port Trust sought parity with employees of statutory canteens. Their claim was not rejected but the concerned employees were allowed to give better particulars to substantiate their claim. 41. However, in the case of M.M.R. Khan vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 937 there were three types of employees working in Railway Canteens. There were: i) Statutory Canteen - Canteens required to be provided compulsorily in view of Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948. 41. However, in the case of M.M.R. Khan vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 937 there were three types of employees working in Railway Canteens. There were: i) Statutory Canteen - Canteens required to be provided compulsorily in view of Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948. ii) Non-Statutory recognised canteens -Canteens run in the establishment which may or may not be governed by the Act aforesaid, but such non-statutory canteens have been established with the prior approval and recognition of the railway board as per the procedure detail. iii) Non-statutory non-recognised canteens - Canteens which employ 100 or less than 100 employees but are established without the prior approval of recognition of the Railway Board. 42. With regard to canteens (i) and (ii) it was held: "That even employees of the non-statutory canteens have to be treated at par with the employees. In the statutory canteens, because such canteens had been established with the prior approval and recognition of the Railway Board as per the procedure detailed in the Railway Establishment Manual. For arriving at the said conclusion this Court made reference to different paragraphs of the Railway Establishment Manual and to the materials on record to show as to how such non-statutory canteens were being managed under the direct supervision of the railway administration. In that connection it was also pointed out as to how Railway Board had prescribed a minimum dearness allowance relief to employees of such non-statutory canteens and the scales of pay, the enhanced dearness allowance were being revised. In respect of employees working in the metropolitan cities, the Railway Board has fixed the scales of pay of the employees working in all non-statutory canteens which were being revised from time to time by different orders issued by the Railway Board". 43. With regard to (iii) category of canteen it was held : "The canteens are run more or less on adhoc basis, the railway administration having no control on their working neither is there a record of these canteens nor of the contractors who run them who keep on changing much less of the workers engaged in these canteens are not entitled to claim the status of the railway servants". 44. See also Surendra Prasad Khugsal vs. Chairman M.M.T. Corpn. of India and another, AIR 1993 SC 2491 where on account of disputed facts matter was directed to be referred to Industrial Govt. 44. See also Surendra Prasad Khugsal vs. Chairman M.M.T. Corpn. of India and another, AIR 1993 SC 2491 where on account of disputed facts matter was directed to be referred to Industrial Govt. 45. Even though the cumulative effect of Article 14 and 16 is to ensure that the employees with the same status; experience and seniority and doing similar work in the same cadre received equal treatment yet it must be established as a factual reality. It may be seen that Article 16 is a specific application of the general principle of equality contained in Article 14. The object of the two Articles is to ensure equality of opportunity in matters relating to public offices. 46. Employees of education department deputed to Engineering College for teaching nontechnical subjects not possessing necessary qualifications were held to be not entitled to revised scales. 47. Assistant Audit Officers belonging to the Office of Comptroller and Audit General and Working with Railway Audit Department wanted to have facilities like Railway passes the quotas etc. It was held that he cannot claim parity with Group I Officers of Indian Railway Central Railway Audit Staff Association vs. Director of Audit Central Railways 1993(3) SCT 264 (SC) AIR 1993 SC 2647. 48. Thus as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India the following principles emerge in the matter of grant of equal pay for equal work. i) The claims for equal pay for equal work is not to be decided as an abstract doctrine. Supreme Court Employee Welfare Association vs. Union of India and Ors AIR 1990 SC334. ii) Aggrieved employees must demonstrate discrimination. Markendeya and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others AIR 1989 SC 1308. iii) Equality claim would be attracted where classification is unreasonable or is not based on any principle P.K. Ramachandra lyerand Ors. vs. Union of India and Others and Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India and Others AIR 1990 SC 334. iv) Equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done, it cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. Differentiation despite similarity of functional work but due to dissimilarity of the responsibility confidentiality is not discriminatory. vs. Union of India and Others and Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India and Others AIR 1990 SC 334. iv) Equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done, it cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. Differentiation despite similarity of functional work but due to dissimilarity of the responsibility confidentiality is not discriminatory. Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (recognised) and others vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1988 SC 1291 v) Even in the matter of alllowance the concept of equality would step in. Dr. Ms. O.Z. Hussain vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1990 SC 311. Abid Hussain and others vs. Union of India and Others AIR 1997 SC 820 and the Union of India vs. All India Union Services Pensioners Association and Another, AIR 1988 SC501. vi) Non giving of allowance merely by fixing a cut-off date is not legal. State of Rajasthan vs. Gurcharan Singh, AIR 1990 SC1760 and UP. Rajya Sahakari Bheemi Vikas Bank Ltd. U.P.V. its workmen, AIR 1990Sc495. vii) Differentiation on the basis that an employee is working in headquarters may also be had, Gopika Ranjan Chowdhary, General Secretary of Union of Assam Rifles Non-Gazetted Employees, North East Region vs. Union of India and Others AIR 1990 SC 1212. viii) Classification in two groups i.e. deputation and non-deputation in the matter of pay-scales is again bad. M. P. Singh and Others vs. Union of India and Others AIR 1987 SC485. ix) In the matter of grant of pension discrimination cannot be made on the basis of date of retirement on getting higher and the other getting lower pension. D.S. Nakara and others vs. Union of India, AIR 1983 Sc 130. However, option given to employees to opt for pension scheme and prescribing a cut-off date is not bad, Krishna Kumar vs. Union of India and others AIR 1990 SC 1782. Again making a classification in the matter of grant of family pension on the basis whether the marriage took place before retirement or after retirement would be bad. Smt. Bhagwanti vs. Union of India AIR1989.SC 2088. (x) Classification in the grant of pension to widows on the basis of place of service of their husbands even though in the same state is bad Smt. J.S. Rukmani etc vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, AIR 1985 SC 785. Smt. Bhagwanti vs. Union of India AIR1989.SC 2088. (x) Classification in the grant of pension to widows on the basis of place of service of their husbands even though in the same state is bad Smt. J.S. Rukmani etc vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, AIR 1985 SC 785. (xi) Payment of higher salary on the basis of higher qualification is permissible, Dr. C. Girijambal vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR SC 1537. Similarly employees working in one institution cannot claim parity with other institutions All India Sainik Schools Employees Association vs. The Defence Min-ister-cum-Chairman, Board of Governors, Sainik School Society, New Delhi and Others, AIR 1989 SC 88. (xii) In the matter of revision of pay scales two groups were formed not on the basis of merit-cum-seniority but on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness though they were performing the same duties would be bad, P. Savita and others vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1985 SC 1124 and Delhi Veterinary Association vs. Union of India and Others AIR 1984SC1211. (xiii) Discrimination on the basis of sex alone would be bad Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. vs. Audrey DCosta and Another AIR-1987 SC 1281. (xiv) Denial of same scale of pay to same staff under one Ministry is bad. Y.K. Mehta and Others vs. Union of India AIR 1988 SC 1970. (xv) Semi skilled and skilled cannot be clubbed together. Paras Nath and another and Mamman Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and Others AIR 1900 SC 298 and (xvi) Part time employees doing work for same or more work hours are to get the same pay as regular employees. Vijay Kumar and others vs. State of Punjab and others AIR 1994SC265. 49. Above are some of the conclusions which can be spelled out of the decisions given by the Supreme Court of India dealing with the concept of equal pay for equal work. 50. We are of the opinion that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge calls for no interference. The respondent writ petitioners were able to make out a case for claiming benefit of equal pay for equal work. The duties which are being performed by Dawasaz are similar to those being performed by the Medical Assistants. As a matter of fact, at one stage the State Government itself was of the opinion that they should be treated at par with Medical Assistants. The duties which are being performed by Dawasaz are similar to those being performed by the Medical Assistants. As a matter of fact, at one stage the State Government itself was of the opinion that they should be treated at par with Medical Assistants. This aspect of the matter was also taken note of by the learned Single Judge. The view expressed by the learned Single Judge calls for no interference. 51. This appeal is found to be without merit and is dismissed.