JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—This petition is filed by the petitioner for an appropriate relief prayed in paragraph-36 of the petition. The said para reads as under:— 2. It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that : (a) the notification appointing the respondent No. 1 as Commission vide Annexure P-3/A may be quashed and the consequent proceedings may be quashed, the respondent No. 1 may be directed not to proceed with the inquiry. (b) That the proceedings before the respondent No. 1 are wrong and illegal and in view of the facts and circumstances of the case submitted hereinabove, the same may be quashed. (c) Records of the case may be called for. (d) Writ petition may be allowed with costs. (c) Any other order or directions which this Honble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be issued in the interest of justice enquity and fair play" 3. The petitioners are active members of Indian National Congress, a leading political party. Petitioner No. 1 is the leader of Congress party in the State of Himachal Pradesh and at present he is the leader of opposition in Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Petitioner No. 2 is the General Secretary of Himachal Pradesh Congress Committee. Petitioner No. 3 was, at the relevant time, President of National Students Union, an Organisation of Indian National Congress. 4. By the present petition, the petitioners have challenged the legality and validity of a notification, dated September 10, 1999 issued by the State Government in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 5. It was the case of State Government that certain incidents of lawlessness were reported to have occurred between March 3 and March 12, 1998 in Shimla and round about areas. The Government, therefore, decided to inquire into the matter and by an order, dated April 24, 1998 appointed Deepak Sanan, Divisional Commissioner, Shimla to make necessary inquiry and submit a report. The Divisional Commissioner held the inquiry and submitted his report (Annexure P-3). 6. The Government, therefore, decided to inquire into the matter and by an order, dated April 24, 1998 appointed Deepak Sanan, Divisional Commissioner, Shimla to make necessary inquiry and submit a report. The Divisional Commissioner held the inquiry and submitted his report (Annexure P-3). 6. In paragraph-8 of the report, it was stated :— "In view of the allegations which have come up before this inquiry and the replies received from the person mentioned in this context, the following issues require clarification/merit consideration: (i) With regard to the allegations relating to use of force, kidnapping and pressure on Shri Ramesh Chaudhary and his associates; it needs to be clarified whether such an inquiry would invite action under the Contempt of Courts Act in view of the High Court decision on the Habeas Corpus Petition of Shri Kamal Kishore Sharma? (ii) With regard to the allegations contained in the various affidavits it would appear that incidents of lawlessness and harassment of various persons occurred in and around Shimla on 5th/6th March, 1998. However, most of the persons mentioned in this context have denied any role in these incidents and in the case of Shri Atul Sharma and Shri Sagar Parashar they are yet to submit a response. A detailed inquiry into this matter would require affording concerned persons an opportunity to produce witnesses and the power to summon their presence. This would also require the appointment of a Counsel to assist the Inquiry Officer. On the one hand any such procedure is likely to be time consuming and on the other hand this inquiry has no statutory powers to summon any evidence. It may be appropriate, therefore, that an inquiry is instituted under the Commission of Inquiry Act to reach a meaningful conclusion. Sd/- (Deepak Sanan) Commissioner, Shimla Division" 7. On the basis of the above report submitted by the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla, and the incidents which had caused serious public concern over the maintenance of law and order requiring judicial inquiry into the matter which was of public importance, the State Government formed an opinion that it was in public interest to constitute a Commission of Enquiry to establish the sequence of events leading to incidents creating law and order situation and to assign responsibility for those incidents. Accordingly, in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, a notification dated September 10, 1999 was issued by the State Government appointing Shri Hari Dutt Kainthla, retired District and Sessions Judge as the Commission of Inquiry and to enquire into the matters referred therein and submit a report within a period of six months from the date of publication of the notification. The said notification reads as under: "WHEREAS, it is alleged that certain incidents of lawlessness occurred in and around Shimla between the period intervening between 3rd March, 1998 to 12th March, 1998; AND WHEREAS the State Government had ordered a fact finding enquiry vide order No. Home (A)-p(4)-l/98, dated April 24, 1998 and Shri Deepak Sanan, Divisional Commissioner, Shimla, was appointed as Inquiry Officer conduct the inquiry into aforementioned; incidents of lawlessness; AND WHEREAS the incidents had caused serious public concern over the maintenance of law and order requiring judicial inquiry into the matter which is of public importance; AND NOW WHEREAS, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is of the opinion that it would be more expedient and in the public interest to appoint a Commission of Enquiry to enquire into the aforesaid incidents which are the matters of public importance; NOW, THEREFORE, the Governor of Himachal Pradesh in exercise of the powers vested in her under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, is pleased to appoint Shri Hari Dutt Kainthla, Retired District and Sessions Judge as the Commission of Inquiry and to enquire into and report on the following matters in relation to the aforementioned incidents within a period of six months from the date of publication of this Notification:— (i) To establish the sequence of events leading to alleged incident creating a law and order situation on 6th March, 1998 at Ghora Chowki/Bus Stand and Chalet Day School, Shimla, and on 6th March, 1998, in and around PWD Rest House, near Raj Bhawan, Shimla. (ii) To assign responsibility for these incidents, including the role of the official machinery. (ii) To assign responsibility for these incidents, including the role of the official machinery. Further, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is of the opinion that having regard to the nature of the inquiry to be conducted other circumstances of the case, the of sub-sections (2) (3) (4) and (5) of Section 5 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952, should be made applicable to the Commission and in exercise of the powers vested in her under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the aforesaid act is pleased to direct that the provisions contained in sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 5 shall apply to the Commission. The Commission shall have its Headquarter, D.C. Office, Shimla and may also visit such places as may be necessary in furtherance of the inquiry By Order Sd/- Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh." 8. On 11th October, 1999, a public notice was issued by the Commission which was published on 14th October, 1999 in Tribune, Indian Express and Divya Himachal. It was also published on 15th October, 1999 in the Government Gazette by which rules to regulate procedure by the Commission were framed. On January 3, 2000, a notice was issued to petitioner No. 1 (Annexure P-7), making certain allegations against him and calling upon him to put forward his version in the matter. Similar notices were also issued to petitioners 2 and 3. On 25th March, 2000, a reply to the above notice was filed by the petitioner No. 1 raising preliminary objections. It was inter alia contended in the reply that the State Government had no power, authority jurisdiction to issue such Commission; issue of Commission was clearly amounted to contempt of Honble High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in view of a judicial Order dated March 9,1998, passed in Criminal Writ Petition 4 of 1998; holding of further inquiry or appointment of Commission would be abuse of process of law. It was stated that one Ramesh Chaudhary who was said to have been kidnapped, forcibly taken away or detained had filed an affidavit in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998 in the High Court wherein he had categorically stated that he was neither detained nor kidnapped nor forcibly taken away. As such, no Commission could have been appointed for so-called kidnapping of Ramesh Chaudhary. As such, no Commission could have been appointed for so-called kidnapping of Ramesh Chaudhary. It was also contended that it was not open to the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla, to inquire into the matter and to submit a report. When the initial step itself was unlawful, no further action could be taken. On all those grounds, it was urged that the action of issuing notification was illegal and invalid. 9. Respondent No. 1, vide his order dated 10th April, 2000 (Annexure P-12) did not uphold preliminary objections raised on behalf of petitioner No. 1. He, however, observed: "In regard to the aforesaid preliminary objection, I hold the view that these can be conveniently decided at the time of final decision to be arrived at by the Commission on conclusion of this inquiry on merits." 10. The above order has been challenged by the petitioners in present writ petition as also the notification dated 10th September, 1999, Annexure P-3/A. 11. On 25th April, 2000, a notice was issued to the respondents to show cause as to why the writ petition be not admitted. On CMP No. 371 of 2000 in which interim Relief was prayed restraining the respondent No. 1 from proceeding, with the inquiry, a Division Bench hi this Court passed the following orders— CMP No. 371 of 2000. Notice accepted in terms of the above. After hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioners, learned Advocate General for the State and learned Counsel for the Commission, we are of the view that petitioners have a prima facie case for granting interim order that the Enquiry Commission may proceed with the enquiry and record cross examination of six of the deponents but it will be subject to the right of the petitioners to cross examine other six deponents which right has been denied to them by his order dated 10th April, 2000. We further direct the Commission of Enquiry to decide the application of Mr. Atul Sharma, seeking permission to cross examine some of the deponents before he starts recording the cross examination of deponents as per his order." 12. The matter was thereafter placed for hearing from time to time. Affidavits-in-reply have been filed by respondent No. 2 as well as respondent No. 1. 13. Today, we have heard Mr. Inder Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Suresh Bhardwaj, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. The matter was thereafter placed for hearing from time to time. Affidavits-in-reply have been filed by respondent No. 2 as well as respondent No. 1. 13. Today, we have heard Mr. Inder Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Suresh Bhardwaj, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Sanjay Karol, learned Advocate General with Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General and Mr. Vivek Thakur, learned Assistant Advocate General. 14. Mr. Inder Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners raised several points. It was contented that after Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998 was decided by this Court, it was not open to the State Government to exercise power under the Act and to constitute a Commission. In that petition, a judicial verdict was recorded by the Court and in no uncertain terms, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that on the basis of the materials placed on record and particularly, in the light of an affidavit filed by Ramesh Chand himself, it could not be said that Ramesh Chand was kidnapped, detained or forcibly taken away by any person. Constitution of Commission and exercise of power under subsection (1) of Section 3, according to the learned Counsel, would interfere with a judicial order passed by this Court without being challenged in a Superior Court. The action thus, interferes with administration of justice, and the order would be contrary to law and otherwise unlawful. It was also submitted that if the Commission is allowed to proceed with the inquiry, there is every possibility of the Commission to come to a conclusion on the basis of evidence produced including so called affidavit by Ramesh Chand and other witness, that he was kidnapped, illegally detained or forcibly taken away The Counsel contended that it would not be open to the Commission to express any opinion in the teeth of the order passed by a Competent Court in a petition in which State Government was party and the decision was based on an affidavit filed by Ramesh Chand himself. Obviously, therefore, the Commission cannot inquire into the matter. The power constituting the Commission, hence, could not be said to have been exercised bona fide by the State Government and notification has been issued for collateral purpose and in colourable exercise of powers. Obviously, therefore, the Commission cannot inquire into the matter. The power constituting the Commission, hence, could not be said to have been exercised bona fide by the State Government and notification has been issued for collateral purpose and in colourable exercise of powers. The petitioner has contended that the case of Ramesh Chand as put forward in the affidavit before the Commission is inconsistent with his own affidavit in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998. Thus, he has committed perjury and appropriate proceedings are required to be initiated against him. In the submission of learned Counsel, the basic question centres round so railed kidnapping or illegal detention of Ramesh Chaudhary When that was finally decided by this Court, no Commission could have been constituted. Moreover, the question cannot be said to be of public importance, and on that ground also, power could not have been exercised under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, Virtually by constituting the Commission, the respondent-State intends to fill in lacunae which is not permissible. It was, therefore, submitted that respondent No. 2 has committed an error of law and of jurisdiction in constituting the Commission and respondent No. 1 has committed an error in not upholding the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner. Alternatively, it was submitted by the learned Counsel that the respondent No. 1 may be directed as a preliminary point objections raised by the petitioners, including the objection of the jurisdiction of the Commission. A grievance was also made that no rules have been framed under the Act for procedure to be adopted by the Commission and the so-called rules framed by the Commission (Annexure P-4) are without jurisdiction. 15. Learned Advocate General, on the other hand, supported the notification issued by the State Government and the order passed by the respondent No. 1. He submitted that the power and jurisdiction of the State Government under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act is entirely different and it has nothing to do with an order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998. He submitted that it is settled law that a writ of Habeas Corpus is a prerogative writ and an extra-ordinary remedy which is of a summary nature. He submitted that it is settled law that a writ of Habeas Corpus is a prerogative writ and an extra-ordinary remedy which is of a summary nature. In exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, a High Court only decides a limited point whether a person is or is not legally detained. It has nothing to do with substantive rights and obligations! of the parties which can be decided only in appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. He, however, submitted that reading the notification issued by the State Government, it is clear that the State Government was satisfied that certain incidents of lawlessness occurred in and around Shimla during the period between March 3 and March 12, 1998. Inviting our attention to clauses (i) and (ii), he submitted that Commission will exercise powers under Section 3 (1) of the Act in respect of sequence of events leading to alleged incidents at places mentioned in the notification and will submit a report. Learned Advocate General submitted that the notification makes no reference to detention of Mr. Ramesh Chand. The Commission will exercise powers within the four corners of the notification and such an action cannot be said to be in interference with the decision of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998. 16. The learned Advocate General also submitted that looking to the order passed by the Division Bench in the above petition, it is clear that the inquiry before the Court was extremely limited. This is apparent, according to him, if the following observations of the Division Bench are to be borne in mind : ".....The allegations levelled against the police and the second respondent the Honble the Chief Minister have been specifically denied in the replies filed by them. The person whose liberty has been allegedly deprived, namely, Shri Ramesh Chand himself has filed an affidavit through his Counsel and in very clear terms he denied the allegations that he was forcibly taken away by the police and certain others and wrongfully confined in the residence of the Honble the Chief Minister. In the circumstances, there is absolutely no basis even remotely to think that the personal liberty of Shri Ramesh Chand was at any time in jeopardy because of the respondents." 17-18. It was submitted that the power has been exercised bona fide under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. In the circumstances, there is absolutely no basis even remotely to think that the personal liberty of Shri Ramesh Chand was at any time in jeopardy because of the respondents." 17-18. It was submitted that the power has been exercised bona fide under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. When on subjective satisfaction, the Government formed an opinion that an inquiry was necessary and a Commission was constituted, the action was in accordance with law. Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, at this stage, is limited and though it is open to this Court to interfere with issuance of notification and taking of action by the State Government of constituting a Commission, if it is found to be without authority of law, arbitrary or unreasonable, this Court will not substitute its opinion for the opinion of the Government for coming to a different conclusion. The Commission is a fact finding authority which will go into the circumstances on the basis of materials placed before it and submit a report. The basic question is not detention of Ramesh Chand but incidents of lawlessness occurred in and around Shimla between March 3 and March 12, 1998. By constituting a Commission to inquire into those incidents, it cannot be said that the State has even indirectly interfered with a judicial process or a decision rendered by a Division Bench in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998. The question, according to the learned Advocate General, is of great public importance and when there was satisfaction on the part of the Government that such a question needs to be enquired into by a Commission and in exercise of power, under the Act, issued a notification, it cannot be said to bad in law. It was also submitted that it was rightly observed by the respondent No. 1 that all objections, including the objection as to jurisdiction of the Commission could be gone into and could be decided at the time of hearing of the matter. It was, therefore, submitted that petition does not deserve admission as no prima facie case has been made out and is liable to be dismissed. 19. Mr. It was, therefore, submitted that petition does not deserve admission as no prima facie case has been made out and is liable to be dismissed. 19. Mr. Bhardwaj, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that after application of mind, the Commission held that all questions will be decided at the time of hearing of the matter and such an order cannot be said to be illegal or contrary to law. Regarding procedure to be adopted by the Commission, he submitted that Section 8 of the Act enables the Commission to follow the procedure "subject to any rules to be made in that behalf by appropriate Government." Section 12 of the Act empowers an appropriate Government to make rules to carry out purposes of the Act. It was stated by Mr. Bhardwaj that no rules have been framed by the State Government in exercise of power under Section 12 of the Act. It was, therefore, open to the Commission to prescribe its own procedure of course subject to the provisions of the Act. No grievance, hence, can be made by the petitioners for laying down procedure (Annexure P-4) in the conduct of proceedings before the Commission vide a public notice, dated October 11, 1999. He, therefore, submitted that petition has no substance. 20. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. We are of the view that the petition filed by the petitioners does not deserve to be admitted at this stage and cannot be entertained. It is, no doubt true and cannot be disputed that if a question is decided by a Competent Court, power under sub-section (1) of Section 3 cannot be exercised by the State Government of constituting a Commission. Whereas according to Mr. Inder Singh, appointment of Commission and issuance of notification have interfered with an order passed by this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998, according to the learned Advocate General, it is not so. W7e do not intend to enter into larger question on the ambit and scope of a writ of Habeas Corpus issued by a High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. W7e do not intend to enter into larger question on the ambit and scope of a writ of Habeas Corpus issued by a High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion, however, it is well settled that a writ of Habeas Corpus is a prerogative process for securing liberty of a subject and affords an effective means of immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention of a person (Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 11, para 1452 p. 768). It is, thus, a prompt and effective remedy against illegal detention or restraint. It is remedial in nature. Its paramount purpose is to secure release of a person and not to punish a wrong doer. In Sapmawia v. Deputy Commissioner. Aijal, (1970) 2 SCC 399, it was observed by the Apex Court that a writ of Habeas Corpus is a prerogative writ by which causes and validity of detention of a person are investigated by summary procedure and if the authority having custody of such person does not satisfy the Court that the deprivation of his personal liberty is according to the procedure established by law, the person is entitled to. Such order, however does not per se amount to his or discharge and the authorities are not, by virtue of the release only on Habeas Corpus, deprived of the power to arrest and keep him in custody in accordance with law for this writ is not designed to interrupt the ordinary administration of criminal law. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling and others, AIR 1973 SC 2684, and it catena of decisions. 21. In our view, the contention of learned Advocate General is well founded that in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998, the subject matter before this Court was limited, viz. whether Ramesh Chand was kidnapped, illegally detained or forcibly taken away. In the light of the materials placed before this Court as also considering the reply filed by Ramesh Chand himself, this Court held that it was not proved "even remotely" that personal liberty of Ramesh Chand was at any time interrupted or was put in jeopardy because of any action of the respondents. In the light of the materials placed before this Court as also considering the reply filed by Ramesh Chand himself, this Court held that it was not proved "even remotely" that personal liberty of Ramesh Chand was at any time interrupted or was put in jeopardy because of any action of the respondents. This is clear from the observations of the Division Bench extracted herein above as also the limited nature of inquiry this Court was called upon to undertake. It is also clear from the following statement : "This writ petition is concerned only with the alleged deprivation of the personal liberty of Shri Ramesh Chand." (Emphasis supplied) 22. In our opinion, therefore, issuance of notification under subsection (1) of Section 3 does not interfere with a judicial order passed by this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998. The contention that the notification is inconsistent with a judicial order cannot be upheld and is hereby rejected. 23. Relying on a decision of Full Bench of the High Court of Kerala in R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala, AIR 1989 Kerala 99 (FB), learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that there is a great and eternal principle that there is nothing like "unfettered" or "absolute" discretion immune from judicial scrutiny. Hence, if power vested in the Government under Section 3 of the Act has been exercised otherwise than in accordance with law, the action/order is invalid, improper and unreasonable. It is, therefore, open to a Court to interfere with the exercise of such power. 24. It is well settled that every power must be exercised legally, reasonably and within the four corners of law. At the same time, however, it cannot be overlooked that this Court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the power exercised by the Government under Section 3 of the Act. Such power can be exercised by the Government in the light of circumstances which are to be considered relevant and germane for exercise of such power. It was, however, urged that the incidents for which the notification is issued did not at all take place. The only incident related to so called kidnapping, detaining or forcibly taking away of Ramesh Chand and consequences ensued therefrom. It was, however, urged that the incidents for which the notification is issued did not at all take place. The only incident related to so called kidnapping, detaining or forcibly taking away of Ramesh Chand and consequences ensued therefrom. It was, therefore, contended that it was incorrect to estate that over and above so called kidnapping of Ramesh Chand, some other incidents also took place between March 3 and March 12, 1998 either at Ghora Chowki or at Bus Stand or at Chalet Day School or in and around PWD Rest House, near Raj Bhawan, Shimla. 25. In our considered opinion, it is not within the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to enquire into correctness or otherwise of the statement made in the notification and to uphold the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner that the incident was one and only one of so called kidnapping of Ramesh Chand and no other event happened between March 3 and March 12, 1998. To us, the law appears to be well settled and it is that this Court has to read the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 3 and to decide the validity or otherwise of a notification issued thereunder. 26. In this contention, we may refer to certain cases. The leading decision on the point is a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Ram Krishan Dalmia and others v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and others, AIR 1958 SC 538. In that case, constitutional validity of Section 3 of the Act was challenged. A notification issued by the Central Government was also questioned. It was observed by the Court that if an appropriate Government is satisfied that certain matters are required to be considered Commission and for that purpose, a Commission is constituted, it cannot be said that appropriate Government has no jurisdiction to constitute such Commission. Upholding the constitutional validity of Section 3 of the Act, it was observed by the Supreme Court that such a provision cannot be said to be arbitrary, discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also indicated that while exercising power under Section 3 of the Act, an appropriate Government is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial act and it is, therefore, open to an appropriate Government to act upon information available to it. It was also indicated that while exercising power under Section 3 of the Act, an appropriate Government is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial act and it is, therefore, open to an appropriate Government to act upon information available to it. According to the Court, appropriate Government is the best Judge of the reliability of its source of information and if it acts in goods faith on the material brought to its notice and comes to the conclusion that certain acts were required to be considered which are matters of public importance calling for an inquiry with a view to devise measures for preventing the recurrence of such evils, the Court would not hold such executive action to be bad or illegal. The Court also observed that it was not unmindful of wide discretionary powers conferred on an appropriate Government but a bare possibility of abuse of such power cannot make a provision illegal or ultra vires. The action was accordingly not interfered with. The Court concluded that Parliament in its wisdom has left the matter of setting up of a Commission of Inquiry to the discretion of appropriate Government and if appropriate Government has formed an opinion that a definite matter of public importance has arisen and calls for an inquiry, the Court will not lightly brush aside such opinion. 27. In P.V. Jagannath Rao and others v. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1969 SC 215, a Commission was appointed by the State of Orissa to enquire into certain matters which was challenged by the petitioners. It was contended that the appointment of Commission was for political rivalry and thus the action was de hors the Act, illegal, ultra vires and mala fide. Moreover, certain cases were pending in a competent Court. It was, therefore, contended that appointment of Commission would amount to contempt of Court and on that ground also, the action was unconstitutional and was unlawful. Following Ram Krishna Dalmia and reiterating the law laid down therein, the Court held that a statutory power can always be exercised by the authority and such action cannot be said to be ultra vires or without jurisdiction. If the power is not exercised for the purpose for which it had been granted, it would not be bona fide exercise of power but for collateral measures and the action will be mala fide and can be interfered with. If the power is not exercised for the purpose for which it had been granted, it would not be bona fide exercise of power but for collateral measures and the action will be mala fide and can be interfered with. On the contention of political rivalry, however, it cannot be said that the action is mala fide. It was further observed that the inquiry before the Commission is not judicial in nature and ambit and scope of inquiry before the Commission on the one hand and cases pending before a competent Court on the other hand, are entirely different. It cannot, therefore, be said that it would interfere with administration of justice and by proceeding with the inquiry, the Commission would be committing contempt of Court. If the Government is satisfied on the ground of materials that Constitution of Commission is necessary, such and action could be taken and it cannot be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court further observed : "It is well settled that if a statutory authority exercises its power for a purpose not authorised by the law the action of the statutory authority is ultra vires and without jurisdiction. In other words, it is a mala fide exercise of power in the eye of law, i.e., an exercise of power by a statutory authority for a purpose other than that which the Legislature intended (See King v. Minister of Health, (1929) 1 KB 619). But the question arises as to what is the legal position if an administrative authority acts both for an authorised purpose and for an unauthorised purpose. In such a case where there is a mixture of authorised and unauthorised purpose, what should be the test to be applied to determine the legal validity of the administrative act? The proper test to be applied in such a case is as to what is the dominant purpose for which the administrative power is exercised. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other is unauthorised, the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. This principle was applied in Rex v. Brighton Corporation; ex parte Shoosmith, (1907) 96 LT 762. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other is unauthorised, the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. This principle was applied in Rex v. Brighton Corporation; ex parte Shoosmith, (1907) 96 LT 762. A Borough Corporated expended a large sum of money upon altering and paving a road, which was thereby permanently improved, but they decided to do the work at the particular time when it was done in order to induce the Automobile Club to hold motor trials and motor races upon it. The Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the Divisional Court), refused to intervene, and it was observed by Fletcher-Moulton, L.J. at page 764 as follows: "It cannot be denied that the physical act of changing the surface of a road when the Corporation thought fit and proper so to do was within their statutory powers and there is no case proved by the evidence which shows either that they wastefully used the public money or that they did so with improper motives. The case would be quite different if one came to the conclusion that under the guise of improvement of a road, certain moneys had been used really for diminishing the expenses of the Automobile Club or anything of that sort and that there had been a turning aside of public moneys to illicit purposes.” The principle was applied by Denning, L.J. in Earl Fitzwilliams Wentworth Estate Company Ltd. v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, (1951) 2 KB 284. It was a case concerning the validity of a compulsory purchase made by the Central Land Board, and confirmed by the Minister, under the provisions of Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, in respect of a plot of land, ripe for development, which the owner was not prepared to sell at the existing use value. The landowner applied to have the order quashed, as not having been made for any purpose connected with the Boards function under the Act, but for the purpose of enforcing the Boards policy of sales at existing use values. The landowner applied to have the order quashed, as not having been made for any purpose connected with the Boards function under the Act, but for the purpose of enforcing the Boards policy of sales at existing use values. The majority (consisting of Some well and Singleton L.J.) held that, though the main purpose of the Board may well have been to induce landowners in general and the company, in particular, to adopt one of the methods of sale favoured by the Board, it was nevertheless in connection with their function as the authority operating the development charge scheme, and at any rate, "the case was not the in which it could be said that powers were exercised for a purpose different from those specified in the statute." Denning, L.J. disagreed with the majority and held that the dominant purpose of the Board was not to assist in their proper function of collecting the development charge, but no enforce their policy of sales at existing use value only. The dominant purpose being unlawful, the order was invalid, and could not be cured by saying that there was also some other purpose which was lawful. The Board and the Minister had misunderstood the extent of their compulsory powers and their affidavits showed that they had overlooked that their ultimate purpose in exercising their powers should be connected with the performance of the Boards functions under the Act." 28. Again in Krishna Ballahh Sahay and others v. Commission of Inquiry and others, AIR 1969 SC 258, a similar view was taken by the Apex Court. It was held that successive Ministry can take a decision to enquire into certain charges against outgoing Minister and such action cannot be said to be mala fide or otherwise illegal. It was contended that the allegations were false. The Court, however, observed that it could be decided only after the findings would be arrived at by the Commission. The Court, therefore, concluded: "Whether they led to the conclusion that the inquiry was justified or, it was malacious cannot be said just now, when there are only allegations and recriminations but no evidence. “It was also observed that if the charges been levelled malaciously or falsely, the Commission would say so but at the stage of Constitution of Commission, the Court would not enter into correctness or otherwise of such allegations. 29. “It was also observed that if the charges been levelled malaciously or falsely, the Commission would say so but at the stage of Constitution of Commission, the Court would not enter into correctness or otherwise of such allegations. 29. In State offammu and Kashmir and others v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad and another, AIR 1967 SC 122, validity of Constitution of a Commission was challenged inter alia on the grounds that the question was not of public importance; no grievance was made by public at large against the so-called accumulation of large wealth by Bakshi Gulam Mohammad and his kiths and kins and the power was not lawfully, reasonably and bona fide exercised. The contention was upheld by the High Court and the action of constituting the Commission was held to be illegal., The aggrieved State approached the Supreme Court. 30. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court, the Supreme Court observed that the matter pertained to public importance and even if there was no objection by public at large, when the Government was satisfied that Constitution of Commission was necessary, an action could be taken. It was not open to the High Court to conclude the matter by holding that the Constitution of Commission was illegal inasmuch as such a finding could only be recorded on the basis of materials placed before the Commission. It was, therefore, held that action could not be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction and by interfering with the Constitution of Commission, the High Court committed which was liable to be set aside. 31. Our attention was also invited by the learned Advocate General to a decision of the High Court of Gauhati in Manabendra Sarkar v. State of Assam and others, AIR 1974 Gauhati 46 wherein it was held that even if a criminal case was pending, an inquiry could be instituted by constituting a Commission and such order could not be held to be illegal or contrary to law only on the ground that criminal proceedings were pending before an appropriate Court. 32. In Harekrushna Mahtab v. Chief Minister of Orissa and others, AIR 1971 Orissa 175, a Division Bench of the High Court held that formation of opinion by the State Government is subjective in nature and is not justiciable. 32. In Harekrushna Mahtab v. Chief Minister of Orissa and others, AIR 1971 Orissa 175, a Division Bench of the High Court held that formation of opinion by the State Government is subjective in nature and is not justiciable. Unless such satisfaction is arrived at mala fide, the decision, being administrative in nature, cannot be set aside merely on the ground that no hearing was afforded and principles of natural justice were not observed. 33. In our opinion, the law laid down in Ram Krishna Dalmia is also clear on the point that exercise of power under Section 3 (1) of the Act is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in nature and principles of natural justice have, therefore, no application. 34. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our considered opinion, it cannot be said that the power has been exercised mala fide or for collateral purposes or in colourable exercise of power or de hors Pursuant to an order passed by the State Government on April 14, 1998, the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla, made necessary inquiry and submitted his report (Annexure P-3). On the basis of said report, in exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, the respondent No. 2 decided to constitute a Commission and issued a notification (Annexure P-3/A). Looking to the matters which weighed with the appropriate Government, in our view, it can neither be said that they do not concern or deal with matters of "public importance" nor there is mala fide exercise of power. We are also of the view that Constitution of Commission neither directly nor remotely interfered with judicial process of the Court or in conflict with a decision rendered by this Court on March 9, 1998 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 4 of 1998. The action, hence, cannot be quashed and set aside at this stage. We also hold that in rejecting preliminary objections, the respondent No. 1 has not committed an error of law and/ or jurisdiction which requires interference in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution particularly when it was specifically observed by respondent No. 1 that all such objections will be decided at the time of hearing of matter. 35. For the foregoing reasons, we see no force in any of the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 35. For the foregoing reasons, we see no force in any of the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. The petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, however order as to costs. 36. Before parting with the matter, we may clarify that all the observations made by us hereinabove have been made only for the purpose of deciding the present petition and we should not be understood to have decided any question on merits. Hence, as and when such questions arise before an appropriate authority, they will be decided independently without being inhibited or influenced by any observations made by us in this order. CMP No. 371 of 2000. 37. In view of the order passed by us, interim order passed earlier deserves to be vacated and is hereby vacated. C.M.P. stands dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.