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2000 DIGILAW 279 (PAT)

T. v. R. Raju VS State Of Bihar

2000-02-17

ASOK KUMAR GANGULY

body2000
Judgment A.K.Ganguly, J. 1. With the consent of the parties, this matter has been heard at length at the admission stage itself and the controversy raised in this writ petition is decided by the following judgment. 2. The question which falls for decision in this case is whether the appropriate Government, while acting in exercise of the statutory power of review under section 25-0(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the I.D. Act), can, without hearing the parties, pass an order reversing its earlier decision which was passed, after hearing the parties, under section 25-0(2) of the I.D. Act. 3. In the instant case the grievances of the petitioners are that while passing the order dated 29.7.1999 under section 25-0(2) of the I.D. Act respondent no.2 rejected the application filed by respondent no.6 (hereinafter called the respondent Company) for closing its H.D.P. Unit and this oder was passed upon hearing the parties. In passing the said order, respondent no.2 came to the conclusion that the respondent Company could not substantiate its case for closing down its H.D.P. Unit. Thereafter the Managing Director of the said Company filed an application under Sub-section (5) of Section 25-0 of the said Act for review of the previous order dated 29.7.1999. This time, respondent no.2 did not hear either the workers or the Management and, on review, reversed the earlier order and granted permission to respondent Company to" close the H.D.P. Unit of the respondent Company. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners raised the following points : (i) Even though the provisions of Section 25-0(5) of the said Act enable the appropriate authority to review its previous order under Sub-section (2) of Section 25-0 of the I.D.Act, such power must be exercised in a manner which is consistent with the principles of natural justice. (ii) Even though the provision of giving a hearing is not stated in so many words under section 25-0(5) of the said Act, the requirement to follow the principles of natural justice must be read into it having regard to the nature of the power to be exercised by way of review, the interest of parties and the interest of industrial peace before a completely new order can be passed by the authority. (iii) Therefore, in passing the order under review, all the requirements which are prescribed under Sub-section (2) of Section 25-0 of the said Act must be followed. (iv) The instant order of review purporting to grant permission to the said respondent Company to close its H.D.P. Unit directly affects the livelihood of the petitioners. This amounts to affecting the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This right can only be affected on the basis of a procedure which must be just, fair and reasonable. (v) Such just, fair and reasonable procedure demands that the authority must act in compliance with the principles of natural justice. 5. Learned counsel for both respondent no. 6 Company and the State in this case spoke in one voice. Their principal contentions are : (i) There is no requirement of hearing under sub-section (5) of section 25-O of the I.D.Act. As such the impugned order has been rightly passed without hearing either of the parties. (ii) In the facts of this case no hearing is necessary as the order dated 29.7.1999 was reversed by respondent no.2 on the basis of facts which are all verified and there is no scope for the petitioners to controvert those facts. (iii) The impugned order dated 8.10.1999 has not caused any prejudice to the petitioners. 6. In order to appreciate these points, few facts which are material are noted below : 7. The respondent Company, it is asserted, was incorporated on 20th January, 1920 and at that time it had, only a Hot Deep Plant (H.D.P.) and it used to produce tin plates and adopted the said Hot Deep continuing process till after 1970. Thereafter in 1970 a new plant, namely E.T.P. was commissioned for the purpose of producing tin plates using electrolytic tinning process. It is stated in the writ petition that at present the respondent Company has three units, namely, H.D.P. E.T.P. and C.R.M. The petitioners are workers engaged in H.D.P. Unit of the respondent Company. The petitioners have asserted that the profits of the H.D.P. Unit have been utilised for establishing those two other units. 8. The respondent Company filed an application dated 1.6.1999 in the prescribed QA form under section 25-0 of the I.D. Act before the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Department of Employment and Training, Government of Bihar, Patna for obtaining permission for closure of its H.D.P. Unit. 8. The respondent Company filed an application dated 1.6.1999 in the prescribed QA form under section 25-0 of the I.D. Act before the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Department of Employment and Training, Government of Bihar, Patna for obtaining permission for closure of its H.D.P. Unit. The same was a notice seeking permission of closure under subsection (1) of Section 25-O of the said Act. It has been accepted by the respondent Company in its affidavit filed before this Court that on the basis of the said notice, the Commissioner- cum-Secretary called a meeting on 6.7.1999 in which the representatives of the respondent Company as also representatives of the recognised Union and also some other workmen participated while the matter was discussed in detail. In the affidavit of the respondent Company it was also stated that a supplementary statement was filed by it on 21.7.1999 containing various materials. Thereafter on 29.7.1999 an order was passed by respondent no.2 in which he had refused to grant permission for closure of H.D.P. Unit. Copy of the said order is marked Annexure-3 to the writ petition. 9. It is not in dispute that in the said order respondent no.2 has held that the respondent Company has not filed its balance sheet for the period 1998-99 and it was also stated that no sincere effort was made by the respondent Company for expansion and modernisation of its H.D.P. Unit. 10. However, it may be noted that the respondent Company did not challenge the said order dated 29.7.1999 before any forum. 11. Without challenging the said order, what the respondent Company did was that it filed an application for review dated 7.8.1999 before the said respondent no. 2. The said review application has been annexed to the affidavit filed by the respondent Company. A perusal of the said review application would show that various facts have been alleged in the said detailed review application along with various enclosures. 12. From the impugned order dated 8.10.1999 it appears that the said review petition was received by respondent no.2 on 10.8.1999 (wrongly typed as 10.8.1998) and on receipt of the said application respondent no.2 reviewed the order and granted permission to the respondent Company to close down the H.D.P. Unit under the provisions of section 25-O(5) of the said Act from the date of the impugned order, which is 8.10.1999. 13. 13. This Court makes it clear that it does not propose to decide the question whether the claim for closing down the H.D.P. Unit of the respondent Company is a genuine one or the said claim is wholly unjustified. In fact for deciding the said question under the appropriate statutory provision a full fledged mechanism has been provided and if necessary, there can be a reference on this question under I.D. Act. So this Court is well advised not to take upon itself the burden of deciding the correctness or otherwise of the disputed claims and counter claim of the parties. 14. But the Court in exercise of its power of judicial review can and should examine whether in the process of reaching the impugned decision dated 8.10.1999 the respondents authorities have acted in a manner which is consistent with the justice of the case and fair play in action. 15. From the aforesaid chain of events, one thing is clear that the respondents authorities after receiving the application for review from the respondent Company on 10.8.1999 had taken two months time to pass the order of review. Therefore, it had sufficient time to hear the parties. It cannot be the case of respondent no.2 that situation does not brook a moments delay and a hearing to the parties would have defeated either the purpose of law or the urgency of the situation. In fact when the previous order dated 29.7.1999 was passed, the same was also passed within a period of two months from the date of the application of the respondent Company. But on that occasion it was passed after hearing the parties. Therefore, there is no conceivable explanation for not giving a hearing to the parties. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent Company in support of the impugned order urged that there has been a settlement between the management of the respondent Company and the majority labour Union and as a result of the said settlement, which according to the learned counsel is a tripartite one, the employees have accepted voluntarily retirement scheme offered by the management of the respondent Company. Learned counsel further submitted that accepting the said scheme, majority of the workers of the H.D.P. unit have accepted payment and as such the present grievance made by some of the workers against the impugned order is practically of no consequence. Learned counsel further submitted that accepting the said scheme, majority of the workers of the H.D.P. unit have accepted payment and as such the present grievance made by some of the workers against the impugned order is practically of no consequence. According to the learned counsel, out of 1000 workers, about 680 workers have accepted the improved offer under the V.R.S. Scheme by the respondent Company. Learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the said memorandum of settlement between the respondent Company and the workmen represented by Golmuri Tin Plate Workers Union at the concilliation proceeding under section 12(3) of the said Act held by the Joint Labour Commissioner, Bihar, Patna. Learned counsel also submitted that as a result of the said improved terms under the said VRS on the basis of the said tripartite agreement dated 23.8.1999, the impugned order is totally justified. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, has disputed the aforesaid fact and said that the respondent Company can very well run the H.D.P. Unit instead of seeking to close it down. Previously on consideration of all relevant matters and after hearing them the prayer made by the respondent Company was turned down by respondent no. 2. Therefore, there is no reason for allowing the same on the basis on a review of the previous order by the said respondent no. 2 and that too in a manner which is totally unfair inasmuch as the petitioners have not at all been given any notice of the review petition and they have not been admittedly heard in the said proceeding. 18. This Court, at the cost of repetition makes it clear that in a situation like this, its judicial scrutiny is directed against the decision making process and not against the decision itself. 19. 18. This Court, at the cost of repetition makes it clear that in a situation like this, its judicial scrutiny is directed against the decision making process and not against the decision itself. 19. Since the provisions of Section 25-O of the said Act have come up for consideration in this case, this Court sets out those provisions for its proper appreciation : "25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking, (1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission atleast ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work. (2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1) the appropriate Government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons interested in such closure may having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days. (4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from, the date of such order. (4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from, the date of such order. (5) The appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or, any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication : Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub- section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (6) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like, it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order. (8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under subsection (2) or where permission for closure is deemed to be granted under sub-section (3), every workman who is employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months." 20. The exact controversy in the instant case is whether an order of review can be passed without hearing the parties. The exact controversy in the instant case is whether an order of review can be passed without hearing the parties. It may be noted in this connection that similar provisions for review are also contained in sub-section (7) of Section 25-M of the I.D. Act which relates to prohibition in a case of lay-off and also in sub-section (6) of Section 25-N of the said Act which lays down the conditions precedent for retrenchment of workmen under the I.D.Act. 21. It may be further noted in this connection that original Section 25-O of the said Act, as was enacted by the Amending Act 32 of 1976, was struck down by the Honble Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Excel Wear vs. Union of India as being violative of the provisions contained in Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. The Honble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that right to carry on business also includes within it the right not to carry on business. Therefore, the restrictions imposed under relevant section of the I.D.Act as incorporated by the Amending Act 32 of 1976 were unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right. 22. In order to save the Act from the challenge of constitutional invalidity, the present section 25-O of the I.D. Act has been recast by way of Amending Act 46 of 1982 and Section 25-O in the present form has come into existence with effect from 21.8.1984. 23. Before this Court, the constitutional validity of the aforesaid section 25-O of the I.D. Act has not been challenged. As such this Court does not make any finding on the same. 24. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, this Court is called upon to decide particularly the purport and ambit of the review contemplated under sub-section (5) of Section 25-O of the I.D. Act. Looking at the context in which the said section occurs, this Court is of the opinion that what is contemplated by Section 25-O (5) of the I.D. Act is not a review on limited ground as is understood within the meaning of Order XXXVII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Here the question is one of statutory review. The object of this provision is to do complete justice between the parties by reconsidering the matter afresh to find out whether the original decision was legal and factually sustainable. Here the question is one of statutory review. The object of this provision is to do complete justice between the parties by reconsidering the matter afresh to find out whether the original decision was legal and factually sustainable. The nature of such consideration is so broad based that it can even be the subject matter of industrial adjudication before a tribunal. From the wording of the section it is obvious that in review the matter is wide open for factual reconsideration on all points. So the review has to be a very broad based one and in deciding such question evidence can also be gone into. 25. So it is imperative that in such consideration the parties whose interests are affected must be heard in accordance with principles of natural justice even though requirement of hearing is not specifically provided for under sub-section (5) of Section 25-O of the said Act. 26. Learned counsel for the State and the respondent Company harped very much on this aspect that since there is no express provision of hearing under section 25-O(5) of the I.D.Act, the principles of natural justice are not attracted. This Court is unable to accept this contention either on principle or on precedent. 27. Bereft of all verbiage, the principles of natural justice ought to mean those principles which have emerged over the years to ensure fairness to an actionbe it administrative, quasi-judicial or even judicial. Such principles obviously defy any rigid formulation and by their na- ture must remain fluid to meet the varying demands of fairness in a given situation. 28. In the present context of a decision on review under section 25-O(5) of the I.D. Act, it is obvious that the authority will have to weigh the pros and cons of conflicting representations. So the very nature of the statutory scheme and the wording of the section tend in favour of the view that the requirement of a hearing is inherent if a fair decision on conflicting representation is to be arrived at by the authority. Such a decision is obviously a quasi-judicial one. On the outcome of the decision depends the fate of the managements fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, which includes also the negative of the right of not carrying on the business. Such a decision is obviously a quasi-judicial one. On the outcome of the decision depends the fate of the managements fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, which includes also the negative of the right of not carrying on the business. As against that, it is the workers right to livelihood which is also a right included within the embrace of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. So the decision on review is of a far reaching consequence and very crucial to the contesting parties. 29. In this connection, it is apt to extract the opinion of Lord Guest delivered in Wiseman and another vs. Borneman and Others, a decision of the House of Lords, reported in 1971 Appeal Cases, page 297. At page 310 of the report, the learned Judge observed as follows : "It is reasonably clear on the authorities that where a statutory tribunal has been set up to decide final questions affecting parties rights and duties, if the statute is silent upon the question, the courts will imply into the statutory provision a rule that the principles of natural justice should be applied. This implication will be made upon the basis that Parliament is not to be presumed to take away parties rights without giving them an opportunity of being heard in their interest. In other words, Parliament is not to be presumed to act unfairly. The dictum of Byles J. in Cooper vs. Wandsworth Board of Works, 14 C.B.N.S. 180, 194 is clear to this effect and has been followed in many subsequent cases." 30. The speeches of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, in that decision, at page 308-09 of the report are couched in even more felicitous expressions and which I quote : "My Lords, that the conception of natural justice should at all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision of definition or precision as to application. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision of definition or precision as to application. We do not search for prescriptions which will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent situations, be done. The principles and procedures are to be applied which, in any particular situation or set of circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural justice, it has been said, is only "fair play in action." Nor do we wait for directions from Parliament. The common law has abundant riches: There may we find what Byles J. called "the justice of the common law" [Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180, 194]." (emphasis added) 31. In a subsequent decision of the House of Lords in Pearl Berg and Varty (Inspector of Taxes) reported in (1972) 1 WLR page 534 the observations of Lord Guest, which are extracted above, have been expressly approved at page 547 of the report of Lord Pearson. 32. Back home, the Supreme Court has not lagged behind. In dealing with the question of review by the President of the Board of Secondary Education, the Honble Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Sayeedur Rahman vs. State of Bihar and others reported in AIR 1973 S.C. page 239 have laid down the position quite clearly. In that case the President of the Board of Secondary Education, Bihar by an order dated 25th February, 1961 reviewed the earlier order dated 22nd April, 1960 without affording the employee an opportunity of being heard. In paragraph 7 at page 243 of the report, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have noted that : "There is no express provision for review in the rules to which our attention was drawn." (emphasis added) 33 Even then the learned Judges held as follows, in paragraph 7 at page 243 of the report : "This unwritten right of hearing is fundamental to a just decision by any authority which decides a controversial issue affecting the rights of the rival contestants. This right has its roots in the notion of fair procedure.(emphasis added)" 34. This right has its roots in the notion of fair procedure.(emphasis added)" 34. This principle has been further elaborated by their Lordships in the said paragraph 7 at page 243 of the report in the following words : "The omission of express requirement of fair hearing in the rules or other source of power claimed for reconsidering the order dated April 22, 1960 is supplied by the rule of justice which is considered as an integral part of our judicial process which also governs quasi-judicial authorities when deciding controversial points affecting rights of parties." 35. The same principle has been reiterated later on by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the celebrated decision in the case of Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and another reported in AIR 1978 S.C. page 597. In paragraph 57 at page 624 of the report the said question has been answered by the Honble Mr. Justice Bhagwati (as His Lordship then was) by drawing inspiration from the dictum of Byles J, in Cooper vs. Wandsworth Board of Works the decision which was expressly approved by the House of Lords in the judgments mentioned hereinbefore, Justice Bhagwati observed : "Now, it is true that there is no express provision in the Passports Act, 1967 which requires that the audi alteram partem rule should be followed before impounding a passport, but that is not conclusive of the question, if the statute makes itself clear on this point, then no more question arises. But even when the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle stated by Byles, J. in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180: "A long course of decisions, beginning with Dr. Bentleys case (1723) 1 Str 557 and ending with some very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature." (emphasis added) 36. In a more recent judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of National Textile Workers Union vs. P.R.Ramakrishnan and others reported in AIR 1983 S.C. page 75 similar opinion has been expressed. 37. In a more recent judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of National Textile Workers Union vs. P.R.Ramakrishnan and others reported in AIR 1983 S.C. page 75 similar opinion has been expressed. 37. While delivering the majority view in the said case, Justice Bhagwati (as His Lordship then was) explained the rationale behind recognising the right of the workers to be heard in a winding up proceeding of a Company even though there is no such right given to them under the law. His Lordship held, relying on the various decisions of the Supreme Court including the decision in the case of Maneka Gandhi (supra), that no order involving adverse civil consequences can be passed against any person without giving him an opportunity to be heard against the passing of such order and this rule applies irrespective of whether the proceeding in which it is passed is a quasijudicial or an administrative proceeding. 38. His Lordship expressed strong displeasure on the system of law which seeks to take away, from the workers, such a right of being heard in the following words : "It is difficult to imagine how any system of law which is designed to promote justice through fair play in action can permit the Court to make a winding up order which has the effect of bringing about termination of the services of the workers without giving them an opportunity of being heard against the making of such order." 39. In the instant case the position of the petitioners stands on a much stronger footing. Under sub-section (2) of Section 25-O of the said Act, they have a right of being heard when the original order was passed and, in fact, they were heard. So the petitioners are not excluded under the scheme of the Act. Therefore, when that order is reviewed and a fresh order is passed reversing the earlier order it cannot be passed without hearing them once again. 40. Therefore, relying on the aforesaid binding ratio of the Apex Courts judgments and the persuasive wisdom of the principle established by the House of Lords, this Court is of the considered opinion that even though right of hearing under sub-section (5) of Section 25-O of the said Act has not been specifically stated but such a right must be read into it as part of a fair procedure. It has also been held by the Supreme Court that the principle of natural justice is an inbuilt content of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in the case of Union of India and another vs. Tulsiram Patel reported in AIR 1985 S.C. page 1416. 41. Learned counsel for the respondent Company has said that this requirement of natural justice can be satisfied by post decisional hearing. But in a case of this description post decisional hearing does not and cannot serve the purpose. When the petitioners have a right of hearing at a pre-decisional stage before an order can be passed under sub-section (2) of section 25-Oof the I.D. Act, the said right must be available to them if that order is capable of being reversed on review. In such a situation, a post decisional hearing is but an empty formality as has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of K.I.Shephard and others vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1988 S.C. page 686. (Paras 14, 15 and 16). 42. Learned counsel for respondent Company relied on the decision in the cases of D.C.M. Ltd. vs. Lt.Governor, Delhi and others reported in 1989 Lab. I.C. page 1652. In that judgment the learned Judges of the Full Bench of Delhi High Court examined the decision given by the authority refusing to grant closure of the establishment. In the facts of that case, the learned Judges of the Full Bench held that grant of closure will meet the justice of the situation in view of the settlement between the management of the Textile Mill and majority of the workmen and the learned Judges held that in the fact of that case the interest of labour cannot be said to have been ignored by the management and the case was found fit for grant of permission to close down. In this case this Court is not, as observed earlier, concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the decision given on review but this Court is concerned with the fairness of the procedure which should have been adopted in passing such an order. Therefore, the decision of the Full Bench in the case of D.C.M. Limited (supra) does not throw any light on the question with which the Court is concerned in this case. 43. Therefore, the decision of the Full Bench in the case of D.C.M. Limited (supra) does not throw any light on the question with which the Court is concerned in this case. 43. The other decision which has been cited by the learned counsel for respondent Company is in the case of Air India Hostesses Association vs. Air India Limited and others reported in 1997 Lab. I.C. page 2569. In that case also the learned Judges of Bombay High Court expressed their views on the binding nature of a settlement arrived at under section 18 of the said Act and the Honbl Judges of the High Court gave caution that such a settlement which has been arrived at as a result of protracted negotiation cannot be thrown overboard on complaints from a small group of workers. 44. In this case we are not concerned with the said question. Since, the nature of question in this case is totally different, the principle decided in the case of Air India Hostesses Association (supra) is not relevant to this case. 45. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the discussions made above, this Court holds that it cannot sustain the impugned order at Annexure-6. The same is hereby quashed as it was passed without hearing the parties. 46. But this Court remits the matter to the authority concerned for a decision afresh on the review petition filed by respondent Company. In such review proceeding, notice of oral hearing must be given to the petitioners. Since the review petition has already been disclosed in this writ petition no copy need be served again on the petitioners. In the hearing of the review proceeding, the petitioners are given liberty to produce materials and file rejoinder in support of their case. Since the matter is of vital importance to the parties the review proceeding may be concluded as early as possible but preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of production of a copy of this order before the authority concerned. 47. This writ petition is thus allowed to the extent indicated above. Till decision is made on review petition, the interim order granted on 20.1.2000 and reiterated on 31.1.2000 must continue. No order as to costs.