Judgment :- 1. This Petition is filed by petitioner to condone delay of one month in filing the revision petition against the fair and decretal order in R.C.A. 17 of 1998 on the file of Rent Control Appellate Authority/Sub Court, Devakottai. 2. Appellate Authority pronounced Judgment on 29.1.1999 and on the same day, application was filed for getting certified copy. Stamp papers were called on 18.2.1999 and on the very next day, the same was deposited. Certified copy was made ready on 1.3.1999 and the same was delivered on 23.1999. 3. Under Section 25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, ‘every application to the High Court for the exercise of its power under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within one month from the date on which the order or proceeding to which the application relates is communicated to the applicant; provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time specified in this Sub-section. 4. From the above provision, it is clear that the revision will have to be filed within one month and if there is delay, this Court can condone the same subject to maximum of one month. 5. The question arises in this petition is what is the meaning of the word ‘month’ occurring in Section 25 of the Act. 6. If the month is calculated only as 30 days, the revision ought to have been filed on or before 31.3.1999. If limitation is to be considered according to calender month, the revision ought to have been filed on or before 1.4.1999. Likewise, this Court is empowered to condone delay only for a period of one month. Whether that one month is equal to 30 days or English Calender month is the matter in issue. If it is according to English Calender month, the last day for filing revision was 1.4.1999 and delay commences from 2.4.1999 and one month thereafter will end on 1.5.1999.1.5.1999 is holiday and Court also closed for summer vacation. Court reopened only on 7.6.1999 on which date C.R.P. was filed. If we calculate month as 30 days, even for the purpose of condoning delay, revision ought to have been filed on or before 30.4.1999. 7. Court reopened only on 7.6.1999 on which date C.R.P. was filed. If we calculate month as 30 days, even for the purpose of condoning delay, revision ought to have been filed on or before 30.4.1999. 7. The question is whether the word ‘month’ occurring in Section 25 of the Act is to be calculated according to English Calender month or only 30 days as contended by respondent. 8. Learned counsel for respondent relied on the decision of this Court rendered by a single Judge reported in 1994 (1) L.W. 599 (Deenadayalan v. Habibunnissa). Learned Judge held that the word ‘month’ referred to in Section 25 is only 30 days and not 31 days. If I am to rely on the decision, I have to hold that I have no power to excuse the delay and consequently the CMP is to be dismissed. In that judgment in paras 6 and 7 learned single Judge held thus, “6. The above approach does not completely solve the problem. In the permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, it is stated that the term ‘month’ in a statute ordinarily denotes the period terminating with day of succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning, less one. This is the method adopted in the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in interpreting the period of one month, three months, or six months respectively. I might at once say that this is the method adopted even by the Registry in calculating the period of delay. For instance, in the method of calculation which I have quoted earlier, the period of delay for the whole month to July is taken as 31 days whereas the period of delay in the month of June is taken as 21 days adopting the period of month as 30 days. Therefore, when the period of calculation extends over a number of months the Court always adopts the British Calender month for the purpose of calculating the period. But we are faced i n this case as to whether the word ‘month’ used as a measure in S. 25(2) of the Act should be equated to 30 days or 31 days. Therefore, when the period of calculation extends over a number of months the Court always adopts the British Calender month for the purpose of calculating the period. But we are faced i n this case as to whether the word ‘month’ used as a measure in S. 25(2) of the Act should be equated to 30 days or 31 days. In the very same Permanent Edition of Words and Phrases it is stated that ‘month’ as contained in the proviso of the 8th Section of the (General Railway Law is used to express the same time as the words 30 days in the body of the Section. This is more or less in accord with the judgment of this court in Vama Dava Desikar v. Murugesa Muddali I.L.R. (1905) 29 Mad. 75). A reterence to the Halsburys Laws of England does not also improve the situation. For instance it is stated in the 4th Edition of Halsburys Laws of England at page 147 that the method of calculation of the period one month is the last day of the succeeding month, less one day. This method of calculation of a calendar month has already been advertised to by me. To complete the reference to English dictionaries, one may refer to the Standard Dictionary by Funk and Wangalls. After referring to a lunar month, the definition says that the month is equal to “One of the 12 parts into which the calendar year is divided, called a calendar month; lossely, thirty days or four weeks.” In my opinion this definition affords the best method of calculating the period of one month as the 12 parts of a year and a year under Gregorian Calendar is 365 days. Venkataramaiyas Law Lexicon Vol. 11 at page 935 says as follows:— “In the context the expression “month” meant a period of 30 days. In the Oxford Dictionary also, the following meaning is given for the expression “month”; A space of time; reckoned from any moment, and either extending to the corresponding day of the next calendar ‘month’ (in which case space of time is called ‘a calendar month’.)” 7. The above quotation clearly indicates that it is only when the period of time extends to the next month, the importance of the calendar month is fell and the question of referring to the British Calendar is indicated. The above quotation clearly indicates that it is only when the period of time extends to the next month, the importance of the calendar month is fell and the question of referring to the British Calendar is indicated. But when the word “month” is used merely as an unit of measure, I am of the opinion that it can only refer to 30 days and not 31 days. I have already referred to the definition contained in the Standard Dictionary by Funk and Wangalls and also permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, in this regard. But the observation of Venkataramaiyas Law Lexicon, above quoted, confirms my view.” 9. A Division Bench of our High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in 1977 Taxation Law Reports 711 ( I.T. Commissioner, Madras v. Kadri Mills). Section 271 (1)(a) of the Income-Tax Act states that if the Income-Tax officer is satisfied that any person has without reasonable cause failed to furnish the return of the total income which he was required to furnish under Sub-S(1) of S. 139 or by notice given under Sub.S(2) of S. 139 or S. 148 or has without reasonable cause failed to furnish it within the time allowed and in the manner required by Sub-S(1) of S. 139 or by such notice, as the case may be, he may direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty, in addition to the amount of the tax, if any payable by him, a sum equal to two per cent, of the tax for every month during which the default continued, but not exceeding in the aggregate fifty per cent of the tax. Before the Division Bench, the question came up for consideration was, what exactly the word ‘month; occurring in the statute. In that case, the assessee had to file return and time was given till 15.1.1962. But the return was actually filed on 15.2.1962. The question before the Division Bench was whether the assessee is liable to pay penalty under Section 271(1)(a) of the Act. A contention was taken before Division Bench that the word ‘month’ means only a period of 30 days and such a period of 30 days of default had occurred and hence the assessee was liable to penalty. The question before the Division Bench was whether the assessee is liable to pay penalty under Section 271(1)(a) of the Act. A contention was taken before Division Bench that the word ‘month’ means only a period of 30 days and such a period of 30 days of default had occurred and hence the assessee was liable to penalty. As against the said contention, the assessee submitted that the word ‘month’ has to be reckoned according to English Calendar month as provided under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act (1897) and if so, return filed on 15.2.1962 is within time. Income-tax Act also does not define the word ‘month’ and S. 3 of the General Clauses Act says that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, ‘month’ shall mean month reckoned according to English Calendar. Thereafter, learned Judge considered this question from paragraphs 5 onwards which read thus, “5. How a month is to be reckoned has been the subject matter of consideration by Courts. According to “Words and Phrases - Permanent Edition, West Publishing Company,” “The term ‘month’, whether employed in modern statute or contracts, and not appearing to have been used in a different sense, denotes a period terminating with the day of the succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning, less one. If there be no corresponding clay of the succeeding month, it terminates with the last day thereof.” According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Third Edition, ‘month’ means:— “A Space of time, either (a) extending from any day to the corresponding day of the next calendar month (called ‘a calendar month’), or (b) containing 28 days (often miscalled a ‘lunar month’,)” One of the earlier decisions which happened to consider the meaning of the word ‘month’ is the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in South British Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Brojo Nath Shako, (1909) ILR 36 Cal 516; that was concerned with the meaning to be attributed to the word ‘month’ occurring in an insurance policy. The question for consideration was whether the word ‘month’ was to be understood as a lunar month or it was to be understood in any other sense. Chief Justice Maclean stated:— “The ordinary meaning of the word ‘month’ in the English language is a lunar month and not the artificial month in the Gregorian calendar. The question for consideration was whether the word ‘month’ was to be understood as a lunar month or it was to be understood in any other sense. Chief Justice Maclean stated:— “The ordinary meaning of the word ‘month’ in the English language is a lunar month and not the artificial month in the Gregorian calendar. This is sufficiently shown by the fact that until the year 1850 the word ‘month’ in an Act of Parliament meant ‘lunar month’, since which date, however, by virtue of a statutory enactment the word ‘month’ is used in Acts of Parliament to mean a calendar month. But the rule as to ‘month’ meaning a ‘lunar month’ in contracts still remains the law in England. The learne d counsel, however for the plaintiff has argued before us that the rule is different in India having regard to certain. Statutory Enactments of the Indian Legislature. The Statutory Enactments relied on are the General Clauses Act and S. 25 of the Indian Limitation Act. “The definition of the word ‘month’, however in the General Clauses Act is only for the purpose of Acts passed by the Indian Legislature. Then coming to Sec. 25 of the Limitation Act, all that Section provides is that for the purpose of that Act time shall be computed according to the Gregorian Callendar. The object of the Section is obvious; here in India there are in use several calendars, the Gregorian and the Bengali, Sambat, so forth-each of which divides the year artificially in a different manner, and for the purpose of the Limitation Act.S. 25 provides that the Gregorian Calendar is to be used. This Section therefore appears to us to have no bearing on the question what is the meaning of the word ‘month’ in a contract drawn in the English language. In various statutes in India, a month is defined as a calendar month; this would have been unnecessary if that were its ordinary meaning. This Section therefore appears to us to have no bearing on the question what is the meaning of the word ‘month’ in a contract drawn in the English language. In various statutes in India, a month is defined as a calendar month; this would have been unnecessary if that were its ordinary meaning. As we have pointed out above it is clear in England that the word ‘month’ in a contract means ‘lunar month’ and we see no reason why the interpretation of an ordinary word in a contract in English should bear a different signification in India to that in England.” Even this is an authority for the proposition that the word ‘month’ occurring in a statute passed by the Indian Legislature has to be understood according to the definition contained in the General Clauses Act, 1897, The expression ‘monthly tenancy’ occurring in S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was the subject matter of consideration of the Calcutta High Court in Ahumad Ali Biswas v. Jyotsna Kumar, AIR 1952 Cal. 19 . The learned Judge held, (at p. 20) “Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly contemplates any kind of ‘monthly tenancy’ and it is well known that a monthly tenancy may be according to an English Calendar, Bengali Calendar, Sambat Calendar and so forth, and may commence on any day of the particular month, say from the 5th of one to the 4th of the next and so on.” 6. In Markanda Sahu v. Lai Sadananda AIR 1952 Orissa 279 a single Bench of the Orissa High Court had applied this definition of ‘month, contained in General Clauses Act to the word ‘month’ occurring in decrees and orders of Courts. The Rajasthan High Court had occasion to consider the same expression occurring in S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in its judgment in Banarsilal v. Shri Bhagwan, AIR 1955 Raj 167. In that judgment, the Rajasthan High Court followed the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Ahumad Ali Biswas v. Jyotsna Kumar, AIR 1952 Cal 19 referred to already. A Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Lalif Mohamed v. Commissioner, Gorakpur, AIR 1968 All 44 had occasion to consider the use of the word ‘month’ occurring in S. 40 (1)(a) of the U.P. Municipalities Act. A Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Lalif Mohamed v. Commissioner, Gorakpur, AIR 1968 All 44 had occasion to consider the use of the word ‘month’ occurring in S. 40 (1)(a) of the U.P. Municipalities Act. Section 4(28) of the U.P. General Clauses Act had defined the word ‘month’ in identical terms as in S. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In the light of this definition, the meaning of the expression “three consecutive months” occurring in S. 40(1)(a) of the U.P. Municipalities Act had to be considered. The Allahabad High Court held with reference to the facts of that cas e that the Calendar month commenced on October 30, 1965 and ended on November 29, 1965. 7. A Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had to consider the meaning of the word ‘month’ occurring in S. 106 of the Factories Act of 1948 in Re. v. S. Mehta, AIR 1970 Andhra Pradesh 234. Section 106 of the Factories Act states:— “No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector.” There is a proviso and it is not necessary to refer to it for the purpose of this case. That case dealt with 5 prosecutions. In two cases, the Inspector had visited the factory on 29.8.1966 and the complaint was lodged on 29.11.1966 and in three other cases, the Inspector visited the Factory on 21.8.1966 and the complaint was lodged on 21.11.1966. It was contended by the accused that the prosecution was beyond time. The basis for the contention was that a month meant a period of 30 days and three months meant 90 days and the complaint should be lodged within 90 days from the date of inspection. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the definition of the word ‘month’ occurring in S. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applied and if so applied, the three months meant only there calendar months from the date of inspection and consequently the prosecutions were in time. 8. Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 37, paragraph 139 at page 82 gives the variant meanings of the word ‘month’. That paragraph states – “The term ‘month’ is use J in several senses. 8. Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 37, paragraph 139 at page 82 gives the variant meanings of the word ‘month’. That paragraph states – “The term ‘month’ is use J in several senses. It may mean one of the twelve unequal parts into which the calendar year is divided; it may mean the period which, beginning on any day of a calendar month other than the first, ends on the day next before the corresponding day of the next month; or it may denote a lunar month, that is to say, a period consisting of twenty-eight days”. In paragraph 140, it is pointed out that in statutes before 1850 and instruments before 1926, the word ‘month’ was understood as a lunar month. In statutes after 1850 the word ‘month’ meant calendar month and similarly in instruments after 1925, the word ‘month’ meant calendar month, Paragraph 143 gives the meaning of the word ‘calendar month’. “When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if the period starts at the end of a Calendar month which contains more days than the next succeeding month, the period expires at the end of the latter month.” 9. As far as the present case is concerned, as we have pointed out already, the default commenced on 16.1.1962. Consequently, one months of default would have been completed on 15.2.1962. But on 15.2.1962 itself, the assessee has filed the return. Consequently, the default had not lasted for a month as provided for in S. 271(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act read with S. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, so as to attract the liability to penalty., 10. The learned counsel for the department brought to our notice a decision of the Allahabad High Court dealing with the identical word ‘month’ occurring in the very Section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act which is reported in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kanpur v. Laxmi Rattan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd 97 ITR 285 = (1973) Tax LR 1079). A Bench of the Allahabad High Court in that case after referring to the rival contentions of the parties observed.:— “It is settled that the word ‘month’ is normally understood to mean a lunar month, i.e. period of thirty days. Ltd 97 ITR 285 = (1973) Tax LR 1079). A Bench of the Allahabad High Court in that case after referring to the rival contentions of the parties observed.:— “It is settled that the word ‘month’ is normally understood to mean a lunar month, i.e. period of thirty days. (See Simpson v. Margitson, (1847) 11 QB 23, 31, Ryalls v. R. (1848) 11 QB 781, 798 Rogers v. Kingstonupon-hull Dock Co. (1864) 4 New Rep 494, 496, Schiller v. Peterson and Co. Ltd., (1924) I Ch. 394, 420, 421 (C.A.) Philips (P) and Co. (Northampton) and Towcester Breweries Ltd. v. Rogers, (1925) 1 KB 14, 26, 27 (C.A.) and South British Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Brojo Nath Shaha, (1909) ILR 36 Cal 516. Although these cases do not deal with the interpretation to be put on the word ‘month’ as occnurring in a Statute, and relate to cases relating to contract, they throw light on the meaning of the word as commonly understood. This Court in the case of Misrri Lal v. Jawala Prasad, ILR (1962) 1 All 761, has however, taken the view that in some cases, the word ‘month’ as occurring in a statute may be taken to mean a period of thirty days. On an examination of the scheme and purpose of this section, we are of the view that the word ‘month’ as occurring in this sub-section must be taken to mean a period of thirty days. This provision was enacted for the purpose of imposing a penalty on an assessee who had not filed his return during the prescribed time, and was enacted to serve as a deferent for such lapses. The penalty is imposable for every month during which the default continues. If the meaning ascribed to this word in the General Clauses Act is adopted, it may in some cases lead to a defaulting assessee escaping penalty altogether, in spite of default. To take an illustration; Let us assume that time is given to an assessee up to the 30th January in a particular year for filing a return and he defaults. He, thereafter, files his return on the 27th February. If the word ‘month’ occurring in the Section is taken to mean a full calendar month, the assessee in such a case would not be liable for any amount of penalty. He, thereafter, files his return on the 27th February. If the word ‘month’ occurring in the Section is taken to mean a full calendar month, the assessee in such a case would not be liable for any amount of penalty. Such a result is not contemplated by the language of the sub-section, for the sub-section in clear and unambigious terms makes every assessee liable for penalty during the period of default. In the circumstances, it is not appropriate to import the meaning of the word ‘month’ given in the General Clauses Act in the sub-section, for it does not fit in with the context and scheme of the section, and results in some cases in setting at naught the purpose of the enactment.” With respect, we are unable to share the above view. In the first place, the learned Judges have failed to take note of the difference in the meaning attributable to the word ‘month’ even in England, depending upon whether the word occurs in a deed or in a statute. As we pointed out already till 1850, the word ‘month’ in a statute in England meant only a lunar month and after 1850, the word ‘month’ meant a calendar month, while the same word in a deed meant lunar month till 1925 and only thereafter a calendar month. Consequently, it is not correct to rely upon decisions construing the word ‘month’ occurring in deeds for the purpose of construing the word ‘month’ occurring in statutes. As a matter of fact, the very decision of the Calcutta High Court in South British Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Brojo Nath Shaha, (1909) ILR 36 Cal 516 to which we have already drawn attention and which has been referred to by the learned Judges themselves make this distinction clear. Further, even under the English law, to the lunar month meant only 28 days and not 30 days. Apart from this, the very illustration given by the learned Judges do not support their reasoning and conclusion. In their illustration, the learned Judges pointed out that time has been given to an assessee upto 30th January in a particular year for filing a return and he defaults and files the return on the 27th February. Apart from this, the very illustration given by the learned Judges do not support their reasoning and conclusion. In their illustration, the learned Judges pointed out that time has been given to an assessee upto 30th January in a particular year for filing a return and he defaults and files the return on the 27th February. Between 30th January and 27th February, 30 days had not elapsed and even on the interpretation of the learned Judges the illustration does not establish the assessee escaping from the liability to penalty, Independent of the above, we are also of the opinion that there is absolutely nothing in the context of S. 271(1)(a) of the Income-Tax Act to exclude the application of the definition of the word ‘month’ occurring in S. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, (1897). The learned Judges states that the examination of the scheme and purpose of Sec. 271(1)(a) showed that the word ‘month’ occurring in the said sub-section must be taken to mean a period of 30 days. Otherwise, according to the learned Judges, a defaulter will escape penalty. Even if this escape or non-escape is taken to be the criterion for construing the word ‘month’ yet on the interpretation of the learned Judges themselves, there is scope for escape. A month reckoned according to the British Calendar will be equal to 30 days in some cases and more than 30 days in some other cases and less than 30 days in some other cases . When the default commences on any day in the months of January, March, May, July, August, October, and December and month will be 31 days; if the default commences on any day in April, June September and November and the month will be 30 days and if the default commences on any day in February, the month will be 28 or 29 days according as the year is an ordinary year or leap year. Let us also take an illustration. Suppose an assessee has time to file the return till February 15, 1975, but actually filed in March 16, 1975. If the month is reckoned according to the British Calendar, the default commenced on February 16, 1975, and one month of default expired on March 15, 1975, and therefore, the assessee is liable to penalty. Suppose an assessee has time to file the return till February 15, 1975, but actually filed in March 16, 1975. If the month is reckoned according to the British Calendar, the default commenced on February 16, 1975, and one month of default expired on March 15, 1975, and therefore, the assessee is liable to penalty. On the other hand, if the construction of the learned Judges is adopted, 30 days of default would be completed only on March 17, 1975, and the assessee having filed the return on March, 16, 1975, would escape liability to penalty. Therefore, in our view, this test of escape or no n-escape from penalty to such a limited extent, cannot constitute a safe and sound basis for holding that there is something in the subject or context of S. 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act repugnant to the definition of the word ‘month’ contained in S. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, so as to exclude its application. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the word ‘month’ occurring in S. 271(1)(a) of the Income-Tax Act has to be reckoned according to the British Calendar as provided for in S. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act 1897 and consequently we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee “ (emphasis supplied) Finally in para 10 their Lordships concluded by stating that a month reckoned according to the British Calendar will be equal to 30 days in some cases and more than 30 days in some other cases and less than 30 days in some other cases. 10. Unfortunately this decision was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge. According to me, this decision fully supports the case of the petitioner and the word ‘month’ as referred to in Section 25 of the Rent Control Act is only to be reckoned as per English Calendar month. In view of the provisions of the General Clauses Act, unless there is any requirement to the subject or context, the word ‘month’ shall mean the month reckoned according to the British Calendar month. On a reading of the relevant provisions of the Act, I do not find anything repugnant to the context and the learned Judge also has not held that there is anything repugnant in the context in which it appears. On a reading of the relevant provisions of the Act, I do not find anything repugnant to the context and the learned Judge also has not held that there is anything repugnant in the context in which it appears. Reasoning of the learned Judge that the word ‘month’ is used as unit of measure and it can only refer to 30 days and not 31 days, has not taken into consideration whether there is anything repugnant to the subject or context. Even if the word ‘month’ is used as unit of measure, it cannot be said that the same is repugnant to the subject or context in which it appears. 11. Under normal circumstances, I ought to have referred the matter to larger Bench. But when the Division Bench of this Court itself has taken the view and which is not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge, I feel I will be justified in following the principles enunciated by the Division Bench. 12. In (1979) 1 SCC 75 (Tamil Lahiri v. P.N. Tagore), also their Lordships considering how to calculate the period of six months for the purpose of launching prosecution under Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, in para 7 of the Judgment, their Lordships said that ‘six months’ means ‘six calendar months’ and not 180 days. 13. In (1974) 2 Karnataka Law Journal 369, (Laxmayya v. Harichandra), also similar question came for consideration. In that case, there was direction from the Court that tenant shall deposit all arrears of rent within one month from the date of the order, failing which landlord will be put in possession of the suit house. The question was how to interpret the word ‘one month’. It was held that ‘one month’ shall mean the month reckoned according to British Calendar. 14. In AIR 1970 Andhra Pradesh 234 (In re. v. S. Metha) a similar view was held and the same is referred in the Bench decision of our High Court cited supra. 15. In 1970 Rent Control Journal 177 (Bimal Kumar Gosh v. Susanta Kumar Bose), a case coming under Bihar Rent Control Act, their Lordships considered the scope of Section 11(a) of Bihar Rent Control Act. After extracting the section, learned Judge held that the word ‘month’ referred to has to be reckoned according to English Calendar month. 16. 15. In 1970 Rent Control Journal 177 (Bimal Kumar Gosh v. Susanta Kumar Bose), a case coming under Bihar Rent Control Act, their Lordships considered the scope of Section 11(a) of Bihar Rent Control Act. After extracting the section, learned Judge held that the word ‘month’ referred to has to be reckoned according to English Calendar month. 16. Learned counsel for respondent also relied on the decision reported in (1982) T.L.N.J. 138 = 95 L.W. 76 (D.B.) (M.A. Rajarathnam v. J. Rajammal) a Division Bench decision of our High Court. I do not think that the Division Bench considered this question. In that case only question came up for consideration was how far Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act will apply for filing a revision under Section 25 of the Rent Control Act. At page 144 of the reports the Bench observed that the proviso to Section 25(2) of Rent Control Act has put a ceiling on the power of the High Court when it lays down that in no case shall the High Court extend the time beyond the period of 30 days from the end of the time-limit of one month fixed under Section 25 of the Rent Control Act. In fact, the statute does not provide for 30 days. The word used is one month and the question whether one month is - days’ or - days’ was not decided nor that is a matter in issue in that case. 17. In view of the Bench decision cited supra. I am of the view that the word “month” referred to in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has to be calculated according to English Calendar month, whether it is 30 days or 31 days or even less than 30 days. On the basis of above decision, if we take into consideration the facts of this case, it has to be held that this Court has got power to excuse delay. It is not disputed that from 1.5.1999 (inclusive) Court was closed for summer vacation and reopened only on 7.6.1999. On the reopening date, revision petition was filed. 18. The only other question requires consideration is whether sufficient cause is made out for condoning the delay. The statement in the affidavit was not controverted by the respondent and no serious argument is placed in that regard. 19. On the reopening date, revision petition was filed. 18. The only other question requires consideration is whether sufficient cause is made out for condoning the delay. The statement in the affidavit was not controverted by the respondent and no serious argument is placed in that regard. 19. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Petition is allowed and the delay is condoned.