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2000 DIGILAW 283 (JK)

Gh. Qadir Sheikh v. High Court Of J&K

2000-12-06

A.K.GOEL, NISAR AHMAD KAKRU, T.S.DOABIA

body2000
Per Doabia, J. 1. This Bench has assembled to answer three questions of law which came to be formulated by a Division Bench of this Court. These three questions are:- I. Whether power of control under Subsection (4) of Section 30 of the Act conferred on the Chief Justice under Rule (4) of the Rules called Rules relating to the appointment of ministerial officers of the subordinate courts is dependant on or independent of Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Act? II. Whether the power of appointment of ministerial officers vested in the District Judge can be regulated by the Chief Justice by exercising the power of control under Subsection (4) of Section 30 of the act in absence of provision of mode and method of recruitment and if the answer is in affirmative, to what extent? III. Whether the Chief Justice has the power on administrative side to constitute selection committees, issue orders, instructions, guidelines and circulars to regulate mode and method of recruitment of ministerial officers." 2. The basic reason which led the Division Bench to formulate these questions and refer it to a Larger Bench was that even though a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.33/ 92 in judgment dated 15.04.1999 (hereinafter referred to as Chanchal Singhs case) has expressed an opinion that the High Court under Section 30(4) of the Civil Courts Act, 1977 can monitor the exercise of power of appointment even though this power of appointment is vested in the District Judge and even though to this extent the view expressed was found to be acceptable, the Division Bench was of the opinion that further view expressed by the Division Bench that power under Section 30(4) can be exercised only to examine the legality or otherwise of an appointment order but this can be done only under the rules, if any [as this is traceable to the rules which may be framed under Sub-Section (3)] and no rules have been framed, therefore, the power to monitor vested under Section 30(4) could not be exercised. The Division Bench in Chanchal Sings case was of the view that if this conclusion is accepted then the power under Section 30(4) would no doubt be available to the Chief Justice in terms of the rules framed under Section 30(3) but in the absence of rules the Chief Justice has no such power. The Division Bench in Chanchal Sings case was of the view that if this conclusion is accepted then the power under Section 30(4) would no doubt be available to the Chief Justice in terms of the rules framed under Section 30(3) but in the absence of rules the Chief Justice has no such power. It was also held that the Chief Justice cannot even issue circulars under Rule (4) of the rules. 3. With a view to answer the questions of law formulated and the afore-mentioned view expressed by the Division Bench, it would be apt to appreciate the facts which led to the litigation out of which this reference (hereinafter referred to Ghulam Qadir Sheikhs case) has arisen and also the facts in the earlier litigation in Chanchal Singhs case, in which the aforementioned view noticed by the Division Bench came to be expressed. 4. The facts in the present case i.e. Ghulam Qadir Sheikhs case be noticed. 5. Ghulam Qadir Sheikh (hereinafter referred to as the writ petitioner) submitted an application before the Hon™ble Chief Justice of this court. This application was forwarded to the District Judge, Baramulla. The endorsement made by the Secretary to the Honble Chief Justice is to the following effect:- I am desired to say that you may ask Chowkidar, Munsiff Court, Tangmarag to act as process server in the existing vacancy in the said court, if you think fit and make arrangement for Chowkidars post as you deem fit and proper under rules." 6. After this communication was received by the District Judge, Baramulla (hereinafter referred to as the District Judge), he appointed the Chowkidar at Munsiffs court, Tangmarag as process server and in the resultant vacancy which occurred, the writ petitioner was appointed as the Chowkidar. An order to this effect was issued on 21.08.1989. The writ-petitioner joined the service. His service book was also prepared. He was allotted General Provident Fund Account Number. Later on a telegraphic message was received by the Munsiff, Tangmarag. This was to the following effect:- Munsiff,Tangmarag. 16160/SY refer your telegram dated: 28.11.1989, Gh.Qadir Sheikh, Chowkidar appointment order not confirmed, oust him with (sick) conf." It was this order which was challenged in the writ petition. He was allotted General Provident Fund Account Number. Later on a telegraphic message was received by the Munsiff, Tangmarag. This was to the following effect:- Munsiff,Tangmarag. 16160/SY refer your telegram dated: 28.11.1989, Gh.Qadir Sheikh, Chowkidar appointment order not confirmed, oust him with (sick) conf." It was this order which was challenged in the writ petition. His basic contention was that under section 30 of the Civil Courts Act, it is the District Judge, who has the exclusive power to appoint, suspend and remove the ministerial staff/officer of the subordinate courts. It was accordingly contended that an appointment made by the District Judge could in no circumstances be annulled by the High Court. The learned Single Judge took note of the provisions of Section 30 and as these were interpreted by him, it would be apt to notice these provisions. These read as :- "SECTION 30 Ministerial Officers of Subordinate courts. (1) The ministerial officers of the District courts shall be appointed and may be suspended or removed by the Judges of these courts respectively; (2) The ministerial officers of all courts controlled by a District Court, other than courts of small causes, shall be appointed and may be suspended or removed by the District courts; (3) Every appointment under this Section shall be subject to such rules as (the High Court) may prescribe in this behalf, and in dealing with any matter under this section, a Judge of a court of Small Causes shall act subject to the control of the District courts; (4) Any order passed by a District Judge under this Section shall be subject to the control of the High Court." 7. While interpreting these provisions, it was held that section 30 gives the control and power to the High Court in the matters of appointments in the subordinate courts. It was observed that even under Section 30(4) the High Court has ample power of superintendence and control under the provisions of the Constitution of the State. It was concluded "therefore, it cannot be said that in case of appointment of ministerial staff, the High court has no control and power, but at the same time it is a fact that the basic appointing authority is the District Judge." 8. It was concluded "therefore, it cannot be said that in case of appointment of ministerial staff, the High court has no control and power, but at the same time it is a fact that the basic appointing authority is the District Judge." 8. As in the counter-affidavit the High Court had taken a stand that the appointment of the writ petitioner came to be made in contravention of a Circular issued by the High Court, which circular was to the effect that no person is to be appointed in another District and as the writ-petitioner belonged to Srinagar District, therefore, his appointment in District Baramulla could not be said to be in accordance with the circular issued by the High Court. This aspect of the matter was noticed and it was observed that the District Judge while issuing the letter of appointment could not so act contrary to the directions contained in the circular of the High Court, which circular was to the effect that a person of one District is not to be appointed in another District. However, taking note of the fact that a right had come to vest to the writ-petitioner and as the provisions of Section 126 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir were not followed, therefore, the order of termination was held to be bad. It was observed that this provision should have been followed. A show cause notice should have been issued. It was observed that this provision should have been followed. A show cause notice should have been issued. What was concluded by the learned Single Judge can be summarised as under:- (i) that under Section 30 of the Civil Courts Act, it is only the District Judge, who is appointing authority for the ministerial staff/ officers of the courts at the District level; (ii) that the High Court does not have the power to make appointments of the ministerial officials of the subordinate courts; (iii)that merely because the High Court is the controlling authority, it would not become appointing authority; : (iv) that even though the District Judge has power to make appointments, but he is bound by the circulars issued by the High Court; (v) that even though the High Court is not the appointing authority, but if an employee is appointed in contravention of the circulars and policies laid down by the High Court, then this power can be regulated and even used by the High Court; (vi) that in case the services of an employee are to be brought to an end then the formalities, and procedural safe-guards as indicated in Section 126 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir are required to be followed. 9. In view of conclusion No.(vi) the learned Single Judge set aside the order of termination. It was this order which was challenged in the Letters Patent Appeal. An appeal was also tiled by the High Court as also by the writ-petitioner. The High Court challenged the order of reinstatement of the petitioner. The writ-petitioner has challenged that part of the order by which the back-wages were not granted to him. 10. The facts in Chanchal Singhs case may now be notice: Chanchal Singh was appointed as a Process Server by the District Judge. This was on the basis of merit list prepared by the District Judge. Earlier applications were invited. Chanchal Singh was however, removed from service. This was because his appointment was found to be in contravention of circular No. 10 dated:-31.08.1989. This order of termination was challenged. The writ petition was allowed. An appeal was preferred. This was on the basis of merit list prepared by the District Judge. Earlier applications were invited. Chanchal Singh was however, removed from service. This was because his appointment was found to be in contravention of circular No. 10 dated:-31.08.1989. This order of termination was challenged. The writ petition was allowed. An appeal was preferred. The argument raised was that when the appointment of Chanchal Singh, who was borne on the cadre of ministerial staff was made, a circular issued by the High Court was not observed, and therefore, the Chief Justice of this Court could direct his removal. The Division Bench examined the question as to who is the appointing authority of the ministerial staff. Provisions of Section 30 of the Act were taken note of. It was found that in the absence of rules framed under Section 30(3) of the Act District Court/Judge alone was competent to determine the qualification and mode of appointment of these ministerial servants. The view expressed by the learned Single Judge, "that Chief Justice or any other Judge is, therefore, not a High Court for the purposes of Sub-Section (4) of Section 30 of the Act unless the court including all the judges, have by resolution or under the rules, conferred power upon the Chief Justice for the purposes of said Subsection" was noticed. As the High Court had not placed anything on the record that the powers of the High Court were conferred upon the Chief Justice for the purposes of sub-section (4) of Section 30 of the Act. It was concluded that the High Court had not passed any resolution conferring power of the court on the Chief Justice. 11. The Division Bench took note of the fact that under Section 30 of the Act, the rules were framed and notified on 28.03.1968. It was however, observed that as under the rules the mode of recruitment and appointment had not been prescribed, the District Judge in the matter of appointments could make the appointments in a manner which he thought was just and reasonable. The Division Bench then proceeded to examine the merit of the controversy. It was found that order of termination was passed because it was in breach of Circular No. 10 issued on 31.08.1989. The Division Bench then proceeded to examine the merit of the controversy. It was found that order of termination was passed because it was in breach of Circular No. 10 issued on 31.08.1989. It was found as a matter of fact the circular in question had not reached the District Court, Jammu on the date when the order of appointment was made. It was also held that the circular as a matter of fact could not reach Jammu as it was despatched by the High Court at Srinagar on 31.08.1989. Nevertheless Circular No.3 of 1971 was taken note of, it was observed: "so in the case object and purpose of the Circular was to take away the powers of the District Court vested in it under Sub-section (2) it would be illegal and void ab-initio. However, if its purpose was to monitor the exercise of the power of appointment by the District Court under Sub-Section (4), the same is permissible." 12. As noticed by the Division Bench in Ghulam Qadir Sheikhs case, the division Bench in Chanchal Singhs case also held that "however, under Section 30 of the Act, power of appointment of ministerial officers exclusively vests in the District Court, though it is subject to the rules prescribed under Sub-section (3). The control envisaged under Sub-section (4) must be traceable to the rules prescribed under Sub-section (3)." It was observed as the rules have not been prescribed the parameters of this control and the letter dated: 07.03.1990 is not traceable to the Rules framed under Sub-section (4), it is liable to be quashed. 13. Taking this view of the matter, the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court was affirmed. 13. Taking this view of the matter, the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court was affirmed. A perusal of the judgment in Chanchal Singhs case, referred to above makes it apparent that the Division Bench held:- (i) if the purpose of a circular is to monitor the exercise of power of appointment by the District Judge under Sub-section (4) the same is permissible; (ii) the power to make appointment of ministerial officers exclusively vest in the District Court; (iii) this power is subject to the rules prescribed under Sub-section (3); (iv) the control envisaged by Subsection (4) is to be traceable to the rules prescribed under Sub-section (3); (v) that as the rules had not been pre-scribed and the letter in question (dated:07.03.90) is not traceable to the rules framed under Sub-section (4), it is liable to be quashed. 14. In Ghulam Qadir Sheikhs case this aspect of the matter was taken note of. Division Bench found itself in complete agreement with the observations that by a circular it is possible to monitor the power of appointment exercised by the District Judge under Sub-section (4) but came to the conclusion that this observation runs counter to what has been said in para 11 of the judgment in Chanchal Singhs case. At this stage it would be apt to refer to notification No.87 dated: 28.03.1968 by which rules relating to appointment of ministerial staff of the subordinate courts have been framed. For facility of reference these are re-produced below: - High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu. Notification No.87 Dated:28th March, 1968 In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 30 of the Civil Courts Act, 1977, the High Court is pleased to make the following rules:- (1) These rules may be cited as the rules relating to appointment of the Ministerial officers of the subordinate courts. (2) In these rules- (i) Court means the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir; (ii) Chief Justice means the Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir High Court. (iii)Act means the Civil Courts Act, 77. (iv) Judge means a Judge of the High Court. (v) Ministerial Officer means and include every member of the non-gazetted staff of a District Court and the Courts controlled by it or by the High Court. (iii)Act means the Civil Courts Act, 77. (iv) Judge means a Judge of the High Court. (v) Ministerial Officer means and include every member of the non-gazetted staff of a District Court and the Courts controlled by it or by the High Court. (3) No District Judge shall appoint by promotion any ministerial officer in a grade other than the lowest grade of clerks and menials without previously informing the Chief Justice about the vacancy in that other grade; (4) The control to be exercised by the High Court under Sub-section (4) of Section 30 of the Act shall be exercised through the Chief Justice. (5) An appeal against the order of punishment passed by a District Judge in his original or appellate jurisdiction in respect of a ministerial officer shall lie to the Chief Justice whose orders shall be final subject to further appeal against the order of the Chief Justice imposing or up-holding a penalty of dismissal or removal from service which shall lie to a committee of two Judges to be constituted by the Chief Justice. (6) The ministerial officers may be transferred by the District Judge concerned in accordance with the instructions that may be issued from time to time in this behalf by the Chief Justice; provided that the transfer of a ministerial officer from one district to another shall be made by the Chief Justice. (7) All or any of the powers under these rules may, in the discretion of the Chief Justice, be assigned to any Judge nominated by him." 15. A perusal of Rule (4) makes it apparent that the control to be exercised by the High Court under Sub-section (4) of Section 30 of the Act is to be exercised through the Chief Justice. This aspect of the matter is vital and important for the determination of the controversy in this case. After examining the arguments put across by the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the provisions of Section 30 of the Act and also the rules framed under it, it becomes apparent that so far as the power of appointment of ministerial officers is concerned this vests in the District Courts, meaning "thereby the District Judge. There can be no two opinions about it. There can be no two opinions about it. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, there is no conflict in the views recorded in Ghulam Qadir Sheikhs case and in Chanchal Singhs case. There is again no conflict with regard to the power of the High Court to monitor these appointments. The learned Single Judge in Ghulam Qadir Sheikhs case has gone to the extent rightly so to hold that as a controlling authority the High Court is within its power to issue circulars, frame policies, rules and guide-lines, which the District Judges are bound to follow in making appointments in terms of Section 30 of the Civil Courts Act. It has again been rightly observed that being the controlling authority the High Court is not powerless to quash and recall the appointments, if the appointments have been made by the District Judge in contravention of the policies and circulars. 16. It is this view which to some extent comes in conflict with the view expressed in Chanchal Singhs case. After conceding that the High Court has got requisite power to monitor the process of appointment, the Division Bench in Chanchal Singhs case has expressed a view that this control cannot be exercised unless rules exist on the subject. It is with this view the later Division Bench was unable to agree and this led to the formulation of the questions of law, which have been referred to this bench. We are of the opinion that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in Ghulam Qadir Sheikhs case that short of actual appointments all other steps can be taken by the High Court, is a view which is the correct approach to look at the matter. Under the rules issued by Notification No. 87 (Supra) whereby the control which is to be exercised by the High Court under Sub-section (4) of Section 30 of the Act is to be exercised through the Chief Justice. Therefore, when an observation is made that the High Court is to exercise the control then it would mean that this control has to be exercised through the Chief Justice. To this extent observations made in Chanchal Singhs case are not to be treated as good law and therefore, what is said in para 11 of the judgment in this behalf, in Chanchal Singhs case is over ruled. 17. To this extent observations made in Chanchal Singhs case are not to be treated as good law and therefore, what is said in para 11 of the judgment in this behalf, in Chanchal Singhs case is over ruled. 17. In what manner this control has to be exercised may now be elaborated. In Chanchal Singhs case, it has been observed that this control can be exercised only if there are rules on the subject. The Division Bench while interpreting the said rules in Ghulam Qadir Sheikhs case has observed that this power can be exercised by the Chief Justice even by issuing circulars, administrative instructions and for this reliance has been rightly placed on a decision of the Supreme Court of India in case Sant Ram vs State of Rajisthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910. The decision given in Sant Rams case was noticed by the Supreme Court in a later decision reported as Union of India vs K.P. Joseph and others, 1973 (1) S.L.R. 910. The principle was further elaborated. What is said in this regard is being re-produced below:- "9. Generally speaking, an administrative order confers no justiciable right, but this rule, like all other general rules, is subject to exceptions. This court has held in Sant Ram Sharma v/s State of Rajisthan (1968) 1SCR111 that although Government cannot supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, yet, if the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed and these instructions will govern the conditions of service. 10. In Union of India vs M/S Indo-Afgan Agencies Ltd. (1968)2 SCR 366 at p 377, this court, in considering the nature of import Trade Policy said: "Granting that it is executive in character, this court has held that courts have the power in appropriate cases to compel performance of the obligations imposed by the schemes upon the departmental authorities." To say that an administrative order can never confer any right would be too wide a proposition. There are administrative orders which confer rights and impose duties. It is because an administrative order can abridge or take away rights that we have imported the principle of natural justice of audi alteram partem into this area. A very perceptive writer has written: Let us take one of Mr. There are administrative orders which confer rights and impose duties. It is because an administrative order can abridge or take away rights that we have imported the principle of natural justice of audi alteram partem into this area. A very perceptive writer has written: Let us take one of Mr. Harrisons instance, a regulation from the British War Office that no recruit shall be enlisted who is not five feet five inches only in height and pays him the kings shilling: afterwards the officer is sued by the Government for being short in his accounts; among other items he claims to be allowed the shilling paid to the undersized recruit. The court has to consider and apply this regulation and, whatever its effect may be, that effect will be given to it by the Court exactly as effect will be given to a statute providing that murderers shall be hanged, or that last wills must have two witnesses," (John Chipman Gray on The Nature and Sources of the Law). 11. We should not be understood as laying down any general proposition on this question. But we think that the order in question conferred upon the first respondent the right to have his pay fixed in the manner specified in the order and that was part of the condition of service. We see no reason why the court should not enforce that right." As a matter of fact it is settled law so far as service jurisprudence is concerned and for that matter judicial precedents dealing with the exercise of executive powers that in absence of rules, the executive powers can always be exercised by issuing administrative instructions. Such a view has again been expressed by the Supreme Court of India in S.K.Mathur & others vs Union of India and others, AIR 1999 SC 129. 18. In this regard it would be apt to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court of India in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & others vs State of Punjab, 1955 (2) SCR 225. What was sought to be urged was that no reasonable restriction could be imposed upon the citizens right to carry on trade which right stood guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution by mere executive orders without proper legislation. What was sought to be urged was that no reasonable restriction could be imposed upon the citizens right to carry on trade which right stood guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution by mere executive orders without proper legislation. It was observed that the powers of the executive do extend to matters upon which the State Legislature is competent to legislate and are not confined to matters over which legislation has been passed already. Thus the existence of a legislation on a particular subject is not necessary before the executive is in a position to take a decision. Accordingly the power of the executive to deal with a matter on the executive side even in the absence of legislation was up-held. This decision has been quoted with a view to show that existence of a legislation either in the form of a statute or in the form of a rule is not a sine qua non before executive authority invested with certain powers can take any action in the matter. 19. We are accordingly of the view that an area where a statute or rule does not operate, can always be taken care of by executive orders. 20. At this stage it would be apt to refer to the implication of the term control. The term control stands defined in Websters Dictionary. This meaning has been quoted in the order of reference and it is being quoted again: "To check or regulate; to exercise restraint or direction over; dominate; command; to hold in check; curb; to over power." In Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Edition) the term control has been defined as under: "to exercise, restraining or directing influence over; to regulate; restrain; dominate; curb; to hold from action; over power; counteract; govern." 21. Thus the term control would be of a wide connotation and amplitude and would include a large variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to achieve the powers vested in the authority concerned. See corporation of Nagpur vs Ramchandra, AIR 1984 SC 626. The word control is synonymous with superintendence, management or authority to direct restrict or regulate. See Sharrao Vithal Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs Kassargod Pandhuranga Mallya, AIR 1972 SC 1248. 22. See corporation of Nagpur vs Ramchandra, AIR 1984 SC 626. The word control is synonymous with superintendence, management or authority to direct restrict or regulate. See Sharrao Vithal Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs Kassargod Pandhuranga Mallya, AIR 1972 SC 1248. 22. We are accordingly of the view that the Chief Justice in pursuance of the powers conferred on him under rule 4 of the rules framed vide notification No: 87 re-produced at page 10 of this judgment can exercise the powers which are vested in the High Court and in the exercise of this power of control he can exercise all those powers, which are noticed while taking note of the definition of the word control. 23. The afore-mentioned decisions indicate that executive powers can be exercised by the executive instructions where the rules do not exist and if full effect is given to the word control, then the Hon™ble Chief Justice of this Court is competent to regulate the exercise of power which is expressly not conferred on any other functionary. It is only the power of appointment which is conferred on the District Judge. As to how these appointments are to be made or which authority is to issue notification inviting applications or who would constitute a selection committee or what would be the procedure to be adopted by the selection committee are all matters which would fall under the word control and this word control which is comprehensive in nature would include as indicated above the power to regulate the procedure to be followed while making the appointments. 24. As a matter of fact there is nothing new in the interpretation we have placed. The Union Public Service Commission in the case of Union of India and the State Public Service Commissions in the case of States, make recommendations for making appointments and it is ultimately if accepted by the appointing authority it leads to an order of appointment being issued. The appointing authority comes into picture only after the recommendations are made. On the same analogy if the executive instructions are issued by the Chief Justice in the exercise of the powers conferred on him and the method, manner of appointment and procedure to be adopted is indicated, then this would be within the ambit of section 30 (4) of the Act, read with the rules framed thereunder. On the same analogy if the executive instructions are issued by the Chief Justice in the exercise of the powers conferred on him and the method, manner of appointment and procedure to be adopted is indicated, then this would be within the ambit of section 30 (4) of the Act, read with the rules framed thereunder. The issuance of rules is not a condition precedent to the exercise of this power. This leads to uniformity in the method and manner of selection process. Leaving this process at District level can lead to different criteria being adopted by different District Judges. If the Honble Chief Justice of this court wishes to regulate or has regulated this procedure by issuing instructions and method or manner stands determined by the executive order then this would be well within the four comers of the statutory scheme and the rules. Question No.1. We are accordingly of the view that the power of control under Sub-section (4) of Section 30 of the Act conferred on the Chief Justice under rule (4) of the rules relating to the appointment of the ministerial officers of the Subordinate Courts is not dependent on subsection (3) of Section 30. Question No.1 is answered accordingly. Question No.II. The power of appointment of ministerial officers vested in the District Judges can be regulated by the Chief Justice by exercising the power of control under Sub-section (4) of Section 30 when there exist no provision determining the mode and method of recruitment. Question No.III. In the exercise of powers conferred on the Chief Justice under Section 30 of the Act, the Chief Justice can regulate the mode and method of recruitment of ministerial officers. This would include the power to constitute the Selection committees and issue orders/instructions, dealing with criteria to be adopted. The three questions formulated by the Division Bench are answered accordingly. 25. So far as the merits of the controversy in Ghulam Qadir Sheikhs case is concerned, the view expressed by the learned Single Judge that the ministerial officials can be appointed by the District Judge and that Ghulam Qadir Sheikh was appointed by the District Judge and that before bringing an end to his service tenure, procedure as indicated in Section 126 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir was not followed, is upheld. Ghulam Qadir Sheikh, writ-petitioner shall be entitled to reinstatement. Ghulam Qadir Sheikh, writ-petitioner shall be entitled to reinstatement. The appeal preferred by the High Court to this extent would be dismissed. The appeal preferred by Ghularn Qadir Sheikh seeking back-wages is disposed of with an observation that he would be entitled to back wages with effect from the date the judgment was passed by the learned Single Judge. This would however, be subject to the condition that he would furnish proof of the fact that during this period he was not gainfully employed else where.