1. Petitioner has filed this writ petition for the grant of following reliefs: "A) An appropriate writ, order or di­rection in the nature of writ of mandamus com­manding the respondents to extend the similar benefit to the petitioners as has been extended to writ petitioners by virtue of judgment in case titled Javed iqbal and others vs. State of J&K and others. B) Any other relief which this Honble court, in the facts and circumstances of the case deems fit and proper." 2. At the time of hearing of the writ peti­tion as also from the record it is clearly made out that petitioner Khadim Hussain and other persons had already filed SWP No. 102/93 which stands already dismissed by this court in terms of Annexure "D" dated: 17.11.1999. In this behalf what is stated by the petitioners and is relevant for the purposes of this case is men­tioned in para 12 of the petition, which is ex­tracted hereinbelow: "That the petitioners have filed a writ petition bearing No. 102/93 titled Hakim Nazir and others vs. State. The said writ petition has been decided by the court on 17.11.1999, copy whereof is enclosed herewith as Annexure "D". However, the point being raised in this petition was neither agitated nor convassed." 3. When this case was taken up for consid­eration, Sh. J.P. Singh, learned counsel appear­ing for respondents 1 & 2 alongwith Sh. D.C. Raina, who appeared for respondent No.3, objected to the entertainment of petition on the principles underlying order 2 Rule 2 as well as under section 11 (iv) Explanation of CPC being barred and for its dismissal. 4. As per prayer (A) made in the writ peti­tion, petitioners claim that similar benefit be ex­tended to them on the basis of judgment of this court in the case of Javed Iqbal & others vs. State of J&K & others, which petition alongwith other connected cases was allowed on 22.08.1991, copy Annexure "A" to the writ pe­tition. Thus it is obvious that when SWP No. 102/93 was dismissed on 17.11.1999 then claims of the petitioners could not have been and in fact should have been based on the said judgment. Incidently it may be clarified that the judgment in the case of Javed Iqbal & oth­ers (supra) is a Division Bench Judgment. Thus it is obvious that when SWP No. 102/93 was dismissed on 17.11.1999 then claims of the petitioners could not have been and in fact should have been based on the said judgment. Incidently it may be clarified that the judgment in the case of Javed Iqbal & oth­ers (supra) is a Division Bench Judgment. Only plea urged in this writ petition is that the grounds on which present petition has been filed were not agitated or convassed in SWP No 102/93. 5. So far provisions of order 2 Rule 2 and Section 11 of the CPC are concerned, those are in consonance with the public policy to bring to an end litigation inter-parties finally so that parties do not keep on litigating for the same relief time and again and or indulge in court hunting/bench hunting. 6. Continuous frivolous litigation as well as multiplicity of litigation has always to be looked down upon and in fact has been looked down upon by the judicial precedents. The purpose being that at some stage judicial ver­dict attains finality and the matter is set at rest for ever. 7. Faced with this situation Sh.Sethi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that since with the addition of Ex­planation to section 141 of the J&K Code of Civil Procedure, CPC, does not apply to the writ proceedings. As such plea urged on behalf of the respondents merits dismissal and he prayed accordingly with a further submission that his case may be heard on merits. 8. In this behalf it may be observed that the rules of procedure are hand-made for ad­vancing the cause of justice and not thwarting the same. This is the situation so for all proce­dural laws are concerned. Admittedly no ap­peal has been preferred by petitioner No.1 against decision in SWP No: 102/93 (supra). Then the question arises should the said peti­tioner be permitted to file a writ petition every now and then when lie could have urged the grant of relief on the grounds on which he claims the same in the present writ petition. It is not his case that the grounds on which present petition is filed were not either available and or open to him either at the time of filing of the writ petition i.e. SWP No: 102/93 or when it was dismissed finally. It is not his case that the grounds on which present petition is filed were not either available and or open to him either at the time of filing of the writ petition i.e. SWP No: 102/93 or when it was dismissed finally. In this view of the mat­ter bar of constructive res-judicata is also attraded to the present case. This matter had been attending attention of the Supreme Court as well as of High Courts. 9. In "Devilal Modi vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam & others", AIR 1965 SC 1150, what was observed by the Constitution Bench in this case and is relevant for the present case is ex­tracted hereinbelow:- "Though the courts dealing with the ques­tions of the infringement of fundamental rights must consistently endeavour to sus­tain the said rights and should strike down their unconstitutional invasion, it would not be right to ignore the principle of resjudicata altogether in dealing with writ petitions filed by citizens alleging the contravention of their fundamental rights. Considerations of public policy can not be ignored in such cases, and the basic doctrine that judgments pronounced by the Supreme Court are bind­ing and must be regarded as final between the parties in respect of matter covered by them must receive due consideration." "10. As we have already mentioned, though the courts dealing with the questions of the infringement of fundamental rights must consistently endeavour to sustain the said rights and should strike down their unconstitutional invasion, it would not be right to ignore the principle of resjudicata altogether in dealing with writ petitions filed by citizens alleging the contravention of their fundamental rights. Considerations of public policy cannot be ignored in such cases, and the basic doctrine that judgments pronounced by this court are binding and must be regarded as final between the par­ ties in respect of matters covered by them, must receive due consideration. 11. The result of the decision of this court in the earlier appeal brought by the appel­lant before it is clear and unambiguous, and that is that the appellant had failed to chal­lenge the validity of the impugned order which had been passed by the Assistant Commissioner against him. In other words, the effect of the earlier decision of this court is that the appellant is liable to pay the tax and penalty imposed on him by the im­pugned order. In other words, the effect of the earlier decision of this court is that the appellant is liable to pay the tax and penalty imposed on him by the im­pugned order. It would, we think, be unreasonable to suggest that after this judg­ment was pronounced by this court, it should still be open to the appellant to file a subsequent writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court and urge that the said impugned order was invalid for some addi­tional grounds. In case the Madhya Pradesh High Court had upheld these contentions and had given effect to its decision, its or­der would have been plainly inconsistent with the earlier decision of this court, and that would be inconsistent with the incon­sistent with the finality which must attach to the decisions of this court as between the parties before it in respect of the subject-matter directly covered by the said decision. Considerations of public policy and the principle of the finality of judgments are im­portant constuents of the rule of law and they cannot be allowed to be violated just because a citizen contence that this Funda­mental right have been contravened by an impunged order and wants liberty to agi­tate the question about its validity by filing one writ petition after another. 12. The present proceedings illustrate how a citizen who has been ordered to pay a tax can postpone the payment of the tax by pro­longing legal proceedings interminably. We have already seen that in the present case the appellants sought to raise additional points when he brought his appeal before this court by special leave; that is to say, he did not take all the points in the writ peti­tion and thought of taking new points in appeal. When leave was refused to him by this court to take those points in appeal, he filed a new petition in the High Court and took those points, and finding that the High Court had decided against him on the mer­its of those points, he has come to this court; but that is not all. At the hearing of this appeal, he has filed another petition asking for leave from this court to take some more additional points and that shows that if con­structive resjudicata is not applied to such proceedings a party can file as many writ petitions as he likes and take one or two points every time. At the hearing of this appeal, he has filed another petition asking for leave from this court to take some more additional points and that shows that if con­structive resjudicata is not applied to such proceedings a party can file as many writ petitions as he likes and take one or two points every time. That clearly is opposed to considerations of public policy on which resjudicata is based and would mean har­assment and hardship to the opponent. Be­sides, if such a course is allowed to be adopted, the doctrine of finality of judgments pronounced by this court would also be ma­terially affected. We are, therefore, satis­fied that the second writ-petition filed by the appellant in the present case is barred by constructive resjudicata." 10. To similar effect is the decision of Con­stitution Bench in the case of "Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh vs. State of Gujrat", AIR 1965 SC 1153, wherein it was held that decision in earlier writ petitions on merits bars suit involv­ing same questions and for the same relief is barred upon the general principles of resjudicata. In this behalf reference can also be made to "Union of India vs. Nanak Singh", AIR 1968 SC 1370. In this case while consid­ering maintainability of a writ under Article 32, after the dismissal of writ petition under article 226 by the High Court, Supreme Court held that this writ petition before it was barred even if no notice was issued to the other side by in­voking the doctrine of resjudicata. 11. A Full Bench of Kerala High Court in "M.P.Raghavan Nair vs. State Insurance Officer & others", AIR 1971 Kerala 175,while consid­ering the provisions of order 2 Rule 2, it was held as under:- "The principles underlying statutory provi­sions like the Limitation Act and Section 11 and order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are, we should think applicable to petitions under Article 226 of the Consti­tution. These Provisions are not to be re­garded as emboaying technical rules of pro­cedure. They are based upon principles of public policy aiming at justice, the secur­ing of which is the very object of Article 226. The principles are principles of re­pose and peace. "Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice in them," said Best CJ. in A Court v. Cross, (1825) 130 DR 540. They are based upon principles of public policy aiming at justice, the secur­ing of which is the very object of Article 226. The principles are principles of re­pose and peace. "Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice in them," said Best CJ. in A Court v. Cross, (1825) 130 DR 540. And so, we might add, has the fighting of the same legal battle over again with the same adversary, or, once a wrong has been suffered, the fighting of the battle for redress piecemeal." 12. In "Forward Construction Co. & others v. Prabhat Mandal (regd.), Andhen & others", AIR 1986 SC 391, while considering the mat­ter relating to Section 11, Explanation VI of CPC, it was held as udner:- "So far the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would riot operate as resjudicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicu­ous by its absence in the earlier petition. Explanation IV to S.I 1, CPC provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is con­clusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate pur­view of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The prin­ciple underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been con­structively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and de­cided. The first reason, therefore, has abso­lutely no force." These are few illustrative cases dealing with the matter relating to resjudicata and or­der 2 Rule 2 CPC so far stand of petitioner No. 1 is concerned. 13. It could only be deemed to have been heard and de­cided. The first reason, therefore, has abso­lutely no force." These are few illustrative cases dealing with the matter relating to resjudicata and or­der 2 Rule 2 CPC so far stand of petitioner No. 1 is concerned. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion this writ petition is patently barred by principles of order 2 Rule 2 and Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nothing to the contrary has been brought to my notice at the time of hear­ing of this writ petition. Moreover the grounds which according to the petitioner were not can­vassed in the earlier writ petition cannot be deemed to have been waived and or given up. If this line of argument is accepted thereby permitting the petitioner to keep on filing one case after being successful in the earlier lis, then there will be no end of this circle continuing and thus the judgment will never attain finality, this will be not only contrary to law but will be against public policy. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is no merit in the writ petition which is accord­ingly dismissed summarily.