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2000 DIGILAW 29 (GAU)

State of Assam v. Himatsingka Motor Works Ltd.

2000-01-20

BRIJESH KUMAR, D.N.CHOWDHURY

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Brijesh Kumar, C. J.--This appeal arises out of a judgment and order, passed by the learned Single Judge, dated September 30,1994 in Civil Rule No. 1280 of 1988 (1995 (1) GLJ 151). The aforesaid petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge and the present appellants were directed to settle the land in question in favour of the petitioner M/s Himatsingka Motor Works Ltd as early as possible, at any rate, within a period of two months from the date of passing of the order. The appellants felt aggrieved by the aforesaid order. Hence the present appeal, as preferred by the State of Assam and the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, Guwahati. 2. We have heard Shri BC Das, learned counsel appearing for the appellant State and Shri NM Lahiri, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent a M/s Himatsingka Motor Works Ltd. 3. The facts briefly as may be necessary to appreciate the controversy involved in the appeal are that, according to the respondent M/s Himatsingka Motor Works Ltd (hereinafter to be referred as the petitioner), is a company registered under the Companies Act having its garage and automobile workshop. The case of the petitioner further is that a modern workshop with advanced technology and equipment was established in the year 195 8 for manufacturing of automobile accessories after taking a loan from Assam Financial Corporation. Since the petitioner-respondent needed some more land for the purposes of its workshop and factory. Shri GS Himatsingka, a Director of the petitioner company applied for settlement of land measuring 1 bigha 3 kathas in Dag No. 1372 in Saruchela Beel on 7.10.58. A copy of the said application has been filed as Annexure I to the writ petition. According to the petitioner this land was to the South of the land of the petitioner. It was low lying land and unfit for use unless it was developed, but the petitioner had filled it incurring huge amount of money and it extended its business of manufacturing automobile accessories on that plot. The petitioner again applied to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup on 6.7.59 for settlement of the said land. It was low lying land and unfit for use unless it was developed, but the petitioner had filled it incurring huge amount of money and it extended its business of manufacturing automobile accessories on that plot. The petitioner again applied to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup on 6.7.59 for settlement of the said land. The Deputy Commissioner, is said to have held discussion with late Shri RK Himatsingka, a Senior Director of the company and he is said to have been asked by the Deputy Commissioner to surrender a strip of land about 14 feet wide on the Eastern side of Dag No. 1382 so as to be utilised for purpose of construction of an approach road to the Sarkari Dag No. 1372. It is further indicated that the Deputy Commissioner by letter dated July 22,1959 required the petitioner to confirm the surrender of 14 wide strip of land falling in Dag No. 1382. A copy of the letter dated July 22,1959 has been filed as Annexure D to the writ petition. On representation made to the Chief Minister on 1.2.60, the petitioner was advised to contact the Industries Department, as a result whereof the petitioner took up the matter with the Director of Industries and wrote letter in that connection on 26.2.60. According to the petitioner, the Director of Industries had recommended the case of the petitioner to the Secretary to the Govt of Assam, Revenue Department for settlement of the land in favour of the company. A copy of the aforesaid letter dated 2.3.60 has been filed as Annexure III to the writ petition. The Deputy Commissioner is said to have personally inspected the site and the petitioner wrote to the Director of Industries to forward the papers to the Revenue Department to fulfil the formalities. By letter dated May 20, 1960 the petitioner was informed that the Director of Industries had taken up the matter with the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup. The Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup is also said to have recommended the case in favour of the petitioner for settlement of the land by letter dated 11.3.61 addressed to the Secretary, Revenue (B) Department, Govt of Assam; A copy of the letter dated 11.3.61 has been filed as Annexure IV to the writ petition. The Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup is also said to have recommended the case in favour of the petitioner for settlement of the land by letter dated 11.3.61 addressed to the Secretary, Revenue (B) Department, Govt of Assam; A copy of the letter dated 11.3.61 has been filed as Annexure IV to the writ petition. It is also said that the Deputy Commissioner had recommended for settling more land measuring 1 katha free of cost with the petitioner as the petitioner had agreed to relinquish 1 katha of land out of Dag No. 1382 for construction of approach road to Dag No. 1372. There seem to have been some exchange of letters amongst the authorities and by letter dated 25.4.61 the Director of Industries wrote to the Secretary, Industries to the Govt of Assam to take up the matter with the Revenue Department for immediate settlement of land. Annexure V is the copy of the letter dated 25.4.61. 4. The case of the petitioner is that in the facts and circumstances indicated above, the petitioner company in bonafide belief and legitimate expectation of settlement of land in Dag No. 1372t spent huge amount in developing the low lying waste land and raised valuable structure and boundary wall for starting workshop by installing machineries as imported under a valid licence. Request was again made by letter dated 14.6.62 by the petitioner to Secretary, Revenue, Govt of Assam for early settlement of the land. The case of the petitioner is that a meeting in connection with the settlement of land in favour of the petitioner was held on 2.5.63 in which the Minister, Industries, Secretary Industries, Chairman of Gauhati Development Authority and some other officers and representatives of the petitioner company were present wherein it was decided to settle 1 bigha 4 kathas and 7 lechas of land in Dag No. 1372 on payment of premium according to the Rules of the Govt. A copy of the minutes of the aforesaid meeting has been filed as Annexure VI to the writ petition. 5. A copy of the minutes of the aforesaid meeting has been filed as Annexure VI to the writ petition. 5. The specific case of the petitioner is that on the request of the Deputy Commissioner, another plot of land measuring 1 bigha 3 kathas covered by KP Patta No,l (old) 52 (new) at Shantipur area near Pragjyotish College, Guwahati standing in the name of late RK Himatsingka was surrendered to the Govt for the purposes of construction of a road leading to the college. It is further stated that no compensation was paid in view of settlement of land which was to take place in favour of the petitioner. The above averment have been made in paragraph 14 of the writ petition. Somehow, however, no settlement took place and in the year 1976 the petitioner approached the Revenue Minister who by order dated 18.9.76 called for a report from the Deputy Commissioner, Kamcup. A copy of the letter dated 18.9.76 has been filed as Annexure VII to the writ petition. / 6. The grievance of the petitioner is that instead of settling the land in favour of the petitioner despite surrender of some land by it to the Govt for construction of approach road to Dag No. 1372, the Govt started eviction proceedings being Encroachment Case No.III of 1961-62. The said case, however, was dropped on the representation of the petitioner. It again, however, started in 1962-63, but it was also dropped. Yet another Case No. 13 of 1976-77 was started against the Directors of the company. According to the petitioner, the said encroachment case was also dropped after the representation. But it was still not the end of the matter and in the year 1980-81, Encroachment Case No.171 was again started against the Directors of the company which matter was challenged before the Board of Revenue in Revenue Appeal No. 382 of 1981. The Board of Revenue, in appeal, set aside the notices issued for ejectment, but once again Case No. 26 of 1986 was started against the alleged encroachment under Rule 18 (3) of the Settlement Rules as framed under Assam Land and Revenue Regulations requiring the petitioner to vacate the land within 15 days. It was indicated that the land was being occupied without any authority. A translated copy of the notice was filed as Annexure VIII to the writ petition. It was indicated that the land was being occupied without any authority. A translated copy of the notice was filed as Annexure VIII to the writ petition. The petitioner once again filed an appeal before the Assam Board of Revenue being Case No. 154 RA (K) of 1986. According to the petitioner, the Board of Revenue allowed the appeal setting aside the notice of eviction and remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup for taking up the matter with the Govt for decision in respect of settlement of the land. Thereafter, it is said that the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup sent a notice dated 21.12.87 to the petitioner indicating that according to the decision of the Board of Revenue the petitioner had applied for settlement of land measuring 1 bigha 3 kathas in Dag No. 1372 but the records did not indicate that any such application was filed. Hence the petitioner was required to furnish a copy of the application which, according .to the petitioner, was submitted on 11.1.88. Ultimately the petitioner was informed by means of letter dated 26.7.88 sent by the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup that the application for settlement was rejected by the Govt by order dated 6.7.88. Hence the petitioner was required to clear off the land. The petitioner aggrieved by the letter dated 26.7.88 preferred the petition to stay the operation of the notice dated 26.7.88 , and to quash the same. 7. Letter dated July 26,1988 has been addressed to the petitioner-respondent by the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, Guwahati. By means of the said letter dated 26.7.88 the petitioner has been informed that its petition for settlement of Sarkari land in Dag No. 1372 Saruchela Beel of Sahar Guwahati has been rejected by the Govt by letter dated 6.7.88. The addressee was further required to clear the Sarkari land from encroachment immediately. A copy of the order dated 6.7.88 has been filed as Annexure A to the affidavit in opposition. It is issued by the Commissioner and Secretary "to the Govt of Assam, Revenue (Settlement) Department. It is addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup on the subject of encroachment of Govt land in Dag No. 1372. A copy of the order dated 6.7.88 has been filed as Annexure A to the affidavit in opposition. It is issued by the Commissioner and Secretary "to the Govt of Assam, Revenue (Settlement) Department. It is addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup on the subject of encroachment of Govt land in Dag No. 1372. It was informed through the letter that the Govt after examining all connected papers and considering the facts that the land of the said Dag is essential for public purpose, as the area serves as a reservoir for excess rain water coming from various parts of the city providing a natural drainage system, rejected the request for settlement of the land: It is also mentioned that the party may be informed to clear the area from encroachment. As indicated above, the petitioner-respondent approached this Court on being informed of the decision of the State Govt rejecting their request for settlement of land in Dag No. 1372. 8. The thrust of the petitioner's case has been that the State Govt had promised to settle the land in question with it and in lieu whereof the petitioner-respondent had agreed to surrender two pieces of land and had actually delivered the possession to the Govt of the land belonging to the petitioner for the purpose of construction of approach road, the Govt later could not resile from the promise made and was bound by principle of Promissory Estpppel to settle the land with the petitioner and refrain from proceeding against it to dispossess it. It is further the case of the petitioner that in view of the talks held with the Govt, the petitioner had legitimate expectation of the land being settled with it. Hence it constructed its workshop over the land. The workshop, it is submitted, has a number of employees. Therefore, the Govt could not undo what the petitioner had done in legitimate expectation of the settlement of the land with the petitioner. Since on its part the petitioner had delivered the possession of its land to the Govt in lieu of land in question, the position had altered on the promise held out by the Govt. 9. An affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the appellants resisting the prayer made in the civil rule. Since on its part the petitioner had delivered the possession of its land to the Govt in lieu of land in question, the position had altered on the promise held out by the Govt. 9. An affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the appellants resisting the prayer made in the civil rule. Any promise or understanding to settle the land with the petitioner has been denied as well as the fact that the petitioner and delivered possession of any land belonging to it in lieu of land in question, namely Dag No. 1372. 10. The learned Single Judge has observed that the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate is a question of fact in each case. It is to be decided not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest. On facts it has been held that for several decades correspondence went on between the parties and enquiries were made and assurance was given to the petitioner that the land would be settled with them. During all this long time, it was not indicated to the petitioner that it would not be possible to settle the land with it as question of public interest was involved. It has also been observed that no document had been annexed with the affidavit filed by the State on the basis of which the Deputy Commissioner may have written the letter dated 2.4.87 indicating public interest as may be involved in the matter. It has also been found that after the assurance was given, the petitioner had filled up the low lying area. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the said portion of the land serves as reservoir. The learned Single Judge found no force in the plea of the State that the land in question serves public interest as a natural drainage system for the city. Yet another finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is that in pursuance of the promise and assurance given by the State, the petitioner had spent huge amount, raised construction and installed machinery by taking loan and surrendered a valuable plot of land. Therefore, the State was estopped from going back from its promise or assurance. The promise given by the State Govt gave rise to legitimate expectation to the petitioner to get the settlement of the land. Therefore, the State was estopped from going back from its promise or assurance. The promise given by the State Govt gave rise to legitimate expectation to the petitioner to get the settlement of the land. The learned Single Judge with the findings and observations indicated above, allowed the petition directing the State Govt to settle the land as early as possible, at any rate, within a period of two months from the date of the delivery of the judgment 11. The learned State counsel has submitted that no promise or assurance was ever given by the State Govt to settle the land with the petitioner. The petitioner had no reason to raise legitimate expectation of settlement of land in their favour. It is also submitted that it is incorrect that the petitioner had delivered any land to the Govt in lieu of land in question in Dag No. 1372. Yet another submission which has been advanced by the learned State counsel is that in any case, there cannot be any estoppel as against the law. The Govt land can be settled only in accordance with the statutory provisions which are in operation. No land can be settled with anyone except in accordance with those rules, not in their violation. The rules are to be mandatorily complied with. Hence, legally a direction could not be issued to settle the land with the petitioner. The learned State counsel further submits that so as to ascertain as to whether there was any promise on the part of the State to settle the land with the petitioner, the documents filed along with the petition may be perused. Annexure I is a copy of the application dated 7.10.58 for settlement of land measuring 1 bigha 3 kathas in Dag No.l372 in Saruchela Beel, Mouza Panbari. Annexure II is a copy of the letter dated July 22 (year not indicated) addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup. It was mentioned in this letter that as per discussion held on the earlier day, and early settlement of the land may be made and there would be no objection in surrendering the strip of land on the Eastern side of the petitioner's godown on Dag No. 1382 needed for approach road on Dag No. 1372. It was mentioned in this letter that as per discussion held on the earlier day, and early settlement of the land may be made and there would be no objection in surrendering the strip of land on the Eastern side of the petitioner's godown on Dag No. 1382 needed for approach road on Dag No. 1372. Annexure III is a copy of a letter seems to have been sent from the office of the Director of Industries dated March 2, 1960 informing the petitioner that the papers mentioned in the letter were forwarded to the Secretary to the Govt of Assam, Revenue Department for necessary action. Annexure IV is a copy of the letter issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup dated March 11,1961 addressed to the Secretary to the Govt of Assam, Revenue Department, Shillong with reference to petition dated 6.7.59 filed by Shri GS Himatsingka and the petition dated 7.8.59 filed by Shri Rabindra Ram Dutta. The above noted petitions were forwarded with the letter. It was indicated that some of the land was encroached by M/s Himatsingka which Shri GS Himatsingka stated that was required for the purpose of extension of their workshop. Giving some more facts, the Deputy Commissioner had recommended that the land in Dag No. 1372 be given to the petitioner in exchange of petitioner's land on periodic patta free of cost. He also suggested settlement of some more land over the same dag. It is only communication between the Govt officers, namely, from the Deputy Commissioner to the Secretary to the Govt recommending settlement. Annexure V to the petition is a copy of the letter dated Nil April, 1961 written from the office of the Director of Industries to the Secretary to the Govt of Assam, Industries Department forwarding therewith copies of certain letters with a request to move the Revenue Department to expedite the matter which was pending since long. Annexure VI is supposed to be a copy of the proceeding of discussions held on 2.5.63 in the office room of the Minister of Industries. Those shown to be present are the Minister Industries, Chairman, Gauhati Development Authority, Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department, Under Secretary Revenue Department, Sri Sontosh Kumar Himatsingka and Shri NC Ghosh. The copy which has been annexed seems to be incomplete. It contains only one page. Those shown to be present are the Minister Industries, Chairman, Gauhati Development Authority, Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department, Under Secretary Revenue Department, Sri Sontosh Kumar Himatsingka and Shri NC Ghosh. The copy which has been annexed seems to be incomplete. It contains only one page. Clause 1 says that Shri Himatsingka agreed to relinquish a strip of 10 feet wide land to the Gauhati Development Authority in Dag Nos 1381 and 1382 for widening the existing road provided that compensation is paid to them by Gauhati Development Authority for destruction of the structures situated on the strip of land to be relinquished. Clause 2 says that the Chairman, Gauhati Development Authority agreed that he would withdraw his objection to the settlement of 1 bigha 4 katha 7 lecha of Sarkari land in Dag No. 1372 in Saruchela Beel at Guwahati at present. Thereunder it is written, “Under encroachment by Shri Himatsingka on payment of premium as per Govt rules on his relinquishing the strip of land as mentioned above” It would be necessary to comment on the document Annexure VI to the petition. As indicated above, may be that it is an incomplete document filed by the petitioner as it is only in one page with two clauses. Like all other documents, this document also does not bear any certificate of the deponent of the petition or the counsel indicating it to be a true copy, nor the Oath Commissioner has put his signature or its seal. It is also not indicated in the end as to whether Annexure VI, alleged proceeding of the discussions has been signed by any one shown to be present at the time of meeting. In any case, the two clauses a mention of which has been made above, only shows that Shri Himatsingka had agreed to relinquish some strip of land in favour of the Gauhati Development Authority for widening of some road, provided compensation was paid to them by Gauhati Development Authority for destruction of structures situated over the strip to be relinquished. In its turn, the Chairman. Gauhati Development Authority agreed to withdraw his objection to the settlement of the land in Dag No. 1372. None of the clauses as contained in Annexure VI shows that the Govt had given any assurance or promise to settle the land of Dag No. 1372 with the petitioner. In its turn, the Chairman. Gauhati Development Authority agreed to withdraw his objection to the settlement of the land in Dag No. 1372. None of the clauses as contained in Annexure VI shows that the Govt had given any assurance or promise to settle the land of Dag No. 1372 with the petitioner. If at all it contains some understanding arrived at between the Chairman, Gauhati Development Authority and the petitioner. It is nowhere indicated that any one on behalf of the Govt made any promise or gave any assurance to settle the land of Dag No. 1372 with the petitioner. There is serious doubt if any help can be sought from such a document. The next document is Annexure VII which is purported to be a note written by the Minister, Revenue dated 18.9.76 to the Secretary, Revenue. It mentions that some petition on behalf of M/s Himatsingka Motor Works Ltd for settlement of Sarkari land in exchange of land to be surrendered by them was received. It was indicated that the matter was lingering since 1958 and the Minister wrote that full facts may be called for, relating to the said matter and also wanted the Secretary to check up if such records were available in the department itself. The Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup was requested to furnish full facts so that an early decision could be taken. In connection with the above document, it may be observed that till 1976 no decision was taken and the Minister had written to the Secretary about exchange of land to be surrendered by the petitioner that it is to say, according to the said note which seems to have been written on some petition of M/s Himatsingka Motor Works Ltd, land was not surrendered by them till then. Annexure VIII annexed to the petition is a translation of eviction notice under Rule 18 (3) of the Settlement Rules of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation dated 7.4.86 in Encroachment Case No. 26 of 1986. The encroachment from over the land of Dag No. 1372 was required to be removed and cleared. The petitioner seems to have approached the Assam Board of Revenue against the said notice of eviction dated 7.4.86 and copy of the order passed has been filed as Annexure IX to the petition. The encroachment from over the land of Dag No. 1372 was required to be removed and cleared. The petitioner seems to have approached the Assam Board of Revenue against the said notice of eviction dated 7.4.86 and copy of the order passed has been filed as Annexure IX to the petition. The impugned notice was set aside and the matter was sent back to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup for taking up the matter with the Govt who may take a decision within 3 months as per law. By means of Annexure X dated 21.12.87, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, Guwahati informed the petitioner with reference to the order passed by the Board of Revenue, Assam that their a application dated 7.10.5 8 said to be given to the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup for settlement of land was not available on record. They were required to furnish a copy of the application and other relevant documents on or before 24.12.87. Annexure XI to the petition dated January 11,1988 is a letter by the petitioner addressed to the Deputy Commissioner (Land Settlement Department), Kamrup in reply to letter dated 21.12.87. Three documents are said to have been sent along with the said letter, namely, copies of the application for settlement dated 7.10.58, application dated 6.7.59 and letter dated 11.3.61 written by the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup to the Secretary to the Govt of Assam, Revenue (Settlement) Department. It was requested that the said documents, though submitted with delay, may be accepted and necessary orders for settlement of the land in question be passed in favour of the petitioner. Annexure XII is a copy of the letter dated 8.2.88 by which the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, Guwahati required the petitioner to produce the originals of certain documents. Annexure XIII is the copy of the letter dated July 26,1988 informing the petitioner that the application was rejected by the Govt. 12. A perusal of the documents filed by the petitioner in support of its plea that there was promise and assurance on the part of the State to settle the land in question with them is not at all substantiated. In none of the documents of the State Govt it has been indicated that the Govt had agreed to settle the land with the petitioner. In none of the documents of the State Govt it has been indicated that the Govt had agreed to settle the land with the petitioner. There is hardly anything in any of the documents indicating that it would give rise to any legitimate expectation on the part of the petitioner that the Govt would settle the land with the petitioner. If at all, it only remained at negotiation stage. Even according to the own documents of the petitioner, namely, in the note supposed to be written in 1976 by the Minister it was stated that the matter may be decided for settling the land in exchange of the land to be surrendered by the petitioner, that is to say that in 1976 neither the land was surrendered by the petitioner nor any decision was taken for settling the land with the petitioner. Again by means of order dated 16.12.86, the Board of Revenue while allowing the appeal required the Deputy Commissioner to take up the matter with the Govt so that the Govt may take an early decision as per law. This fact also indicates that till December, 1986 no decision was taken by the State Govt. No document contains any assurance. The-petitioner seems to be contacting different officers at different levels and had only been negotiating, but that would not amount to any promise, nor such consideration would give rise to any kind of legitimate expectation. 13. So far the question of handing over of the land by the petitioner in pursuance of the alleged assurance given by the State, those averments are made in paragraphs 14 and 17 of the petition. The said averments have been denied in paragraphs 13 and 16 of the affidavit-in-opposition. It is nowhere indicated as to when and to whom the land was handed over by the petitioner. No document or memorandum or anything has been annexed with the petition to support or substantiate the bald allegation of handing over possession of the land in lieu of the land sought to be settled with the petitioner. It is; therefore, difficult to accept the averments and the case of the petitioner that land was handed over by the petitioner to the State in lieu of land in Dag No. 1372 which, it is alleged that the State had promised to settle with the petitioner. It is; therefore, difficult to accept the averments and the case of the petitioner that land was handed over by the petitioner to the State in lieu of land in Dag No. 1372 which, it is alleged that the State had promised to settle with the petitioner. The finding of the learned Single Judge that the petitioner had handed over its land to the State is not supported by any material on the record. 14. So far the legal position relating to the promissory estoppel is concerned, the learned State counsel has referred to certain decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In AIR 1979 SC 621 (M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co Ltd vs. The "State of Uttar Pradesh & others), our attention has been drawn particularly to paragraph 24 of the decision where while referring to certain other decisions of the Supreme Court, it has been observed that the Govt cannot claim to be immune from applicability of the promissory estoppel and repudiate promise made being in case promisee acts relying upon the promise made by the Govt and alters his position, there is no reason why the Govt should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other individual. It further observed that doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine and it must yield when the equity requires. In case the Govt can show that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired it would be inequitable to hold the Govt to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Govt. Similarly, if the Govt is able to show that in view of the facts which have transpired since making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the Govt were required to carry out the promise, in that event, the Court will have to balance the public interest in the Govt carrying out the promise made to a citizen. The other case relied upon is reported in AIR 1986 SC 806 (Union of India & others vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd). It has been held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is now well established in the Administrative Law of India. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The other case relied upon is reported in AIR 1986 SC 806 (Union of India & others vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd). It has been held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is now well established in the Administrative Law of India. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. It is further observed that where one party makes a clear and unequivocal promise to the other intending to create legal relations and the promisee acts upon the same, in that event, the promise made shall be binding on the party making it. Referring to the decision in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co Ltd (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there can be no promissory estoppel against Legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions, nor can the Govt or public authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition. It is further observed : “It is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Govt or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Govt or public authority to make.” From the two decisions referred to above, it clearly emerges out that first of all there must be a clear and unequivocal promise on the part of the State on the basis of which the promisee has acted upon and has altered his position. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would not operate against the law, nor it shall override a prohibition to do something as has been provided under the law. Yet another principle which emerges out is that any such promise made will have to yield to the public interest. In this connection reference may be made to a decision a reported in (1997) 3 SCO 398 (Shrijee Sales Corporation & another vs. Union of India). While considering the question as to whether a notification issued by the Excise Department granting exemption specifying the period during which it was to remain in force could be withdrawn in public interest or not, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows : “.... Once public interest is accepted as the superior equity which cab override individual equity, the principle should be applicable even in cases where a period has been indicated. Once public interest is accepted as the superior equity which cab override individual equity, the principle should be applicable even in cases where a period has been indicated. The Govt is competent to resile from a promise even if there is no manifest public interest involved, provided, of course, no one is put in any adverse situation which cannot be rectified. To adopt the line of reasoning in Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayi vs. Broiscoe quoted in MP Sugar Mills even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be within the competence of the Govt to resile from the promise on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position, provided, of course, it is possible for the promisee to restore the status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable.” 15. From the findings which have been recorded in the earlier part of the judgment, it is clear that as a matter of fact that the State had made no promise, much less clear and unambiguous promise to the petitioner to settle the land in Dag No. 1372. From the documents which have been filed along with the petition it appears that throughout, the whole matter has been under process and consideration without any decision regarding settlement of land in question with the petitioner-respondent. So far altering of the position of the promisee is concerned, we have already held that there is no material to substantiate the allegation that the petitioner-respondent had surrendered or handed over possession of its land to the State in lieu of promised settlement of the land in question for its factory. Bald statement in that regard which has been denied in the affidavit-in- opposition in no way leads to the conclusion that the petitioner-respondent had altered its position in any manner. So far the question of public interest is concerned, it is clearly indicated that the land in question may be necessary to be available for the purpose of natural drainage of rain water of the city of Guwahati. The learned Single Judge refused to accept the involvement of public interest as indicated by the State on the ground that the District Magistrate has not indicated the basis on which the said reason was indicated in the letter. The learned Single Judge refused to accept the involvement of public interest as indicated by the State on the ground that the District Magistrate has not indicated the basis on which the said reason was indicated in the letter. Be that as it may, we feel that documentary evidence may not always be necessary for taking into account such matters of fact. There is no denial of the fact that the area which is sought to be taken on settlement would be useful for natural drainage for the rain water of the city. It may be different matter, as averred on behalf of the petitioner that still larger area is available for the purpose. No definite or expert's opinion has been provided by the petitioner-respondent to meet out the case that no public interest, as indicated, was involved even though this fact was evident from the order passed by the Govt dated July 6,1988, a copy of which was filed as Annexure A along with the affidavit-in opposition on June 27,1994. It was clearly indicated that land was essential for public purpose as the area serves as reservoir for excess rain water coming from various parts of the city and it is also a kind of an essential natural drainage system for the city. Unless it is satisfactory shown by the petitioner-respondent, there would be no justifiable reason to doubt the case of the State that the land is required for the public purpose. 16. On the point that there would be no estoppel against the law, nor a direction could be issued to the State or its authorities to act against the prohibition contained under the law, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the rules framed for settlement of Govt land under Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. Rules 5 to 10 relate to settlement of Govt land and the provisions relating to town land are contained in Section IV of the Rules. The provision for making application in writing for lease of waste land in towns is provided under Rule 67. Rule 16 provides that the lease shall be issued only on written application and no person shall enter into possession over any area of the waste land until lease has been issued or pending issuance of the lease, the Deputy Commissioner in writing permits the applicant to enter into possession. Rule 16 provides that the lease shall be issued only on written application and no person shall enter into possession over any area of the waste land until lease has been issued or pending issuance of the lease, the Deputy Commissioner in writing permits the applicant to enter into possession. Rule 18 provides for ejectment of those who have encroached upon the Govt land. The learned counsel for the State placed reliance upon a decision reported in (1996) 8 SCC 692 (State of Assam & others vs. Radha Kanoo & others). It has been held that any one who enters into possession of Govt vacant land otherwise than pursuant to Rule 16, is an encroacher. It appears that the Govt had issued administrative instructions to Mouzadars to collect revenue from persons in occupation of Govt land. It has been held that payment of rent to Mouzadars by those who had not legally entered into possession in accordance with the provisions of Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 or the Rules framed thereunder will acquire no right. It is further held that Rule 16 is mandatory. At the most it can be said that the collection of rent by Mouzadar was contrary to the provisions of Rule 16. The possession of such persons who had not entered into possession in accordance with rules cannot be recognised. It is thus contended that there would not be any estoppel against the law much less overriding the mandatory provisions prohibiting entering upon possession over land except as provided under the rules. 17. In connection with the other contention relating to legitimate expectation, earned counsel for the State has placed reliance upon a decision reported in AIR 1993 SC 1601 (Food Corporation of India vs. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries). It has been held in this case that whether the expectation of a claimant is reasonable or legitimate is a question of fact in each case. It may be determined not according to the claimant's perception, but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. While considering the question it has also been observed that in case the authorities have acted bonafide, the requirement of non-arbitrariness would be satisfied. It may be determined not according to the claimant's perception, but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. While considering the question it has also been observed that in case the authorities have acted bonafide, the requirement of non-arbitrariness would be satisfied. On the basis of the above decision it has been submitted that the matter could not be considered only from the point view of the petitioner, but wider public interest was also taken into consideration which is well indicated in the order as contained in Annexure A to the affidavit-in-opposition. So long the decision is bonafide, it would not be open to attack on the ground that it was an arbitrary decision. It is submitted that no malafides whatsoever has been shown or established by the petitioner-respondent in the decision taken by the State Govt. 18. Yet another decision which has been relied by the learned State counsel is reported in AIR 1994 SC 988 (Union of India & others vs. Hindustan Development Corporation). On the basis of the said decision it is submitted that legitimate expectation is not a right guaranteed, but expectation has some protection giving rise to different kinds of right depending upon different situations. 19. On behalf of the petitioner-respondent it has been vehemently urged by Shri NM Lahiri, learned senior counsel that construction over the land in question is standing since long time, namely, 1958. A number of workers are employed in the workshop. The decision taken by the authorities rejecting the application of the petitioner-respondent for allotment of the land is arbitrary and in violation of the principles of promissory estoppel and also against the legitimate expectation of the petitioner-respondent. It is further submitted that the appellants had started proceedings for eviction of .the petitioner-respondent under Rule 18 of the Rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 a number of time, but each time those proceedings were dropped. It is submitted that dropping of the proceedings itself shows that the appellants had agreed for not evicting the petitioner-respondent-in view of the agreement that the petitioner-respondent would surrender some land in lieu of land in question which was surrendered. It is submitted that dropping of the proceedings itself shows that the appellants had agreed for not evicting the petitioner-respondent-in view of the agreement that the petitioner-respondent would surrender some land in lieu of land in question which was surrendered. In this connection, it may however, be observed that initiation of proceedings for ejectment of the petitioner-respondent a number of time and to drop them would not lead to only one logical conclusion that the appellants had agreed to lease out the land to the petitioner-respondent. As a matter of fact, it cuts both ways. Right from the very beginning the authorities have been making efforts time and again to eject the petitioner-respondent from the land in question, but the proceedings appear to have been dropped. Proceedings were initially initiated in the year 1961 itself and thereafter in different years subsequently. It will also be difficult to accept the case of the petitioner-respondent that it had raised construction over the land after any settlement had arrived at with the condition that the petitioner-respondent would surrender its land in lieu of the land in question which fact would be evident from the facts that according to the petitioner the construction was raised in 1958. The petitioner on its own showing had applied for the first time for allotment of the land on 7.10.58 which application was not found to be there on the record. Second time they applied for it in 1959. Annexure II dated July 22 (without indicating the year) seems to be a letter written after 6.7.59 as would he evident from the contents of the letter and it made a reference to a discussion held a day earlier and it was mentioned that the petitioner would have no objection in surrendering the strip of land on the Eastern side of its godown. 'It makes it clear that till the time the said letter was written, there was no surrender of the land nor any final agreement to that effect by the petitioner respondent and all that was indicated was that it would have no objection in surrendering the land. The construction, according to the petitioner, was raised in 1958 itself. Repeated initiation of ejectment proceedings under Rule 18 of the Rules shows that the appellants had not been treating the petitioner-respondent in lawful possession of the land in question. The construction, according to the petitioner, was raised in 1958 itself. Repeated initiation of ejectment proceedings under Rule 18 of the Rules shows that the appellants had not been treating the petitioner-respondent in lawful possession of the land in question. Thus the plea as raised on behalf of the petitioner-respondent does not cut any ice and it is liable to be rejected. 20. The learned Single Judge while allowing the petition attached weight to the fact that the State Govt had not produced the original records even though time was granted by the Court for the purpose. In this connection we would like to observe that the petitioner has to substantiate its case first on the basis of the documents which are relied upon by the petitioner. If those documents do not make out a case at all which is sought to be projected by the petitioner, the absence of the record may not lead to an inference adverse to the State. It does not seem to be the case of the petitioner-respondent that at any stage any competent authority in the Govt had taken any final decision and had passed and issued any order on that basis or had executed any lease deed, which was being suppressed by the State and so as to verify the same the record would have been necessary. It is also not the case of the petitioner-respondent that there is documentary evidence on the record of the State showing handling over or taking over the possession of the land on any date, alleged to have been surrendered by the petitioner-respondent to the appellants. In case any such averments were made and any hide and seek was played by the other side, in that event it might have led to some inference. But that is not the position in present case. 21. In view of the discussions made in the earlier part of the judgment, it is held that there has not been any clear or unambiguous promise by the State to lease out the land in question to the petitioner-respondent. The document relied upon by the petitioner-respondent only indicate that negotiations had been going on at different levels with different authorities but no decision was ever taken for leasing out the land. The document relied upon by the petitioner-respondent only indicate that negotiations had been going on at different levels with different authorities but no decision was ever taken for leasing out the land. In view of the denial by the appellants that any land was ever given in their possession by the petitioner-respondent in lieu of the land in question, in absence of anything to substantiate the bare averment of the petitioner-respondent, we find that no land was handed over by the petitioner-respondent to the State on the basis of which it could be held that the petitioner-respondent had altered its position because of any promise allegedly extended by the State. Neither the doctrine of promissory estoppel, nor of legitimate expectation would be applicable in the facts of the present case. We, therefore find that the appeal deserves to be allowed. 22. In the result the appeal is allowed and the order dated 30.9.94 passed in Civil Rule No. 1280 of 1998 is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. There would, however, be no order as to costs.