S. R. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THIS special appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19. 9. 1999 whereby the learned single Judge has allowed the writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19450 of 1999 filed by the Committee of Management. Mahatma Gandhi Vidyalaya Inter College, Vijai Nagar. Kanpur Nagar, in short the College, and quashed the order dated 12. 4. 1999 impugned in the writ petition. By order dated 12. 4. 1999 the District Inspector of Schools had revoked the suspension of the appellant in exercise of power under sub-section (8) of Section 16g of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, in short the Act. ( 2 ) THE appellant--a teacher In the college--was taken into custody on 27. 2. 1997 in connection with a criminal case registered under Section 304b and 498a of the Indian Penal Code. The deceased in the incident was the daughter-in-law of the appellant and because of his alleged involvement in the said case, the appellant was placed under suspension by the Committee of management vide order dated 14. 3. 1997. The suspension was approved by the District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 26. 4. 1997 but it was revoked vide order dated 8. 5. 1997. This Court vide its judgment dated 28. 10. 1997. however, quashed the order dated 8. 5. 1997 and directed the district Inspector of Schools to pass a fresh order under sub-section (8) of Section 16g of the act after affording opportunity of hearing to the Management. Consequent upon the judgment dated 28. 10. 1997. the parties were heard by the District Inspector of Schools who by his order dated 12. 4. 1999 revoked the suspension order as stated (supra) by order dated 12. 4. 1999 which order came to be quashed by the learned single Judge vide judgment dated 19. 9. 1999 which Is under challenge in this special appeal. ( 3 ) A perusal of the order dated 12. 4. 1999 of the District Inspector of Schools would show that the suspension order has been revoked. 4. 1999 which order came to be quashed by the learned single Judge vide judgment dated 19. 9. 1999 which Is under challenge in this special appeal. ( 3 ) A perusal of the order dated 12. 4. 1999 of the District Inspector of Schools would show that the suspension order has been revoked. inter alia, on the grounds that the charge against the appellant was not related to his conduct as a teacher nor was it of such a gravity as could Justify his continuance under suspension for a long period of about two years ; that there would be no possibility of any interference in the process of investigation of the criminal cases if the appellant was allowed to take classes in the institution : that there was no question of making any disciplinary inquiry in respect of the conduct of the appellant during the pendency of the criminal case ; that if the appellant was allowed to perform his duties the same would not hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceeding ; and that it would not be in the interest of the institution to keep a teacher under suspension for a long period. The learned single Judge in his judgment under challenge in this appeal held that the District Inspector of Schools had revoked the suspension of the appellant on Irrelevant consideration and that the possibility of continuation of the criminal case for a long period was also no ground for revoking the suspension order. ( 4 ) WE have heard Sri P. N. Saxena for the appellant and Sri S. C. Dwivedi for the respondent committee of Management. ( 5 ) SUB-SECTION (8) of Section 16g of the Act empowers the District Inspector of Schools to revoke an order of suspension passed under this Section if at any time he is satisfied that the disciplinary proceedings are being delayed for no fault of the teacher. It has not been disputed at the Bar that commission of an offence punishable under Sections 498a and 304b of Indian Penal code involves moral turpitude. The appellant is facing criminal trial of an offence involving moral turpitude. It has not been disputed at the Bar that commission of an offence punishable under Sections 498a and 304b of Indian Penal code involves moral turpitude. The appellant is facing criminal trial of an offence involving moral turpitude. Sub-section (5) of Section 16g of the Act empowers the management of a institution to suspend a teacher only if in the opinion of the management the charges against him are serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. For convenience sub-section (5) of Section 16g of the Act is quoted below : " (5) No head of institution or teacher shall be suspended by the management unless in the opinion of the management (a) the charges against him are serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank ; or (b) his continuance in office is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him ; or (c) any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude against him is under investigation, inquiry or trial. The management was justified in suspending the appellant under clause (c) of sub-section (5) of section 16g of the Act since the appellant was at that time facing investigation of a criminal case Involving moral turpitude. The suspension was rightly approved by the District, Inspector of Schools. Since the law permits suspension pending investigation. enquiry or trial of an offence involving moral turpitude, the question of revoking the suspension order passed on such ground merely because of delay In the trial of the offence does not arise. Sub-section (8) of Section 16g will have no application in such situation. The revocation of order of suspension In the fact situation of present case was not Justified. ( 6 ) IN Allahabad Bank and another v. Deepak Kumar Bhola (1997) 4 SCC 1 , the respondent therein-a bank employee-being Involved in a case of embezzlement was suspended pending prosecution launched against him. The charge against him was of "criminal misconduct and cheating by adopting corrupt and illegal means or otherwise abusing his position by obtaining undue pecuniary gain". The suspension order was quashed by this Court as fn its opinion it was not a case involving moral turpitude. The charge against him was of "criminal misconduct and cheating by adopting corrupt and illegal means or otherwise abusing his position by obtaining undue pecuniary gain". The suspension order was quashed by this Court as fn its opinion it was not a case involving moral turpitude. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and held that the allegations made against the respondent therein constituted an offence involving moral turpitude and further that expiry of a long period of 10 years since the filing of the charge-sheet in such matters would not be a ground for quashing the suspension order and allowing the delinquent to come back on duty "unless he is exonerated of the charge". In Rajendra Prasad Pandey v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and another, (1998) 3 UPLBEC 2088 , the petitioner therein was placed under suspension due to his alleged involvement in a case under Sections 498a, 304b, 318, and 201. I. P. C. one of us (S. R. Singh. J.)held that the offence involved "moral turpitude". The expression moral turpitude" though not defined in the Rules is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved, or having any connection showing depravity. Killing, a person per se may not come within the periphery of moral turpitude but subjecting a woman to cruelty and/or killing her for or in connection with demand of dowry, it was held therein, "would certainly be an offence involving moral turpitude"-it being an act done contrary to principles of good morals besides being derogatory to the dignity of the women" and violative of Article 51a (e) of the Constitution. The trial of the criminal case has already commenced. One of the material prosecution witnesses, namely, the mother of the deceased is a class IV employee in the same institution and in such situation, the District Inspector of Schools was not justified in revoking the suspension order. The decisions referred to in the order of the District Inspector of schools revoking suspension have no application to the facts of the case particularly in view of the provisions of Section 16g (5) (c) of the Act. The learned single Judge has rightly quashed the impugned order dated 12. 4. 1999 of the District Inspector of Schools. The decisions referred to in the order of the District Inspector of schools revoking suspension have no application to the facts of the case particularly in view of the provisions of Section 16g (5) (c) of the Act. The learned single Judge has rightly quashed the impugned order dated 12. 4. 1999 of the District Inspector of Schools. ( 7 ) IN view of the above discussion, the appeal fails and is dismissed.