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2000 DIGILAW 298 (HP)

BHUVNESH VERMA v. KASHMIRI LAL

2000-11-16

M.R.VERMA

body2000
JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.:- This revision petition is directed against the order dated 15.5.2000 passed by the learned senior Sub Judge Hamirpur thereby dismissing the application under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. filed by the petitioner-defendant (hereafter to be referred as the defendant) in civil suit No.260 of 1999 titled Kashmiri Lai v. Bhuvnesh Verma for disposal of the said suit on the basis of a written compromise dated 18.9.1999 entered into between the parties. 2. The material facts for the disposal of the present controversy, in brief, are that the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) has instituted the aforesaid suit for possession of land and shop thereon by way of redemption and is pending disposal in the court of the learned Senior Sub Judge. On 18.9.1999, when the suit was posted for filing written statement by the defendant, the parties with their counsel appeared before the trial court, indicated their intention to compromise the suit and also filed the compromise dated 18.09.1999, which purports to have been signed by the parties. The learned trial Judge, however, instead of taking further action in the matter in accordance with the compromise, directed that the suit be listed before the Lok Adalat. The suit thus was placed before the permanent Lok Adalat but the Lok Adalat failed to re-concile the dispute between the parties. 3. On 8.2.2000, the defendant moved the said application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC thereby graying that the suit may be disposed of as per the original compromise already on record. The plaintiff filed reply to the application claiming that there has been no valid and effective compromise and even if there is any such compromise, the plaintiff is not bound by the same. After hearing the parties, the learned Senior Sub Judge, passed the impugned order and dismissed the application; hence the present petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the relevant records. 5. A perusal of the record reveals that the compromise dated 08.09.1999, which purports to-have been signed by the parties, is on the record,. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the relevant records. 5. A perusal of the record reveals that the compromise dated 08.09.1999, which purports to-have been signed by the parties, is on the record,. In view of the zimini order dated 08.09.1999, passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge, it cannot be doubted in any manner, that this compromise was filed in the court by the parties in the presence of their respective counsel after indicating to the court their intention to compromise the suit. 6. The application in question has been dismissed by the learned Senior Sub Judge, as is evident from the impugned order, on the grounds - (i) that the Court was satisfied that the compromise dated 18.09.1999 has not been recorded by the court and (ii) that the plaintiff was not ready to accept the terms and conditions of the compromise and as such, could not be compelled to effect the compromise. 7. Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows: Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject- matter of the suit, the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith." 8. It is clear from a bare reading of the aforesaid Rule that it gives mandate to the court to record a lawful adjustment or compromise and pass a decree in terms of such compromise or adjustment. When the compromise relates to the whole suit, the Court must, on being invited by the parties, record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith and the suit must stop. It cannot be disputed that this Rule is applicable to all the suits including a suit for redemption of mortgage. When the compromise relates to the whole suit, the Court must, on being invited by the parties, record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith and the suit must stop. It cannot be disputed that this Rule is applicable to all the suits including a suit for redemption of mortgage. If a party to a suit alleges that the suit has been adjusted by a lawful agreement, and applies to the Court to record the agreement and pass a decree in accordance therewith but the opposite party to the suit denies the agreement, or wishes to recede from it, the Court has the power to decide whether, as a fact, the alleged agreement or compromise was made, and if it is satisfied that it was made, to record it. The proviso in the Rule in express terms directs the court to decide the controversy about the parties having arrived at the adjustment or satisfaction. To avoid any delay the proviso also provides that no adjournment shall be granted except where the court for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant adjournment. The words "where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court" in the Rule are wide enough to impose a duty on the Court to inquire whether a compromise was lawfully arrived at. If it is satisfied that it was not, or that it is vitiated by fraud,-coercion or undue influence, or any other factor which will render the contract void, to proceed with the suit on merits. Evidently, the Rule does not require that the compromise can be enforced only when it is recorded by the Court. 9. As already noticed hereinabove, the parties alongwith their counsel appeared before the Court, indicated their intention to compromise the suit and filed the written compromise, evidently there was no reason for the Court to adjourn the matter but, it ought to have proceeded with the matter in accordance with law. Thus, the trial court acted contrary to the express provisions pf law by not proceeding with the matter there and then and instead referred the matter to the Lok Adalat because it was a compromise already arrived at and not a case where the compromise was yet to be arrived at. 10. Even the reasons given by the trial court for rejecting the application are not lawful. 10. Even the reasons given by the trial court for rejecting the application are not lawful. The compromise is to be written by the parties and is required to be signed by them. Once the parties have entered into a written compromise, the court cannot refuse to act on such a compromise on the ground that the court has not yet recorded it. To do so, as has been done in this case, will amount to not exercising the jurisdiction, which vested in the Court. 11. It is true that no party can be compelled to enter into a compromise, however, this logic and reason will not apply to a case as in hand, where the parties after having indicated their intention to compromise the case, has filed a written compromise. Thus, this ground of rejection of the application by the learned trial court is not lawful. 12. It is thus clear that the trial court has failed to arrive at on objective satisfaction after deciding the question as required under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, Code of Civil Procedure. 13. In view of the above discussion and reasons, the learned trial court in passing the impugned order, has acted illegally and, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 14. As a result, this revision petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The trial court is directed to consider and decide the application as per the provisions of Rule 3 of Order 23 Code of Civil Procedure and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 15. The parties through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the learned trial court on 18.12.2000. Records be transmitted to the trial court forthwith.