JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C J- Oral :- This petition is filed by the petitioner against Union of India, Assistant Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Siliguri (West Bengal) and Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (I), Regional Office, Shimla for an appropriate writ, direction or order in terms of Para 22 of the petition. The said Para reads as under: - "(a) Quash the impugned orders dated 24.09.1998 (P-6), 04.02.1999(P-12), 15.04.1999 (P-14) and dated 23.06.1999 (P-16) issued by the Regional Provident Fund Organisation, Siliguri are illegal, arbitrary and ultra vires; (b) Direct the respondent No. 1 to accord the exemption to the petitioner society as prayed for immediately; (c) Direct the respondents to produce all the relevant records alongwith reply for perusal by this Honble Court; (d) Allow the cost of this writ petition to the petitioner, and; (e) Allow such other relief or pass such other orders as deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case in favour of the petitioner and justice be done." 2. The case of the petitioner is that it is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The society is aggrieved by the action of Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner Siliguri (West Bengal) whereby he had initiated proceedings under Section 7A of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). According to respondent No. 2, Hotel Tibet of Gangtok was an establishment within the meaning of the Act and hence, the provisions of the Act were applicable to the said establishment. It is the say of petitioner, respondent No. 2 has no jurisdiction in the matter. Petitioners head office is situate at Dharamsala in the State of Himachal Pradesh and Hotel Tibet at Gangtok is one of its corpus/units. The petitioner is a single establishment within the meaning of Section 2A of the Act. According to the petitioner, therefore, actions taken by respondent No. 2 are wholly without jurisdiction, illegal and deserve to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Notices were issued, pursuant which the respondents appeared, respondent No. 1 Union of India has not filed an affidavit, respondent No. 2, however, filed a counter affidavit raising certain preliminary objections as well as objections on merits. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. 3. Notices were issued, pursuant which the respondents appeared, respondent No. 1 Union of India has not filed an affidavit, respondent No. 2, however, filed a counter affidavit raising certain preliminary objections as well as objections on merits. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. Since we were prima facie of the view that the High Court of H.P. has no territorial jurisdiction in the matter, we requested Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner to make submissions on the point of territorial jurisdiction of this Court. He submitted that since the head office of the petitioner is situate at Dharamsala, this Court has jurisdiction. He stated that a Trust Deed at Annexure P-7 dated November 8, 1998 also proves this fact. The petitioner is a single establishment under the Act and hence it was obligatory on the part of respondent authorities to take action in accordance with law, only through the petitioner whose head office is at Dharamsala. Mr. Sharma, therefore, submitted that the High Court of Himachal Pradesh alone has territorial jurisdiction in the matter. Considerable arguments were advanced on the point. 6. Now looking to prayer clause in para 22(a) also, it is abundantly clear that the prayer is to quash and set aside Annexure P-6 dated September 24, 1998, Annexure P-12 dated February 4, 1999, Annexure P- 14 dated April 15, 1999 and Annexure P-16 dated June 23, 1999. Now let us consider - those orders/notices/communications. Annexure P-6 is a notice dated September 24, 1998 issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Siliguri (West Bengal) to M/s. Hotel Tibet, Gangtok. Annexure P-12, dated February 4, 1999 is a communication addressed by Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Sub Regional Office, Siliguri to the Manager, M/s. Hotel Tibet, Gangtok. Annexure P-14 dated April 15, 1999 is again a letter addressed by Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Siliguri to Manager, Hotel Tibet, Gangtok. Finally, Annexure P-16 dated June 23,_ 1999 is a communication from Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Sub Regional Office, Siliguri to the General Manager, Hotel Tibet, Gangtok, a copy whereof has been forwarded to Shri T. Tashi, Secretary, Deptt. of Finance, Office of H.H. Dalai Lama, Dharamsala. 7. Now, so far as territorial jurisdiction is concerned, Article 226 of the Constitution Provides as o when a High Court can entertain a petition. of Finance, Office of H.H. Dalai Lama, Dharamsala. 7. Now, so far as territorial jurisdiction is concerned, Article 226 of the Constitution Provides as o when a High Court can entertain a petition. Clause (1) Of Article 226 enacts that every High Court has power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority within those territories directions, orders or writs for enforcement of Fundamental Rights or for any other purposes. 8. It may be stated that it is not even the case of the petitioner that the officers who had issued notices/orders/communications (vide Annexures P6, P12, P14 and P16) are within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The contention of Mrs. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the case of the petitioner is covered by clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution. Clause (2) of Article 226 is, therefore, relevant and may be reproduced: "(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." 9. Conjoint reading of clauses (1) and (2) makes the legal position clear. And it is this. Clause (1) lays down general principle as to territorial jurisdiction of High Courts. It states that every High Court can exercise power "throughout the territories in which it exercise jurisdiction." Further, the person or authority to whom it issues a writ should be "within those territories." Clause (2) is in the nature of extension or expansion to the above rule in clause (1) of Article 226. It declares that even though a person or authority is not within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, if cause of action either wholly or in pan arises within the territorial limits of that Court, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction irrespective of location of office of such person or authority. 10. It declares that even though a person or authority is not within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, if cause of action either wholly or in pan arises within the territorial limits of that Court, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction irrespective of location of office of such person or authority. 10. It was urged by the counsel that since the head office of the petitioner is situate in Dharamsala, in the State of Himachal Pradesh, and as a copy-of one of the notices issued to Hotel Tibet at Gangtok was also forwarded to the petitioner at Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh and further since the establishment of the petitioner is a single establishment within the meaning of Section 2-A of the Act, at least part of the cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and hence this court has jurisdiction in the matter to deal with and decide the points raised in the petition. 11. In this connection, our attention was invited by the learned counsel to the following decisions: (i) Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2000(6) SCALE 262; (ii) Damomal Kausomal Raisinghani v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1967 Bom 355 (iii) L. V. Veeri Chettiar & Anr. v. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay AIR 1971 Mad 155. (iv) Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Alka Syqtefics Ltd, & Ors. AIR 1999 Guj. 221. (v) C.Pitcheiyan and etc. v. Regional Manager, Co-optex, Koohi & Ors., AIR 1999 Ker 328. (vi) Jagat Nath Wahal & Ors., v. The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., AIR 1977 All 83. (vii) Dr. P.S. Rao v. The Union Government & Ors., AIR 1974 Mys 39. (viii) D. Munirangappa v. Amidayala Venkatappa & Anr., AIR 1965 Mys 316. (ix) M/s. The Karur Vysia Bank Ltd., Coimbatore v. Ramachandra C. Oza & Ors. AIR 1974 Mad 209. (x) Velupillai Narayana Pillai v. N. Gopala Pillai & Ors., AIR 1974 Ker 27. - (xi) Sri Rejendra Mills Ltd. v. Messrs, H. V.M. -Hazi Hasan Dada & Anr., AIR1970Cal342. (xii) Hira Lai Patni v. Sri Kali Nath AIR 1962 SC 199. (xiii) State of Bihar & Ors. v. Sm. Charusila Dasi AIR 1959 SC 1002. (xiv) The State of Bihar & Ors., v. Bhabapritananda Ojha AIR 1959 SC 073. (xv) Serajuddin & Co., v. Union of India 1996 AIHC 2228. (xii) Hira Lai Patni v. Sri Kali Nath AIR 1962 SC 199. (xiii) State of Bihar & Ors. v. Sm. Charusila Dasi AIR 1959 SC 1002. (xiv) The State of Bihar & Ors., v. Bhabapritananda Ojha AIR 1959 SC 073. (xv) Serajuddin & Co., v. Union of India 1996 AIHC 2228. On the basis of the above case law, it was submitted that this Court has Territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 12. Alternatively, it was argued that the relief in terms of para 22(b) can be considered by this Court and to that extent; a direction may be issued to respondent No. 1 Union of India. On this point, it was submitted by the learned counsel that Income Tax Department has granted exemption certificate on April 1, 1998 (Annexure P 18). The said certificate recites that under Rule 3(i) of Part A of the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961, recognition was accorded to the TAWS STAFF WELFARE PROVIDENT FUND TRUST, GANGCHEN KYISHANG, DHARAMSHALA (H.P.) constituted vide Trust Deed dated 9th November, 1998. On the basis of the said certificate, submitted the counsel, it was incumbent on respondent No. 1 to take appropriate decision for granting exemption under Section 17 of the Act. To that extent, therefore, the petition is maintainable in this Court and appropriate direction may be issued. Mr. Sharma also submitted that for this relief, the petitioner cannot approach the High Court of Sikkim or High court of Calcutta as they have no jurisdiction to issue a writ, order or direction to respondent No. 1 Union of India for granting exemption. According to the learned counsel, if the petition will not be entertained on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction in respect of prayer (a) of para 22, at least for prayer (b) of Para 22, this court may exercise power under Article 226. He also submitted that if the petition will not be entertained, it would result in multiplicity of proceedings inasmuch as for one relief the petitioner may have to approach the High Court of Sikkim or of Calcutta whereas for the other relief, he has to approach this Court. 13. On merits also, submissions were made that the actions taken by respondent No. 2 were unlawful and contrary to and inconsistent with provisions of the Act. 14. Ms. 13. On merits also, submissions were made that the actions taken by respondent No. 2 were unlawful and contrary to and inconsistent with provisions of the Act. 14. Ms. Abhilasha Kumari, learned counsel, for the Union of India, on the other hand, submitted that it is true that respondent No. 1 has not filed any affidavit in spite of time granted to it. She however, submitted that as far as territorial jurisdiction of this Court is concerned, the Union can make submissions as the point relates to the jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of averments made in the petition and documents on record. If, from the facts stated by the petitioner, this Court is satisfied that there is want of territorial jurisdiction of this Court, it is not necessary for the Union of India to file an affidavit and even without an affidavit, the point can be decided. According to her, reading the communications which have been challenged by the petitioner in this Court, no cause of action, either wholly or in part, can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Regarding prayer (b) of Para 22, she submitted that there is nothing to show that a competent Court at Sikkim or at Calcutta cannot grant that relief prayed by the petitioner. She, however, submitted that even otherwise, if this court has no jurisdiction, the petitioner cannot pray that since a particular court cannot grant a particular relief, irrespective of the fact that this Court has no jurisdiction, it may entertain a petition and grant relief. She, therefore, submitted that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. 15. Mr. Barowalia, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, supported Ms Abhilasha Kumari on the question of territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Over and above preliminary objection, he submitted that even if this Court has territorial jurisdiction, it may not entertain the petition at this stage as no final action has been taken by the authority under the Act against the petitioner. In accordance with the provisions of Section 7A of the Act, an order will be passed by the authority which is subject to appeal before a competent Tribunal constituted under Section 7 D of the Act within the stipulated period. In accordance with the provisions of Section 7A of the Act, an order will be passed by the authority which is subject to appeal before a competent Tribunal constituted under Section 7 D of the Act within the stipulated period. He, therefore, submitted that alternative and equally efficacious statutory remedy is available. Even on that count, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 16. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion, that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction and only on that ground, the petition deserves to be dismissed. Since we are disposing the petition on that ground, we express no opinion, one way or the other on the merits of the matter. 17. Now looking to the orders/communications/ notices at Annexure P-6, P- 12, P-14 and P-16, we are clearly of the view that no part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Orders/communications/notices have been issued by the office of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Sub Regional Office, Siliguri (West Bengal). It is an admitted fact that Siliguri is not situate within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this Court. Similarly, the notices have been issued to Hotel Tibet, Gangtok. It is also not disputed by and between the parties that Gangtok is not situated in the territorial limits of this Court. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the Trust is registered at Dharamsala which is within the jurisdiction of this Court, having its head office there, and as it is a single undertaking under Section 2A of the Act and since copies of notices/communications/orders were forwarded to head office at Dharamsala, at least a part of the, cause of action can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In our opinion, however, since the action which is sought to be challenged by the petitioner is taken by the office at Siliguri against Hotel Tibet at Gangtok, no petition lies in this Court. We are also clear in our minds that location of the registered office of the petitioner is hardly relevant. 18. In our opinion, the point is no longer resintegra. We may not refer to several decisions which have been cited before us. It may, however, be profitable to refer few leading decisions on the point. 19. We are also clear in our minds that location of the registered office of the petitioner is hardly relevant. 18. In our opinion, the point is no longer resintegra. We may not refer to several decisions which have been cited before us. It may, however, be profitable to refer few leading decisions on the point. 19. In State of Rajasthan & Ors., v. M/s. Swaika Properties & Anr., 1985 (3) SCC 217, the Company had its registered office in Calcutta (West Bengal). The company owned certain land on the outskirts of Jaipur City in the State of Rajasthan. The Special Officer, Town Planning, Jaipur issued a notice under Section 55(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 for acquisition of land for public purpose of a development scheme. The notice was duly served on the company at its registered office at Calcutta. The company filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta. Rule nisi was issued and an ad interim relief was granted by the High Court. The said action was challenged by the State in the Supreme Court. It was argued before the Apex Court that since a notice was issued to the company at its registered office at Calcutta, at least a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court of Calcutta and it had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 20. Allowing the appeal, negativing the contention of the company and holding that Calcutta High Court had not territorial jurisdiction over the matter, the Court observed that what was necessary to decided was whether notice could be said to be an integral part of cause of action so as to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta. Since the property was situated in Jaipur, i.e. within the local jurisdiction of High Court of Rajasthan, the mere fact that the registered office of the company was located in Calcutta (West Bengal) or that the notice was served on the company at that place. was not at all relevant and did not become a part of cause of action and hence, the High Court of Calcutta could not have entertained the petition. 21. was not at all relevant and did not become a part of cause of action and hence, the High Court of Calcutta could not have entertained the petition. 21. The Court observed: "It is to be deeply regretted that despite a series of decisions of this Court deprecating the practice prevalent in the High Court of passing such interlocutory orders for the mere asking, the learned Single Judge should have passed the impugned ad interim ex parte prohibitory order the effect of which, as the learned Attorney - General rightly complains, was virtually to bring to a standstill a development scheme of the Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur viz. Civil Lines Extension Scheme, irrespective of the fact whether or not the High Court had any territorial jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such arbitrary exercise of power by the High Court at the public expense reacts against the development and prosperity of the country and is clearly detrimental to the national interest." (Emphasis supplied). 22. The law laid down in Swaika Properties was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors., 1994(4) SCC 711. In Utpal Kumar, Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) issued an advertisement in leading newspapers of the country and tenders were invited for setting up a Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit at ONGCs Hazira Complex in Gujarat. Tender offers were to be communicated to Ell. at New Delhi. Tenders were to be scrutinized by Tender Committee and final decision was to be taken by a Steering Committee at New Delhi. It was also on record that the Head office of ONGC was located at Dehradun. Now the advertisement was also published in the Times of India, Calcutta Edition, and NICCO, which was having its registered office at Calcutta, read the above news about tenders in Times of India of Calcutta Edition and submitted its bid from Calcutta. The tender bid of the petitioner was not accepted. The petitioner, therefore, made a representation from Calcutta. The representation was turned down and the order was communicated by the Commission to petitioner at Calcutta. Taking into account the above circumstances, the petitioner filed a petition in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the action of rejection of the bid. The petition was entertained by the High Court of Calcutta and interim order was also made. The representation was turned down and the order was communicated by the Commission to petitioner at Calcutta. Taking into account the above circumstances, the petitioner filed a petition in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the action of rejection of the bid. The petition was entertained by the High Court of Calcutta and interim order was also made. That order was challenged by the Commission by approaching the Supreme Court. 23. The question before the Apex Court was whether the High Court of Calcutta had territorial jurisdiction in the matter. According to ONGC, the cause of action neither wholly nor partly could be said to have been arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court of Calcutta and hence, the High Court could not have entertained the petition. On the other hand, the argument on behalf of the company was that the registered office of the company was situated in Calcutta, the advertisement was published in Times of India, Calcutta Edition, tenders were submitted by the petitioner from Calcutta, representation was made by the company from Calcutta and the said representation was turned down by ONGC and communication of the said decision was sent to the petitioner at Calcutta. Hence, at least a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta and no error of law had been committed by the High Court of Calcutta in entertaining the petition. 24. Negativing all the contentions and accepting the appeal filed by ONGC, the Supreme Court held that in the facts and circumstances, no cause of action, either wholly or in part, could be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court of Calcutta. 25. Explaining the connotation "cause of action" the Court stated: "It is well settled that the expression" cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Cha.id Kour v. Partab Singh ILR 1889 (16) Cal 98, 102: 15 IA 156 Lord Watson said: "...the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. In Cha.id Kour v. Partab Singh ILR 1889 (16) Cal 98, 102: 15 IA 156 Lord Watson said: "...the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour." Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words, the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the* instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5,7,18,22,26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. 26. It was also held by the Court that mere service of notice would not amount to accrual of cause of Action, either in whole or in part, unless service of notice or communication is an integral part of cause of action. Since none of the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner was an integral part of the cause of action, no part of cause of action could be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court of Calcutta. 27. Deprecating the practice and tendency of the litigants in instituting proceedings in a forum which has no jurisdiction in the matter, the Court stated: "It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. 27. Deprecating the practice and tendency of the litigants in instituting proceedings in a forum which has no jurisdiction in the matter, the Court stated: "It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants woi d seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice, we do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation. (Emphasis supplied) 28. It was contended on behalf of the company that as per settled law, want of territorial jurisdiction does not go to the root of the matter and hence, even if the Court was satisfied that there was irregularity in entertaining the petition, the Supreme Court may not interfere with interim order passed by the High Court. Repelling the argument, their Lordships observed: "The submission of the learned counsel for NICCO based on Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the High Court of Calcutta had not jurisdiction, this Court should, in the absence of proof of prejudice. Refuse to interfere with the decision of the High Court unless it is otherwise found to be erroneous. While the spirit of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure may support such a submission, we are afraid, the discretion cannot be used in favour of a party which deliberately invokes the jurisdiction of a Court which has no jurisdiction whatsoever for ulterior motives. That would only encourage such type of litigation. While the spirit of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure may support such a submission, we are afraid, the discretion cannot be used in favour of a party which deliberately invokes the jurisdiction of a Court which has no jurisdiction whatsoever for ulterior motives. That would only encourage such type of litigation. The object underlying the provision in Section 21 is not to encourage such litigants but to avoid harassment to litigants who had bona fide and in good faith commenced proceedings in a court which is later found to be wanting in jurisdiction. In the instant case, we are convinced, beyond doubt, that NICCO did not act bonafide in moving the Calcutta High Court and, therefore, the submission based on Secton 21 must fail." 29. In the case on hand, in our considered opinion, no part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the local limits of this court by reasons of location of the head office of the Trust or registration of Trust or receiving copies of notices/orders/communications at Dharamsala. All actions challenged in the present petition by the petitioner were taken by the respondent No. 2 from Siliguri, not within the jurisdiction of this Court. Similarly, the action sought to be taken against the party i.e. Hotel Tibet at Gangtok, is also not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. To us, it is more than clear that the head office, or registered office of the petitioner is hardly material so far as territorial jurisdiction of the Court is concerned. We, therefore, hold that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction over the matter and on that ground alone; the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 30. So far as prayer in Para 22(b) is concerned, prima facie we are of the view that the submission of Ms Abhilasha Kumari is well founded that there is nothing to show why the petitioner cannot make that prayer in an appropriate Court relating to exemption from the operation of the Act. We may, however, hasten to state that we express no final opinion on that aspect. When this Court has no territorial jurisdiction, it is not proper on our part to state anything more. We may only state that if we have not territorial jurisdiction, we cannot entertain the petition and the matter must end there. 31. We may, however, hasten to state that we express no final opinion on that aspect. When this Court has no territorial jurisdiction, it is not proper on our part to state anything more. We may only state that if we have not territorial jurisdiction, we cannot entertain the petition and the matter must end there. 31. Regarding non - filing of affidavit by respondent No. 1, Mr. Sharrna submitted that once notice was issued, it was incumbent on the part of the Union of India to file an affidavit and without such affidavit, the Court may not hear the learned counsel even on preliminary point regarding jurisdiction of the Court. We are afraid, we cannot uphold the contention. It this Court has no territorial jurisdiction, apart from the filing of affidavit or raising of contention by the respondents, we have to satisfy ourselves whether we have jurisdiction in the matter and we can entertain a petition. In the light of well settled principles of law and in view of several decisions of the Honble Supreme Court, we are convinced that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction over the matter. We, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents and dismiss the writ petition only on that ground. 32. In all the cases, cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been observed that even if apart of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can entertain a petition and decide it on merits. There cannot be two opinions about the law laid down in the above cases. Once the Court is of the view that a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, the case has to be decided on its own merits. It is also true that being a dominus litis, it is the petitioner who has right to approach a competent forum. In the instant case, however, since we are of the view that no cause of action, either in whole or in part, can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, there is want of jurisdiction on our part and hence the petition deserves to be dismissed. 33. In the instant case, however, since we are of the view that no cause of action, either in whole or in part, can be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, there is want of jurisdiction on our part and hence the petition deserves to be dismissed. 33. Learned counsel for the petitioner prays that ad-interim relief granted earlier may be continued for some time more so as to enable the petitioner to approach higher forum. In our opinion, the prayer is reasonable. Ad-interim order passed earlier will remain in force for a period of four weeks from today.