JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:---Rule. By consent, the rule made returnable forthwith. 2. The petitioners challenge auction of stalls No. 33 to 42 in the market complex of respondent No. 1 held on 11th February, 2000 and seek for writ of mandamus to reauction the said stalls for beef tenders. The challenge in the petition is mainly on two grounds. Firstly, that the respondent No. 1 could not have changed the use of the said stalls from those meant for the chicken vendors to the beef vendors and secondly, that such change having been brought about at the eleventh hour the petitioners have been greatly prejudiced and are denied of their right to bid for the said stalls. 3. The facts relevant for the decision are that the respondent No. 1 by an advertisement dated 19th January, 2000, published in the local newspaper, invited general public to apply for allotment of stalls in meat market complex at Margao. In terms of the said notice, the application forms along with the terms and conditions were to be collected from respondent No. 1 from 24th January, 2000 to 7th February, 2000 on payment of Rs. 500/- which was non refundable amount. The said forms, duly filled, were to be submitted on or before 10th February, 2000 by 12.00 noon along with Earnest Money Deposit of Rs. 7,500/- in favour of the respondent No. 1. The petitioners collected the application forms in time and along with the said forms, the petitioners were also supplied with a plan of the meat market complex. In accordance with the terms and conditions, the respondent No. 1 was to determine the highest offers on 11th February, 2000 at 10.00 a.m. at his office at Margao on which day, time and place all the applicants were invited to place their highest bids. Accordingly, the petitioners remained present on 11th February, 2000 for the purpose of bidding after having filed the application forms disclosing the choice for beef stalls and Earnest Money Deposit of Rs. 7,500/ by each of the petitioners. 4. It is the contention of the petitioners that in terms of the plan furnished to the petitioners read with the advertisement as well as the terms and conditions, the stalls from 1 to 10 were designated as the pork vending stalls, those bearing Nos. 11 to 20 were designated as the chicken vending stalls, those bearing Nos. 4. It is the contention of the petitioners that in terms of the plan furnished to the petitioners read with the advertisement as well as the terms and conditions, the stalls from 1 to 10 were designated as the pork vending stalls, those bearing Nos. 11 to 20 were designated as the chicken vending stalls, those bearing Nos. 21 to 32 were designated as the mutton vending stalls and those bearing Nos. 33 to 42 were designated as the beef vending stalls and that the stalls Nos. 11 to 25 were reserved for the existing meat vendors at the fish market. It is their further case that the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4, 7 and 8 were interested in participating in the auction relating to the beef stalls identified as the stalls Nos. 33 to 42, whereas the petitioners Nos. 5 and 6 were initially interested in applying for chicken stalls; however, on being told that the chicken stalls were only for the existing vendors of fish market, the said petitioners Nos. 5 and 6 decided to apply for beef stalls. Accordingly, the petitioners purchased necessary forms and inspected the stalls and submitted their applications along with Earnest Money Deposit. It is their further case that on 11th February, 2000, the respondent No. 1 in total violation of the terms and conditions of the auction and without any prior notice declared that the stalls Nos. 33 to 42 would be auctioned as stalls for chicken vendors. Inspite of the petitioners objecting the last minute change, the respondent No. 1 proceeded to hold auction and, therefore, the petitioners refrained from participating in the said auction proceedings. It is the case of the petitioners that the changes brought about in the stalls which were earlier designated as beef vending stalls and allotting the same to the chicken vendors are arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the terms and conditions. According to the petitioners, the terms and conditions of auction do not permit such change as no licensee can sell the meat other than the one for which the stall is earmarked in the plan. It is the grievance of the petitioners that the petitioners were also interested in bidding for chicken stalls. According to the petitioners, the terms and conditions of auction do not permit such change as no licensee can sell the meat other than the one for which the stall is earmarked in the plan. It is the grievance of the petitioners that the petitioners were also interested in bidding for chicken stalls. However, they did not apply for chicken stalls as the stalls shown for chicken vending in the plan were shown to be reserved for the existing vendors in the fish market and that gave an impression that the stalls available to the others are those earmarked for selling pork, mutton and beef. Otherwise, the petitioner Nos. 5 and 6 would have applied for and taken part in bidding for chicken stalls instead of applying for beef stalls. 5. On the other hand, it is the case of the respondent No. 1 that all the terms and conditions regarding the auction were disclosed along with the application forms furnished to the petitioners. It is their case that in the meeting held by the respondent No. 1 on 26th October, 1999 and adjourned on 28th October, 1999, the issue of allotment of different types of stalls including the stalls in the meat market were discussed and certain decision in relation thereto was taken which included the decision in relation to the base price, the deposit amount to be received from the licensees and manner of allotment of the stalls. Accordingly, it was decided to allot the stalls on preferential basis to the vendors who were carrying on the business near the market by way of lots and after accommodating those vendors the remaining stalls to be auctioned with the base price of Rs. 2,49,550/- per stall. It was also decided to undertake the said exercise immediately in order to generate funds as at the relevant time the financial condition of the respondent No. 1 was precarious and the decision was forwarded for the approval of the Government. It is their further case that in the meeting held on 11th January, 2000, the issue of allotment of meat stalls was discussed and it was decided to fix upset price for the remaining stalls, after allotting the stalls to the vendors in the market, at Rs. 3,00,000/- instead of Rs. 2,49,550/-. It was further decided to allot the stalls to the applicants offering the highest amount over and above Rs. 3,00,000/-. 3,00,000/- instead of Rs. 2,49,550/-. It was further decided to allot the stalls to the applicants offering the highest amount over and above Rs. 3,00,000/-. It was resolved to allot fifteen stalls to the meat vendors occupying the space near the fish market by way of drawing lots and further to advertise and invite applications for allotment of meat stalls and accordingly the said advertisement dated 19th January, 2000, was issued. In answer to the said advertisement, 59 applications were received from different applicants. Further, in the meeting held on 10th February, 2000, the issue of disposal of the meat stalls was taken up and considering the fact that by 1.00 noon on 10th February, 2000, 21 applications for chicken stalls, 3 applications for mutton stalls, 10 applications for beef stalls and 6 applications for pork stalls were received, in the circumstances, it was decided to increase the number of stalls for chicken and mutton which were tentatively shown for beef stalls in the plan. It was also resolved to earmark 10 stalls for beef and pork but segregating two types of stalls by constructing a wall and having separate entry, and accordingly stall Nos. 1 to 6 were reserved as beef stalls and stall Nos. 7 to 10 were reserved as pork stalls. It is their further case that the stall Nos. 11 to 25 were reserved for existing meat vendors, the stall Nos. 26 to 32 were reserved for chicken vendors, stall Nos. 33 to 42 for chicken/mutton vendors. According to the respondent No. 1 on 11th February, 2000, bids in respect of the stalls beginning from 26 to 42 were invited from chicken and mutton vendors and out of 17 successful bidders, 13 paid 75% of the amount payable by each of the applicants within the stipulated period and, therefore, 4 remained vacant without being allotted. None of the 10 applicants who had applied for beef stalls participated in the bids on 11th February, 2000 and one of the applicants for beef stall namely Dodapir G. Dharwad withdrew his application and obtained refund of Earnest Money Deposit. Out of the 6 applicants for the pork vending stalls, only 4 appeared on 11th February, 2000 and since there were only 4 stalls earmarked for pork vending, it was decided not to auction the same on that day. Out of the 6 applicants for the pork vending stalls, only 4 appeared on 11th February, 2000 and since there were only 4 stalls earmarked for pork vending, it was decided not to auction the same on that day. It is their further case that all the 42 stalls earmarked for meat are identical in nature except for their location and roofing. Stall Nos. 33 to 42 and 1 to 10 are identical in the sense that 6 stalls on either sides have slopy roofs and 4 stalls each on either side are having flat roofs. It is their further case that reference to different stalls for different types of meat vending in the plan was a tentative one and the authority is entitled to make necessary changes in the allotment of stalls based on the demand for such stalls and, therefore, the decision taken in the meeting held on 10th February, 2000 was just and fair and can neither be called arbitrary or illegal and does not infringe any of the rights of the petitioners and respondent No. 1 has not violated any of the essential terms and conditions of the tender notice. 6. Shri N. Sardessai, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners while assailing the decision to change the earmarking of the stalls submitted that the decision is not only illegal and arbitrary and in violation of the terms and conditions of the notice issued on 19th January, 2000 but also in violation of the provisions of law contained in section 22 r/w section 56 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Town and Country Planning Act, 1974. Drawing our attention to Notice dated 19th January, 2000, the learned Advocate submitted that in terms of the said notice, the stall Nos. 11 to 25 were reserved for the existing vendors from the fish market and the said terms did not permit change of use of the stalls by the licensee once it is obtained for a particular purpose and bearing in mind these provisions and the representation made to the petitioners in the plan regarding the earmarking of different stalls for different categories of meat vending, it was not permissible for the respondent No. 1 to bring about the said change at the eleventh hour. He further submitted that if the petitioners were made aware that there were chicken stalls available to the members of the public and other than the vendors from the fish market, the petitioners would have applied for chicken stalls instead of applying for beef stalls, more particularly the petitioner Nos. 5 and 6. In that connection, attention was also drawn to Clause 5(b) and Clause 13 of the terms and conditions of the tender notice. He further drew our attention to item No. 6 in the application forms which required the applicants to disclose the type of stalls intended to be occupied in the market. 7. On the other hand, Shri A.P. Lawande, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1 submitted that the plan did not form part of the notice issued as well as the terms and conditions and in any case, the classification of different stalls for different categories of meat vending originally disclosed in the plan was a tentative marking and that based upon the response from the members of the public, an appropriate decision was taken by the respondent No. 1 in its meeting held on 10th February, 2000. The decision so taken was necessitated on account of the facts disclosed in the resolution of the respondent No. 1 passed in the meeting held on the said day. According to the learned Advocate, the said decision is within the powers of respondent No. 1 and in the realm of the management of the market and has nothing to do with the drawing of the scheme as contemplated under section 56 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Town and Country Planning Act, 1974. Placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in the matter of (Frigorifico Allana Ltd. and another v. Goa Meat Complex Ltd.)1, reported in 2000(1) G.L.T. 83 and that of the Apex Court in the matter of (Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India and others)2, 1981(1) S.C.C. 568 and (Tata Cellular v. Union of India)3, reported in 1994(6) S.C.C. 651 , the learned Advocate submitted that the decision taken by the respondent No. 1 in the facts and the prevailing circumstances certainly confines to reasonableness and cannot be termed as capricious or arbitrary and, therefore, there is no case made out by the petitioners for interference in the decision of the respondent No. 1. He further submitted that in any case subject to the result of this petition, the respondent No. 1 proposes to invite bids from 9 Applicants including the 8 petitioners herein in respect of the stalls Nos. 1 to 6 meant for beef vending and as regards the 4 stalls which are available, 3 being for chicken vending and one for beef vending. The petitioners if so interested can certainly participate for bidding in beef stalls as and when invited by the respondent No. 1. 8. Shri M.B. D'Costa, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and 7 to 10 while reiterating the submissions made by the learned Advocate Shri A.P. Lawande submitted that the pleadings in the petition do not disclose necessary averments to claim the relief prayed for and in any case the plan on which the petitioners have placed heavy reliance did not form part of the notice or the terms and conditions and any representation in the said plan which is not in accordance with the terms and conditions for the bid does not create any right in favour of the petitioners and, therefore, no interference is called for. 9. On plain reading of Notice dated 19th January, 2000, it discloses that the applications were invited from the members of the public for allotment of the stalls in meat market and it discloses that the meat market stalls accommodate chicken, beef and pork stalls. The said Notice also requires the members of the public to obtain forms by making payment of Rs. 500/-. It is an undisputed fact that in order to obtain such forms the respondent No. 1 had prescribed an application form, a copy of which is placed on record at Annexure 'R1' to the petition and the applications in the said forms were filed by all the petitioners and in those applications the petitioners had applied for beef stalls. It is not in dispute that when the said applications were submitted to the respondent No. 1, the petitioners were not in possession of the copy of the said plan. A copy of the said plan was made available to the petitioners only along with the application form which was required to be submitted to claim right to participate in the bid for the stalls in the said market. A copy of the said plan was made available to the petitioners only along with the application form which was required to be submitted to claim right to participate in the bid for the stalls in the said market. In other words, even before the alleged representation in the plan showing different categories of the stalls, the petitioners themselves had expressed their desire to participate in the bid for the beef stalls and no other stalls. This clearly shows that the petitioners were interested only in beef stalls and were never interested in chicken stalls. 10. The respondents are also justified in submitting that the plan did not form part of the notice dated 19th January, 2000 and the terms and conditions annexed thereto. It is true that Clause 13 of the terms and conditions clearly require licensee not to change the use of the stalls. The said Clause 13 provides that the licensee shall use the stall only for selling the meat that is the one for which the stall is allotted and should not make any change therein. The said condition is naturally for the licensee to observe subsequent to the allotment of a stall. The said condition does not debar the respondent No. 1 to decide in its powers of administration of the market to change the earmarking of the stalls for different categories. Such decision naturally has to depend upon the demand for different types of stalls and other circumstances which may prevail at different times. It has to be necessarily in the best interest of the augmenting maximum financial return to the respondent No. 1. It is not in dispute that it is a commercial venture and any decision as regards the earmarking of the stalls cannot be taken totally ignoring the financial aspect, and the demand for different categories of the meat. 11. Reference to section 22 and section 56 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Town and Country Planning Act, 1974 has no relevancy to the matter in issue. 11. Reference to section 22 and section 56 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Town and Country Planning Act, 1974 has no relevancy to the matter in issue. Section 22 provides that subject to the provisions of the said Act and Rules framed thereunder and subject to any directions which Government may give, functions of every Planning and Development Authority shall be to prepare an existing Land Use Map, an Outline development plan, a comprehensive development plan, to prepare and prescribe uses of land within its area and to prepare scheme of development and undertake their implementation and for these purposes it may carry out or cause to carry out surveys of the planning area and prepare report or reports of such surveys and to perform such functions as may be prescribed. Section 56 thereof speaks of making of town planning scheme and its scope. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that subject to the provisions of the said Act, a Planning and Development Authority may for the purpose of implementing the proposals contained in the development plan make one or more town planning schemes for the area within its jurisdiction or any part thereof, and shall submit such schemes along with a plan proposed to be included. Sub-section (2) thereof deals with the matters in relation to which the provisions in any town planning scheme can be made. Much stress was laid upon Clause (e) of sub-section (2) by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. The same reads as under :- "(2) A Town Planning Scheme may make provision for all namely :- ........................................................... (a) ......................................................... (b) ......................................................... (c) ......................................................... (e) the allotment of reservation of land for roads, open spaces, gardens, recreational grounds, schools, markets, green belts and dairies, transport facilities, and public purposes of all kinds;..................... ..........................................." 12. Referring to the word 'land' in the said clause, it was sought to be contended that land includes building and, therefore, any change in the use of the building would require necessary approval of the Government in terms of Clause 1 of section 56 and, therefore, the decision taken by the respondent No. 1 on 10th February, 2000 having not been subjected to approval of the Government, and the same without such approval being sought to be implemented, is totally illegal. 13. 13. Firstly, the expression to the word 'land' referred to in Clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 56 cannot be interpreted in the manner sought to be argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. Sub-section (2) of section 56 speaks about various items in respect of which the town planning scheme may provide. The Clause (e) speaks about allotment or reservation of land for different purposes within such scheme. It does not speak about the change of use of the buildings which may be constructed in a land earmarked for different purposes under Clause (e) in a town planning scheme drawn and approved under the said section. Besides, as rightly submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondents, classification of the stalls for different items in a meat market is within the realm of management of the market. It is for the respondent No. 1 to take necessary decision in that regard depending upon various factors. It is not in dispute that 21 applications were received in respect of the chicken stalls. The contention that the respondent No. 1 could not have accepted 21 applications in relation to chicken stalls being fully aware that chicken stalls were not available for members of the public and were reserved for the existing meat vendors from the fish market, is totally devoid of substance. First of all, there is no such ground taken in the petition. Secondly, the notice dated 19th January, 2000 nowhere debarred the members of the public from applying for chicken stalls. It is true that one of the terms of the notice disclosed that applications were also invited from the existing meat vendors presently occupying the space near the fish market. It is also true that a decision was taken by the respondent No. 1 in the meeting held on 26th October, 1999 and adjourned to 28th October, 1999 to allot different types of stalls to the vendors who were carrying on the business near the market. It is also true that the said decision was reiterated in the meeting held on 11th January, 2000. However, none of the decisions in the said meetings, as disclosed from the Affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondents, refers to any decision being taken by the authority to earmark specific stalls in the meat market for the existing meat vendors near the fish market. However, none of the decisions in the said meetings, as disclosed from the Affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondents, refers to any decision being taken by the authority to earmark specific stalls in the meat market for the existing meat vendors near the fish market. In other words, when the notice dated 19th February, 2000 was published, there was no representation nor any records available to show that the respondent No. 1 had specifically and finally decided to earmark the specific stalls for the existing meat vendors from the fish market. Therefore, neither the notice inviting applications nor the terms and conditions disclosed any restrictions to the public against applying for the stalls for chicken vending. Being so, nothing prevented the members of the public from applying for the chicken stalls eventhough they were the existing meat vendors in the fish market. It is true that in the plan which was furnished along with the application form, there were some markings made in ink showing certain stalls being meant for particular type of meat vending. But as already observed above, in the Resolution dated 10th February, 2000, it was clearly resolved by the respondent No. 1 that whatever classification of the stalls which was done categorywise prior to the said date was a tentative one and not final and that the final decision in that regard was taken only on 10th February, 2000 depending upon the response from the members of the public. We do not find any arbitrariness in the said decision nor any irregularity in entertaining 21 applications from the members of public for chicken stalls in answer to the Notice dated 19th January, 2000. The Resolution passed in the meeting held on 10th February, 2000 as reproduced in Affidavit-in-reply by the respondent No. 1 clearly reads thus:- "Due to the increased demand for chicken stalls and also considering the poor response for pork and beef stalls the authority has decided to increase the number of stalls for chicken and mutton by including the stalls which were tentatively shown for beef stalls in the plan..............." 14. The expression used in the Resolution to the effect "tentatively shown for beef stalls in the plan" disclose the so called earmarking of the stalls for the beef which was purely tentative in nature and there was no final decision taken as regards identifying the location as well as the number of beef stalls in the meat market. Whatever that was shown in relation to the beef stalls was purely tentative in nature and the decision in that regard was yet to be taken and it was taken only on 10th February, 2000. Once, it is clear that whatever was shown in the plan was of tentative nature, the question of shifting of the stalls does not arise at all. The question of shifting might have arisen if respondent No. 1 had taken any final decision on earmarking of stalls for specific purposes. Once, it is clear that till 10th February, 2000 there was no final decision as regards the number of stalls as well as their location in the market and the same was taken only on 11th February, 2000, the contention of the petitioners regarding the shifting of the stalls does not hold any water. It is pertinent to note that neither the notice nor the terms and conditions disclosed categorywise allocation of stalls. 15. It cannot be disputed that the judicial review basically is regarding the decision making process rather than the decision itself. The Apex Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India (supra) has clearly held that the judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself. In the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it being an undisputed fact that there was more demand for chicken stalls and the decision by the competent authority in the matter of allocation of stall categorywise was finally, taken only on 10th February, 2000, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the same cannot be faulted with. In the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it being an undisputed fact that there was more demand for chicken stalls and the decision by the competent authority in the matter of allocation of stall categorywise was finally, taken only on 10th February, 2000, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the same cannot be faulted with. The Apex Court in the said decision has also referred to its earlier decision in the matter of (Fasih Chaudhary v. Director General, Doordarshan and others)4, reported in 1989(1) S.C.C. 89 wherein it was observed that "it is well settled that there should be fair play in action in a situation like the present one, as observed by this Court in (Ram Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana)5, reported in 1985(3) S.C.C. 287 that while as mentioned herein above, fair play action in matters like the present one is an essential requirement, similarly, however, "free play in the joints" is also necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere as the present one." 16. In the case in hand, it is apparent that the decision was taken not with any ill-will or malice towards the petitioners but considering the fact that there was greater demand for chicken stalls and lesser for beef stalls and, therefore, the number of stalls allotted for beef and pork were less than those allotted for chicken vending. Such a decision in the facts and circumstances of the case disclosed by the respondent No. 1 and not being controverted by the petitioners cannot be said to be an arbitrary one. The Apex Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India (supra) has also referred to one more decision in the matter of (G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council)6, reported in 1991(3) Bom.C.R. 139 : 1991(3) S.C.C. 91 wherein it reads thus :- "The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which Parliament appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires. The Court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires. The Court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choices which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be legitimate. But if the decision is within the confines of reasonableness, it is no part of the Court's function to look further into its merits. "With the question whether a particular policy is wise or foolish the Court is not concerned, it can only interfere if to pursue it is beyond the powers of the authority"............. . So also the Apex Court in the matter of Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India (supra) has held thus :- "A pragmatic approach to social justice compels us to interpret constitutional provisions, including those like Articles 32 and 226, with a view to see that effective policing of the corridors of power is carried out by the Court until other ombudsman arrangements- a problem with which Parliament has been wrestling for too long- emerges. I have dwelt at a little length on this policy aspect and the Court process because the learned Attorney General challenged the petitioner's locus standi either qua worker or qua citizen to question in Court the wrongdoings of the public sector although he maintained that what had been done by the Corporation was both bona fide and correct. We certainly agree that judicial interference with the administration cannot be meticulous in our Montesquien system of separation of powers. The Court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the Directorate of a Government company has acted fairly, even if it has faltered in its wisdom, the Court cannot, as a super-auditor, take the Board of Directors to task. This function is limited to testing whether the administrative action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and has substantially complied with the norms of procedure set for it by rules of public administration." 17. This function is limited to testing whether the administrative action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and has substantially complied with the norms of procedure set for it by rules of public administration." 17. Considering the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as by this Court in Frigorifico Allana Ltd. v. Goa Meat Compex (supra) and the facts of the case in hand, we do not find any arbitrary action on the part of the respondents in deciding to allot more stalls for chicken vending and less the number of stalls for beef vending. This has been done in the facts and circumstances disclosed in the affidavit-in-reply and which have not be controverted. The grievance of the petitioners that if the petitioners were made aware that there were chicken stalls available for members of the public apart from the persons who were meat vendors in the fish market is totally devoid of substance as neither the notice dated 19th February, 2000 nor the terms and conditions nor the plan prohibited the petitioners from applying for the chicken stalls. That apart, para 9 of the petition in clear terms had disclosed that petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 and 7 and 8 were never interested in chicken stalls but beef stalls. This is apparent from the application in form Exhibit 'R1' which was filed by the petitioners disclosing that they wanted to apply for beef stalls. Being so, the petitioners grievance regarding increase in number of the chicken stalls is without any substance. As regards the petitioner Nos. 5 and 6, it is true that the contents of the petition disclose that their intention was to apply for chicken stalls but they preferred to apply for beef stalls on the ground that they were informed that chicken stalls were not available. As already observed, there is no material disclosed on record to establish that there was any such representation by respondent No. 1 to the petitioners. As regards whatever was disclosed in the plan firstly, the plan was made available to the petitioners subsequent to the filing of the application in the form R.1 and secondly, whatever that was disclosed in the plan was of tentative nature and the final decision in that regard was taken only on 10th February, 2000. As regards whatever was disclosed in the plan firstly, the plan was made available to the petitioners subsequent to the filing of the application in the form R.1 and secondly, whatever that was disclosed in the plan was of tentative nature and the final decision in that regard was taken only on 10th February, 2000. Even in the objections which were filed by the petitioners on 11th February, 2000 protesting over the so-called shifting of the stalls, the petitioners had nowhere disclosed that they had any intention to apply for chicken stalls or that they would have preferred to apply for chicken stalls or that they were misled in any manner by the copy of the plan furnished to them. It is thus clear that the objections which are sought to be raised in the petition are purely afterthought. It is also pertinent to note that the representation dated 11th February, 2000 was in fact filed with the respondent No. 1 on 14th February, 2000 and even on that occasion there was no grievance made of any lack of opportunity to the petitioners to bid for chicken stalls. 18. No case is made out for the issuance of the Mandamus asked for and the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The rule is discharged with costs of Rs. 2000/-. 19. At this stage, the learned Advocate for the petitioners prays for stay of the judgment in the matter as well as for leave to file appeal to the Apex Court. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has prayed for maintenance of status quo. The request is objected to by the learned Advocate for the respondents. The petition having been dismissed and no interim relief granted during the pendency of the petition, the question of grant of maintenance of status quo does not arise and, therefore, the same is rejected. As regards the grant of leave to appeal to the Apex Court, we do not find any substantial question of law to be dealt with and as such the request is rejected. The petition having been dismissed, question of grant of stay of the judgment does not arise. Petition dismissed. -----