Judgment 1. This revision application under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) is directed against the judgment and decree of the trial court in Eviction Suit no.47 of 1988 directing eviction of the petitioners from the suit premises on the ground that the opposite parties herein reasonably and in good faith require the said premises for their own use and occupation. 2. The eviction suit in question against the petitioners for their eviction from the suit premises on the ground that they require the premises in question for their occupation for residential purposes. The suit premises mentioned in Schedule B of the plaint is the first floor of a double storied building situated on holding no.48 of Rajendra Nagar Colony in the town of Jamshedpur consisting of 5 living (bed) rooms; one store room, a dining space, besides bath rooms, lavatories, open space, varandah and a kitchen on the top of that floor. The entire building (mentioned in Schedule A of the plaint) belonged to one Jitendra Kumar Ghosh, a sub-lessee of Jamshedpur Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. During his life time, the said Jitendra Kumar Ghosh had let out the entire first floor of the building as mentioned in Schedule B of the plaint to petitioner-defendant no.1Bihar State Sales Representatives Union, a union of the sales representatives registered under the Indian Trade Union Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Union) on a monthly rental of Rs. 825/- exclusive of electricity and water charges. Petitioner -defendant no.2 is the General Secretary of the Union. After the death of Jitendra Kumar Ghosh, the property devolved upon his widow, son and a daughter. The widow died and the daughter relinquished her right, title and interest in the property in favour of the son Sri Ashish Ghosh. On his part, said Sri Ashish Ghosh transferred the entire building to the plaintiffs on the basis of a registered sale deed dt. 4th July, 1985 for a valuable consideration. Thereafter the plaintiffs came in possession of the building and the defendant-tenant started paying rental for the tenanted premises to the plaintiffs on obtaining rent receipts. The case of the plaintiffs is that they had no house property of their own in the town of Jamshedpur and were residing in tenanted premises. 4th July, 1985 for a valuable consideration. Thereafter the plaintiffs came in possession of the building and the defendant-tenant started paying rental for the tenanted premises to the plaintiffs on obtaining rent receipts. The case of the plaintiffs is that they had no house property of their own in the town of Jamshedpur and were residing in tenanted premises. Therefore, with the sole purpose of their residence they had acquired the building in question from Ashish Ghosh. Plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 are husband and wife and the remaining plaintiffs, namely, plaintiff nos. 3 to 6 are their adult married sons. According to them, plaintiff no.3 had two grown up daughters aged about 19 years and 15 years and a son aged about 8 years. Plaintiff no.4 had two sons; whereas plaintiff no.5 had one son and a daughter. Plaintiff no.6 had been married recently. Therefore, at the relevant time he had no issue. After acquiring the building, the entire ground floor was occupied by them as residence. As the ground floor consisted of only three bed rooms, two drawing rooms and a dining space, besides a store room, a kitchen and bath rooms and lavatory etc., they felt difficulty in accommodating all the members of their family. Besides, plaintiff nos.1 and 2 had a divorced daughter dependent on them. Therefore, she was also required to be accommodated in the building. Plaintiff no.1 has also a younger brother who wanted to reside with him at Jamshedpur after his retirement from service in Bombay. Therefore, the accommodation on the ground floor was not sufficient for them, so much so that the garage was required to be converted into living rooms to be occupied by plaintiff no.3, his wife and children; whereas plaintiff no.4 was required to hire a separate accommodation in the same locality situated over holding no.40 on assurance that after the first floor is vacated, he shall vacate the tenanted premises. When he failed to fulfil his commitment, his landlord put pressure on him to vacate the tenanted premises; as a result he had to hire another accommodation over holding no.31 by paying a monthly rental of Rs. 600/-. Feeling the acute necessity for their accommodation, the plaintiff had requested the defendant-tenant to vacate the premises. When he failed to fulfil his commitment, his landlord put pressure on him to vacate the tenanted premises; as a result he had to hire another accommodation over holding no.31 by paying a monthly rental of Rs. 600/-. Feeling the acute necessity for their accommodation, the plaintiff had requested the defendant-tenant to vacate the premises. The latter had assured to vacate the same, but when they failed to vacate the premises, then a notice dated 5.9.97 was sent to them for vacating the tenanted premises within one month from receipt of the notice. When the defendant-tenant failed to oblige, the suit was instituted in the court of Munsif under the provision of Section 14 of the Act for a decree of eviction of the defendant-tenant on the ground that the plaintiffs require the tenanted premises for their personal use and occupation. 3. The defendant tenants appeared in the court below and by filing affidavit sought leave to contest the suit. Leave having been granted, the defendants-tenants filed their written statement for opposing the claim for eviction from the tenanted premises on two grounds; first, that the land and building belonging to Jamshedpur Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. was allotted to Jitendra Kumar Ghosh for residential purpose and it was not permissible to be transferred by the allottee or his heir Ashish Ghosh. Therefore, Ashish Ghosh had no authority or right to sell the building in question without prior permission of the Jamshedpur Co-operative House Building Society. Thus, on the basis of the sale deed dated 4.7.85 no title could pass to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to decree of eviction on the ground of their personal necessity. Secondly, that the plaintiffs had absolutely no necessity for the tenanted premises for their personal use as they were conveniently residing on the ground floor of the building. According to the defendants-tenants, the garage measuring 25 x 12 was converted into bed room and plaintiff no.3 was residing in that portion of the building alongwith his wife and children. Plaintiff no.4 was residing in a rented accommodation in the same locality because he was not feeling convenient to live with other members of the family. The remaining portion of the ground floor was in occupation of plaintiffs nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 and they were residing very conveniently on the ground floor with their family. Plaintiff no.4 was residing in a rented accommodation in the same locality because he was not feeling convenient to live with other members of the family. The remaining portion of the ground floor was in occupation of plaintiffs nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 and they were residing very conveniently on the ground floor with their family. As regards the requirement of the brother, the tenant denied that younger brother of plaintiff no.1 ever lived in the building with his wife. The divorced daughter of plaintiff no.1 and 2 was running her own business separately and was residing at another place independently. On these grounds, it was contended on behalf of the defendants-tenant that the plaintiffs did not require the tenanted premises for their use and occupation, much less reasonably and in good faith. 4. In the trial court, both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. On consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Munsif came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are rightful owners of the building including the tenanted premises on the strength of the sale deed dated 4.7.85 (Ext. 3) and they were attorned by the Union as landlord by paying rent and obtaining receipts in token thereof. There fore, there was relationship of landlords and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants. As regards the necessity of the plaintiffs for the tenanted premises, the learned Munsif has come to the conclusion, on consideration of evidence adduced by the parties, that admittedly the family of the plaintiffs consisted of about 15-16 members and the accommodation on the ground floor was not sufficient to accommodate all of them, so much so that one of the plaintiffs was forced to reside with his wife and children in the garage by converting the same into living (bed) rooms and another was living in a rented house by paying a monthly rental of Rs. 600/-. The story of the defendants that plaintiff no.3 residing separately in the garage portion and plaintiff no.4 in a rented premises because of family feud inasmuch they were born to plaintiff no.1 from his first wife, has not found favour with learned Munsif. Therefore, on consideration of all the facts and circumstance of the case, learned Munsif has held that the plaintiffs require the tenanted schedule B premises reasonably and in good faith for their personal use and occupation. Therefore, on consideration of all the facts and circumstance of the case, learned Munsif has held that the plaintiffs require the tenanted schedule B premises reasonably and in good faith for their personal use and occupation. Therefore, he has decreed the suit directing the defendants to give vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiffs within 60 days from the date of the decree failing which the plaintiffs are to be entitled to get decree executed through the process of the court. Against that order of the trial court, the present application has been filed in accordance with the provision of sub-section (8) of Section 14 of the Act. 5. Mr. V. Shivnath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has assailed the judgment and decree of the trial court on the ground that the requirement/necessity of the plaintiffs for the tenanted premises has not been shown to be reasonable and bonafide inasmuch as they had purchased the entire building in July, 1985 and instituted the suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity in the month of Feb., 1988. Prior to institution of the suit, they were cosy in the accommodation available on the ground floor. Therefore, simply because the plaintiffs desire that they should also occupy the first floor let out to the Union for accommodation of its members, the same cannot be treated as reasonable and bonafide requirement. Learned counsel also convassed that according to the transfer deed in favour of the plaintiffs, the lease in favour of their vendor expired on 5.6.87. Therefore, the plaintiffs had been left with no right, title or interest in the building, much less the tenanted premises, to seek eviction of the tenants on the ground of personal necessity. 6. Under Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, a tenant in occupation of a building can be evicted in execution of a decree passed by court where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. Landlord is a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant. [Section 2(f)]. According to Explanation I of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 the word landlord shall not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of section 2. In other words, an agent receiving rent for the building on behalf of the principal (owner) of the building even though is landlord according to the definition given in clause (f) ot Section 2, cannot maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant on the ground of his personal necessity. In the present case, admittedly, the suit building belonged to one Jitendra Kumar Ghosh, a sub-lessee under Jamshedpur Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. for a fixed period expiring on 5.6.87. He inducted the Union as a tenant in respect of the first floor of the building and was receiving rent. After his death, the entire building devolved upon his son Ashish Ghosh who transferred his right, title and interest to the plaintiffs for valuable consideration by executing a registered deed (Ext.3). The document discloses that the transfer by way of sale was made in favour of all the six plaintiffs, namely, the parents and their four adult sons. The evidence is overwhelming that after the transfer, the Union- tenant attorned the plaintiffs as its landlord, paid rent and obtained rent receipts. Almost all the witnesses examined on behalf of the tenant-defendants have admitted this position. To quote D.W.10 who filed the written statement on behalf of the defendants as their legally constituted attorney after the plaintiffs purchased the suit building, the defendants started paying rent to them treating them their landlords. That apart, the said witness had given in writing that the defendant-Union was "paying rent and electricity bill to Sri Amrit Lal Seth (plaintiff no.1) every month, against which we are getting receipt". The certificate was issued by D.W.10 on 14.11.86 and is admitted into evidence as Ext.7. That apart, the said witness had given in writing that the defendant-Union was "paying rent and electricity bill to Sri Amrit Lal Seth (plaintiff no.1) every month, against which we are getting receipt". The certificate was issued by D.W.10 on 14.11.86 and is admitted into evidence as Ext.7. Therefore, no further evidence was/is required to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants in respect of the suit premises, that is, the first floor of the building standing on holding no.48 of Rajendra Nagar Colony in the town of Jamshedpur. 7. However, Mr. Shivnath has contended that even though at the time the plaintiffs acquired right, title and interest in respect of the suit building of which the tenanted premises is a part by virtue of the transfer made by Ashish Ghosh on the basis of Ext.3, there was established a relationship of landlords and tenant between them and the Union, after 5.6.87, the plaintiffs ceased to be the owners of the property. Therefore, they are not entitled to a decree for eviction of the tenant on the ground of their personal necessity even if it is found that their requirement is genuine, reasonable and bonafide. For this contention he has heavily relied on the title deed executed in favour of the plaintiffs. In the 4th paragraph of the document at page 3, it has been mentioned that the house and premises transferred "was obtained on sub-lease by the father of the seller from the Jamshedpur Co-operative House Building Society Ltd, Jamshedpur by virtue of a registered deed of sale dt. 6.10.69 valid till 5.6.87". On the basis of this recital in the document, Mr. Shivnath has contended that the lease in favour of the vendor of the plaintiffs was valid up to 5.6.87. If they stepped into the shoes of the vendor-sublessee on the basis of the transfer, their right, title and interest was co-extensive with the right title and interest of the vendor. The moment right, title and interest of the vendor ceased to exist by virtue of the expiry of the sub-lease in his favour, the plaintiff vendees ceased to have right, title and interest, that is, ownership in respect of the suit building. The moment right, title and interest of the vendor ceased to exist by virtue of the expiry of the sub-lease in his favour, the plaintiff vendees ceased to have right, title and interest, that is, ownership in respect of the suit building. Once they lost their right, title and interest in the property, particularly the portion in occupation of the tenant, the plaintiffs could not obtain a decree for eviction of the tenant on the ground of their personal necessity. For this, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 1113 . 8. In M.M.Quasim V/s. Manoharlal Sharma and others : AIR 1981 SC 1113 , the Apex Court has held that the definition of landlord in section 2 is couched in very wide language. However, this wide amplitude of the expression has been cut down by the explanation appended to cl.(c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11. Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in Section 11(1)(c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of S.11(1)(c). In that case, the plaintiff-landlord has sought eviction of the tenant from a tenanted premises on the ground that he required the same for his own use and occupation. During the pendency of the eviction proceeding, there was a partition in the family and in course of the said partition, the suit premises fell to the share of another co-sharer. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiff for eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal necessity was negatived. The Apex Court held that where a person claiming to be a landlord seeks to evict the tenant on ground of bonafide requirement but loses his interest in entirety in the demised premises during the pendency of appeal, he would not still be entitled to maintain or continue the action after cessation or extinguishment of his interest in the building. 9. However, the facts of the present case are quite different. 9. However, the facts of the present case are quite different. Even though it has been stated in the transfer deed executed in favour of the plaintiffs that sublease in favour of the father of their vendor was valid till 5.6.87, there is nothing on the record that after the expiry of the sub-lease, the superior owner (lessor) Jamshedpur Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. had disowned the transferee-plaintiffs as the sub-lessee owners of the building in question. No such plea was taken in the written statement of the defendants. What the defendants have stated in their written statement was that the transfer of the leasehold property by the sub-lessee without the written consent of the Society in question was not permissible, even though they accepted the plaintiffs as their landlords, paid rent to them in respect of the tenanted premises, and obtained receipts in token thereof. The law is well settled that a tenant cannot disown the title of his landlord so long as the tenancy subsists. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. V/s. Mohammad Amber Yunus and another, 1997(1) PLJR 230, the plaintiffs were a lessee in respect of the tenanted premises for ten years with right to sub-lease. Therefore, when they sued the tenant-sub-lessees for their eviction, a plea was taken by the tenants that the tenancy in favour of their lessor having already expired, the plaintiffs-landlords were not entitled to a decree for eviction. It was held that once a person is inducted as a tenant by a person claiming himself to be the landlord, the tenant cannot be permitted in law to challenge the title later on. 10. The law on the point is more succinctly laid down by the Apex Court in AIR 1992 SC 1590 (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha V/s. Haradeb Banerjee). In that case, the plaintiff was a sub-lessee in respect of the suit building from a Housing Co-operative Society and had let out the same to the defendants-tenants on a monthly rental. 10. The law on the point is more succinctly laid down by the Apex Court in AIR 1992 SC 1590 (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha V/s. Haradeb Banerjee). In that case, the plaintiff was a sub-lessee in respect of the suit building from a Housing Co-operative Society and had let out the same to the defendants-tenants on a monthly rental. When the plaintiff sued the defendant for eviction on the grounc of default in payment of rent as well as on the ground that he himself required the premises for his occupation, the defendants- tenants took the plea that the plaintiff merely being a sub- lessee of the Housing Co-operative Society was not the owner of the building, therefore, he was not entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground of personal necessity. It was held by the Apex Court that all that a plaintiff needs to prove is that he has a better title than the defendant. He has no burden to show that he has the best of all possible titles. His ownership is good against all the world except the true owner. The rights of an owner are seldom absolute, and often are in many respects controlled and regulated by statute. The question, however, is whether he has a superior right or interest vis-a-vis the person challenging it. 11. In the present case, the petitioners were admittedly tenant under the plaintiffs by virtue of attornment after execution of the transfer deed (Ext. 3) in favour of the latter. The only fault now pointed out in the title or ownership of the plaintiffs-landlords is that the lease in respect of the building in favour of his transferror was valid till 5.6.87 only. Therefore, after 5.6.87, the plaintiffs ceased to be the owners of the property. There is nothing on the record to show that after the expiry of the term of the lease in favour of the vendor of the plaintiffs, Jamshedpur Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. terminated the lease or took any step for re-entering on the property. As a matter of fact, the plea of the plaintiffs ceasing to be the owners of the property on the ground that the lease was valid up to 5.6.87 only, a date prior to the institution of the suit, was not taken in the court below. As a matter of fact, the plea of the plaintiffs ceasing to be the owners of the property on the ground that the lease was valid up to 5.6.87 only, a date prior to the institution of the suit, was not taken in the court below. No bye-law of the Co-operative Society has been produced to show what would be the effect of the expiry of the term of the lease in favour of a sub-lessee of the said Society. In absence of any such plea being taken, the plaintiffs could not lead any evidence on the question what followed thereafter. After the expiry of a lease, a tenant may continue in occupation of the demised property either by sufference or on account of holding over. Unless action is taken by the superior owner to eject him from the demised property, the tenant remains the owner of the property demised in his favour. Therefore, at this stage, the petitioners cannot be permitted to say that by dint of the fact that the lease in favour of vendor of the plaintiffs was valid up to 5.6.87 only, the plaintiffs ceased to be the owners of the building and consequently their landlord so as to be entitled to decree for eviction on the ground of personal necessity. 12. As regards the requirement of the plaintiffs for the first floor of the building in occupation of the petitioners, there is a finding of fact of the trial court that the plaintiffs had reasonably and in good faith required the premises for their use and occupation. Such a finding can be interfered with and reversed only if it is found that it is not supported by evidence, is against the tenor of evidence, or rendered without evidence. The admitted position in the case is that the plaintiffs have purchased the suit building for their residential purpose as they had no house of their own in the town of Jamshedpur and were residing in tenanted premises. It is also undisputed a fact that plaintiff no.4 is residing in a tenanted premises with his wife and two sons and paying rent of Rs. 600/- per month. It is also undisputed a fact that plaintiff no.4 is residing in a tenanted premises with his wife and two sons and paying rent of Rs. 600/- per month. Likewise, it is undisputed a fact that the garage on the ground floor of the suit building meant for keeping therein cars or similar vehicles, has been converted into living rooms for accommodating plaintiff no.3, his wife and two daughters and a son. The remaining of the plaintiffs are occupying three bed rooms, two drawing rooms and dining space for their accommodation. The defendants assert that plaintiffs nos. 3 and 4 are sons of plaintiff no.1 by another wife. Therefore, they were not feeling convenient to live with other members of the family. Often there used to be family squables. The result was that one of them decided to live in a separate hired building and another shifted to the garage by converting the same into living rooms. For the remaining ones, three bed rooms, drawing rooms and dining space, besides varandah are sufficient. Therefore, it has been contended that the requirement of the plaintiffs is neither reasonable nor bonafide. On evidence, the trial court has found that the story as propounded by the defendants that plaintiff nos.3 and 4 are sons of plaintiff no.1 by another wife is not true and that they are residing separately; one in a hired accommodation and another in the garage, on their own sweet will and not driven by necessity or paucity of accommodation in the living rooms on the ground floor. The trial court has also held that the family of the plaintiffs consisted of five units, each unit requiring, at least, two living rooms as their children are now grown up and unless they get the first floor in its entirety, their requirement for residential purposes cannot be fully and reasonably satisfied. He has also found that the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants on the question of family feud for whatsoever reason is not acceptable as they are not competent ones. It shall be apt to reproduce the following observation/finding of the tral court: "20. In this suit there are altogether six plaintiffs out of which plaintiff no.4 is residing in holding no.31, Rajendra Nagar Colony, Jamshedpur with his family members. It shall be apt to reproduce the following observation/finding of the tral court: "20. In this suit there are altogether six plaintiffs out of which plaintiff no.4 is residing in holding no.31, Rajendra Nagar Colony, Jamshedpur with his family members. It is admitted feature of the suit that the plaintiffs are in occupation of entire ground-floor and the defendants are in occupation of entire first floor. It is also admitted fact that plaintiff no.3 is residing in garage portion. There are altogether three bed rooms and two drawing rooms, kitchen, store, bath-room on the ground floor and the same accommodation is on the first floor. Suppose one of the room of ground floor is used for drawing room even then there will be four bed rooms. It has come in evidence that plaintiffs nos.3 to 6 have been married and they have their wives and children. Meaning thereby besides plaintiffs nos.1 and 2, there is four family unit to reside in the ground floor. There are five rooms including drawing room on the ground floor. Meaning thereby there is only one room for one family unit. "21. The defendants themselves have admitted that (i) the plaintiff no.3 is residing in garage portion; (ii) plaintiffs converted the outer verandah in a room by grilling the same for the purpose of bed room; (iii) the plaintiff no.4 is residing in other holding bearing no.31, Rajendra Nagar colony since long as there is no good relation in between the plaintiffs." Finally, the trial court has concluded thus: "23. Thus (i) having five family units in five rooms (ii) to reside in garage portion and keeping the car outside in open space (iii) conversion of outer verandah into a room by grilling the same for the purpose of residence, (iv) to reside in rented house by one of the plaintiffs (v) having no other house at town Jamshedpur are the strong circumstances to prove that plaintiffs need with respect to the suit premises is bonafide and reasonable. There is five family and at least two rooms is minimum requirement of a family. There is altogether ten rooms in this suit building including ground floor and first floor portion. As the plaintiff no.1 has four sons, who are married and have their wives and grown up children, the entire first floor and ground floor portions will suffice the need of the plaintiffs. There is altogether ten rooms in this suit building including ground floor and first floor portion. As the plaintiff no.1 has four sons, who are married and have their wives and grown up children, the entire first floor and ground floor portions will suffice the need of the plaintiffs. To my view the need of the plaintiffs with respect to the suit premises is bonafide and reasonable." The trial court has proceeded to observe: "the partial eviction of the defendants from the suit premises will not fulfil the need of the plaintiffs because of large number of family members of the plaintiffs." 13. I have perused the evidence of the witnesses examined by the plaintiffs and the defendants and found that the above finding of the learned trial court can hardly be found fault with. In course of his evidence, P.W.1 who is plaintiff no.1, has narrated his necessity giving out the brief particulars of the family, of course, he has stated that even his younger brother and his wife wanted to live with him. There is no evidence that the brother is joint with other plaintiffs. Therefore, the necessity of the brother of plaintiff no.1, and his wife cannot be treated a necessity. Moreover, it has come in evidence that they visit the place occasionally. Likewise, it has come in evidence that one of the daughters of plaintiff no.1, who had been divorced by her husband and was living with the plaintiffs, has remarried and is presently residing in Rajasthan with her husband. It has also come in evidence that eldest daughter of plaintiff no.3 has got married and is residing in her matrimonial family elsewhere. However, even if the requirement of one of the daughters of plaintiff no.1 and a daughter of plaintiffs no.3 is excluded, the fact remains that the family still consists of old parents, four sons their wives and children. Undisputed fact is that plaintiff no.3 has one more daughter, now grown up, and a son. He was stated to be about 8 years old in 1989. Naturally, he is more than 18 years old by now. Consequently, both the daughter and son of plaintiff no.3 need a separate accommodation. By dint of acute paucity of accommodation in the living rooms on ground floor, they have been forced to occupy the garage by converting the same in living rooms. Naturally, he is more than 18 years old by now. Consequently, both the daughter and son of plaintiff no.3 need a separate accommodation. By dint of acute paucity of accommodation in the living rooms on ground floor, they have been forced to occupy the garage by converting the same in living rooms. A car purchased by the family is being parked outside in view of the fact that the garage has been occupied by plaintiff no.3, his wife and children. Similarly, plaintiff no.4 is living in a rented house along with his wife and two sons. Plaintiff no.5 who is also married, has two children, one daughter and a son; and plaintiff no.6 has his wife and a child to live with him. On evidence, it cannot be said that plaintiff no.4 is residing in a rented house out of his own free will because he is not willing to live with other members of the family. He was brought to the witness box as P.W.4 and nothing could be elicited from him to show that he did not like to live in the suit building with other members of the family and therefore, he has hired an accommodation. On the other hand, there is evidence by the witness of the defendants themselves that one of the plaintiffs (plaintiff no.5) was residing in a rented house. Later on, he vacated the same to be occupied by plaintiff no.4 and plaintiff no.5 is residing on the ground floor, although in the written steatement it has been stated that plaintiff no.5 after vacating the holding no.40 had hired a new accommodation. Similarly, the defendants have failed to prove by evidence of competent witnesses that plaintiff no.3 has shifted to the garage because he had liking for it. In the written statement itself, it was stated that the garage was converted into living rooms very recently. A garage is converted into living room only in case of emergency or dire need of accommodation. 14. Even if it is accepted that plaintiffs nos.3 and 4 are sons of plaintiff no.1 from another wife and therefore, unwilling to live jointly with their parents and step brothers, they being the joint purchasers of the suit building, their requirement/need for the first floor occupied by the Union tenant is a fortiori compelling so that they can live in that portion separately from other members of the family. Therefore, whatever view of the matter is taken, the need of the plaintiffs for the suit premises can neither be said to be imaginary, ill founded or unreasonable and punctuated by the sole motive of evicting the tenant from the suit premises. The pitiable condition of the family of the plaintiffs cabined, cribbed and confined on the ground floor can be very well visualised by the description given by the defendants in para 10 of their written statement. It shall be apposite to extract the relevant portion of their written statement: "The plaintiffs have much more living accommodation than what has been mentioned in para 6 of the plaint in the ground floor there is a big hall earmarked for garage, which is about 25 x 12 fit. The plaintiffs recently converted the same into 2 rooms, and they are suitably (sic) using the same for their bed rooms. There is another room in the south-east corner i.e. towards backsides alley. There was another space left under the 1st slant of stair case in the ground floor which has been walled up by the plaintiffs and a door has been fixed for using the same as store room. The outer verandah has been grilled up and with a grill door and the same is also used as a bed room. Thus the plaintiffs are having as many as 8 bed rooms, besides 2 drawing rooms, kitchen, store and other appurtenances, which are more than luxurious necessity of the present family of plaintiff nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6 and they do not require anything more". The very fact that slant of stair case is required to be converted into store room and verandah and garage in bed rooms, shows that such conversions have been made due to dire necessity of accomodation than is available on the ground floor for a decent living of a family of about 15-16 members having grown up children, both males and females. Such conversions have been made only because on their asking, the accommodation available on the first floor which rightly belongs to them, was not vacated and made available to them by the tenant occupying it. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the plaintiffs requirement for the first floor of the building in occupation of the defendant tenant is not reasonable and bonafide. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the plaintiffs requirement for the first floor of the building in occupation of the defendant tenant is not reasonable and bonafide. 15 The Apex Court in the case of Sarla Ahuja V/s. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1999 SC 100 has observed that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafide of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. Thus seen, the trial court has rightly held that the plaintiffs are in dire necessity of the entire first floor for a decent living of all the members of the family who are taken to be joint even though they are doing their business separately. One has to bear in mind that all the plaintiffs are joint purchasers of the property and not that the property was purchased by plaintiff no.1 alone. Therefore, the need of every plaintiff has to be considered individually and separately. 16. Indeed, the proviso to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act enjoins upon the court to ascertain the feasibility of partial eviction of the tenant to meet the requirement of the landlord. According to this proviso where the court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting tenant from a part of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the court shall pass a decree accordingly. The trial court has held that keeping in view the number of members of the family of the plaintiffs, their requirement cannot be satisfied by partial eviction of the tenant. At the time of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners also agreed that unless the whole of the first floor is allowed to be retained by the tenant-defendants, it shall not be conducive and convenient for their members to live only in a part of that floor. In other words, even the tenant-defendants are not agreeable for partial eviction. At the time of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners also agreed that unless the whole of the first floor is allowed to be retained by the tenant-defendants, it shall not be conducive and convenient for their members to live only in a part of that floor. In other words, even the tenant-defendants are not agreeable for partial eviction. Otherwise also, it shall not be convenient because the plaintiffs require the premises for the residence of the members of the family consisting of females and children; whereas other part be occupied by the Union for accommodating sales representatives who are its members, and often visit the town of Jamshedpur on business. Therefore, it shall not be convenient or conducive either for the members of the Union or for the plaintiffs to share the first floor. In other words, partial eviction of the tenant defendants is neither feasible nor acceptable to either of the parties, particularly the tenant. Therefore, the Union-tenant has to vacate the first floor of the building under its occupation in its entirety. 17. Thus on consideration of the entire material on record, l find that the impugned judgment and decree directing eviction of the petitioners from the suit premises warrants no interference. Therefore, this application is dismissed. The petitioners shall pay to the opposite parties a sum of Rs. 500/- by way of costs.