Judgment :- 1. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the unsuccessful husband has filed the above appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act read with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The case of the appellant is briefly stated hereunder:— It is stated that the respondent herein filed H.M.O.P. No. 29 bf 1993 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Dindigul against the appellant herein for restitution of conjugal rights. She filed the said petition on the basis that they married on 26.9.87 at 5 p.m. in the residence of her (respondent) friend at Vathalagundu by exchange of garlands under Self Respect form of marriage (Suya Mariathai way) in the presence of respondents friends. It is further stated that however the petitioner/appellant herein has denied the status of the respondent as his wife and refused to live with her. Hence she filed the said petition. The petition filed by the wife was resisted by the appellant by filing counter statement inter alia contending that he is not his wife and the petition for restitution of conjugal rights is not maintainable. The trial Court without properly considering the facts, erroneously allowed the petition and passed orders in favour of the wife on 4.7.97. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein preferred an appeal in CMA No. 15 of 97 on the file of Principal District Judge, Dindigul. The Appellate Court also committed the same error and dismissed the appeal and confirmed the orders passed by the trial Court on 16.3.98. Having aggrieved by the same, the appellant has preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal. 3. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the respondent. 4. Mr. K. Doraisami, learned senior counsel for the appellant, after taking through the orders of the courts below and other materials, has raised the following contentions:— (i) In the absence of any proof for marriage as claimed by the respondent-wife, the decree granted by the trial Court in an application filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights cannot be sustained; (ii) In as much as the respondent filed to examine the important witness, namely, her friend Santhi, in whose house the marriage is said to have been performed and the other witnesses, namely, P.Ws. 2 and 3 are chance witnesses examined only for the purpose of this case, the conclusion of both the courts below are liable to be set aside; (iii) The lower appellate court has also committed the same error in not considering the legal objection, namely, regarding want of proof of marriage. 5. On the other hand, Mrs. Sudha Ramalingam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-wife, after taking me through the orders of both the Courts below, would contend that in as much as the respondent had proved her case regarding the “Suya Mariyadhai Marriage” on 26.9.87 and had also established her case for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act by placing acceptable oral and documentary evidence and in the light of the concurrent findings of the Courts below, there is no merit in the Second Appeal and prayed for dismissal of the same. 6. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 7. In the light of the rival contentions, I shall consider whether the respondent/wife had established her case that the marriage between herself and the appellant was performed on 26.9.87 in accordance with Section 7(A) of the Hindu Marriage Act. In respect of the factum of the marriage and the subsequent desertion by the appellant herein, she herself got examined as P.W.I by marking Exs. P-1 to P-26 in respect of her claim. Apart from her evidence, she also examined one Sowdamuthu as P.W. 2 and one Muth upandian as P.W. 3 to speak about “Suya Mariyadhai Marriage” which was performed on 26.9.85 at her friends house, namely Santhi. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant would contend that even though it is stated that the marriage was performed at the residence of her friend Santhi, she was not examined. Likewise, the other two witnesses P.Ws. 2 and 3 were only chance witnesses and it is not safe to rely upon their evidence. He also very much relied on two letters dated 15.3.91 written by her to her f ather-in-law. He also very much relied on a private complaint made before the Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai. Both the documents were marked through wife during her cross- examination. After perusal of those documents, I am unable to accept the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. He also very much relied on a private complaint made before the Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai. Both the documents were marked through wife during her cross- examination. After perusal of those documents, I am unable to accept the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. In the letter dated 15.3.1991 though she had prayed for performance of marriage with the appellant herein at any early date, even in that letter, she described the appellant as her husband and described herself as his Daughter-in-law. The following statement made in the letter dated 15.3.1991 is relevant:— (Emphasis suupplied) Tamil In another letter said to have been written on the same date, she had pleaded for performance of her marriage in the presence of all persons at an early date. Before the trial Court, as stated earlier, apart from her own evidence and the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3, she also filed number of letters written by the appellant herein. Those letters have been marked as exhibits through her. Even though she did not examine her friend Santhi, she examined two other persons, namely, Sowdamutu and Muthupandian as P.Ws. 2 and 3. Though P.W. 2 is related to her, P.W. 3 is not a relative of her and he is neighbour. No doubt on the side of the appellant, apart from his own evidence as D.W.I, one Ayyavu Gounder, leader of his community was examined as D.W. 2 to show that there was no marriage as alleged by the wife. The trial Court, after analysing the entire evidence, particularly with reference to Exs. P.1 to P. 6 letters exchanged by the petitioner and the respondent has concluded thus: Tamil 8. Even the lower appellate court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence let in by both sides regarding the marriage on 26-9-87, has concluded thus:— Tamil 9. It is clear that the wife has established her case regarding her marriage with the appellant herein on 26-9-87. There is no dispute that Section 7(A) of the Hindu Marriage Act recognises “Suya Mariyadhai and Seerthirutha” marriages. It is also clear that on 26-9-87 at 5. p.m. in the presence of relatives and friends, both the appellant and the respondent exchanged garlands. The Court below accepted the case of the respondent herein, in the light of the oral and documentary evidence, namely P.Ws. 1 to 3 and Exs. It is also clear that on 26-9-87 at 5. p.m. in the presence of relatives and friends, both the appellant and the respondent exchanged garlands. The Court below accepted the case of the respondent herein, in the light of the oral and documentary evidence, namely P.Ws. 1 to 3 and Exs. P.1 to P. 26 and found that the wife had established her marriage with the appellant herein and inasmuch as the appellant-husband failed to take care of her, rightly granted decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. All the objections raised by the appellant herein very duly considered by both the courts below on the basis of the acceptable evidence placed by the wife and I am in agreement with the factual conc lusions arrived at by the courts below. In such a circumstance, interference by this Court under Section 100 C.P.C., is very limited. Learned counsel for the respondent has very much relied on the following decisions:— Panchugopal Banua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami ( AIR 1997 S.C. 1041 ); 2. Kondiba Dacadu Kadam v. Savithri Bai Sopan Gujar ( AIR 1999 S.C. 2213 ); 3. Trikranmatoch v. Sakwmtlm Mohamad (AIR 1999 S.C.I 104); 4. Kanuitaka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris - In-Niswan ( AIR 1999 S.C. 3067 ); 5. Satia Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar 1998 6 S.C.C. 423); and 6. Maniar Ismail Sab v. Maniar Fakruddin 1989 2 S.C.C. 605). In all these decisions, the Honble Supreme Court has held that in the absence of any substantial questions of law, interference by this Court under Section 100 C.P.C. is not warranted. Though learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has stated that legal objections were not considered by the Courts below, as stated earlier, after going through the orders of both the Courts below, I am unable to accept the said contention. On the other hand, the courts below have concurrently found that the wife had established her marriage with the appellant by placing acceptable oral and documentary evidence. In such a circumstance, and in the absence of any perversity in the findings rendered by the Courts below, merely on the basis of some discrepancy in the evidence, this Court cannot interfere under Section 100 C.P.C. The intendment of the legislature in amending Section 100. C.P.C, as observed by their Lordships in the above referred cases must be respected. In such a circumstance, and in the absence of any perversity in the findings rendered by the Courts below, merely on the basis of some discrepancy in the evidence, this Court cannot interfere under Section 100 C.P.C. The intendment of the legislature in amending Section 100. C.P.C, as observed by their Lordships in the above referred cases must be respected. Here, in our case, the trial Court and the lower appellate court have decided the case only on the question of facts, on the basis of pleadings and on the evidence led by the parties. In the absence of any substantial question of law, which is required to be resolved in this Second Appeal, the appellant is not entitled to any relief in the Second Appeal. It is stated that it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. In AIR 1999 S.C. 2213 (cited supra) their Lordships have pointed out that “. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence” I am satisfied that the courts below have not violated any of the conditions prescribed by their Lordships for interference by this Court. I am also satisfied that the findings rendered by both the Courts below are based on appreciation of evidence and the same cannot be treated as perverse or based on no evidence. 10. In the light of what is stated above, I do not find any merit in the appeal; consequently the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. In view of the relationship of the parties and the relief granted in favour of the respondent/wife, I am not awarding any costs. Consequently, both the Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed.