JUDGMENT - R.K. BATTA, J.:---All these revision applications arise out of the trial of the applicants in Customs Criminal Case No. 48/89/A, which was tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panaji. The applicants alongwith others were tried for offences under section 135(1)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962. 2. The prosecution case, in brief is that 207 silver ingots weighing approximately 30 kgs. valued at Rs. 4,22,48,225/- were clandestinely brought into Goa in an Arab Dhow and the same were to be transported in a trawler Gramdev Navdurga (hereinafter referred to as "the said trawler"), belonging to accused No. 4, who is the applicant in Criminal Revision Application No. 7/2000. The applicant in Criminal Revision Application No. 4/2000 was accused No. 8 before the trial Court and he was found on the Arab Dhow, which had clandestinely brought into Goa, India the said 207 silver ingots. The applicants in Criminal Revision Applications No. 5 and 6/2000, were accused Nos. 3 and 1 respectively, on the said trawler, which was to transport the said ingots clandestinely brought into Goa, India. The learned chief Judicial Magistrate held all the applicants guilty of the charge. Accused No. 2 who was tried alongwith the other accused was acquitted and the other accused No. 5, 7, 9 and 10 had pleaded guilty and they were convicted. 3. The applicants had challenged their convictions and sentences before the learned Sessions Judge, Panaji, and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mapusa, has dismissed the appeal of all the applicants. This is how the applicants are before this Court in revision against concurrent findings of two courts below. Before proceeding ahead, it is necessary to bear in mind that the scope of revision is limited and the revisional Court does not interfere unless it can be established that the findings of the courts below are perverse. This is how the applicants are before this Court in revision against concurrent findings of two courts below. Before proceeding ahead, it is necessary to bear in mind that the scope of revision is limited and the revisional Court does not interfere unless it can be established that the findings of the courts below are perverse. The Apex Court in (State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri)1, 1999(2) S.C.C. 452 , upon which reliance was placed by learned advocate for the respondents, has laid down that the jurisdiction under section 401 Criminal Procedure Code is one of supervisory jurisdiction which is exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice; the revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction; and ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court, which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. 4. Learned advocates for the applicants have urged before me three points, namely :--- 1. The Customs Authorities while recording the statement under section 108 of the Customs Act, had not followed the safeguards provided under section 164 Criminal Procedure Code; 2. The applicants in Criminal Revision Applications No. 4, 5 and 6/2000 had been detained by the Customs Authorities from 4th October, 1988 to 7th October, 1988, which amounts to arrest of the said applicants and the statements of these applicants were recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act during this period of detention after giving threats and exercising duress. In this connection it is pointed out that the medical papers of the applicants show that they were assaulted and, as such, the statements of these applicants recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, cannot be said to be voluntary; and 3. No link has been established between the Arab Dhow and the said trawler. 5. Insofar as the first point is concerned, the law on this aspect is no longer res integra and it is settled by pronouncements in different cases. No link has been established between the Arab Dhow and the said trawler. 5. Insofar as the first point is concerned, the law on this aspect is no longer res integra and it is settled by pronouncements in different cases. I had, myself occasion to deal with this aspect in greater details in (Smt. Natalina Sanches v. Shri R. S. Gajjar)2, Criminal Revision Application No. 22/96 decided on 19th February, 1997, wherein the same challenge had been raised. It is not necessary to once again deal with this issue in the light of the elaborate findings given by me in paras 16 to 19, in the said Judgment which read as under :--- "16. The next challenge which has advanced before me by learned advocate for the petitioner is that before recording statement of the petitioner under section 108 of the Customs Act, no warning was given to her that the statement in question shall be used against her. In support of this submission, learned advocate for the petitioner has relied upon (N.S.R. Krishna Prasad v. Directorate of Enforcement Loknayak Bhawan Khan Market, New Delhi others)3, 1992 Cri.L.J. 188 and (State of Maharashtra v. Hasmukh Hargovind Shah)4, 1993 Cri.L.J. 1953. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in N.S.R. Krishna Prasad v. Director of Enforcement (supra) has laid down that the empowered authority seeking to record confession must administer warning or caution as contemplated under section 164(2) Cr.P.C. to the concerned person that it would be used against him. It was pointed out therein that it is basic and fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that caution must be administered to a person from whom confessional statement is recorded that he should be informed that the same would be used against him in judicial proceedings. It was further pointed that the legislature had advisedly used the expression 'statement' while enacting section 108 of the Customs Act authorising the empowered authority to record what the person summoned states and a plain reading of section 108 of the Customs Act, makes it clear that it does not enable the empowered authority to record a confessional statement from a person summoned thereunder, and in the absence of any such power conferred under section 108 of the Customs Act, the empowered authority can only fall back upon section 164 Cr.P.C. to record a statement of confessional nature from the person summoned. The distinction between the statements and confessions in section 164 Cr.P.C. was taken into consideration and it was pointed out that it is well settled that all confessions are statements, but all statements are not confessions. It was, therefore, held that unless the empowered authority under section 108 of the Customs Act administers the caution or the warning embodied under section 164(2) Cr.P.C., before recording a statement of confessional nature, from the person summoned, the statement so recorded will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose. It was further pointed out that in other words, the impugned statements recorded by the empowered authority under section 108 of the Customs Act are inadmissible in evidence and liable to be eschewed from consideration for any purpose, as no caution or warning embodied under section 164(2) Cr.P.C. was administered to the persons from whom the said statements were recorded and the defect is not curable under section 463 Cr.P.C. 17. The next authority referred by learned advocate for the petitioner is the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Hasmukh Shah (supra) wherein the question involved was as to what was the evidentiary value of a statement made to Customs Officer under section 108 of the Customs Act. Relying upon a judgment of Apex Court in (Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra)5, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 832 wherein the Apex Court had occasion to observe that a Court should be put on caution while dealing with a statement under section 108 of the Customs Act insofar as these statements are distinguishable from confessions recorded by a Magistrate who is a judicial authority and who observes the requisite precautions while recording such a statement. It was held by the learned Single Judge that the credibility of statement in the latter case is undoubtedly much higher. The attention of the learned Judge was drawn to the said judgment of the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court wherein it was held that there is requirement of law that when statements are recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act that the accused should be warned that the statement in question is liable to be used against him and that he should be put on notice. It was pointed out by the learned Single Judge that this aspect of the matter is one of great significance because even if statements are admissible the Court must take cognizance of the fact that the accused person, even if he had at that point of time not been placed under arrest was confined by the Department's Officers that his liberty was curtailed and that, therefore, the all important question is as to whether or not in the circumstances so placed the accused would voluntarily make a statement requires careful scrutiny. Reading paragraph of the said judgment of the learned Single Judge, wherein there is a reference to the observations of the Apex Court that statement under section 108 of Customs Act are distinguishable from confessions recorded by Magistrates under section 164 Cr.P.C., it gives me an impression that the learned Single Judge has not approved the observations of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in toto to the effect that if warning or caution as contemplated under section 164(2) Cr.P.C. is not administered before recording statement under section 108, such statement is inadmissible and is liable to be eschewed from consideration for any purpose and such defect is not curable under section 463 Cr.P.C. The learned Single Judge of this Court did not express any positive opinion in this respect but went on the assumption that even if statements are admissible, the fact that the accused was not warned or put on notice that the statement is liable to be used against him is one of considerable significance since statements are recorded when liberty of the person is curtailed and it has to be found out whether in such circumstances he would make voluntary confession which would require careful scrutiny. 18. With due regard to the views of the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court I cannot subscribe to the broad proposition laid down by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that requirement of law be imported into section 108 Customs Act that unless the accused is warned that the statement in question is liable to be used against him and is put on notice such statement is inadmissible and liable to be eschewed from consideration for any purpose. Admissibility of confessional statements is dealt with under sections 24 and 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Admissibility of confessional statements is dealt with under sections 24 and 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making a confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. Thus, a statement in the nature of a confession made by the accused with reference to the charge is irrelevant when the making of the same appears to have been caused by inducement, threat or promise coming from a person in authority. A Customs Officer is certainly a person in authority for the purpose of section 24. Therefore, if such statement in the nature of confession is obtained by Customs Officer by inducement, threat or promise, then certainly the same shall be inadmissible in evidence. Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence. It is now well settled that the duties of Customs Officer are very much different from those of police officers for detecting and smuggling goods would not make them police officers, within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and the Customs Officer making enquiry under section 107 or section 108 of the Customs Act is not a police officer and person against whom enquiry is made is not an accused person. It is not necessary to quote any authority on this well settled position of law as there are umpteen number of authorities on this issue. Suffice to quote the Apex Court ruling in (Armies Chandra Mehta v. The State of West Bengal)6, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 940 wherein it has been held that Customs Officer acting under Customs Act of 1962 is not a police officer and a person against whom an enquiry is held under section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 is not a person accused of any offence. It is also settled position of law that confessional statements recorded by Customs Officers under section 107 and 108 of the Act are not hit by section 25 or Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and this proposition has been laid down by the Apex Court in (Harbansingh Sardar Lenasingh and another v. The State of Maharashtra and another)7, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1224. Thus, even if a statement recorded by a Customs Officer under section 108 of the Customs Act is in the nature of confession, such statement is not hit by section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. 19. Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for recording of confessions and statement by any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate. Statements (other than confessions) made under section 164(1) are required to be recorded in the manner provided for recording of evidence in terms of section 164(5) Cr.P.C. However, insofar as recording of confession is concerned, section 164(2) lays down that the Magistrate shall before recording such confession explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does so it may be used against him and the Magistrate shall not record any confession unless upon questioning the person making it he has reason to believe that it is being voluntarily made. The Apex Court in (Hira H. Advani v. State of Maharashtra)8, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 44, while dealing with statements recorded under section 171-A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, which corresponds to section 108 Customs Act, 1962 has categorically laid down that the statements recorded under the said section containing inculpatory and exculpatory portions do not stand at par with a confession and portion inculpatory against maker can be accepted excluding exculpatory portion. The Apex Court in Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra (supra) while considering statements containing admissions constituting the guilt of the maker has categorically observed that these statements are not confessions recorded by a Magistrate under section 164 Cr.P.C. but are statements made in answer to notice to section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act. In fact this authority was also referred by learned Single Judge of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Hasmukh Hargovind Shah (supra). In fact this authority was also referred by learned Single Judge of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Hasmukh Hargovind Shah (supra). The Apex Court further observed in the said judgment that as these statements are not made subject to safeguards under which confessions are recorded by Magistrates, they must be specially scrutinised to find out if they were made under threat or promise from someone in authority and are voluntary. Thus, a statement recorded by a Customs Officer under section 108 which may also include confession cannot be strictly speaking equated to confession under section 164 Cr.P.C. and, as such, the question of importing safeguards contained in section 164(2) Cr.P.C. into section 108 of the Customs Act would not, in my opinion, arise. However, it goes without saying that statements recorded under section 108 Customs Act which are in the nature of confessions do require careful scrutiny before the same can be accepted. In (K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India)9, 1992(3) S.C.C. 178 : 1992 Cr.L.J., 2781 the Apex Court in relation to section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act which is para materia with section 108 of the Customs Act, has observed that there are no safeguards in the matter of recording statements under section 40 of the said Regulation as the case of recording a statement of an accused under section 164 Cr.P.C. by a Magistrate. However, the statements obtained from persons under the provisions of FERA or the Customs Act, should not be tainted with any illegality and they must be free from any vice. The voluntary nature of any statement made either before the Customs authorities or the officers of Enforcement under the relevant provisions of the respective Acts is a sine qua non to act on it for any purpose and if the statement appears to have been obtained by any inducement, threat, coercion or by any improper means that statement must be rejected brevi manu. Therefore, I cannot persuade myself to accept the view taken by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that in law warning embodied under section 164(2) Cr.P.C. has to be imported into section 108 Customs Act and in case of non-compliance of section 164(2) Cr.P.C. the statement recorded under section 108 would be inadmissible and cannot be looked into." 5A. In this judgment, judgment rendered by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in (State of Maharashtra v. Hasmukh Hargovind Shah)10, 1993 Cri.L.J. 1953, has been explained and distinguished. The proposition of law laid down in Criminal Revision Application No. 22/96 (supra) gets complete support from a Division Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (Smt. Usha Rani, Kalikaman, Hyderabad v. Govt. of A.P. others)11, 1994 Cri.L.J. 112. In this Judgment, the learned Judges had overruled the view taken in (Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd.)12, 1992 Cri.L.J. 231, and the view taken in Writ Petitions No. 3103 and 3104 of 1991 was held to be bad per incuriem. In the said Judgments the view taken was that when statements under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, are recorded, the safeguards provided under section 164 are required to be followed and in case the same are not followed, the statements under section 108 of the Customs Act would become inadmissible. A similar view had also been taken earlier by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in N.S.R. Krishna Prasad and etc. v. Directorate of Enforcement Loknayak Bhawan Khan Market, New Delhi others, 1992 Cri.L.J. 1888 and to this judgment reference is found in Criminal Revision Application No. 22/96 (supra). With respect, the view of the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was not accepted in Criminal Revision Application No. 22/96 (supra). Reverting to the Division Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Smt. Usha Rani v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (supra), it has been held that the statement recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, is not a confession within the meaning of section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, yet in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 832, such statements which are not made subject to safeguards under which confessions are recorded by a Magistrate, are required to be specially scrutinized to find out whether the same are voluntary or not. 6. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the first submission of the learned advocates for the applicants. 7. 6. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in the first submission of the learned advocates for the applicants. 7. The second submission relates to alleged detention of the applicants in Criminal Revision Application No. 4, 5 and 6/2000 from 4th October to 7th October, 1988. The case of the applicants is that during this period they were detained, assaulted and the statements under section 108 of the Customs Act were recorded after duress and threat as a result of which these statements are not voluntary. The medical record of these applicants was not proved by the applicants. Besides this, it appears that the medical record did not disclose any injury. The learned advocates for the applicants, after placing reliance on (Suaibo Ibow Casamma v. Union of India)13, 1995(80) E.L.T. 762 have urged that withholding a person for investigation and putting him under complete control of the Investigating Officer with absolute restrictions on his movements, amounts to arrest. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition laid down by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the said Judgment, but what has to be seen is whether it can be said from the facts and circumstances that the applicants can, in fact, be said to have been arrested on 4th October, 1988. The evidence on record appears to be that the movements of the applicants were not restricted during the period from 4th October to 7th October, 1988, and on those days the applicants were called for the purpose of investigation. The Courts below have appreciated the evidence on record and there are concurrent findings based upon material on record which do not call for interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 8. The only other point urged is that no link was established between the Arab Dhow and the said trawler. In clandestine activity, direct evidence may not, normally be available and the conclusion has to be drawn on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case. In the cases under consideration, Arab dhow was intercepted near Fort Aguada from where 207 silver ingots were recovered and the trawler was waiting in order to transport the same. On the basis of circumstances on record, the two Courts below have been satisfied that the link between the Arab Dhow and the said trawler had been duly established. In the cases under consideration, Arab dhow was intercepted near Fort Aguada from where 207 silver ingots were recovered and the trawler was waiting in order to transport the same. On the basis of circumstances on record, the two Courts below have been satisfied that the link between the Arab Dhow and the said trawler had been duly established. The said concurrent findings are based on material on record and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be perverse so as to call for interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 9. For the aforesaid reasons there is absolutely no merit in any of the Revision Applications and the Revision Applications are summarily rejected. Revision application dismissed. -----