Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 310 (RAJ)

Madan Lal v. Municipal Counsil Barmer

2000-03-07

B.S.CHAUHAN

body2000
JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 31.7.98 (Annex. 12) passed by the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Jodhpur, in Revision Petition No. 20/1993. by which the order dated 7.7.93 passed by the District Collector, Barmer, has been interfered to the extent that an inquiry may be held regarding title of the land and to proceed further strictly in accordance with law. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioners claim to have purchased the plot in dispute, measuring 705 square feet, from one Umed Singh vide registered sale deed for a consideration of so Rs. 16,500/- on 13.1.92. As they intended to construct a building on the said plot, they filed an application (Annex. 2) under Sub-section (1) of Section 170 of the Rajasthan Muncipalities Act, 1959 (for short, `the Act'). On the said application, general notice was published for inviting objection. Kesri Mal and Hem Raj filed objections contending that the petitioners may not be permitted to construct the house as they were having some interest in the land. However, a report was called for and inspection of the site was made and permission was accorded for constructing the house to the petitioner vide order dated 6.6.92 and a letter was issued to this effect on 10.6.92 (Annex. 5). Petitioners constructed the house as per the said permission and completed it in 1992 itself, Respondent No. 3 Heera Lal preferred an appeal under Section 170 (12) of the Act, 1959 against the said permission dated 6.6.92 before the District Collector, Barmer and the said appeal was disposed of vide order dated 7.7.93 (Annex. 7) by which the District Collector held that said Heera Lal had no concern with the land in dispute and his appeal was liable to be rejected. However, in the concluding part of the order, the District Collector directed as under- "It has also been submitted before me that the land had been purchased by the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 from Umed Singh and the latter had no title/interest in the (sic) land. While granting the sanction by the Municipal Board, the matter has not been examined from this angle by the Municipal Board. Therefore, this order of the Board cannot be held to be justified. 1 to 3 from Umed Singh and the latter had no title/interest in the (sic) land. While granting the sanction by the Municipal Board, the matter has not been examined from this angle by the Municipal Board. Therefore, this order of the Board cannot be held to be justified. It is in the interest of justice that it requires further examination whether Umed Singh, vendor, had any title over the land in dispute?" 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, petitioners preferred the revision before the Additional Divisional Commissioner under Section 300 of the Act, 1959 and the same has been disposed of by the impugned order dated 31.7.98 (Annex. 2), by which the Additional Divisional Commissioner has also directed the Municipal Board to examine the title of vendor Umed Singh. Hence this petition and proceed further according to law. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. Mr. Panwar, learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that the Collector has directed the Municipal Board to examine the title of Umed Singh in respect of the land in dispute. Moreso, the Additional Divisional Commissioner, in the revisional order, has also directed the Board to execute the directions issued by the District Collector and if Umed Singh is found to having no title in the land, the Board will examine whether the house has been constructed as per the plan and in case Umed Singh is found having no title or interest in the property, the same shall be considered as the Government/Municipal Board's land and the Authority will proceed accordingly. 6. The grievance raised by Mr. Panwar is that the issue of title cannot be adjudicated upon in any summary proceedings and the Municipal Board has no businesses right to decide the title. The submission made by Mr. Panwar is full of substance and stands fully fortified by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 7. It is settled proposition of law that the title in dispute can always be decided only by the Civil Court and it cannot be determined in summary proceedings, as held by the. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081 ; and State of Rajasthan v. Padmawati Devi, 1995 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 290 . 8. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao, AIR 1982 SC 1081 ; and State of Rajasthan v. Padmawati Devi, 1995 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 290 . 8. Similar view has been reiterated by the Division Benches of this Court in Mohammed Yunus v. Urban Improvement Trust, AIR 1999 Raj. 334 ; and in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 108/1997 , Municipal Board, Barmer v. Rewa Shanker Mewara, decided on 5.2.98. 9. In Lotika Co-operative Housing Board Society & Anr. v. Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta & Ors., AIR 1980 Cal. 17 , the Calcutta High Court considered the anologous provisions of Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 and held that the sanction for constructing the house may also be sought by a person other than the owner of the land under certain circumstances. 10. The dispute is not regarding the competence of seeking approval for construction. The apprehension raised by the District Collector as well as by the Additional Divisional Commissioner is that the land sold by Umed Singh to the present petitions may be the Government land. Therefore, the direction issued are only limited to the extent to examine whether the house has been constructed on the Government land and they have a right to do so and the order cannot be said to be unjustified for the reason that a person so cannot transfer a title better than he himself possessed. 11. In the instant case. the controversy regarding permission for construction does not survive as stated by the petitioners that the construction has been completed in 1992 itself. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the Authorities, including the Appellate and Revisional Authorities, become meaningless after completion of construction of the house, the re-determination for the permission of construction is of no consequence. If the contesting respondents still feel aggrieved and want to claim any kind of title or interest in the (sic) said premises, they must approach the appropriate court i.e. Civil Court, by filing a suit of declaration and recovery of possession. Raising dispute regarding the permission for construction cannot determine the title in dispute and the Municipal Board, which had sanctioned the plan for construction, is certainly not competent to decide the issue of title. 12. Raising dispute regarding the permission for construction cannot determine the title in dispute and the Municipal Board, which had sanctioned the plan for construction, is certainly not competent to decide the issue of title. 12. Therefore, the petition is disposed of finally with modification of the impugned order that the Municipal Board may examine whether the land, on which the house has been constructed, was a Government/Municipal Board's land and if the Board comes to the conclusion that it happened to be the Government/Board's land, the Board may proceed strictly in accordance with law and approach the appropriate forum for appropriate relief, but in no case the Board is an authority to decide the title in dispute and recover the possession treating the land to be so. In case the Board is satisfied that the land was not a Government/Board's land, Completion Certificate may be issued and other formalities may be completed with respect to the house in accordance with the law. There shall be no order as to costs.Petition disposed. *******