M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS criminal appeal which once again concerns the familiar but unpalatable allegation of death of a married woman due to suicide raises a few interesting legal facets particularly with regard to the area of law concerning dying declarations. The deceased meenakshi was married to the accused who apparently was a carpenter by profession in the year 1990 and the couple had one child. The prosecution alleges that the accused was in the habit of ill-treating the wife particularly because of his economic condition which was further ruined due to his habit of gambling. There is not much evidence on record with regard to the causes for the ill-treatment other than the above one but the general allegation is to the effect that meenakshi was pushed to a position whereby she was very close to desperation. On 3-11-1993 at about 8. 30 p. m. meenakshi's clothes were on fire and she was screaming for help. The door of the house was locked and the evidence of the neighbours who rushed to her assistance was to the effect that they had to force open the door and extinguish the flames with a blanket. Her one-and-half year old child was found there and she was crying. There is not much indication from this evidence as to whether the accused was in the house or not, his case being that he was out of town on some work and that he came back only the next morning and rushed to the hospital on coming to know that his wife had sustained severe burn injuries. Meenakshi was taken to the hospital. The m. l. c. register contains a brief entry to the effect that the burns were due to an accident. Her statement, or rather dying declaration, because of the fact that she had sustained 70% burns and her condition was serious was recorded by the s. h. o. at about 11 p. m. on that night. On the next day when she was shifted to the hospital at shimoga her statement or more correctly defined as dying declaration No. 2 came to be recorded by the head constable. On the next day when she was shifted to the hospital at shimoga her statement or more correctly defined as dying declaration No. 2 came to be recorded by the head constable. In both of these declarations, the broad version set out is to the effect that the child had accidentally pulled the kerosene lamp which fell over and caused the fire and that this was how meenakshi's clothes were set ablaze. ( 2 ) THE real turning point came on 8-11-1993 because by this time the relations of meenakshi particularly her mother and others had emerged on the scene and on that date, the third dying declaration which is ex. P. 5 came to be recorded by P. W. 25 who is the investigating officer. There is a detailed description in this dying declaration wherein meenakshi has recounted the problems she faced right from the stage of her marriage, how her husband had been addicted to bad habits including alcohol, how he had spent all the money which he received as a dowry, the economic problems that they faced and according to her, on 3-11-1993 which was the date of the incident a quarrel had ensued over a sum of Rs. 50/- that the quarrel got violent and the husband bolted the front door, took the kerosene bottle, doused her clothes with it while telling her that he is not afraid of going to jail and that he would kill her and he set her clothes on fire. Briefly stated, this dying declaration assumes importance because meenakshi has set out an explanation as to why she did not implicate her husband in the earlier statements and she comes out with the explanation that he and his relatives had threatened her stating that if she relates what actually happened, her husband would go to jail for life and that therefore she was instructed to put forward the accident story. She states that only after her mother arrived from belur did she narrate to her the true facts which according to her are contained in the dying declaration of that date. Next, we have ex. P. 10 which is the fourth dying declaration which has been recorded by the tahsildar, P. W. 7 on 9-11-1993 and in which meenakshi reiterates the allegations made against the accused to the effect that it was he who was responsible for burning her. Next, we have ex. P. 10 which is the fourth dying declaration which has been recorded by the tahsildar, P. W. 7 on 9-11-1993 and in which meenakshi reiterates the allegations made against the accused to the effect that it was he who was responsible for burning her. ( 3 ) THIS is a case in which the prosecution has relied very heavily on the two dying declarations, exs. P. 5 and p. 10 because the rest of the evidence is of very little consequence being either narrative or supportive in nature. The learned trial judge has analysed the evidence before the court and has accepted the reason put forward by meenakshi for having put out an accident story right upto 8-11-1993 on the two-fold ground that she herself would have been in a state of panic after having gone through the horrifying experience of being burnt and that with only the husband and his relations around that meenakshi really did not have the courage to disclose the truth until her mother arrived on the scene and elicited exactly what had happened from her and furthermore, from the fact that these two dying declarations were recorded by the investigating officer and the tahsildar both of which inspired considerable confidence in the mind of the court, the learned trial judge has also examined very carefully the probabilities with regard to the accident story and has come to the conclusion that it is impossible to accept that the one-and-half year old child could have caused the fire by pulling the lamp as the child was totally unhurt and furthermore, that the scene of offence panchanama would not support any such version because even if the lamp had fallen over, the probability of its causing a fire which could travel to the clothes of meenakshi is simply not at all possible. On the other hand, having regard to the background of the accused, the court considered that it was most likely that the version which meenakshi had come out with only on 8-11-1993 and 9-11-1993 was the correct one. In this view of the matter, the learned trial judge though he held that there was insufficient evidence to bring home the charge under Section 498-a of the IPC convicted the accused of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and directed that he should undergo imprisonment for life. In this view of the matter, the learned trial judge though he held that there was insufficient evidence to bring home the charge under Section 498-a of the IPC convicted the accused of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and directed that he should undergo imprisonment for life. The present appeal is directed against this conviction and sentence. ( 4 ) AS indicated by us earlier, the conviction is essentially based on the dying declarations or rather the last of the dying declarations which is ex. P. 10 and the arguments addressed by the learned advocates representing the two parties before us effectively deals with this aspect of the law. We need to prefix this judgment with the observation that we are deeply indebted to the appellant's learned Advocate sandesh j. Chouta and the learned state public prosecutor Mr. Mohan shantangoudar for the level of research and the assistance that they have rendered to the court. On behalf of the appellant, the learned Advocate seriously attacked the acceptance of the dying declarations and the main thrust of his arguments centered around the aspect that where there are multiple dying declarations that it would be extremely unsafe to accept any of them. His contention was that this is a case in which the dying declarations cannot be reconciled with each other and he demonstrated to us that the first two statements totally exonerate the accused and explain the burns as being due to an accident whereas the next two fully implicate him and charge him with having committed the offence of murder and what the learned Advocate submits is that even if one were to brush aside for the time being the other aspect such as the question of whether these have been duly certified by the doctor etc. , or the manner in which they have been recorded and more importantly, whether the requisite safeguards which the law prescribes have been observed, that the important point that was made was that if the versions are diametrically opposed to each other that the court ought not to accept either of them insofar as it would not be possible to indicate as to which of the two versions is the true one. His submission proceeded on the footing that as far as criminal law is concerned the courts invariably attach higher credibility to statements made at the earliest point of time as all sorts of outside influences invariably creep in as time progresses and he submits that if the courts were to proceed on this basis and hold that the accident theory which has been recorded even in the m. l. c. register at the time of meenakshi's admission to the hospital and if the first two dying declarations were to be upheld, that the dying declaration nos. 3 and 4 would ipso facto have to be rendered false. If the court were to accept meenakshi's explanation that she had been pressurised and therefore forced to tell the police officers on 3-11-1993 and 4-11-1993 a story that was other than the truth that her credibility would be seriously in doubt and that this is an aspect which the learned trial judge has not taken into account. ( 5 ) WE need to mention here that even though prima facie the versions cannot be reconciled that the learned state public prosecutor pointed out something which is both interesting and which requires serious consideration. It was his submission that if the court were to carefully reconstruct the sequence of events, it would be seen that meenakshi was screaming out for help and that this is something which would hardly have happened if she had decided either to commit suicide or was the victim of an accident but more importantly, what he emphasised is that after the trauma she experienced and without any of her people around her she would not have had the courage to implicate the accused even if he was the man responsible for burning her. Also, what he submits is that the court must read between the lines and not merely accept the situation at face value and his submission was that whether the situation between husband and wife was extremely bad and in a situation where he had gone to the extent of setting her on fire that every effort would have been made to cover up the guilty tracks as is invariably the case and that was the reason why meenakshi was virtually pressurised into putting forward the accident story with the additional threat that if slie were to tell the truth, her husband would go to jail for life and she would be held responsible for it. The learned state public prosecutor submitted that if the case were to be viewed from this angle, then the court would have to ipso facto reject the three heads of evidence namely, the entry in the m. l. c. register and the two dying declarations recorded on 3-11-1993 and 4-11-1993 and considered the validity of the statements made on 8-11-1993 and 9-11-1993. He was very emphatic about the fact that the deceased was more than conscious of her having set out she wrong version earlier and this was why on 8-11-1993 she was specifically dealt with that aspect of the matter and indicated that it was virtually under coercion that she had done so. In the light of this explanation, the learned state public prosecutor has strongly supported the findings of the trial court which are based on the dying declaration recorded by the tahsildar on 9-11-1993. He points out that the tahsildar is an independent officer that the tenor of the dying declaration is quite natural that it contains an explanation as to why it could not be signed and further that because the hands were burnt, even the left hand thumb impression could not be taken and ends with a categorical assertion that the statement is made of her own free will and without anybody's pressure or influence. With regard to the fact that this document does not contain any certificate from the doctor who is P. W. 3 wherein he was required to indicate that the deceased at the relevant time was conscious and that the statement was recorded before him and he was also required to certify that in his opinion, the patient was in a position to make such a statement. Ex. P. 10 has been proved by the tahsildar who is P. W. 7 and ex. P. 5 has been proved by the investigating officer who is P. W. 25 and both these witnesses are categorical about the fact that meenakshi was in a sufficiently fit and stable condition to make a proper and cogent statement. On this basis, the learned state public prosecutor submits that the challenge to the acceptability of exs. P. 5 and p. 10 is liable to be rejected. ( 6 ) THE appellant's learned counsel demonstrated to the court that whereas there is some endorsement on ex. P. 5 from the doctor and whereas on ex. P. 5 there is both the signature and thumb impression. That on the most important document i. e. , ex. P. 10, none of the three are to be found. His submission is that both these documents therefore attract a degree of suspicion, the main reason being that the change of version has come about only after the appearance on the scene of meenakshi's mother and relations and our pointed attention was drawn to the admissions of both the doctor and the investigating officer that meenakshi was totally surrounded by these persons at the time when these two declarations were recorded. The contention is that irrespective of the fact that pome accident had taken place that because of the relations not having been good between the parties that a conscious effort was made to instigate meenakshi into directly alleging, and that too falsely and out of vengeance, that it was the accused who was responsible for setting her on fire. Our attention was drawn to the fact that neither of these dying declarations is in question and answer form and furthermore to the effect that there are no references in the record anywhere to the exact physical and mental conditions of meenakshi on 8- 11-1993 and 9-11-1993. Our attention was drawn to the fact that neither of these dying declarations is in question and answer form and furthermore to the effect that there are no references in the record anywhere to the exact physical and mental conditions of meenakshi on 8- 11-1993 and 9-11-1993. Learned Advocate brings it to our notice that this was a case of 70% burns that inevitably the doctors would have been administering various forms of treatment mainly sedatives and painkillers and antibiotics to control the infection and that from the fact that meenakshi died on 19-11-1993 the court will have to take note of the fact that her condition was getting worse from day to day. Furthermore, what was pointed out to me was that as far as ex. P. 10 is concerned, the reason put forward in the statement by the tahsildar for not obtaining either the signature or the thumb impression are obviously false and the learned Advocate submitted that this document was in all probability fabricated. There is considerable substance in his allegation that if both the signature and the thumb impression could have been obtained one day earlier i. e. , on 8-11-1993 on ex. P. 5 that it is downright false to contend that neither of these were available on the next day. In totality, what is contended is that these two dying declarations, exs. P. 5 and p. 10 are extremely unsafe to be relied upon and the trial court was in error in having based the conviction on such documents. ( 7 ) BEFORE indicating our findings on the submissions, we briefly summarise the decisions on which the appellant's learned Advocate relied: (1) K. Ramachandra Reddy and another v Public Prosecutor. In this decision, the Supreme Court had emphasised the absolute necessity of the doctor certifying that the accused was in a fit state of mind to make the declaration and that the non-inclusion of this ingredient in the certificate was fatal to the prosecution. Also, the apex court held that the magistrate who recorded the dying declaration was required to independently satisfy himself that the injured was mentally capable of making the requisite statement. (2) Bolem Bhaskara Rao and another v State of Andhra Pradesh. Also, the apex court held that the magistrate who recorded the dying declaration was required to independently satisfy himself that the injured was mentally capable of making the requisite statement. (2) Bolem Bhaskara Rao and another v State of Andhra Pradesh. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the omission on the part of the magistrate to question the deceased regarding the state of mind was a serious infirmity but was not a ground on which the dying declaration could be rejected outright. (3) Kanchy Komuramma v State of Andhra Pradesh. In this case, the Supreme Court while dealing with the necessity of the prosecution establishing that the deceased was in a proper mental condition to make the dying declaration pointed out that merely because the declaration had been recorded by judicial magistrate is not by itself a proof of its truthfulness. In that decision, the court laid down certain safeguards to be observed by the magistrate when recording the dying declaration and reiterated that apart from the officer satisfying himself about the mental fitness before recording the dying declaration which satisfaction must be recorded in the document that he must also obtain the opinion of the doctor regarding the fitness of the patient and that these safeguards are an absolute necessity. (4) Anna Appa Sutar v State of Maharashtra. The Bombay high court was dealing with a situation where there were contrary versions set out in the three dying declarations and straightaway held that a conviction under Section 302 of the IPC based on this evidence was not legally sustainable. (5) jagdish lal malhotra's case. The conviction of the appellant in this case which was based on the solitary evidence of the wife's dying declaration was set aside by the Delhi High Court on the ground that the document itself when closely scrutinised is surrounded by suspicion. We need to mention in passing, that even though it is well-settled law that a dying declaration which passes all the tests of scrutiny can forms the sole basis of a conviction that those tests are very rigorous and a dying declaration that gives rise to a degree of suspicion or doubt can certainly not form the sole basis of such a conviction. (6) State of Karnataka v Babu Poojary and others. (6) State of Karnataka v Babu Poojary and others. In this case, a division bench of the Karnataka high court on the facts before the court expressed the view that the dying declaration made at the earliest point of time qualifies for highe'st levels of credibility. We only need to observe here that whereas in the case of an f. i. r. or a statement made by a witness, the one emerging at thfe earliest point of time inspires high levels of confidence that in the case of a dying declaration this Rule may or may not apply because there could be situations in which the condition of the injured person improves after some time or a situation in which the physical and mental condition of the accused is extremely poor at the earliest point of admission to the hospital, the possibility of various other factors such as pressures etc. , having their influence and consequently, everyone of these cases will have to be carefully examined on their own individual facts. (7) Smt. Kamla v State of Punjab. In this case, the allegation was of bride burning and the Supreme Court straightaway set aside the conviction based on the four dying declarations principally because of the fact that there were material inconsistencies inter se and the court concluded that it was unsafe to base a conviction on such material. (8) State of Gujarat v Khumansingh Karsan Singh and others. Here again, the Supreme Court laid down that the inconsistency between the two dying declarations suggesting the possibility of tutoring and false involvement due to strained relations was a circumstance that was sufficient for the court to hold that a conviction cannot be based on such inconsistent material. (9) Harbans Lal v State of Punjab. The court took note of the subsequent conduct of the witnesses who hardly reacted to the commission of a serious criminal offence and rejected their evidence on this ground and it was contended that as far as the evidence of the brother, P. W. 12 is concerned that from his lack of concern where his own sister had been burnt and his own admission that he had thereafter gone away to his house and did not even lodge a complaint with the police is not only unnatural conduct but conduct which indicates that he could never have been present at that place. (1) Din Dayal v RAJ Kumar Alias Raju and others. Here again, in more or less similar circumstances the court rejected the evidence of a close relation who claimed to be an eye-witness who did not accompany the deceased to hospital nor informed the police about the incident and the conduct of P. W. 7 has been assailed by the defence on this ground, a reference was also made to the observations of the Supreme Court in the decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v Madan Mohan and others, wherein the court rejected the prosecution evidence again on the ground of inconsistencies between the oral evidence and the dying declaration. ( 8 ) WE have carefully borne in mind the aforesaid principles as also several others as well as the well-crystallized position in law relating to the appreciation of dying declarations while reassessing the prosecution evidence in this case. In the first instance, we need to record that if one wore to strictly scrutinise the four dying declarations that none of the lour could pass the strict test of scrutiny. There is no indication from the documents that meenakshi was in a fit physical and mental condition to make a valid statement which is condition precedent. There can be no compromises with regard to the fact that the certification by the doctor has to be complete and contemporaneous and that it has to be recorded on the document itself and it is no justification that the doctor or the police officer or the tahsildar seeks to cover up for these lacunae through oral evidence in the witness-box several years later. It is a well-known fact that injured persons particularly in burns cases are subject to not only horrifying levels of pain and trauma but that secondary infections develop and that they magnify and that they spread and get out of control and that the only common treatment prescribed by medical science, namely the administration of painkillers such as pathedine and morphia seriously affect the mental capacities; not only do they increase drowsiness but they also cloud the brain to the effect that it would be difficult for a person to recall clearly and cogently what exactly has happened. With the passage of time invariably the condition of the patient worsens and it is therefore of utmost importance that the statement of the doctor who may certify that the patient was conscious is insufficient because the court is more concerned with the capacity to understand questions, recall what precisely happened, but properly describe it and to virtually recreate the incident and unless the certificate of the doctor and the evidence given before the court and the case papers satisfy the court that the patient was in a sufficiently good mental condition to make a true and cogent statement, what has been recorded would become suspect. The advisability of recording the questions put and the answers given is a salutary one because the court will be able to gauge what exactly was asked and the exact replies of the victim. The courts have also desired, as far as. Possible, that the exact words to be reproduced which again is seldom done and it is really a second-hand version of the person who has recorded the dying declaration which means the intelligence and comprehension level of the recorder would add to a lot of plus and minus in the quality of recording. The several other safeguards which the law prescribes are unfortunately not being followed in everyone of these cases and the casualty is the interest of justice. We have taken the trouble to once again broadly reiterate the requirements with regard to a proper and correctly recorded dying declaration and their extreme importance because if this is not correctly done, that vital and valuable evidence is totally lost and we do hope that the authorities concerned will take serious note of what has been pointed out in this judgment, bring it to the notice of the doctors and police officers in this state and ensure that the mistakes that are being committed in almost all such cases are eliminated in future. ( 9 ) THE important question is as to what really is the requirement of law in a case where the court is faced with multiple and contradictory dying declarations. ( 9 ) THE important question is as to what really is the requirement of law in a case where the court is faced with multiple and contradictory dying declarations. We have briefly observed that in situations such as the present one the version that is put forward at the earliest point of time or for that matter at a later point of time is not necessarily representative of the truth; the court is required to carefully scrutinise the totality of circumstances and above all, the situation in which the victim is placed, the possibility of influence, the probability of brainwashing and the courts cannot Rule out the possibility of false implication. It was once believed that a person who is close to death would not tell a lie but while laying down that maxim an important aspect was overlooked namely that in situations of extreme hostility the tendency to settle scores would be predominant. In such a situation, one cannot Rule out the possibility of false implication. Like all other heads of evidence therefore, the courts have to scrutinise the evidentiary value of a dying declaration and it is more or less well-settled law that where there are multiple dying declarations which are inconsistent with each other, as a Rule of prudence, the court will not rely on any of them unless it is demonstrated that they can be properly reconciled or that one of them inspires total confidence and there is a complete explanation for the rejection of the remaining ones. Barring these exceptional situations, in cases such as the present one, the Rule of prudence would require that the court has to reject all the inconsistent dying declarations for the elementary reason that if the maker has lied on one occasion, there is no certainty that the person was telling the truth either earlier or later on. In sum and substance therefore, we are left with the situation that the only evidence which the prosecution has relied upon in this case is unsafe when tested on the touchstone of acceptability and this being the position, the findings recorded by the trial court to the effect that the accused has been held to have committed the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC will necessarily have to be set aside. ( 10 ) THERE is one tell-tale circumstance which would be totally destructive of the third dying declaration recorded on 8-11-1993 and which really clinches the entire issue. We have assessed the evidence that was recorded virtually with a fine tooth comb and the advantage of having gone through this labour and exercise is that it emerges that the complaint lodged by the mother is a typed complaint obviously drafted in a lawyer's office and we find that the dying declaration No. 3 which was recorded hardly an hour after this complaint was lodged is an abnormally long statement containing large portions that are a verbatim reproduction of the contents of the typed complaint. Not strangely enough, this is the first dying declaration that implicates the accused and the needle of suspicion points strongly towards the mother of the deceased who was undoubtedly very hostile towards the accused for his bad behaviour vis-a-vis her daughter and those feelings could only have been compounded when she came to know of the burning incident. It is this clinching circumstance that virtually drives the last nail into the coffin of the prosecution. ( 11 ) HAVING regard to the consistent errors that are occurring in relation to the recording of dying declarations and the negligence that is being repeatedly displayed resulting in the failure of prosecution after prosecution and acquittals virtually by default: the registrar general to forward a copy of this judgment to the director general of police, the secretary, home department, the secretary, revenue department and the director of prosecutions, state of Karnataka with the request that the principles and the guidelines laid down in this judgment be reproduced in a circular and that the same be brought to the notice of the police officers investigating criminal cases all over the state as also the doctors in the public hospitals whose duty would be to certify dying declarations as also to the notice of the executive magistrates and such other officers who may be called upon to record dying declarations from time to time. ( 12 ) THE appeal accordingly succeeds. The conviction and sentence are set aside. The accused to be set at liberty forthwith. --- *** --- .