R. GURURAJAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is filed challenging the order of the Tribunal dated 3-4-2000 in Revision Petition No. 1111 of 1997. ( 2 ) THE facts in brief are as hereunder: the petitioner holds the stage carriage permit No. 83 of 1993-94 for the route Shimoga to Anavatti and back. He filed an application for variation of the conditions of the permit. The Regional Transport authority (R. T. A.) considered the said application under Sub. No. 7 of 1997-98 in its meeting held on 4/5-6-1997. The variation was granted and the matter was referred to the Secretary, R. T. A. , for fixation of timings. The Secretary, as per Annexure-A assigned the timings. Aggrieved by the grant of timings, respondent 2 filed a revision petition before the Tribunal in R. P. No. 1111 of 1997. Since there was a delay in approaching the Tribunal, the 2nd respondent rightly filed one application for condonation of the delay and another application for grant of stay. The Tribunal has now passed an order at Annexure-B ordering the secretary, R. T. A. , to consider the timings by giving opportunity to all the existing operators within 20 (twenty) days from the date of receipt of the order. This order is questioned by the petitioner before me. ( 3 ) MR. N. Rajashekar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner finds fault with the Tribunal inasmuch as the Tribunal has failed to consider the plea of limitation and also failed to consider the I. A. filed by the 2nd respondent for condonation of the delay. His argument is that without considering the said I. A. , the Tribunal has virtually allowed the revision petition thereby giving a go-by to the statutory provision of limitation to the proceedings. He further argued that the Tribunal has also not given any finding anywhere with regard to the validity of the impugned order in the revision order. In these circumstances, he says that the Tribunal may be directed to reconsider the matter in accordance with law. Per contra, Mr. Krishnaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent states that his client did file an application for condonation of the delay. He states that the order of the Tribunal impliedly indicates that the Tribunal has condoned the delay and hence the impugned order has been passed. Per contra, Mr. Krishnaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent states that his client did file an application for condonation of the delay. He states that the order of the Tribunal impliedly indicates that the Tribunal has condoned the delay and hence the impugned order has been passed. He also says that the matter was remitted back and the petitioner is not aggrieved by the order. ( 4 ) I have heard the learned Counsel on either side. ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY, the petitioner was successful before the 1st respondent in the matter of assignment of timings. The 2nd respondent has challenged the same by way of revision before the Tribunal as rightly in my opinion. Since there was a delay in the matter, the 2nd respondent filed an application seeking for condonation of delay. The Tribunal in the impugned order has directed to consider the timings by the R. T. A. within 20 days. ( 6 ) THE Motor Vehicles Act is a complete Code by itself. It provides for a law regarding motor vehicles. The Act is very clear in the matter of the revision being preferred to the Tribunal under section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. For the purpose of easy reference, Section 90 of the Act is produced which reads as under:"90. Revision. It provides for a law regarding motor vehicles. The Act is very clear in the matter of the revision being preferred to the Tribunal under section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. For the purpose of easy reference, Section 90 of the Act is produced which reads as under:"90. Revision. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made to it, call for the records of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or regional Transport Authority against which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final: provided that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a state Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order: provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making the application in time: provided also that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard". A careful reading of the said provision would show that the Tribunal may, on an application made to it, call for the records of any case in which an order has been made by a S. T. A. or R. T. A. against which no appeal lies and if it appears to the Tribunal that the order made by the s. T. A. or R. T. A. is improper or illegal, the Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit and every such order is final. The said provision categorically shows that the Tribunal is provided with the revision jurisdiction in the matter of an order of S. T. A. or R. T. A. being improper or illegal. The said provision categorically shows that the Tribunal is provided with the revision jurisdiction in the matter of an order of S. T. A. or R. T. A. being improper or illegal. The said section further provides that the Tribunal shall not entertain my application from a person aggrieved by an order of a S. T. A. or r. T. A. , unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order. The said proviso further provided that the Tribunal may entertain any application after the expiry of the said period of 30 days subject to the satisfaction by the Tribunal with regard to the prevention of the applicant by good and sufficient cause from making the application in time. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, reading of Section 90 of the Act, it indicates that the tribunal is clothed with a jurisdiction to consider the order of the S. T. A. or R. T. A. in the matter of illegality or impropriety of an order. A period of 30 days of limitation is fixed under the statute. The said period of limitation is for entertaining the said revision. If any revision is preferred after 30 days, the same can be entertained only on the applicant's satisfaction of good and sufficient cause by the Tribunal with regard to his prevention from approaching the Tribunal within 30 days. This being a statutory provision, the Tribunal is duty-bound to consider the period of limitation in terms of the statute. If any revision is filed beyond the said period, without an LA. for proving good and sufficient cause, it is needless for me to say that the Tribunal is duty-bound to reject the same since it is contrary to the provision of Section 90 of the act. However, the said proviso provides that for an application being filed in the matter of showing good and sufficient cause. In the case on hand, admittedly, the petitioner has filed an application giving certain reasons preventing him from filing the application within the said 30 days. The same is not disputed by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties before me. Unfortunately, the Tribunal without referring to the said application, has allowed the revision which runs counter to the categorical clear Section 90 of the Act. The same is not disputed by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties before me. Unfortunately, the Tribunal without referring to the said application, has allowed the revision which runs counter to the categorical clear Section 90 of the Act. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the said order requires to be set aside with a direction to the tribunal to consider the application for delay, first and be satisfied with regard to the good and sufficient cause in terms of the second proviso of section 90 of the Act. ( 8 ) I also see the order of the Tribunal. The impugned order of the tribunal does not disclose with regard to impropriety or illegality of the i mpugned order under the Act. The revisional jurisdiction is available against an illegal/improper order in terms of Section 90 of the Act. Unless the Tribunal comes to a conclusion that the impugned order suffers from any illegality/impropriety in terms of Section 90 of the Act, the Tribunal shall not remand the matter as has been done in the case on hand. There is absolutely no discussion with regard to the validity or legality of the order in the impugned judgment. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment in my opinion is to be set aside for non-consideration of the application for condonation of delay and for non-consideration of the validity of the order in the impugned judgment. In the circumstances this writ petition is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The Tribunal is directed to pass a fresh order in the light of the observations made in the course of the order and after hearing the parties and in accordance with law. Ordered accordingly. No costs. Mr. H. B. Satish, Additional Government Advocate is permitted to file his memo of appearance within 4 (four) weeks from today. --- *** --- .