New Revtira Co-op Housing Society v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and others
2000-05-02
J.A.PATIL
body2000
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - J.A. PATIL, J.:---The petitioner society has failed this petition under Order 47, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. Code and sought review of the Award dated 23-1-1998 passed by this Court in Land Acquisition Reference No. 6 of 1995. The review petition was filed on 21-4-1998 and as such there was some delay in filing the same. However, the delay has already been condoned and the review petition has been admitted. 2.The petitioner society was respondent No. 1 in the said land reference which was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Government of India had made acquisition of a plot of land of Backbay Reclamation along with a six storeyed structure standing thereon. There was a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Code in which S.L.A.O. passed an order on 22-1-1993, fixing the value of the land at Rs. 15,40,236/- and that of the building at Rs. 2,67,890/-. After adding statutory allowances under sections 23(1)(a) and 23(2) of the Act, the total value was worked out at Rs. 26,56,341/-. Respondent No. 2 are the legal heirs of deceased Rani Roop Raj Laxmi, who not being satisfied with the said Award, raised certain objections with regard to the amount of compensation; persons to whom it is payable and apportionment of the compensation. The S.L.A.O. therefore made a joint reference under sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to this Court. Accordingly notices were issued to all the parties including the present petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to appear before this Court. The other parties led evidence on the basis of which this Court proceeded to pass an Award on 23-1-1998, whereby the amount of compensation in respect of the land was enhanced to Rs. 1,34,04,720/- and that of the building at Rs. 41,90,400/-, equal to Rs. 1,75,95,120/-. Adding to the same, 30% amount and interest at the rate of Rs. 12% the total amount of compensation was worked out at Rs. 3,29,87,330.97/-. This Court directed that the enhanced compensation in respect of the land shall be apportioned between the lessor and the lessee, that is, the State of Maharashtra and Claimant Nos. 2(i) and 2(ii) in proportion of 40% and 60% respectively.
12% the total amount of compensation was worked out at Rs. 3,29,87,330.97/-. This Court directed that the enhanced compensation in respect of the land shall be apportioned between the lessor and the lessee, that is, the State of Maharashtra and Claimant Nos. 2(i) and 2(ii) in proportion of 40% and 60% respectively. This Court further directed that the enhanced compensation in respect of the building will not however, be payable to the present petitioner society but it will be entitled to get compensation in respect of the building to the extent mentioned in the Award of the S.L.A.O. The reason given by this Court for not entitling the petitioner society to the enhanced compensation in respect of the building, as stated in para 18 of the judgment, is that the society did not file any application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, disputing the quantum of compensation awarded by the S.L.A.O. 3.The petitioner's society filed the present review petition on 21-4-1998 contending inter alia that it had to know about the Award only recently. It is necessary to point out that respondent No. 4 filed an appeal being Appeal No. 489 of 1998 before the Division Bench of this Court on the next day i.e. 22-4-1998 and the same is pending. 4.According to the petitioner society it had purchased the land as well as the building standing upon it and therefore it alone is entitled to get the entire amount of compensation. It is stated in the application that the petitioner society had already submitted an application dated 4-3-1993 under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, disputing the quantum of compensation awarded by the S.L.A.O. However, the said application was not forwarded to this Court by respondent No. 1. It is, therefore, contended that it was an error on the part of this Court to have held that the petitioner society, not having filed any application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, was not entitled to get enhanced compensation. 5.The application is resisted by respondent Nos. 2(i) 2(ii). In their reply they have contended that the review petition is not maintainable since the petitioner society has already filed a cross objection in Appeal No. 489/1998. It is further contended that the grounds of the review petition are beyond the scope of the review jurisdiction.
5.The application is resisted by respondent Nos. 2(i) 2(ii). In their reply they have contended that the review petition is not maintainable since the petitioner society has already filed a cross objection in Appeal No. 489/1998. It is further contended that the grounds of the review petition are beyond the scope of the review jurisdiction. It is pointed out that in Land Reference No. 6/1995, the petitioner society was duly served but even then it deliberately absented itself. It is, therefore, contended that it is not open to the petitioner society to re-open the judgment by seeking review thereof. 6.I have heard Shri Milind Vasudeo, the learned Counsel for the petitioner society, Shri Sudhir Gupta, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, Shri Patki the learned A.G.P. for respondent Nos, 1 and 3 and Shri Zaiwala for respondent No. 4. The first objection raised by Shri Gupta is to the very maintainability of the review petition. He pointed out that the petitioner society has filed its cross-objection in the appeal filed by respondent No. 2 and that cross-objection has been served upon the other parties. Shri Milind Vasudeo admits the second fact but clarifies that no cross-objection has actually been filed in Appeal No. 489/1998. In view of this position, the challenge to the maintainability of the review petition on that count cannot survive. Shri Gupta, however, submits that when an appeal against Award passed by this Court is pending before the Division Bench, the present review application cannot lie. He further submitted that it is not necessary that the appeal should have been filed by the petitioner society itself. According to him, it is sufficient for the purpose of Order 47, Rule 1(a) of the C.P.C. Code even if the appeal is filed by any other party.
He further submitted that it is not necessary that the appeal should have been filed by the petitioner society itself. According to him, it is sufficient for the purpose of Order 47, Rule 1(a) of the C.P.C. Code even if the appeal is filed by any other party. Order 47, Rule (1) reads as under :--- ORDER XLVII, Rule 1 : Application for review of judgment: (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved.--- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence and was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake, or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain review of the decree passed or order made against him may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation : The fact that the decision open a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based, has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such a judgment. 7.According to Shri Gupta, the words, "no appeal has been preferred" occurring in sub-clause 1(a) need not be restricted to mean the appeal by the concerned aggrieved person only, who proposes to file a review application but they include appeal by any of the aggrieved persons.
7.According to Shri Gupta, the words, "no appeal has been preferred" occurring in sub-clause 1(a) need not be restricted to mean the appeal by the concerned aggrieved person only, who proposes to file a review application but they include appeal by any of the aggrieved persons. In other words, if there are two or more aggrieved persons and one of them files an appeal, then application by review by the other aggrieved person will not be maintainable as the condition "no appeal has been preferred" is not fulfilled. In short it is the contention of Shri Gupta that if an appeal is filed by any of the aggrieved persons, then no review of the judgment is permissible. The absence of the words "by him" after the words "no appeal has been preferred" would according to Shri Gupta mean that if an appeal is filed by an aggrieved person other than the person who intends to seek review of the order or judgment, then there is no fulfilment of the first condition and therefore, an application for review cannot lie. To some extent this may appear to be correct in cases where the aggrieved persons have common or joint interest and the order or judgment impugned commonly affect their interest. But where there is no such unity of interest then the above submission of Shri Gupta will not be good and correct in that situation. In my opinion, the present case falls under the second category. The interest of the Union of India which has filled the appeal and that of the society which has filed the present review application are altogether different. The position of the former is like a judgment debtor while that of the latter is like a decree holder. Therefore, a review application by the petitioner society is not barred under Order 47, Rule 1 of the C.P. Code. 8.Reference may be made to two decisions relied upon by Shri Milind Vasudeo. The first is (Narayan Purushottam Gargote v. Laxmibai)1, Vol. XXVIII Indian Law Reports 416, wherein the facts were that an application for review of judgment was filed in the District Court and the party subsequently filed in the District Court and the party subsequently filed an appeal in the High Court. The District Court rejected the review application on the ground that it could not proceed with the application as an appeal had already filed.
The District Court rejected the review application on the ground that it could not proceed with the application as an appeal had already filed. The Division Bench of this Court, however, set aside that order observing that there was no express provision in the C.P. Code, which rendered the application for review incompetent on the mere presentation of an appeal by the same party at any subsequent time. 9.The second decision is a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in (Behari Lal v. M.M. Gobardhan Lal others)2, A.I.R. (35)1948 Allahabad 353. WHEREIN it was held that the crucial date under Order 47, Rule (A) is the filing of an application for a review. It was further held that if on that date the Appellate Court has no appeal pending before it, the review application is under the Code, as it stands, competent. There is one more decision on this point and it is of Privy Council, in ((Raja) Indrajit Pratap Bhadur Shahi v. Amar Singh others)3, 1923 Privy Council 128, wherein it was held that a party has a right to apply for review of a judgment to the Court that has decided the case before an appeal has been preferred. In the instant case, it is the petitioner society which filed its review petition, first i.e. on 21-4-1998, while the appeal on behalf of respondent No. 4 came to be filed subsequently i.e. on 22-4-1998. Therefore, in the light of the ratio of the above mentioned decisions, the present review petition is maintainable. 10.The material question to be considered now is whether the review petition should be granted or not. It is true that this Court proceeded on the basis that the petitioner - society had made no application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. However, Shri Patki the learned A.G.P. for the S.L.A.O. conceded that the petitioner society had made an application dated 4-3-1993 but the Collector failed to make a reference to this Court. This being a true position of fact the question is as to whether the present review petition deserves to be allowed. According to Shri Milind Vasudeo, the above mentioned fact is an error apparent on the face of the record and therefore, the review petition should be granted.
This being a true position of fact the question is as to whether the present review petition deserves to be allowed. According to Shri Milind Vasudeo, the above mentioned fact is an error apparent on the face of the record and therefore, the review petition should be granted. Shri Gupta, however vehemently contended that the petitioner society having failed to make an appearance in the land reference despite service of notice, is not entitled to get the award reviewed. Shri Gupta further submitted that it is open to the petitioner society to agitate in the appeal filed by the respondent No. 4, the question regarding failure of the Collector to send the reference. Shri Patki, for S.L.A.O. contended that if the Collector failed to make a reference pursuant to the application made by the petitioner society then it can be a ground for appeal and not for review. Shri Milind Vasudeo did not dispute before me that the fact that the petitioner society was served with a notice of Land Reference No. 6 of 1995 but according to him, by that time the members of the petitioner society had left the premises since the possession of the building in question was already taken. It is stated in the review petition that the possession of the property was taken on 4-10-1996. It is however, material to note that the notice on petitioner society was served much before that i.e. 15-4-1996. There is, therefore, no substance in the submission of Shri Milind Vasudeo and it cannot be said that by any stretch of imagination that the petitioner society was not aware of the reference made by the Collector to this Court pursuant to the application made by the respondent No. 2(i) and 2(ii). 11.A reference may be made to certain decisions relied upon by Shri Gupta in respect of his contention. In (Punjab Sindh Bank Limited v. Ram Kishen and others)4, A.I.R. 1916 Lahore 173, it was held that where an Appellate Court is seized of a case and is empowered by law to grant the relief claimed by the applicant, the latter should have recourse to the Appellate Court and not to the original Court.
In (Punjab Sindh Bank Limited v. Ram Kishen and others)4, A.I.R. 1916 Lahore 173, it was held that where an Appellate Court is seized of a case and is empowered by law to grant the relief claimed by the applicant, the latter should have recourse to the Appellate Court and not to the original Court. In (K. Anjaneyulu and others v. The Collector, Excise R.R. Dist at Hyderabad and others)5, A.I.R. 1989 Andhra Pradesh 54, the review of an order was sought by the petitioner who had unjustifiably remained absent on two consecutive days of hearing, in the matter in which the order under review was passed. The learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rejected the review petition observing that a litigant cannot have a second go with the same matter, after having deliberately kept himself away in the first round. The learned Judge refused to entertain and grant any relief to the review petitioner on the ground that he was recklessly negligent. In the instant case also, there is absolutely no justification for the petitioner for their failure to appear and contest the reference made on the application of respondent No. 2(i) and 2(ii). It is not that the petitioner society or its members were unaware of the said reference. Their negligence however lies in the fact that even after coming to know that a reference had been made to this Court pursuant to the application made on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2(i), 2(ii), no member of the petitioner society bothered to enquire as to what happened to their own application dated 4-3-1993. However, nothing of this sort was done and the reference was allowed to be decided by this Court without any participation of the petitioner society. It is only after passing of the award that the petitioner society has waken up to point out that the application filed by it to the Collector was not forwarded by him to this Court. Had the petitioner society been a little careful, then both the references could have been decided simultaneously by this Court. However, for certain reasons best known to it, the petitioner society appears to have thought it fit to raise this issue only after the Court passes an order in the reference made at the instance of respondent Nos. 2(i) 2(ii).
Had the petitioner society been a little careful, then both the references could have been decided simultaneously by this Court. However, for certain reasons best known to it, the petitioner society appears to have thought it fit to raise this issue only after the Court passes an order in the reference made at the instance of respondent Nos. 2(i) 2(ii). In my opinion, there is no mistake or error apparent on the face of record to entitle the petitioner society to seek a review of the award. As observed in (Meera Bhanja (Smt) v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt.))6, 1995(1) Supreme Court Cases 170, the error contemplated under Order 47, Rule (1) of the C.P.C., 1908, must be such as would be apparent on mere looking of the record without requiring any long-drawn process of reasoning. 12.It was also contended on behalf of the respondent that the petitioner society ought to have filed an application to this Court seeking direction to the Collector to make a reference. Relying upon a decision in (Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major and others)7, 1997(11) Supreme Court Cases 412, it was pointed out that such an application could be made within a period of three years from the date of the expiry of 90 days prescribed in section 18 (3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act, 1960. Really speaking there was no necessity for making any such application by the petitioner society and if it had brought to the notice of this Court that it had made an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that the Collector had failed to make a reference pursuant to said application, this Court would have given a direction to the Collector to remit the reference. 13.For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the review petition does not deserve to be granted. This will not cause any prejudice or damages to the petitioner society since it is open to it to agitate the issue by filing cross objections in the appeal which is already pending before the Division Bench. 14.As this review petition is finally heard and rejected, no order on the Notice of Motion No. 1418/1998 also in Land Acquisition Reference No. 6 of 1995 is necessary and the same is disposed of accordingly. 15.In the result, the review petition is rejected.
14.As this review petition is finally heard and rejected, no order on the Notice of Motion No. 1418/1998 also in Land Acquisition Reference No. 6 of 1995 is necessary and the same is disposed of accordingly. 15.In the result, the review petition is rejected. Parties to bear their respective costs. Certified copy is expedited. Petition dismissed.