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2000 DIGILAW 315 (HP)

D. R. DIWAN v. STATE OF H. P.

2000-12-12

C.K.THAKKER, K.C.SOOD

body2000
JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C J. (Oral):- This petition is filed by the petitioner for quashing and setting aside an order passed by the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal ("Tribunal" for short) on October 3, 2000, in Execution Petition No.6 of 1999 in O.A. No. 787 of 1995. 2. Few facts, relevant for deciding the controversy raised in the present petition may now be stated. On July 5, 1979, the petitioner was appointed as an Inspector (Excise & Taxation) on probation. Under the relevant rules, he was required to pass departmental examination within a period of two years. It is not in dispute that the petitioner cleared the said examination on October 19, 1981 i.e. after two years from the date of initial appointment. The case of the petitioner, however, was that he was always ready and willing to appear at the examination and all steps which were required to be taken at his end were taken by him but since no examination could be conducted by the State authorities within the stipulated period, he could not clear it within the period. It was, therefore, his contention that in view of default and negligence on the part of the State authorities, he should not suffer and he must be held to have cleared the examination within the stipulated period of two years and his seniority must be fixed on that basis. 3. It appears that three petitions were filed in the Tribunal being O.A. Nos. 787 of 1995, (by the present petitioner), 788 of 1995 and 1145 of 1995. All the petitions were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment and order by the Tribunal on October 28, 1996, 0.A. No. 787 of 1995 filed by the petitioner was allowed. The operative part thereof has been annexed to the petition as Annexure P-4 which reads as under: "The application is allowed. Resultantly the applicants are declared to have passed the departmental examination within the probationary period of two years with all consequential benefits of confirmation and seniority etc. under the rules. We further direct respondent’s No. 1 and 2 to re-draw the seniority list and give seniority to the applicants in the light of the observations made above. The application stands disposed of with no order as to costs." 4. O.A. No. 788 of 1995 filed by one Shri J.R. Punj was also allowed. under the rules. We further direct respondent’s No. 1 and 2 to re-draw the seniority list and give seniority to the applicants in the light of the observations made above. The application stands disposed of with no order as to costs." 4. O.A. No. 788 of 1995 filed by one Shri J.R. Punj was also allowed. Mohan Lai and others who were aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, filed Civil Appeal No. 2417 of 1997 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 23766 of 1996) in the Supreme Court. In the said appeal, the present petitioner was also joined as a party respondent. No appeals were, however filed against the orders passed and directions issued in O.A. No.787 of 1995 (filed by the present petitioner) and. in O.A. No.1145 of 1995. The Honble Supreme Court considered the order passed by the Tribunal dated October 28, 19% in Q.A. No. 788 of 1995. After referring to the relevant provisions of the Rules, the Supreme Court vide its order dated March 17, 1997 observed that the question for consideration before the Court was "Whether the period of passing the test within two years by taking four chances was mandatory or not?" The Court also quoted condition No.(iv) in the appointment order, whieh read as under: "(iv) He shall have to pass the departmental examination in respect of both the Excise and Taxation within two years of his joining the duty failing which his services are liable to termination." 5. According to the Supreme Court, the above condition made it clear that a candidate appointed on probation "shall have to pass the departmental examination" within two years of his joining the duty. The Court then "decided the matter on merits. It may be stated that the petitioner was one of the party-respondents before the Supreme Court. He was also represented by a senior counsel. The Apex Court took into account the fact that whereas the petitioner joined duty on July 5, 1979, he cleared departmental examination on October 19, 1981 i.e. "beyond two years". The Court observed that in the light of the prayer made by Mr. Diwan (petitioner) and Mr. Shandil that their seniority should be declared from the date of passing of the. Examination, "their seniority will be reckoned from the date of their passing of the examination". 6. The Court observed that in the light of the prayer made by Mr. Diwan (petitioner) and Mr. Shandil that their seniority should be declared from the date of passing of the. Examination, "their seniority will be reckoned from the date of their passing of the examination". 6. Observed the Supreme Court: "We are not concerned with the action to be taken by the Government for such of these candidates who did not pass the examinations within the prescribed two years period of extended period of four years of the probation. We are concerned with a case of two sets of persons, i.e. those who passed the examinations within two years and another set of officers who set for the examination within two years, but passed the examination beyond two years. It is a case where the respondents themselves sought for the relief in that their seniority would be reckoned from the date of their passing the departmental examination. They have given the details of their date of joining the duty and passing of the examination which show that D.S. Shandil had joined the post on June 26, 1977 and he passed his examination on July 16, 1979. D.R. Dewan joined the duty on July 5, 1979. While he passed the departmental examination on October 19, 1981. In other words, beyond two years. Sh. O.P. Sharma, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, contends that they had applied for examination in the month of January, their applications were duly forwarded; examination were required to be conducted in April; instead, they were conducted in the month of May and the results were declared in the month of October and, therefore, they cannot be blamed for the delay in passing the examinations beyond two years, in the light of the examinations conducted vis-à-vis the operation of the Rules, the question is; whether the seniority of the respondents Shandil and Diwan could relate back to the date of their appointment or from the date of their passing the examination ? In the light of the prayer, they have themselves made that their seniority should be declared from the date of their passing the examination and in the light of the conditions of service and operation of the Rule, we hold that their seniority will be reckoned from the date of their passing the examination." (Emphasis supplied). 7. In the light of the prayer, they have themselves made that their seniority should be declared from the date of their passing the examination and in the light of the conditions of service and operation of the Rule, we hold that their seniority will be reckoned from the date of their passing the examination." (Emphasis supplied). 7. It appears that the petitioner preferred a substantive petition in the Supreme Court being W.P. No. 526 of 1997 in view of certain observations made by the Supreme Court in the order dated March 17, 1997 referred to above. The said petition was disposed of by an order dated march 16, 1996, inter-alia,making the following observations: "The petitioner in this case had filed O. A. No. 187/95 before the Tribunal. The order passed in that application was not under challenge and thus that order had become final. Therefore, the observations made in C.A. No. 2417 of 97, will apply to those persons who were the parties in that case and who had prayed for determination of seniority from the date of passing the examination." 8. Interim application No.4 of 1998 appeared to have been filed by interveners was dismissed by the Supreme Court on November 16, 1998. Another interim application No.5 was filed by the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.526 of 1997 wherein following order was passed on April 5, 1999: "I.A.No.5 is granted. Order dated 16.3.1998 is recalled. The writ petition (c) No.526 of 97 to be placed before the Court for fresh orders." 9. Thus, the order passed in W.P.(C) No. 526 of 1997 was recalled by the Supreme Court on April 5,1999. In view of recalling of the order in W.P.(C) No. 526 of 1997, again the matter was placed for hearing. It was disposed of on July 30, 1997 and the following order was passed: "All applications for impleadment are dismissed as withdrawn. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the order which was passed in favour of the petitioner in O.A. No. 787 of 1995 has become final and then the authorities are not giving proper effect to that order, if that is so, the proper course for the petitioner is either to file a contempt petition or move the High Court for a writ of mandamus. The learned counsel for the respondents’ states that the statement made on behalf of the petitioner is not a correct statement. The learned counsel for the respondents’ states that the statement made on behalf of the petitioner is not a correct statement. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly." (Emphasis supplied) 10. It was the case of the petitioner that the order passed by the Tribunal on October 28, 1996 in his petition (O.A. No. 787 of 1995) had become final and binding. He, therefore, filed the present Execution Application under Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act") for implementation of the order. The contention of the petitioner before the Tribunal was that since the order passed in O.A. No. 787 of 1995 on October 28, 1996 was never challenged before the Supreme Court, it had become final and binding. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the respondent-authorities to implement the said order. Since it was not done, the petitioner was constrained to approach the Tribunal for the execution of the said order and for determining his seniority on the basis of the order made in O.A. No. 787 of 1995. The Tribunal was thus called upon to decide whether the application was well-founded and whether the petitioner would be entitled to get seniority from the date of his appointment i.e. July 5, 1979 or from October 19, 1981 when he actually passed the examination. 11. The Tribunal considered the fact that the decision of the Tribunal was a common decision in three matters i.e. O.A. Nos. 787,788 and 1145 of 1995. The Tribunal was conscious of the fact that only in O.A. No. 788 of 1995; the matter had reached the Apex Court. But the Tribunal observed that the petitioner was also a party-respondent. The Supreme Court considered the entire matter and cases of Mr. Diwan (present petitioner) and Mr. Shandil. Interpreting the relevant rules, the Scheme and condition of appointment, the Supreme Court observed that the petitioner cleared the examination on October 19, 1981, though he was appointed on July 5, 1979. He thus cleared the examination beyond two years. After hearing the learned counsel for the present petitioner, the Supreme Court observed that the prayer of the petitioner who was one of the respondents before the Supreme Court) was that his seniority should be counted from the date of passing of the examination. Accordingly, an order was passed directing the authorities to consider their seniority (of Mr. Shandil and Mr. Accordingly, an order was passed directing the authorities to consider their seniority (of Mr. Shandil and Mr. Diwan) from the date of passing the examination. In the opinion of the Tribunal, therefore, the execution petition was liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. The said order is challenged by the petitioner in the present petition. 12. Several contentions have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner at the time of hearing of the petition. It was submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No. 788 of 1995 on October 28, 1996 had become final, binding and conclusive as no appeal or any other proceedings were taken by any person against the said order. It was therefore, submitted that an execution application filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal under Section 27 of the Act was maintainable. It has also urged that the Tribunal had limited jurisdiction to execute the order passed earlier, and it was not open to the Tribunal to take into account subsequent orders passed by any Court, including the Supreme Court in any other appeal (Civil Appeal No. 2417 of 1997). The counsel also argued that the relief could not have been refused by the Tribunal in execution proceedings which was granted in O.A. No. 787 of 1995 when the judgment had become final and binding on the parties. The Tribunal by refusing the relief took into account irrelevant material as well as new circumstance i.e. the order passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2417 of 1997 and to that extent committed an illegality which deserves to be corrected by this Court. 13. Though, no formal notice was issued by us, since an advance copy was supplied to the learned Advocate General, we have also heard him for the State Authorities-. He submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal is in consonance with law and does not deserve interference. 14. The question for our consideration is whether the Tribunal has committed an error of law or of jurisdiction which deserves to be corrected by this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. 15. From the events narrated here-in-above, certain facts are not in dispute by and between the parties. The petitioner was appointed on July 5, 1979 as a probationer. The question for our consideration is whether the Tribunal has committed an error of law or of jurisdiction which deserves to be corrected by this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. 15. From the events narrated here-in-above, certain facts are not in dispute by and between the parties. The petitioner was appointed on July 5, 1979 as a probationer. Under the relevant rules, he was to pass departmental examination within two years i.e. on or before July 5, 1981. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner cleared the examination on October 19, 1981 i.e. after two years. The case of the petitioner, however, was that there was no fault on his part and he was ready and willing to appear at the examination and had taken all steps. But as no examination was conducted by the authorities, he could not clear it. His prayer, therefore, was that in the facts and circumstances, it must be held that he had cleared the examination within the stipulated period of two years and his seniority must be counted from the date of his initial appointment, i.e. July 5, 1979. Since the said prayer was not accepted by the authorities, he approached the Tribunal and his application, as stated above, came to be allowed and direction was issued to the State Authorities to that effect. 16. At the same time, however, it is equally true and cannot be ignored that by a common order, three petitions were disposed of by the Tribunal. One of them (O.A. No. 788 of 1995) was taken to the Supreme Court. Before the Apex Court, the petitioner was joined as one of the respondents and his case also came to be considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. From the relevant portion extracted here-in- above, from the decision of the Honble Supreme Court, it is further clear that the attention of the Court was invited to the fact and it was observed in the order itself that the petitioner did not clear the departmental examination within two years but, "beyond two years". The Supreme Court also considered the question whether seniority of two persons, namely, Mr. Shandil and Mr. Diwan(petitioner) would relate back to the date of their appointment or would be reckoned from the date of their passing the examination. The Supreme Court also considered the question whether seniority of two persons, namely, Mr. Shandil and Mr. Diwan(petitioner) would relate back to the date of their appointment or would be reckoned from the date of their passing the examination. It was then observed by the Court that in the light of the prayer they themselves made that their seniority should be declared from the date of passing of the examination, it must be held that it would be reckoned from the date of passing of the examination, i.e. obviously from October 19, 1981. 17. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is three fold; firstly, there was factual error on the part of the Supreme Court as it was never prayed by the present petitioner that his seniority may be counted from the date of passing of the examination and not from the date of his initial appointment in 1979. Secondly, when no appeal was filed against the order passed in O.A. No. 788 of 1995, any observation made by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.2417 of 1997 (arising out of O.A. No. 788 of 1995) would not affect the petitioner even though he might have been joined as respondent and represented by an Advocate. Finally, the Tribunal ought to have passed an appropriate order in execution proceedings under Section 27 of the Act on the basis of the order, dated October 28, 1996, which had never been challenged by anyone in any Court. 18. We see no substance in any of the grounds raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In a well considered reasoned order, the Tribunal dealt with the objections raised by the petitioner and negative them. The Tribunal noted that only in one case (O.A. No. 788 of 1995), the matter was taken to the Supreme Court. But considering the facts that the order was common in three matters and the petitioner himself was joined as respondent in the Supreme Court and the order was passed after affording opportunity of hearing, it was binding on him and the Tribunal cannot grant the prayer of the petitioner by invoking the provisions of Section 27 of the Act. 19. The Tribunal in this connection, observed in paras 16 to 20 as under:-"16. 19. The Tribunal in this connection, observed in paras 16 to 20 as under:-"16. Needless to say, a common judgment has been assailed by one of the interested party and that has been modified by the Appellate Authority and in the present case which authority happened to be the Apex Court. In this background, the common judgment passed by the Tribunal stood merged with the appellate judgment. Admittedly, on the basis of the appellate judgment, the prayer of the applicant cannot be favorably considered from the date of his appointment. It cannot be said that the common judgment so far as the present applicant is concerned, it is final as was passed by the Tribunal and so far as the appellants were concerned, whatever has been finally decided by the Apex Court was final. On the other hand, the judgment passed by the Apex Court as appellate authority is final between the parties and the applicant is bound by that judgment, especially when he was one of the parties in the appeal. 17. There is another aspect of the matter so far as the present case is concerned. Article 141 of the Constitution of India makes the law declared by the Supreme Court to be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The Tribunal, as such, has to follow the law declared by the Apex Court more so in the present case as discussed above whatever findings were given by the Honble Supreme Court were final and cannot be deviated from as is being sought on behalf of the applicant. The Honble Apex Court in the present case has interpreted the relevant Rules in the aforesaid judgment passed on March 17, 1997, which interpretation is legally binding. 18. Finally it has been contended on behalf of the applicant that while disposing of the writ Petition No. 526/97 on July 30, 1999, the Apex Court had made certain observations which have already been mentioned above and on that score, the applicant is legally entitled to execute the common judgment made in O.A. No. 787/95. 19. We think, the order of the Appex Court dated July 30, 1999 cannct be inferred in the manner in which being done by the applicant. 19. We think, the order of the Appex Court dated July 30, 1999 cannct be inferred in the manner in which being done by the applicant. The Apex Court only observed that in case the order passed in O.A. No. 787/95 has become final and the authorities were not giving proper effect to that order and if that was so, the proper course for the petitioner was either to file a contempt petition or to move the High Court for a writ of Mandamus. 20. It may be very specifically mentioned here that the Apex Court nowhere gave any finding that the common judgment passed in O.A. No. 787/95 was final. The observations made by the Apex court were that ".....If that is so....." meaning thereby in case it is held that the common judgment made in O.A. No. 787 of 1995 was final. It has not been held to be so as discussed above. Therefore, the applicant cannot take any advantage from the order dated July 30, 1999 passed by the Apex Court in Writ Petition No. 526/97." 21. It was strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision in civil Appeal No. 2417 of 1997 cannot take away vested rights accrued in favour of the petitioner in O.A. No. 787 of 1995. He also stated that a statement made by the Apex Court in the order that a prayer was made by the petitioner in the petition that his seniority might be reckoned from the date of examination i.e. October, 1981 was not correct, the said observation was, therefore, factually incorrect and legally in the nature of obitur dicta, as it was not necessary for deciding the matter in controversy between the parties. It was also submitted that it was obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to execute order passed in O.A. No. 787 of 1995 and it was not open for it to enter into correctness of the decision. Out attention in this connection was invited to the following decisions: 1. V. Ramaswami Annangar and others v. T.N.V. Kalasa Thevar, AIR 1951 SC 189; 2. Dhanki Mahajan v. Rana Chandubha Wakhatsing and others, (1968) 3 SCR 759. 3. Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain and another, (1975) 2 SCC 159 4. Arora Enterprises Ltd. & others v. Indubhushan Obhan and others, (1997) 5 SCC 366. 5. V. Ramaswami Annangar and others v. T.N.V. Kalasa Thevar, AIR 1951 SC 189; 2. Dhanki Mahajan v. Rana Chandubha Wakhatsing and others, (1968) 3 SCR 759. 3. Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain and another, (1975) 2 SCC 159 4. Arora Enterprises Ltd. & others v. Indubhushan Obhan and others, (1997) 5 SCC 366. 5. Tukaram Ramchandra Mane (Dead) by LRs. v. Rajaram Bapu Lakule (Dead) by LRs., (1998) 4 SCC 317. 6 Alavi and another v. Taluk Land Board, Tirur and others, (1999) 1 SCC 260. 7. Vallapally Plantations Pvt. Ltd., v. State of Kerala, (1999) 4 SCC 434. 8.State of A. P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (Dead) by LRs and others, (2000) 3 SCC 689: Current Law Journal (CCR)-2000(l) 476. 9Authorised Officer (land Reforms) v. MM. Krishnamurthy Chetty, (1998) 9 SCC 138. 10. Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 SC334. 21. In all the above cases, it was held that executing court is bound to execute the decree. In appropriate cases, it can interpret the terms of the decree but can neither modify nor rewrite the decree. 22. So far as the proposition of law is concerned, there can be no doubt. But the question is whether the Tribunal has re-written the decree or while dealing with and deciding the application, entered into a matter which was not permissible. In Tukaram Ramchandra, it was held that unless an order has been annulled, quashed or set aside, it is not open to executing court to ignore such order. In MM. Krishnamurthy Chetty, an order was passed by the Authorised Officer under the Tamil Nadu (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Act, 1961. The said order was challenged in the High Court and the matter was remanded by the High Court for fresh consideration to the Authorised Officer. Meanwhile, however, the decision of the High Court was reversed by the Supreme Court. The question was whether the Authorised Officer was bound by the order of the High Court of remand. It was held by the Supreme Court that since an order of remand was made by the High Court, the Authorised Officer was bound to comply with the said order. 23. In Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association, the Apex Court observed that the doctrine of res-judicata is of universal application. It was held by the Supreme Court that since an order of remand was made by the High Court, the Authorised Officer was bound to comply with the said order. 23. In Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association, the Apex Court observed that the doctrine of res-judicata is of universal application. When a particular decision has been arrived at and has become final between the parties, it cannot be set at naught on the ground that such a decision is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The parties to the litigation are bound by such decision and they cannot be permitted to re-open the issue. 24. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that once a decision had been given in favour of the petitioner in O.A. No. 787 of 1995 by the Tribunal and no appeal was filed, it was binding and conclusive between the parties and operated as a judgment in personam. Any observation made by the Apex Court, in other matter cannot set at naught the final decision in O.A. No. 787 of 1995 which would operate res-judicata between the parties. Since the Tribunal was bound to execute the decision in O.A. No. 787 of 1995, there is an error of law as well as of jurisdiction in dismissing the execution application and it is the power and duty of this Court to correct the said error. 25. The learned Advocate General, on the other hand, submitted that there was a declaration of law by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2417 of 1997, when the judgment was common in all the three matters, i.e. O.A. 787, 788 and 1145 of 1995 and the petitioner was party-respondent before the Supreme Court and it was held after hearing him that the petitioner was entitled to get his seniority reckoned from the date of passing of examination, i.e. from /October 19, 1981, such a declaration was binding. We find considerable force in the argument of the learned Advocate General. 26. That apart, even if a declaration is made by the Supreme Court in one matter from a group of matters, such a decision would bind not only to the party, who is before the Court but also to other persons, who might not have been named or joined as parties to the litigation. 27. 26. That apart, even if a declaration is made by the Supreme Court in one matter from a group of matters, such a decision would bind not only to the party, who is before the Court but also to other persons, who might not have been named or joined as parties to the litigation. 27. In this connection, our attention was invited by the learned Advocate General to a decision in M/s. Shenoy and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Bangalore and others, (1985) 2 SCC 512. 28. In that case, 1590 writ petitions were filed in the High Court of Kamataka challenging the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979. Petitions were allowed by a common judgment dated 24th August, 1979 and the Act was struck down as ultra vires and unconstitutional. A writ was issued against the State Government for bearing it from taking any proceedings under the Act. The State approached the Supreme Court, but only in one matter. The Supreme Court, by a judgment, dated 10th April, 1985, allowed the said appeal and set aside the order passed by the Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of the Act. 29. After the Act was held to be constitutional and intra vires by the Supreme Court only in one appeal, the State government issued notices to all the traders calling upon them to registeer themselves under the Act, to file returns and to pay the amount of tax The aggrieved traders approached the High Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution contending that the State government had no authority to issue such notices and prayed for permanent injunction against the Government from proceeding with notices in view of the fact that against them the decision had become final as no appeals were filed by the State in those matters. A precise question before the High Court was whether the order passed by the High Court was final and binding on the State qua the petitioner and whether the judgment of the Supreme Court would operate only in one matter in which an appeal was preferred in the Apex Court. The learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench rejected preliminary objection and the traders approached the Supreme Court. The learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench rejected preliminary objection and the traders approached the Supreme Court. The question before the Apex Court was whether the decision of the Court in one matter would operate against the other traders and the action taken by the State authorities of issuing notices was lawful. Considering two earlier Constitution Bench decisions in State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, AIR 1963 SC 913 and Makhan Lal Waza and others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, AIR 1971 SC 2206, the Court held that even though an appeal might have been filed against one decision rendered by a High Court in several matters, it was a declaration of law by the Supreme Court and would be binding not only to the parties before the Court but to all. The Court held that the principles which have been laid down in both the cases were clear and the action taken by the State of Karnataka in issuing notices to the traders was legal and valid. In paras 21 and 22, their Lordships observed; "In our opinion, both these decisions lay down identical principles and there is nothing to distinguish between the two. In the earlier case, this Court, on its facts, overruled the preliminary objection that absence of appeals against the three petitioners left out, would not render the appeal before this Court incompetent, holding thereby that the effect of the decision in that appeal would be binding on the appellant therein. In the latter case, this Court in unmistakable terms laid down that the law laid down in the earlier case, namely, Triloki Nath case, applied even to those who were hot parties to the case. These two decisions were given by two Constitution Benches of this court. We find that Joginder Singh case was not noted by the Bench that decided Makhanlal Waza case. This does not create any difficulty. As we have already held, the two decisions, on the principles laid down by them, speak the same voice, i.e. that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all, notwithstanding the fact that it is against the State or a private party and that it is binding on even those who were not parties before the court. Since it is necessary to make the position of law clear and free from ambiguity, we would set out our reasons for our conclusion clearly. Though a large number of writ petitions were filed challenging the Act, all those writ petitions were grouped together, heard together and were disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment. No petitioner advanced any contention peculiar or individual to his petition, not common to others, to be precise, the dispute in the cause or controversy between the state and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in it or anything personal or peculiar to each petitioner. The challenge to the constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical grounds common to all petitioners. This challenge was accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and it was this common judgment that was the subject matter of appeal before this Court in Hansa Corporation case. When the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporation case alone, but petitions in which the High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent grovnd that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It is, therefore, idle to contend that the law laid . down by this Court in that judgment would bind only the Hansa Corporation and not th" other petitions against whom the State ofKarnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so is to ignore the binding nature of judgment of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution." (Emphasis supplied). 30. The Court also indicated that to contend that the conclusions arrived at by the Court applied only to the party before the Court "is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 14i illusory." It was also ruled that when a common judgment of the High Court was set aside by the Supreme Court, "the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered ineffective not only in one case but in all cases. (Emphasis supplied) In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the declaration of law is binding on every one and, therefore, it is futile to contend that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties against whom appeal were not filed. 31. (Emphasis supplied) In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the declaration of law is binding on every one and, therefore, it is futile to contend that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties against whom appeal were not filed. 31. Such ground was described by the Constituton Bench of the Supreme Court in Makhanlal Vaza as tenuous, wholly tenable and misconceived. 32. Another important consideration also weighed with the Court. It was observed that suppose the judgment of the High Court is not implemented, one of the remedies available to the aggrieved party is to file an application for contempt. Now, suppose such an application is filed, how mandamus could be enforced in the teeth of the judgment of the Supreme C ourt albeit in one matter in which the Act is held to be constitutional. The Court then posed a question; "Can I be punished for disrespecting the mandamus, when the law of the land has been laid down by the Supreme Court against the mandamus issued, which laws is equally binding on me and on you?" Which Court can punish a party for contempt under these circumstances? The answer can be only in the negative in view of the fact that the Act was held to be intra vires. It was, therefore, held that after judgment of the High Court and before the final verdict of the Supreme Court, the statute was under eclipse. As soon as it was held to be intra vires, temporary shadow cast upon it by the mandamus disappeared and the Act revived with its full vigour and force, the constitutional invalidity having been removed by the Apex Court. No advantage or benefit could be claimed thereafter even by the persons who had succeeded before the High Court and against which no appeals were filed before the Supreme Court. 33. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the ratio laid down in Joginder Singh helps the petitioners rather than the respondents. For that, learned counsel invited our attention to the following observations; "All the four petitions were dealt with together and were disposed of by a common judgment so that relief accorded to Joginder Singh the respondent before us in Writ Application 1559 of 1960 was also granted to the other three petitioners. The State however has preferred no appeal against the orders in other three petitions, and Mr. The State however has preferred no appeal against the orders in other three petitions, and Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent, raise the contention that as the orders in the other three petitions have become final, any order passed in this appeal at variance with the relief granted in the other three petitions would create inconsistent decrees in respect of the same matter and so we should dismiss the present appeal as incompetent. We, however, consider that this would not be the legal effect of any order passed by the Court in this appeal and that there is no merit in this objection as a bar to the hearing of the appeal. In our opinion, the true position arising, if the present appeal by the State Government should succeed, would be that the finality of the orders passed in the other three writ petitions by the Punjab High Court would not be disturbed and that those three successful petitioners would be entitled to retain the advantages which they had secured by the decision in their favour, not being challenged by an appeal being filed. That however would not help the present respondent who would be bound by our judgment in this appeal and besides, so far as the general law is concerned as applicable to everyone other than the three writ petitions (who would be entitled to the benefit of decisions in their favours having attained finality), the law will be as laid down by this Court. We therefore overrule the preliminary objection." (Emphasis supplied). 34. A similar argument was advanced before the Supreme Court in M/s. Shenoy & Co. and it was contended that the ratio laid down in Joginder Singh could be invoked by the appellants. The contention, however, was negatived by the Supreme Court by observing thus; "We would like to make it clear that there is no inconsistency in the finding of this Court in Joginder Singh case and Makhanlal Waza case the ratio is the same and the appellants cannot take advantage of certain observations made by this Court in Joginder Singh case for the reasons indicated above," . 35. In our opinion, the law laid down by the Supreme Court is clear. That apart, in the instant case, the petitioner himself was a party- respondent. 35. In our opinion, the law laid down by the Supreme Court is clear. That apart, in the instant case, the petitioner himself was a party- respondent. His case was also considered and the Court noted that the petitioner cleared the examination on 19th October, 1981 i.e. beyond two years from the date of his appointment on 5th July, 1979 and his seniority should be reckoned from the date of passing of the examination. In view of the clear and unequivocal declaration of the fact by the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the Tribunal was enjoined to execute its order in O.A. No. 787 of 1995 and committed an error in dismissing the execution application filed by the petitioner. 36. There is still one more aspect, which cannot be overlooked. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. It is settled law that it is an equitable jurisdiction. Powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution are exercised by this Court ex debit justitiae, i.e. in the larger interest of justice. Before about five decades, in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah and another, AIR 1955 SC 425, the Supreme Court observed that it cannot be held that whenever there is an error of law, the High Court will exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Those powers, according to the Supreme Court, are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon discretion, it must be exercised along recognized lines and not arbitrarily. One of the limitations imposed by the courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in any case unless substantial injustice has ensued, or is likely to ensue. Again, in A.M. Allison and another v. B.L. Sen and others, AIR 1957 SC 227, it was held that the proceedings by way of writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution are "not of course". The High Court has power to refuse the writ if it is satisfied that there was no failure of justice. 37. In the instant case, grant of relief would result in similarly situated persons being treated differently and unequally since in one of the matters (O.A. No. 788 of 1995), the Supreme Court held that the person would get seniority from the date of passing of examination. All persons similarly situated should be treated similarly. 37. In the instant case, grant of relief would result in similarly situated persons being treated differently and unequally since in one of the matters (O.A. No. 788 of 1995), the Supreme Court held that the person would get seniority from the date of passing of examination. All persons similarly situated should be treated similarly. That is the purport of Article 14 of the constitution. Allowing the execution application of the petitioner and grant of relief in his favour would extend benefits of O.A. No. 787 of 1995 by depriving similar benefits to identically situated employees. Apart from the fact that it would not be in the larger interest of justice, such order would, on the contrary, result in miscarriage of justice. Unless compelled, no court would take such action. 38. In any case, there is a clear finding by the Supreme Court that seniority of the petitioner and Mr. Shandil will reckon from the date of passing of the examination i.e. October, 1981. The said finding neither can be overlooked, brushed aside or ignored by the Tribunal nor by this Court. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal has not committed any error in dismissing the execution application. 39. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after the decision in L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC 1125, the jurisdiction of this Court is very wide and is not circumscribed. In our opinion, however, the powers be exercised by this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution are discretionary and the Court will keep in mind equitable aspects and interest of justice. Since the order passed by the Tribunal does not suffer from any illegality nor is otherwise inequitable or arbitrary, it does not require interference by this Court. For the foregoing reasons, the petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.