JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J: - The appellant, Jeevo alias Jeevan Kumar, hereinafter referred to as the accused, stands convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (2), Kangra at Dharamsala, in Sessions Case No.3-P/VII/97 vide judgment dated 15.10.1997 for the offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-. In default of payment of fine he has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months. 2. Briefly stated, the prosecution story is this Piar Chand (PW 2) son of Sukh Ram (PW 3) is running a "Karyana" shop in village Kakrain. He is a supporter of one Kumari Manbhari. The said Kumari Manbhari was elected as Chairperson of Zila Parishad. PW 2 Piar Chand had accompanied her to Dharamsala during the election, which took place on 31.12.1995. The supporters of Kumari Manbhari were jubilant on her election. 3. At about 7.30 or 8 PM on 31.12.1995, when PW 3 Sukh Ram was present in his house, he was informed by PW 7 Smt. Guddo Devi that his son PW 2 Piar Chand having been stabbed was lying injured at his shop. PW 3 Sukh Ram rushed to the shop of his son and found his son sitting in the Verandah of his shop moaning with pain. On being asked PW 2 Piar Chand told his father that he was stabbed by the accused, PW 10 Trilok Nath and certain others were also present at the shop at that time. PW 2 Piar Chand requested his father for being taken to the hospital. PW 2 Piar Chand was accordingly brought to Palampur Hospital by PW 10 Trilok Nath. 4. The report to the police was made by PW 3 Sukh Ram on the basis of which a case for the offence under section 323 and 324, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, came to be registered vide FIR No. 440/95, Ex. PW 17/C. 5. The injured PW 2 Piar Chand was referred for treatment to PGI Chandigarh by PW 1 Dr. Karan Sharma, where he remained admitted from 1.1.1996 to 8.1.1996. PW 1 Dr. Karan Sharma on the injured having been brought to him vide Medico-legal certificate Ex. PW 1/C had found the following injuries on his person: 1. PW 17/C. 5. The injured PW 2 Piar Chand was referred for treatment to PGI Chandigarh by PW 1 Dr. Karan Sharma, where he remained admitted from 1.1.1996 to 8.1.1996. PW 1 Dr. Karan Sharma on the injured having been brought to him vide Medico-legal certificate Ex. PW 1/C had found the following injuries on his person: 1. Incised wound obliquely placed over left side lower chest 6 cms left of midline at the level of lower end of sternum actively bleeding 3 cm x 4 mm incised. Depth could not be measured. 2. Incised wound over right side of abdomen 8 cm below costal margin obliquely placed 12 cm from midline 3 cm x 4 cm incise and actively bleeding. 6. Both the injuries were opined to have been caused by a sharp edged weapon within the probable duration of twelve hours. The injuries were further opined to be dangerous to life. 7. During the course of investigation, it was revealed that Jasrath alias Jassa and Ashok were accompanying the accused when the offence was committed and that injuries were caused to PW 2 Piar Chand in furtherance of their common intention. The accused while in custody made a disclosure statement leading to the discovery of the weapon of offence, namely, the knife, Ex.P 1, blood stained clothes of the injured were also taken into possession and sent to the Chemical Examiner. These clothes were found to be stained with human blood. 8. On the completion of the investigation, the accused alongwith above-named Jasrath alias Jassa and Ashok were sent up for trial for the offence under section 307, 323 and 324, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. 9. A charge for the offence under section 307 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code was framed against them. They pleaded no guilty and claimed trial. 10. The prosecution in support of its case examined nineteen witnesses in all. The case of the accused and his two co-accused was that of denial and false implication. 11. The learned trial court on consideration of the evidence led before it acquitted Sarvshri Jasrath alias Jassa and Ashok of the offence under section 307 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. It, however, convicted and sentenced the accused for the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code, as aforesaid. 12. 11. The learned trial court on consideration of the evidence led before it acquitted Sarvshri Jasrath alias Jassa and Ashok of the offence under section 307 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. It, however, convicted and sentenced the accused for the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code, as aforesaid. 12. Be it stated that the acquittal of Sarvshri Jasrath alias Jassa and Ashok as recorded by the learned trial court has not been assailed by the State by way of an appeal under section 378. Code of Criminal Procedure. Such acquittal has thus, become final. 13. The learned counsel for the accused, at the very outset, has contended that in view of the acquittal of the other two co-accused of the present accused of the offence under section 307 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, the present accused for the self same reasons is also entitled to be acquitted. In support of the contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the ratio of the Supreme Court in Sukhram v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1989 SC 772. 14. The ratio relied upon b.y the learned counsel for the accused does not supply to the facts of the present case. In the case before the Supreme Court two accused were individually charged for the offences under section 302 and 436, Indian Penal Code. Alternatively they were charged for the offences under section 302 and 436 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced both the accused for the offences under section 302 and 436 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. On appeal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh set aside the conviction and sentence of one of them and acquitted him of both the offences under section 302 and 436 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. The conviction and sentence of the second accused for the offences under section 302 and 436, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code was maintained. Question arose before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction of the second accused under the two charges could be sustained in view of the acquittal of the other accused by the High Court. The conviction and sentence of the second accused for the offences under section 302 and 436, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code was maintained. Question arose before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction of the second accused under the two charges could be sustained in view of the acquittal of the other accused by the High Court. It was held:- "There is another aspect of the matter which has also escaped the notice of the High Court when it sustained the conviction of the appellant under section 302 read with section 34 and section 436 read with section 34, I.P.C. While acquitting the accused Gokul of those charges. Though the accused Gokul and the appellant were individually charged under sections 302 and 436, I.P.C. they were convicted only under the alternative charges under section 302 read with section 34 and section 436 read with Section 34, I.P.C. by the Sessions Judge. Consequently, the appellants convictions can be sustained only if the High Court had sustained the convictions awarded to accused Gokul also. Inasmuch as the High Court has given the benefit of doubt to accused Gokul and acquitted, if follows that the appellants convictions for the two substantive offences read with section 34, I.P.C. cannot be sustained because this is case where the coaccused is a named person and he has been acquitted and by reason of it the appellant cannot be held to have acted conjointly with anyone in the commission of the offences. This position of law is well settled by this court and we may only refer to a few decisions in this behalf vide a Prabhu Babaji v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 51; Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra 1964 (1) SCR 678: AIR 1963 SC 1413 and Baul v. State of U.P. 1968 (2) SCR 450 : AIR 1968 SC 728." 15. In the present case, the accused has not been convicted constructively under section 34, Indian Penal Code for the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code. Rather he has been convicted for the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code. 16. The question whcih, therefore, arises is whether the accused, who was not charged for the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code, could be convicted of the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code? Rather he has been convicted for the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code. 16. The question whcih, therefore, arises is whether the accused, who was not charged for the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code, could be convicted of the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code? The answer to the question is to be found in Subran alias Subramanian & Ors. v. State of Kerala, 1993 Cri. L.J. 1387. 17. In the said case the occurrence took place on 24.12.1986 in which one Suku succumbed to the injuries as a result of the assault. Six persons were arrayed as accused for the offences under section 302,324,323,241, 148 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code. Upon having been put a trial, the trial court found accused No. 1 (Subran) guilty of the offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. The other five accused were found guilty of the offence under section 326 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code and each one of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. In appeal, the High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of four accused including that of accused No. 1 and acquitted two accused. On further appeal before the Supreme Court, it was held that the conviction of accused No. 1 for the substantive offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code in the absence of a specific charge, was bad. It was observed:- "Since, appellant No.l Subran had not been charged for the substantive offence of murder under section 302, IPC, even the trial court, which tried the six accused persons, was not justified in recording a conviction against him for the substantive offence of murder punishable under section 302, IPC after framing a charge against him for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC only. A person charged for an offence under section 302, IPC read with Section 149 cannot be convicted of the substantive offence under Section 302, IPC without a specific charge having been framed against him as envisaged by law. Conviction for the substantive offence in such a case is unjustified because an accused might be misled in his defence by the absence of the charge for the substantive offence under Section 302 IPC. Conviction for the substantive offence in such a case is unjustified because an accused might be misled in his defence by the absence of the charge for the substantive offence under Section 302 IPC. Appellant No. 1, Subran, was never called upon to meet a charge under section 302, IPC smpliciter and, therefore, in defending himself, he cannot be said to have been called upon to meet that charge and he could very well have considered it unnecessary to concentrate on that part of the prosecution case during the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, the conviction of the first appellant for an offence under Section 302 was not permissible." 18. The Supreme Court while acquitting accused No.l (Subran) of the offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, on the basis of evidence coming on record instead convicted and sentenced him for the offence under Section 304 (I), Indian Penal Code. 19. Following the above ratio, it can be safely held in the present case that since the accused was never charged for the substantive offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code, he could not have been convicted for such offence. His conviction for such offence is unwarranted and cannot be sustained. 20. The next question which arises for determination is as to what offence, if any, has been committed by the accused? 21. According to the medical evidence two incised wounds having been caused with a sharp edged weapon, that is, knife Ex.P-1 was proved on the person of the injured PW 2 Piar chand. Both the injuries are simple in nature though PW 1 Dr. Karan Sharma has opined to be dangerous to life due to two gastrict perforation suffered by the injured. The opinion of PW 1 is based on the discharge summary of the treatment received by the injured at Chandigarh Hospital. The doctor who treated the injured PW 2 Piar Chand at Chandigarh was never examined to show whether the injuries were grievous. Nor the discharge summary has been proved in evidence. In the absence of anything to the contrary the injuries found on the person of PW. 2 Piar Chand Singh will have to be treated as of simple nature. 22. PW 2 Piar Chand has categorically stated that the injuries were inflicted on his person by the accused. Nor the discharge summary has been proved in evidence. In the absence of anything to the contrary the injuries found on the person of PW. 2 Piar Chand Singh will have to be treated as of simple nature. 22. PW 2 Piar Chand has categorically stated that the injuries were inflicted on his person by the accused. Nothing could be elicited in his cross examination to show that he was suppressing the truth. The accused was known to PW 2 since childhood. There was no question of wrong identification of the assailant. 23. The accused has tried to make out a defence of false implication due to political enmity. It was suggested to PW 2 that the accused was got falsely implicated at the instance of Kanwar Dugra Chand, M.L.A. Though PW 3 Sukh Ram the father of the injured PW 2 Piar Chand has admitted that he is a supporter of the said M.L.A., there is nothing on the record to show either that PW 2 is also a supporter of such M.L.A. or that the said M.L.A. is in any manner inimical towards the accused. 24. The weapon of offence, namely, knife Ex .P 1 was also recovered from the house of the accused at his instance in pursuance of the disclosure statement Ex. PW 9/A made by him in the presence of PW 9 Onkar Chand and PW. 14 Amarjeet. The disclosure statement was recorded and recovery of knife Ex. P 1 in pursuance thereto was made by PW 18 Inspector Kishan chand. The evidence of PW 9 Onkar Chand, PW 14 Amarjeet and PW 18 Inspector kishan chand as to the making of disclosure statement Ex. PW 9/A by the accused and recovery of knife Ex .PI in pursuance thereto has remained unimpeached. The learned trial court, therefore, has rightly placed reliance thereon. 25. Much stress was laid on the fact that the knife Ex.Pl was never sent for chemical examination to find out the blood stains, if any, thereon. It was contended by the learned counsel for the accused that failure to send the knife Ex.Pl for chemical examination casts a shadow of doubt on the prosecution story and the only inference is that knife Ex.Pl is not the weapon of offence. 26. Admitteldly, knife Ex.Pl was never sent for chemical examination. It was contended by the learned counsel for the accused that failure to send the knife Ex.Pl for chemical examination casts a shadow of doubt on the prosecution story and the only inference is that knife Ex.Pl is not the weapon of offence. 26. Admitteldly, knife Ex.Pl was never sent for chemical examination. PW 18, the investigation Officer has offered explanation therefor by stating that at the time of the recovery of knife Ex.Pl no blood stains were found persisting thereon and that the recovery was effected long after the occurrence. 27. Even if it be assumed that knife Ex.pl is not the weapon of offence, the prosecution case cannot be thrown out simply on this account. The occular evidence coming on record proves beyond doubt that it was the accused who had caused injuries on the person of PW 2 Piar Chand. Such injuries are proved to have been caused by a sharp edged weapon. Therefore, the accused is proved to have committed the offence under Section 324, Indian Penal Code and he is liable to be convicted for such offence. 28. As a result, the present appeal is partly allowed. The accused is acquitted of the offence under Section 307, Indian Penal Code, and instead is convicted for the offence under Section 324, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for the period already spent by him in custody during the course of investigation and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/-. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Out of the amount of fine, if realised, a sum of Rs.3000/- shall be paid to PW 2 Piar Chand as compensation. The accused shall deposit the amount of fine with the learned trial court within four weeks from today failing which the learned trial court will precede against him in accordance with law.