JUDGMENT - R.K. BATTA, J.:---The appellants have preferred these appeals under section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called as "the said Act") since objections raised by the appellants against the award were rejected and the award was made rule of the Court. 2.In both these appeals, preliminary objection has been raised by learned Advocates for the respondents that the appeals do not lie before the Division Bench since the appellants challenge the order passed overruling the objections filed by them and refusing to set aside the Award. In Arbitration Appeal 2/93, the value for the purpose of jurisdiction is Rs. 2,00,000/- approximately and in Arbitration Appeal 3/99, the value for the purpose of jurisdiction is stated to be Rs. 5,58,532/-. Learned Advocates for the respondents have contended that the impugned order do not have force of a decree and, as such, the appeal lies before the Single Judge in terms of Rule 2(1)(a)(v) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (hereinafter called as "the said Rules"). 3.Learned Advocate Shri A.P. Lawande, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 in Arbitration Appeal No. 2/93, has urged that in case of a Decree which follows judgment in terms of award under section 17 of the said Act, the appeal would lie to the Single Judge or the Division Bench, depending upon its valuation in terms of Rule 2(I)(a)(i) of the said Rules. Nevertheless, an appeal under section 39 of the said Act, would lie before the Single Judge in terms of Rule 2(I)(a)(v) of the said Rules as orders referred to under section 39 do not have force of a decree. Learned Advocate Shri V.K. Bodke, appearing on behalf of the respondent in Arbitration Appeal 3/99 has advanced similar arguments before us. 4.Learned Senior Advocate Shri S.G. Dessai, appearing in Arbitration Appeal No. 2/93, on behalf of the appellants has argued that what is material for decision is whether the order, in question, is an interlocutory order or a final order. In case of an interlocutory order, irrespective of valuation of the subject matter, the appeal would lie to the Single Judge. Nevertheless, in respect of an order referred to in section 39 of the said Act, if there is final disposal, then the matter would lie before the Division Bench or Single Judge depending upon valuation of the subject matter. In case of an interlocutory order, irrespective of valuation of the subject matter, the appeal would lie to the Single Judge. Nevertheless, in respect of an order referred to in section 39 of the said Act, if there is final disposal, then the matter would lie before the Division Bench or Single Judge depending upon valuation of the subject matter. However, if an order under section 39(vi) is passed on the grounds raised under section 30 of the said Act, then whether the objection is rejected or accepted, the decree has to follow and such an order shall be appealable as if it has the force of a decree. It has been urged that the Apex Court in (The Union of India v. The Mohindra Supply Co.)1, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 256, has laid down that second appeal is barred under section 39 of the said Act and as such, the Letters Patent Appeal Rules, so far as they deal with the appeals against the orders passed in arbitration proceedings, must be read subject to the provisions of section 39(1) and (2) of the said Act and the right of appeal has to be exercised against orders in the arbitration proceedings only under section 39 and no appeal (except to the Supreme Court) will lie from an appellate order. According to the learned Senior Counsel since the valuation of Appeal in Arbitration Appeal No. 2/93 is more than one lakh, the appeal is to be heard and decided by the Division Bench. 5.Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant in Arbitration Appeal No. 3/99, has urged that in this appeal, there is no dispute that the appeal lies to the High Court and there is also no dispute that the appeal is not against decree. According to the learned Advocate General, Rule 2(I)(a)(i) deals with appeals from original decrees and in such cases, the valuation of the appeal would govern as to whether the appeal has to be heard by Single Judge or the Division Bench. According to the learned Advocate General, Rule 2(I)(a)(i) deals with appeals from original decrees and in such cases, the valuation of the appeal would govern as to whether the appeal has to be heard by Single Judge or the Division Bench. He then pointed out that in terms of section 106 of the Civil Procedure Code, which deals with the courts which have to hear appeals from orders, it lays down that where an appeal from any order is allowed, it shall lie to the Court to which an appeal would lie from the decree in suit in which such order was made, or where such order is made by a Court (not being a High Court) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, then to the High Court. He then argued that section 39 of the said Act deals with appealable orders and it lays down that an appeal shall lie from the orders enumerated thereunder, under the said Act (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order. He emphasized that the expression "Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order" has to be given due meaning and the same will have to be interpreted in the light of the said Rules. Relying upon (M/s. Powar and Powar and others v. C.B.C.I. Society for Medical Education)2, A.I.R. 1983 Karnataka 77, it was urged that section 39 of the said Act which is an Act of Parliament shall govern the forum where the appeal shall lie. This forum has been provided under section 39 of the said Act itself, as the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order is, according to learned Advocate General empowered to hear appeals from original decree as provided under Rule 2(I)(a) of the said Rules, depending upon valuation of the appeal. Learned Advocate, General, therefore, contends that the appeal shall lie before the Division Bench and the preliminary objection raised by the respondents cannot be sustained. 6.There is no dispute on the question that the appeals, in question, filed under section 39 of the said Act would lie before the High Court, but the most point of dispute is whether the appeals, in question, would lie before the Single Judge or the Division Bench. 6.There is no dispute on the question that the appeals, in question, filed under section 39 of the said Act would lie before the High Court, but the most point of dispute is whether the appeals, in question, would lie before the Single Judge or the Division Bench. The appeals, admittedly, have been filed under section 39(1)(vi) of the said Act. It deals with appealable orders. By impugned orders in both the appeals under consideration the objections filed by the appellants to set aside the awards were rejected. These orders are challenged in appeal. There is no doubt that once objections are rejected, the Court has to proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award and upon the judgment so pronounced, a decree follows in terms of section 17 of the said Act. No appeal lies from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of or not otherwise in accordance with the award. Nevertheless, section 39 of the said Act permits appeals against orders referred to thereunder including an order refusing to set aside award. Such order by itself does not have the force of decree. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that the impugned orders do not have the force of decree. Therefore, if Rule 2(I)(a)(v) alone is applied appeal would lie before Single Judge. However, we have to examine the matter with reference to section 39 of the said Act under which the said appeals in question have been filed for the purpose of decision on the preliminary objections raised by the respondents. Section 39 of the said Act, reads as under :--- "39. Appealable orders.---(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order : An order --- (i) superseding an arbitration ; (ii) on an award stated in the form of special case ; (iii) modifying or correcting an award ; (iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement ; (v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement ; (vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award ; Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Cause Court. (2) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court". Rule 2(I)(a) of the said Rules, reads as under : "2. Matters disposed of by a Single Judge. Save as otherwise expressly provided by these Rules, a Single Judge may dispose of the following matters :- I. Civil --- (a) Appeals.---(i) from original decree in suits or from adjudication in other proceedings from which appeals lie to the High Court as from original decrees, whether under the Civil Procedure Code or under any local or special Act, wherein the value of the subject-matter in dispute in the Court or before the Tribunal of the first instance does not exceed (one lakh) rupees and where in the value of the subject matter still in dispute on appeal is (one lakh) rupees or less : provided, however, that the expression, 'the value of the subject matter still in dispute on appeal' appearing in this sub-clause shall be construed to mean where there is an appeal as well as a cross-appeal or cross-appeals or cross-objections, the total of the values of the subject matters in dispute in the appeal as well as the cross-appeal or the cross appeals or the cross-objections; (ii) from appellate decrees in suits or from adjudications in other proceedings from which appeals lie to the High Court as from appellate decrees, whether under the Civil Procedure Code or under any local or special Act ; (iii) from decrees under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (iv) from orders under section 104 or Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and (v) from orders under local or special Acts not having the force of a decree." 7.On the scope and ambit of section 39 of the said Act, reliance has been placed by learned Advocate General on M/s. Powar and Powar and others v. C.B.C.I. Society for Medical Education (supra) and as such, in order to appreciate the submissions made by learned Advocate General, it will be necessary to refer to the said authority of the Karnataka High Court. However, before we do so, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (Balde Pentaiah v. Balaganti Mallaiah)3, A.I.R. 1968 Andhra Pradesh 228. However, before we do so, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (Balde Pentaiah v. Balaganti Mallaiah)3, A.I.R. 1968 Andhra Pradesh 228. 8.In Balde Pentaiah v. Balaganti Mallaiah (supra), the proceedings in which order was passed setting aside the award, were initiated for the first time in second appeal and the question which arose before the High Court was whether an appeal would lie under section 39(1) of the said Act. The appellant thereunder filed an appeal to the Division Bench under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order of the Single Judge, but no leave as required by Clause 15, was obtained. Therefore, the question which arose was whether the appeal was maintainable. In this context, it was laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that not only the Arbitration Act gives an unqualified right of first appeal against the orders mentioned in section 39 of the said Act, but section 39 has also prescribed forum before which the appeal would lie and the forum being "an appeal shall lie to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order". In this connection, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, after placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Union of India v. The Mohindra Supply Co. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 256 wherein it was ruled that Letters Patent Rules, so far as they deal with the appeals, passed against orders in arbitration proceedings must be read subject to provisions of section 39(1) and (2) of the said Act, has laid down in paras (2) and (3), as under: "...... It is thus clear that the Arbitration Act gives an unqualified right of first appeal against the order like the one in question. It has besides fixed the forum to which the appeal may lie. It says "an appeal shall lie to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order". Obviously, it has laid down the test in general terms for easy and ready applications to large variety of cases removing scope for confusion or mistake at all events. It says "an appeal shall lie to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order". Obviously, it has laid down the test in general terms for easy and ready applications to large variety of cases removing scope for confusion or mistake at all events. It is manifest that if an original decree were passed by a Single Judge of this Court, the appeal will lie to a Division Bench of this Court, that being the forum fixed under the Letters Patent. So then, according to the above test if the party is aggrieved by an appellate order made under the Arbitration Act by a Single Judge of this Court he may appeal to the Divisional Bench of this Court which is the proper forum to hear that appeal. Section 39(1) be it remembered gives an absolute right of appeal. It is neither qualified by any condition, nor circumscribed by any limitation whatsoever. Of course, so far as right of second appeal is concerned, no right as such has been given except the right to appeal to the Supreme Court subject to the limitations provided under the constitution. Mr. Venguganti Madhavarao the learned Counsel for the respondents contends that since the order was passed in C.M.Ps. in the second appeal and no leave was obtained, the appeal is barred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. This argument fails to take into consideration that though the petition filed is styled as C.M.P. it is in substance an O.P. presented on a Court fee stamped paper of Rs. 100. It also ignores the fact that the Indian Arbitration Act (Act 10 of 1940) gives a right of appeal unqualified and absolute against the order of the kind passed in such proceedings. It must admit of the controversy that the impugned order was made in a proceeding started under the Arbitration Act, though it may be in the course of the second appeal. If the Arbitration Act was not thus attracted of course the qualification for right to appeal imposed by the Letters Patent must needs have been satisfied. But that is not the case here. The right of appeal conferred by section 39 of the Arbitrator Act cannot therefore be defeated for want of leave contemplated by the Letters Patent Rules. If the Arbitration Act was not thus attracted of course the qualification for right to appeal imposed by the Letters Patent must needs have been satisfied. But that is not the case here. The right of appeal conferred by section 39 of the Arbitrator Act cannot therefore be defeated for want of leave contemplated by the Letters Patent Rules. It has been definitely laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co., 1962(2) S.C.J. 179 that L.P.A. Rules so far as they deal with the appeals passed against orders in arbitration proceedings must be read subject to the provisions of section 39(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act. The right of appeal therefore must be exercisable shorn of all limitations of the Letters Patent Rules, as the said rules should guide us only in so far as fixation of forum is concerned for purposes of section 39(1) of the Indian Arbitration Act. (3) ...... The result of the above discussion is : that section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act has not only given a right of appeal which is unqualified, but has also fixed the forum by laying down a test, the test being that it should be the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order. So then if a Single Judge of this Court were to pass an original decree and the appeal therefrom lies to a Division Bench under the Letters Patent which have all the force of law, the Court authorised to hear the appeal from the appealable order under the Arbitration Act would be a Division Bench of this Court. When a forum is thus provided the question whether this Court for the time being is exercising its original jurisdiction or not is of little consequence. Section 39 is concerned with the forum authorised by law and does not impose any further limitations. The forum authorised by law being determined, no further question would arise and the appeal would be preferred in that forum in relation to the appealable order. The right of appeal being a creature of special enactment one has to look only to the enactment for the extent and manner in which it is to be exercised. The order under appeal is made under the provisions of the Arbitration Act and is appealable under the said Act. The right of appeal being a creature of special enactment one has to look only to the enactment for the extent and manner in which it is to be exercised. The order under appeal is made under the provisions of the Arbitration Act and is appealable under the said Act. Being a special enactment passed by the Central Legislature, it must prevail over the other Acts in cases of inconsistency. As a matter of fact, as already noticed, the Supreme Court has said that the Letters Patent Rules are subject to the provisions of section 39(1) and (2). That being the case, the argument that since no leave is obtained no appeal will lie is wholly untenable. Besides, when the letters patent have fixed the forum in relation to the orders passed by a Single Judge that forum must be the Appellate Court authorised by law for purposes of section 39(1). The appeal as filed therefore does not suffer from any infirmity as to its maintainability. The objection taken is overruled. The appeal is hereby admitted. KSB. Objection overruled and appeal admitted". 9.Coming to the ruling of the Karnataka High Court in M/s. Powar and others v. C.B.C.I. Society for Medical Education (supra), the appeal under section 39(1)(v) had been preferred since the principal Civil Judge had rejected the plea for stay of the proceedings in the suit. Learned Advocate for the respondent in the said appeal had contended that the appeal would lie before the Single Judge and not before the Division Bench. On the other hand, learned Advocate for the appellants, has urged that having regard to the peculiar wording of section 39(1) of the said Act, the appeal lies only to a Division Bench which is competent to hear appeals from original decrees passed by the Civil Judges in a suit in which the value excised Rs. 20,000/-. There was no dispute that power to institute an appeal is provided for in section 39(1)(v) of the said Act. Therefore, there could not be any doubt that the appeal would lie to the High Court, but the question was whether it lies before the Single Judge or Division Bench. Learned Judges of the Karnataka High Court had taken into consideration the provisions of sections 5, 9(xi) and section 10(v) of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. Therefore, there could not be any doubt that the appeal would lie to the High Court, but the question was whether it lies before the Single Judge or Division Bench. Learned Judges of the Karnataka High Court had taken into consideration the provisions of sections 5, 9(xi) and section 10(v) of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. Section 5(i) of the Karnataka High Court Act, lays down that save as otherwise provided in the Act, all first appeals against a decree or order passed in a suit or other proceedings, the value of subject matter of which is Rupees 20,000/- or more shall be heard by a Bench consisting of not less than two Judges of the High Court and other first appeal shall be heard by Single Judge of the High Court. Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 deals with other powers of Single Judge and sub-section (xi) speaks of appeals from interlocutory orders, where such appeals are allowed by law, which lie before the Single Judge. Section 10 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 deals with other powers of a Bench of two Judges and as per sub-section (v) all other matters not expressly provided for in the Act or any other law for the time being in force, shall lie before the High Court. It was urged by learned Advocate for respondent therein that an order passed under section 34(v) partakes the nature of an inter locutory order and since an appeal is provided against such order in terms of section 9(xi) of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, the appeal has to be heard by Single Judge and not by Division Bench. The submission of the learned Advocate for the respondent was not accepted by the Karnataka High Court and it was laid down: "15. As quoted above, section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act states that an appeal shall lie from an order passed under section 34 of the said Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order. 16. As quoted above, section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act states that an appeal shall lie from an order passed under section 34 of the said Act to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order. 16. Thus, the legislature, though it was well aware of the fact that an order contemplated under section 34 of the Arbitration Act was in the nature of an interlocutory order, while providing for the forum, has clarified in its wisdom that an appeal shall lie to that Court which hears appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order. The legislature does not use its words without any purpose. Every word used in the section is to be given its importance. When, therefore, it is specifically stated that the appeal shall lie to that Court which hears the appeals from original decree of the Court passing the order, it cannot be stretched to mean that an appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order passed by the Court. That would amount to unwarranted alteration in the section. 17. If we were to follow the interpretation advanced before us by Shri Sundaraswamy, it would mean that the Court which is competent to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order would also be competent to hear the present appeal though the section provides specifically that the Court competent to hear the appeal is that which is competent to hear appeal from original decree of the Court passing the order, whether the impugned order is interlocutory or final. 18. We have pointed out above that the Court which is competent to entertain and hear appeals from original decrees passed by a Civil Court, if the value of the subject matter is more than Rupees 20,000/-, as rightly pointed out by Shri Sundaraswamy, is the High Court. We have to necessarily look to the Karnataka High Court Act for forum constituted for hearing different matters and, here section 5 read with section 10(v) of the said Act makes it clear that an appeal to the High Court from the original decree of a Civil Court, with which we are concerned in this case, the subject matter of which is more than Rs. 20,000/-, shall be heard by a Division Bench. 20,000/-, shall be heard by a Division Bench. Therefore, the forum that is contemplated under section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act is not merely the High Court, but a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of two Judges, as provided under section 5 read with section 10(v) of the Karnataka High Court Act, that is competent to hear an appeal from original decree passed by a Civil Court in which the value of the subject matter exceeds Rs. 20,000/-. 19. It is for that reason that we hold that the appeal is competent only before a Division Bench of the High Court and that it cannot be heard by Single Judge of the High Court. 20. That being so, we hold that there is no substance in the preliminary objection raised before us and we reject the same. Order accordingly." 10.Section 39 of the said Act, in no uncertain terms lays down the forum before which the appeal shall lie from the orders specified in Clauses (i) to (vi) of sub-section (1), passed under the said Act and the forum is the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order. Therefore, we have to see which is the forum prescribed under the said Rules before whom appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order would lie. Rule 2(I)(a) of the said rules, (as applicable when appeals were filed since during the pendency of appeals, the valuation in the Rule has been enhanced to Rs. 10 lakhs), lays down that save as otherwise expressly provided by these Rules, a Single Judge may dispose of civil appeals from original decree in suits or from adjudication in other proceedings from which appeals lie to the High Court as from appellate decree whether under the Civil Procedure Code or under any local or special Act wherein the value of the subject matter in dispute in the Court or before the Tribunal of the first instance does not exceed one lakh rupees and wherein the value of the subject matters till in dispute in appeals, is one lakh or less. In Rules 2(I)(a)(i) of the said Rules, the word "Rs. 10 lakhs" have been substituted for the existing words "one lakh". In Rules 2(I)(a)(i) of the said Rules, the word "Rs. 10 lakhs" have been substituted for the existing words "one lakh". This means that the matters falling under Rule 2(I)(a)(i) where the value does not exceed ten lakhs rupees are to be disposed of by a Single Judge. The amendment shall apply to pending appeals also. Admittedly, there is no dispute in this respect that appeals arising out of section 17 of the said Act from original decrees would lie before Bench, whether of Single Judge or Division Bench, depending upon the valuation. In view of the same and since section 39(1) of the said Act lays down that an appeal shall lie from the orders under Clauses (i) to (vi) passed under the said Act to the Court which is authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, the said Court shall be the forum for hearing such appeals. The said forum, as per amended Rule 2(I)(a)(i) of the said Rules, would be the Single Judge or Division Bench depending upon whether the valuation is 10 lakh rupees or above. As we have already pointed out above, the amendment shall apply to the pending cases also. Therefore, even according to the arguments advanced by learned Advocates for the appellants, the forum having jurisdiction shall be Single Judge in view of the amendment whereby valuation has been raised to Rs. 10 lakhs and where the amendment is applicable to pending appeals also. In this context therefore, Rule 2(I)(a)(v) will have to be read subject to the provisions of section 39 of the said Act, read with Rule 2(I)(a)(v) of the said Rules in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in The Union of India v. The Mohindra Supply Co. (supra). 11.For the aforesaid reasons, the appeals, in question, would lie before the Single Judge. (Per KHANDEPARKAR, J.) 12.I am in respectful agreement with the decision of my learned brother that the appeals, in question, are to be heard by a Single Judge of this Court, however, for distinct reasons hereinbelow specified. 13.At the cost of repeatation, it would be necessary to note that undisputed facts in the matter. The appeals, in question are against the order passed by the Lower Courts, rejecting the objections filed by the appellants for setting aside the awards passed by the arbitrators. 13.At the cost of repeatation, it would be necessary to note that undisputed facts in the matter. The appeals, in question are against the order passed by the Lower Courts, rejecting the objections filed by the appellants for setting aside the awards passed by the arbitrators. The value of the subject matter of the appeal under Arbitration Act No. 2/93 is Rs. 2,00,000/- ; whereas the value of the subject matter of the appeal under Arbitration Act No. 3/99 is Rs. 5,58,532/-. The impugned order in Appeal No. 2/93 has been passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division; whereas the impugned order in Appeal No. 3/99 has been passed by the Additional District Judge. Both the appeals are filed under section 39(1)(vi) of Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called as "the said Act"). 14.The preliminary objection sought to be raised by the Advocates for the respondents is that the appeal is required to be heard by the Single Judge and not by the Division Bench. 15.It is first necessary to ascertain the provisions of law relevant for the decision. Undisputedly, the appeals are filed under section 39(1)(vi) of the said Act. The said section has already been reproduced hereinabove. A perusal thereof shows that the appeal under the said section lies from the orders passed under the said Act to a Court which is authorised by law to hear appeal from original decree of the Court passing such order. In other words, the forum for appeal would depend upon the Court which passes the order. It would mean that if, under the provisions of law in force the appeal lay to the District Court from the order passed by the lower Court, then the order passed by such lower Court under the said Act would be appealable under section 39 of the said Act to the District Court. Similarly, if the order passed by the lower Court is generally appealable to the High Court, then the order passed under the said Act would be appealable under section 39 of the said Act to the High Court. Similarly, if the order passed by the lower Court is generally appealable to the High Court, then the order passed under the said Act would be appealable under section 39 of the said Act to the High Court. This apparently shows that in order to find out the forum for an appeal under section 39 of the said Act against an order passed under the said Act, it is necessary to ascertain the provisions of law regarding the forum of appeal against the order of the Court that has passed the order under appeal and for that purpose, naturally, in the State of Goa, we will have to refer to the provisions in Goa, Daman and Diu Civil Courts Act, 1965 (hereinafter called as 'the Civil Courts Act"). 16.The Civil Courts Act provides for constitution and organisation of District Courts and subordinate Civil Courts in the State of Goa. When the Civil Courts Act came into force, there was only one District in Goa, which was subsequently divided into two Districts with effect from 15-8-1987. In terms of section 5 of the Civil Courts Act, the District Court is the principal Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction in the District, within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other law for the time being in force. In terms of section 6 of the Civil Courts Act, save or otherwise expressly provided in the Civil Courts Act, the District Court is the Court of appeal from all decrees and orders passed by the subordinate courts from which an appeal lies under any law for the time being in force. Section 15 of the Civil Courts Act provides that there shall be so many Civil Courts subordinate to the District Court as the Government may from time to time direct. The local limits of jurisdiction of Civil Judges relate to the Taluka in which the Civil Judges function. Section 20 of the Civil Courts Act provides for classes of Civil Judges and their jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Civil Judges shall be of two classes, namely Senior Civil Judges and Junior Civil Judges. The local limits of jurisdiction of Civil Judges relate to the Taluka in which the Civil Judges function. Section 20 of the Civil Courts Act provides for classes of Civil Judges and their jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Civil Judges shall be of two classes, namely Senior Civil Judges and Junior Civil Judges. The jurisdiction of Senior Civil Judges extends to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature ; whereas the jurisdiction of Junior Civil Judges extends to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature wherein the subject matter does not exceed in amount or value one lakh rupees. In terms of section 22 of the Civil Courts Act, in all suits decided by a Civil Judge of which the amount or value of the subject matters exceeds Rs. 1.00 lakhs, the appeal from his decision lies direct to the High Court. At the time when the dispute arose between the Government and the respondents in Arbitration Appeal No. 3/99 and the arbitrator was appointed pursuant to an application under section 20 of the said Act, the jurisdiction to deal with the civil suits in which the Government was a party, was with the District Court in terms of the provisions contained in section 26 of the Civil Courts Act, which was subsequently amended and the jurisdiction now vests in the Civil Judges to deal with all civil matters, irrespective of the fact that the Government is a party to such proceedings. 17.If the amount or the value of the subject matter in a suit exceeds Rs. 1.00 lakh, then the appeal would necessarily lie to the High Court irrespective of the fact whether the order is passed by Senior Civil Judge, or the District Judge. This is evident from sections 5, 20(2) and 22 of the Civil Courts Act, which read as under :--- "5. Original jurisdiction of District Court.---The District Court shall be the principal Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction in the district within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or any other law for the time being in force. 20. Classes of Civil Judges and their jurisdiction.--- (2) The jurisdiction of a Senior Civil Judge extends to all original suits and proceedings of a Civil nature. 22. 20. Classes of Civil Judges and their jurisdiction.--- (2) The jurisdiction of a Senior Civil Judge extends to all original suits and proceedings of a Civil nature. 22. Appeals from his decision.---In all suits decided by a Civil Judge of which the amount or value of the subject matters exceeds one lakh rupees the appeal from his decision shall be direct to the High Court". 18.From the above referred sections of the Civil Courts Act along with section 39 of the said Act, therefore, it would be clear that if the order is passed by a Senior Civil Judge, the appeal against the same may not necessarily lie to the High Court, but it can also lie to the District Court, depending upon the value of the subject matter. Section 20(2) of the Civil Courts Act clearly empowers Senior Civil Judge to deal with all original suits and proceedings of Civil nature, irrespective of the value of the subject matter. In other words, a Senior Civil Judge is empowered to hear and decide all original suits and proceedings of civil nature wherein the value of the subject matter is not only above one lakh rupees, but also below Rs. 1.00 lakh. Restriction not to hear and decide the matter wherein the value of the subject matter exceeds Rs. 1.00 lakh is only upon the Junior Civil Judges. This will show that merely because the order is passed by the Senior Civil Judge, the appeal cannot be said to lie before the High Court. In order that the appeal should lie before the High Court, the value of the subject matter has necessarily to be above Rs. 1.00 lakh. There can be no dispute that as far as order passed by the District or Addl. District Court is concerned, the appeal against the same has necessarily to lie before the High Court. 19.Much stress was laid upon the provisions contained in the said Rules to show that the appeal under section 39 of the said Act is to be heard by the Division Bench. Apparently, there is a confusion in the minds of the appellants regarding forum for filing appeal against the orders passed by the lower Courts under the said Act and the jurisdiction of Division Bench and Single Judge of our High Court to hear and dispose of the appeals filed in the High Court. Apparently, there is a confusion in the minds of the appellants regarding forum for filing appeal against the orders passed by the lower Courts under the said Act and the jurisdiction of Division Bench and Single Judge of our High Court to hear and dispose of the appeals filed in the High Court. The forum for filing the appeal is sought to be confused with the jurisdiction of Judges of the High Court to hear and dispose of the appeals filed in the High Court. If one peruses section 39 of the said Act, it nowhere deals with the subject of the jurisdiction of the Judges of the High Court to hear the appeals. In fact, it does not speak about the hearing and disposal of the appeal; but it only speaks about the forum where an appeal would lie. The expression in the said section is "an appeal shall lie" and not "appeal shall be heard". Though this difference apparently may appear to be of little significance, on proper application of mind would show that it is very much relevant and material. 20.The Apex Court in (National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd., Chidambaram v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd)4, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 357 while dealing with a matter pertaining to Letters Patent Appeal arising out of a decision given by a Single Judge of the High Court in an appeal preferred under section 76 of Trade Marks Act, held thus:--- "...Ordinarily after an appeal reaches the High Court, it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect of the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. Thus, section 76, Trade Marks Act, confers a right of appeal to the High Court and says nothing more about it. That being so, the High Court being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by section 76 it has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction is exercised by a single Judge, his judgment becomes subject to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act. The power that is conferred on the High court by section 108, Government of India Act, 1915, still subsists, and it has not been affected in any manner whatever either by the Government of India Act, 1935 or by the Constitution of India. On the other hand it has been kept alive and reaffirmed with great vigour by these statutes. The High Courts still enjoy the same unfettered power as they enjoyed under section 108, Government of India Act, 1915 of making rules and providing whether an appeal has to be heard by one Judge or more Judges or by Division Courts consisting of two or more Judges of the High Court. Further the reference in Clause 15 to section 108 should be read as a reference to the corresponding provisions of the 1953 Act and the Constitution." 21.A Division Bench of this Court in (Salubai Ramchandra v. Chandu Sadhu and others)5, 1965 Mh.L.J. 203 held that the High Court has unrestricted and unfettered powers to make its own rules for the exercise for its various jurisdiction, the only limitation being that the rules will be subject to the provisions of the constitution and to any law made by the State Legislature. Rules made under the powers possessed by the High Court are rules of internal management within the High Court, and rules of procedure relating to the disposal of the matters which reach the High Court under its several jurisdictions. These rules have not the effect of creating any vested rights in the litigant when they direct that certain matters should be decided by a Division Bench or a Single Judge. The litigant is not entitled to complaint that the Rules once made should not be changed. The source of the power of the High Court to make Rules is the provisions of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, section 13, Clauses 36 and 37 of the Letters Patent, section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The source of the power of the High Court to make Rules is the provisions of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, section 13, Clauses 36 and 37 of the Letters Patent, section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 225 of the Constitution of India. 22.Similarly, 5 Judges Bench of this Court in the matter of (State of Maharashtra v. Kusum WD/O. Charudutta and others)6, 1981 Mh.L.J. 93, held that the power of the High Court to frame rules for the sittings of the Court and to regulate in what manner and by what Judges any matter or matters should be heard has been kept alive by Article 225 of the Constitution of India and this power had been reaffirmed with greater vigour by section 108 Government of India Act 1915, section 223 Government of India Act, 1935 and by Article 225 of the Constitution. As mentioned in section 13 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 this is a power to be exercised in such manner as may appear to such Court to be convenient for the due administration of justice. It further held that the Letters Patent would be "existing law" within the meaning Clause (10) of Article 366, and under Article 372 the Letters Patent would continue in force unless altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. 23.Recently the Apex Court in (Vinita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai and others)7, 1998(4) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)321 : 1998(1) S.C.C. 500 , held thus:--- "3. Now it is well settled that any statutory provision barring an appeal or revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High Court. Even the power flowing from the paramount character under which the High Court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned expressly excludes appeals under letters patent. No such bar is discernible from section 6(3) of the Act. It could not be seriously contended by learned Counsel for the respondents that if Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is invoked then the order would be appealable. No such bar is discernible from section 6(3) of the Act. It could not be seriously contended by learned Counsel for the respondents that if Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is invoked then the order would be appealable. Consequently, in our view, on the clear language of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent which is applicable to Bombay High Court, the said appeal was maintainable as the order under appeal was passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court exercising original jurisdiction of the Court." 24.It is thus clear that the stage of "filing of appeal" cannot be confused with the stage of "hearing of appeal" and they are two different stages in an appeal process. The expression "filing of appeal" refers to the forum of the appeal i.e. where the appeal is to be filed. The question of hearing the appeal comes only after filing of the appeal. Considering the provisions contained in the said Rules, it is entirely within the domain of the High Court to decide whether the appeal should be heard by the Division Bench of the Court or by a Single Judge and the same is to be in accordance with the Rules framed in that regard by the High Court, and, therefore, an appeal filed before the High Court is to be heard and disposed of in terms of the provisions of the rules of the High Court irrespective of the forum being provided by any other special statute for "filing of the appeal". Merely because a statute provides that the forum for filing the appeal shall be the High Court, it does not ipso facto follow that the appeal has necessarily to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court. The argument that the appeal is to be heard by the Division Bench on account of the expression used in section 39 of the said Act to the effect that "the Court authorised by law to hear appeal from original decrees of the Court passing the order" is totally devoid of substance. As already seen above, a Senior Civil Judge is empowered to hear the suit of the value of Rs. 1.00 lakh and above as well as below Rs. 1.00 lakh. So merely because an order is passed by the Senior Civil Judge in a suit wherein the value of the subject matter is less than Rs. As already seen above, a Senior Civil Judge is empowered to hear the suit of the value of Rs. 1.00 lakh and above as well as below Rs. 1.00 lakh. So merely because an order is passed by the Senior Civil Judge in a suit wherein the value of the subject matter is less than Rs. 1.00 lakh, it would not lie before the High Court. It would lie before the High Court only when the value exceeds Rs. 1.00 lakh. 25.The Apex Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd., Chidambaram v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd., (supra) has clearly held that ordinarily after an appeal reached the High Court, it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that High Court and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter under which the Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect of the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. It has been held in no uncertain terms that the High Court still enjoys unfettered powers to make rules and provide whether an appeal has to be heard by one Judge or more Judges or Division Bench consisting of 2 or more Judges of the High Court. 26.Bearing in mind, therefore, the difference between the forum for filing of an appeal and the Bench which should hear the matter in the High Court, and considering the rules, particularly Rule 2(I)(a)(i), read with (vi), it is clear that the jurisdiction to hear the appeal would depend on the nature of the order passed by the lower Court and the value of the subject-matter of the dispute. If the order is in the form of a decree in the suit, wherein the value of the subject matter in dispute does not exceed Rs. 10.00 lakhs and where the value of the subject matter still in dispute in appeal is Rs. 10.00 lakhs or less, or where the order passed is not having a force of decree, then the appeals against such orders are necessarily to be heard by a Single Judge. Otherwise, the matter has to be placed before the Division Bench. 10.00 lakhs and where the value of the subject matter still in dispute in appeal is Rs. 10.00 lakhs or less, or where the order passed is not having a force of decree, then the appeals against such orders are necessarily to be heard by a Single Judge. Otherwise, the matter has to be placed before the Division Bench. It is the contention of learned Advocates for the respondents that the impugned orders are neither decrees in a suit, nor have a force of a decree in a suit, therefore, the appeals will have to be heard by a Single Judge. Their contention that the impugned orders are neither decrees, nor have a force of decree, is not disputed. Simultaneously, it is also an undisputed fact that the appeals are preferred under section 39(1)(vi) of the said Act. So, the appeals have necessarily to be hand by a Single Judge. 27.In my considered opinion, the reliance placed by learned Advocate in M/s. Powar and Powar and others v. C.B.C.I. Society for Medical Education (supra) and in the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of The Union of India v. The Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) is of no assistance in the case in hand. In M/s. Powar and Powar and others v. C.B.C.I. Society for Medical (supra), it has been held that the forum that is contemplated under section 39(1)(ii) of the Arbitration Act is not merely High Court, but a Division Bench of High Court consisting of two Judges as provided under section 5 read with section 10(v) of the Karnataka High Court Act since it is the Division Bench who is competent to hear the appeal from original decree passed by a Civil Judge when the value of subject matter exceeds Rs. 20,000/-. The decision of the Karnataka High Court clearly makes reference to certain provisions of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. Section 5 thereof provides that save as otherwise provided under the Act, all first appeals against a decree or order in a suit or other proceedings, the value of subject matter of which is rupees three lakhs or more shall be heard by a Bench consisting of not less than two Judges of the High Court and the other First Appeals shall be heard by a Single Judge of the High Court. Section 10(v) of the Act provides that the powers of the High Court in relation to all matters not expressly provided under the Act or any other law for the time being in force shall be exercised by a Bench of two Judges. It is pertinent to note that the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 is an Act dealing with the provisions for regulating the business and the exercise of powers of the High Court of the State of Karnataka in relation to administration of Justice and to provide for its jurisdiction. The said Act specifically provides that an appeal against a decree or order in a suit where the subject matter of which is Rs. 3.00 lakhs or more, the same is to be heard by a Bench of two Judges. It is to be noted that section 5 of the Act does not distinguish between an order simplicitor and an order having force of decree or decree itself. That is not the case with the said Rules. Besides, it is to be noted that the decision of the Karnataka High Court does not address itself to the differentiation between the forum of appeal for the purpose of filing the appeal and the jurisdiction of the Judges of the High Court for hearing the appeals filed in the High Court. 28.Similarly, the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Union of India v. The Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) is also of no assistance for deciding the point in issue. The said decision was on the point whether any appeal could lie to the Division Bench under the provisions of Letters Patent against a decision of a Single Judge passed in an appeal under section 39(1) of the said Act. The Apex Court, therein, has held that where a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court disposes an appeal under section 39(1) of the said Act, there is no further right of an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court against order of the Single Judge. It has been further held that the legislature has plainly expressed itself that the right of appeal against orders passed under the said Act may be exercised only in respect of certain orders and, therefore, the right to appeal against other orders is expressly taken away. It has been further held that the legislature has plainly expressed itself that the right of appeal against orders passed under the said Act may be exercised only in respect of certain orders and, therefore, the right to appeal against other orders is expressly taken away. It is further observed by the Apex Court that if by the express provision contained in section 39(1) a right to appeal from a judgment which may otherwise be available under the Letters Patent is restricted, there is no ground for holding that Clause (2) does not similarly restrict the exercise of appellate power granted by the Letters Patent and if the expression "second appeal" includes an appeal under the Letters Patent, it would be impossible to hold that notwithstanding the express prohibition, an appeal under the Letters Patent from an order passed in appeal under the sub-section (1), is competent. Apparently, therefore, the decision is totally on a different issue and does not throw any light on the point for consideration before this Court. 29.As far as decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the matter of Balde Pentaiah v. Balaganti Mallaiah (supra), it is seen that it only holds that section 39(1) of the said Act has not given a right to appeal which is unqualified, but has also fixed the forum by laying down the test and the test being that it should be the Court authorised by law to hear appeals form the original decrees of the Court passing orders. It has been further held that section 39 is concerned with the forum authorised by law and does not impose any further limitation and the forum authorised by law being determined, no further question would arise and the appeal would be preferred in that forum in relation to the appealable orders. The decision further holds that the Letters Patent have fixed the forum in relation to the orders passed by Single Judge that the forum must be the Appellate Court authorised by law for the purpose of section 39(1). Needless to say that the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Balde Pentaiah's case was dealing with a matter arising from the decision of a Single Judge passed in its original jurisdiction. Needless to say that the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Balde Pentaiah's case was dealing with a matter arising from the decision of a Single Judge passed in its original jurisdiction. In the said case, the arbitrator had passed an Award and it was remitted to the High Court and the appellant therein had raised an objection thereto and requested the Court to set aside the Award. The Single Judge of the said Court, after hearing the arguments refused to set aside the Award and directed that the decree be drawn in terms of the Award. At the time when the order was made, the appellant therein did not apply for leave to appeal presumably because he was under the impression that he had substantive right of appeal under the provisions of section 39(1) of the said Act and that being an arbitration proceeding though started in the course of second appeal. The Division Bench has in no uncertain terms, observed therein that the proceedings in which the order was passed refusing to set aside the award, were initiated for the first time in the second appeal and they were governed by the provisions of the Arbitration Act including section 39. In those circumstances, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had observed that considering the provisions in Letters Patent, fixing the forum of Division Bench as the appellate forum for the orders passed by Single Judge and considering the fact that the arbitration proceedings were initiated for the first time before the Single Judge, the order passed by the learned Single Judge refusing to set aside Award in the said arbitration proceedings, was appealable to the Division Bench, bearing in mind the provisions contained in section 39 which states that the appeal shall lie to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from the original decrees of the Court passing the order. Undisputedly, the order therein was passed by the Single Judge. The said order was passed in the matter arising for the first time before the Single Judge though in second appeal. The appeal against an order passed by Single Judge in its original jurisdiction, lie to the Division Bench. Section 39 of the said Act provides the appellate forum to be the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the order. The appeal against an order passed by Single Judge in its original jurisdiction, lie to the Division Bench. Section 39 of the said Act provides the appellate forum to be the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the order. Bearing in mind all these provisions, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the appeal therein was to be heard by the Division Bench. Once it is clear that from the time, the appeals comes before the High Court, the same is to be dealt with in accordance with Rules of practice and procedure of the High Court and in accordance with the charter under which the Court is constituted and which confers on it the powers in respect of method and manner of the exercising their jurisdiction, it is in terms of those rules that the matter is to be dealt with either by the Single Judge or the Division Bench. As already observed above, there is no dispute that the value of the subject matter in dispute in both the cases is less than Rs. 10.00 lakhs and, therefore, the appeals are necessarily to be heard by the Single Judge irrespective of the fact that whether the impugned orders have force of decree or not. The preliminary objection, therefore, is to be disposed of accordingly and the appeals are to be placed before the learned Single Judge for the hearing and disposal. ORDER The preliminary objections raised by learned Advocates for the respondents are, therefore, upheld. The appeals shall now be listed for hearing on merits before the learned Single Judge. -----