JUDGMENT P. K. MISRA, J. — Plaintiff has filed this appeal against a reversing decision. 2. It is not necessary to issue notice to proforma respond¬ents 4 to 15 as they were proforma defendants in the suit. In view of the order proposed to be passed, it is not necessary to recount in detail the cases of the parties. Suffice it to say that the plaintiff had filed the suit for permanent injunction which had been decreed by the trial Court and Title Appeal No. 28 of 1994 was filed by the Sarpanch, Dunguripalli Grama Panchayat, in his official capacity, who had been arrayed as defendant No. 3. It appears that the said Title Appeal was barred by limitation and a petition for condonation of delay had been filed. From the order dated 3.10.1994 passed by the lower appellate Court, it appears that the appellate Court directed that the petition under Order 41, Rule 4-A, C.P.C. read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be considered after appearance of the respondents. Even though delay had not been condoned at that stage, the lower appellate Court admitted the appeal on 3.10.1994. Subsequently, the appeal has been allowed and the decision of the trial Court has been reversed, which is being challenged by the plaintiff. 3. It appears from the order-sheet of the lower appellate Court though the question of limitation was required to be considered after appearance of respondents, the question was never considered even though subsequently, the appeal was disposed of on merit. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since the appeal was barred by limitation and delay had not been condoned, the ultimate decree passed by the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained. The learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent No. 1, on the other hand, submitted that it was open to the present appellant to raise this question after appearance of the respondents and since the appeal has been disposed of on merit, it must be taken that the delay in filing the appeal had been impliedly condoned. 4. Law is well settled that when an appeal is barred by limitation, ordinarily, until delay is condoned, the appeal should not be taken up for disposal on merit. 4. Law is well settled that when an appeal is barred by limitation, ordinarily, until delay is condoned, the appeal should not be taken up for disposal on merit. In the decision reported in AIR 1917 Privy Council, 179 (Krishnasami Panikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar and others), the practice of admitting a time-barred appeal without notice to the respondent with the stipulation that the question of condonation of delay is to be considered after service of notice on the respondent was strongly deprecated on the ground that adoption of such a course may lead to needless expenditure of money and un profitable waste of time. It was observed: “........ Their Lordships therefore desire to impress on the Courts in India the urgent expediency of adopting in place of this practice a procedure which will secure at the stage of admission, the final determination (after due notice to all parties) of any question of limitation affecting the competence of the appeal.” In the present case, from the records it does not appear that while issuing notice to the respondents, it was indicated that the question of limitation is to be considered after appearance of the parties. It is apparent that the plaintiff-respondent at that stage was not possibly aware of the fact that the appeal was barred by limitation. Therefore, merely because the plaintiff-respondent remained silent, it cannot be said that he is estopped from raising the question of limitation in the present Second Appeal. Moreover, the question of implied condonation of delay does not arise. It was the duty of the lower appellate Court to consider the question of condonation of delay after appearance of the respondents. In the decision reported in AIR 1961 Ori. 13 (Municipal Councillors of Puri Municipality v. Madhusudan Das Mohapatra) almost in a similar matter, it was held that the party had the right to challenge the decree of the lower appellate Court on the ground that the appeal before the lower appellate Court was barred by limitation. In the decision reported in AIR 1961 Ori. 13 (Municipal Councillors of Puri Municipality v. Madhusudan Das Mohapatra) almost in a similar matter, it was held that the party had the right to challenge the decree of the lower appellate Court on the ground that the appeal before the lower appellate Court was barred by limitation. Since in the present case, the appeal was admittedly barred by limitation and there is no order of the lower appellate Court condoning the delay and keeping in view the principle as envisaged in Section 3 of the Limitation Act casting a duty on the Court to consider the question of limitation, whether raised by the opponent or not, the decree of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. 5. In view of the aforesaid, the matter is remanded to the lower appellate Court to first consider the question of limitation and thereafter if delay is condoned, to hear the parties afresh and dispose of the title appeal on merit. It is made clear that no opinion has been expressed relating to merits of the case. 6. The Second Appeal is accordingly allowed. The matter is remanded to the lower appellate Court for fresh disposal. The parties are directed to appear before the lower appellate Court on 21st February, 2000, for receiving further instruction in the matter. The L.C.R. shall be sent back to the lower appellate Court immediately. A copy of the limitation petition shall be served by the counsel of defendant No. 3 (present respondent No. 1) on the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 in the appellate Court on or before 21st February, 2000, and thereafter the lower appel¬late Court shall give reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff-respondent to file objection and proceed to decide the matter in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.