JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C J Oral:- This petition is filed by the petitioners against an order passed by the Rent Controller (3), Shimla, on July 14, 1993, in case No.35/II of 92/89 and confirmed by the Appellate Authority, Shimla, on May 22, 1998, in C.M.A. No. 83-S/14 of 1993. By the above orders, a petition for possession filed by the petitioners under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came to be dismissed by both the authorities. 2. Before dealing with the questions raised in the present petition, few relevant facts may be stated. 3. The petitioners filed an application under Section 14 of the Act against the respondent, inter alia, alleging that they are landlords of a building being Shop No. 1 at Tilaknagar, Boileauganj, and Shimla. Respondent was a tenant in the premises on a rent of Rs.19-83 paise per month prior to April 28, 1984 when the premises were purchased by the petitioners. It was averred in the petition that the respondent- tenant failed to pay arrears of rent from May 1, 1984 to April 30, 1989 and hence he was liable to be evicted. Another ground, which was put forward by the petitioners, was that the premises were bona fide required by them for their use and occupation and also for use and occupation of their family members. According to the petitioners, their family considered of petitioner No. 1 herself, her husband, three married sons and three grandsons. Over and above those members, Smt. SarlaChawla, younger sister of petitioner No.l was also a family member of petitioner No. 1 after her widowhood in January, 1985 and as she was issueless and was turned out of matrimonial home by her in-laws, she was staying with petitioner No. 1. It was further stated that the petitioners were residing in a rented accommodation in Brahamn Sabha building, Pursharthi Basti, Shimla, which was inadequate and insufficient for the requirement of the petitioners. Precisely for that purpose, the suit property was purchased by the petitioners which consisted of two small shops in the ground floor and one residential set. Two rooms were with respondent, whereas one room and kitchen was with one K.C. Kapila. The petitioners, therefore, brought the petition for possession of the premises. 4. Precisely for that purpose, the suit property was purchased by the petitioners which consisted of two small shops in the ground floor and one residential set. Two rooms were with respondent, whereas one room and kitchen was with one K.C. Kapila. The petitioners, therefore, brought the petition for possession of the premises. 4. The respondent-tenant resisted and contested the claim by raising several objections, preliminary as well as on merits. It was contended that the petition was not maintainable as it was mala fide and could not have been filed. On merits, it was disputed that the tenant was in arrears of rent. According to the tenant, the entire amount of rent was paid. Regarding bona fide requirement, it was contended that petitioner No. 1 as well as petitioner No. 2 were not residing in Shimla nor had any place of working within the urban area of Shimla. The sons of petitioner No. 1 were married and were staying at different places outside Shimla and they were not dependent on petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. Petitioner No. 1 herself was not residing permanently at Shimla and occasionally she used to visit the city. It was also averred that petitioner No. 1 possessed spacious accommodation in Shimla. Smt. Sarla Chawla could not be said to be a family member of petitioner No. 1. The petitioners had also come in possession of complete residential set vacated by K.C. Kapila and hence, the requirement could not be said to be bona fide. The assertions made and contentions raised in the written statement were again controverted in replication. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller raised issues on June 26, 1990. Evidence was led by the parties. The Rent Controller held that it was not proved by the petitioners that the respondent was in arrears of rent and hence, the petitioners were not entitled to possession on the ground of arrears of rent. Regarding bona fide requirement of the petitioners, the Rent Controller held that so called requirement of the petitioners was not bona fide and they were not entitled to an order of eviction against respondent-tenant on that ground. According to the Rent Controller, the requirement of the petitioners was not bona fide. It was merely wish or desire and, therefore not covered by Section 14 of the Act. According to the Rent Controller, the requirement of the petitioners was not bona fide. It was merely wish or desire and, therefore not covered by Section 14 of the Act. He also held that from the particulars on record, Smt. Sarla Chawla could not be said to be a member of the family. Moreover, the case put forward by the petitioners was not believable and hence, the petitioners were not entitled to claim benefit of Section 14 of the Act. The Rent Controller also observed that over and above the fact that the petitioners obtained possession from K.C. Kapila, it was also proved from evidence that the petitioners were not using even the portion in their possession as tenant in Brahamn Sabha building. For that reliance was placed on the evidence of RW-4 Hem Raj, which revealed that electric consumption of the premises in occupation of the petitioners was not such which would show that the premises were used by the petitioners. The Rent Controller, therefore, observed that the petitioners did not reside in Brahamn Sabha building in their possession. The case of the petitioners that they required the premises bona fide for their occupation was not well founded. The Rent Controller, hence, dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners. 6. Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal of the petition, the petitioners approached the Appellate Authority. Before the Appeallate Authority again all the grounds, which were put forward by the petitioners, were reiterated and it was submitted that the Rent Controller had committed an error of fact as well as of law in dismissing the petition and the petitioners were entitled to the relief prayed in the petition. The Appellate Authority once again reappreciated the evidence on record and confirmed the finding of fact arrived at by the Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority agreed with the Rent Controller that the sons of petitioner No. 1 were settled out of Shimla. They were earning their livelihood there. It was true that occasionally they used visit petitioner No. 1. Such occasional visits, however, could not be said to be requirement for sons for whom a prayer was made on the ground of bona fide requirement by the landlady. The Appellate Authority also observed that petitioner No. 1 was in physical and actual possession of rented accommodation, set No. 16 in Brahaman Sabha Building, Pursharthi Basti, Shimla. Such occasional visits, however, could not be said to be requirement for sons for whom a prayer was made on the ground of bona fide requirement by the landlady. The Appellate Authority also observed that petitioner No. 1 was in physical and actual possession of rented accommodation, set No. 16 in Brahaman Sabha Building, Pursharthi Basti, Shimla. Though it was their case that it was not sufficient, nowhere it was mentioned as to how much accommodation was with the petitioners and why it could not be said to be sufficient to the petitioners. The Appellate Authority also considered the fact that even in Brahaman Sabha building, the petitioners were not regularly staying which was proved from consumption of electricity. The Appellate Authority relied upon electricity consumption from April 1987 to April-May, 1992 and observed that looking to the power consumption for about five years, it was clear that the petitioners were not regularly staying in the rented premises. It also noted that the petitioners have their own residence at Ludhiana and they were staying in Ludhiana. 7. Regarding Srat. Sarla Chawla, widowed sister of petitioner No. 1, the Appellate Authority was of the view that the story about staying of Smt. Sarla Chawla with petitioner No. 1 was put forward by petitioner No. 1 only with a view to evict respondent-tenant which was not believable. 8. On all those grounds, the Appellate Authority also agreed with the reasons recorded and conclusions reached by the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. . 9. Being aggrieved by the above order, the present revision was filed by the petitioners, which was admitted. 10. I have heard Mr. N.D. Sharma, learned vice counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. N.K. Sood, learned counsel for the respondent. 11. It was strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that both the authorities have committed an error of law as well as of Jurisdiction and the orders passed by them deserve to be set aside. It was urged that it was obligatory on the part of the authorities to consider whether the case was covered by Section 14 of the Act and once the authorities were satisfied that the requirement of the landlord was bona fide, it was incumbent on them to pass an order of eviction. It was also submitted that the family of petitioner No. 1 was very large. It was also submitted that the family of petitioner No. 1 was very large. Three sons of the petitioners are staying with them and hence, the requirement could not have been ignored. Moreover, widowed sister of petitioner No. 1 Smt. Sarla Chawla is also staying with petitioner No. 1 which was clearly established from the evidence on record. By not believing the evidence of petitioner No. 1 on that count, an illegality was committed which deserves interference. Moreover, there was and there is still imminent danger and petitioner No. 1 might be evicted at any time from the rented premises in Brahaman Sabha building. But that ground has not been considered in its proper perspective. By not doing so, the authorities have acted illegally and the orders have become vulnerable. They are, therefore, required to be interfered with in exercise of re visional jurisdiction of this Court. On all these grounds, it was submitted that the orders passed by the Rent Controller and the confirmed by the Appellate Authority may be set aside and the petition may be allowed by directing the respondents to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to the petitioners. 12. Mr. Sood, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, supported the order passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Authority. He submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court under sub-section (5) or Section 24 of the Act is limited. It is no doubt, true that it is not analogous to section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908. But at the same time this Court does not exercise appellate power and its jurisdiction is circumscribed to see in legality and property of the order passed by the authorities. When on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, a finding of fact has been recorded by the rent controller and confirmed by the Appellate Authority this court would not interfere with such finding unless the Court is convinced that the findings are arbitrary, unreasonable or are based on “no evidence” 13. On merits, the learned counsel submitted that no other view is possible than the one taken by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Authority. From the materials on record, it is clearly established that sons of petitioner No. 1 were settled out of Shimla. On merits, the learned counsel submitted that no other view is possible than the one taken by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Authority. From the materials on record, it is clearly established that sons of petitioner No. 1 were settled out of Shimla. Occasional visits of those persons would not make the wish or desire of petitioner No. 1 to be bonafide so as to attract section 14 of the Act. That apart, the petitioners have not come with clean hands and have not put before the court full and complete facts. So far as the premises occupied by them in Brahaman Sabha building is concerned. nothing was mentioned about the extent of accommodation in the said premises It was nowhere stated as to how many rooms are there. Likewise, there is inconsistency with regard to the accommodation, which was with K.C. Kapila and had come in possession of petitioner No. 1. On the contrary, in pleadings inconsistent stands have been taken by the petitioners. At one stage, the case of the petitioners was that it was having one room and a kitchen but at other stage, it was stated that there was only one room, yet at a third stage, it was stated there was only kitchen. Regarding need of the petitioners on the ground that petitioner No. ls widowed sister Smt. Sarla Chawla was staying with petitioner No. 1, it was submitted that though she cannot be termed as a member of family within the meaning of the Act, the story put forward by petitioner No. 1 regarding staying of Smt. Sarla Chawla with her was not believed and such a finding can be said to be a pure finding of fact. The counsel also submitted that once an order was passed against one of the tenants, second proviso to Section 14 (3) would operate and the petitioners were not entitled to file another petition and claim possession on the ground of bona fide requirement. Finally, it was submitted that one more petition has been filed by the petitioner against the respondent on the ground that the petitioners wanted the premises for reconstruction of the building by demolishing its, as, according to them, it was very old and in a dilapidated condition. Though it was a subsequent development, an application made by the respondent (CMP No.72 of 2000) was allowed. Though it was a subsequent development, an application made by the respondent (CMP No.72 of 2000) was allowed. It goes to show that the case put forward by the petitioners in the present proceedings, namely, that they want the premises for bona fide use and occupation falls to the ground. On all these reasons, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that no case has been made out by the petitioners and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in my opinion, no ground has been made out by the petitioners to interfere with the order passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Authority. Without entering into larger question, in my opinion, from the evidence on record, it is clear that certain findings have been recorded by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Authority. It cannot be. said that the findings are based on no evidence, or they are arbitrary, unreasonable or otherwise perverse. The Rent Controller, on the basis of material on record, held that all the three sons of the petitioners have settled out of Shimla. The said finding is a finding of fact. That apart it is not even disputed by the petitioners themselves. Thus, it cannot be said that sons of the petitioner are staying with them as family members in Shimla. If it is so, obviously both the authorities were right in observing that their visit to Shimla can be described as "occasional". Such visits would not confer .right on the petitioners to get possession under Section 14 of the Act on the ground of bona fide requirement requesting the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority to pass an order of eviction against the respondent. 15. Regarding Smt. Sarla Chawla, apart from the fact that she is a widowed sister of petitioner No. 1 -landlady, who may or may not be said to be a family member within the meaning of Section 14 of the Act, for which I express no final opinion, even on evidence, the authorities have held that it was not proved that she was staying with petitioner No. 1 and the said ground was put forward by the petitioners only with a view to evict the respondent. The authorities also took into account that even in past, proceedings were initiated against the respondent by the petitioners and initially no such ground was pleaded. No doubt, it was the case of the petitioners that subsequently, the said ground was put forward but no sufficient material was placed on record. The authorities were, therefore, not satisfied on the basis of record that Smt. Sarla Chawla was staying with petitioner No. 1. Such a finding of fact and it cannot be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 16. Both the authorities were also right in observing that petitioners were in possession of the rented premises in Brahaman Sabhai5building. Nowhere the extent of the accommodation of the petitioners has been mentioned by the petitioners - neither in the pleadings nor in. the evidence. The matter did not end there. The authorities were also right in indicating that even the said premise has not been continuously occupied by the petitioners. For that purpose, electric consumption for a period of five years has been noticed. It was, no doubt, submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in Shimla, it is not necessary to use Air conditioners or Fans. It may be so but it cannot be ignored that if a family was regularly staying in premises along with Smt. Sarla Chawla, a widowed sister of petitioner No. 1, in all probabilities, she would be occupying a separate room, and there would be electric consumption. It also cannot be overlooked that as per the case of the petitioners in the petition, sons of petitioner No. 1 were frequently visiting Shimla If it is so, there would not be so less electric consumption as reflected in paragraph 15 of the Appellate Authoritys order. Hence, in my view, the Appellate Authority has not committed any-error of law in making the above observation. Moreover, it is an admitted fact that from K.C. Kapila, the petitioners have obtained possession of the premises occupied by him. The extent of occupation of K.C. Kapila had also not come or record. On the contrary, there is inconsistent version of the petitioners on the point. Moreover, it is an admitted fact that from K.C. Kapila, the petitioners have obtained possession of the premises occupied by him. The extent of occupation of K.C. Kapila had also not come or record. On the contrary, there is inconsistent version of the petitioners on the point. If taking into account totality of facts and circumstances, both the authorities have come to the conclusion that their was no need or necessity on the part of the petitioners and so called requirement claimed by the petitioners was in the nature of wish or desire, it cannot be said that by taking such a view, any illegality was committed by the authorities, which deserves interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the court. 17. As I am of the view that both the authorities have recorded a concurrent finding of fact, which cannot be termed as perverse or based on no evidence it is not necessary for me to express any opinion of two additional ground raised on behalf of the respondent, though prima facie they are also well founded, viz. that (i) in the light of relevant provisions of the second proviso to Section 14(3) no petition could have been filed by the petitioners, (vide Molar Mai (dead) through LRs. v. M/s. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1261); and (ii) the stand taken by the petitioners is contradictory inasmuch as on one hand, they were claiming possession on the ground of bona fide requirement and on the other hand they were claiming possession on the ground of rebuilding by demolising it, stating that it was very old building and was in dilapidated condition. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the petition deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.