Arijith Pasayat, C.J.: These two appeals and the revision application are inter-linked. While the appeals have been filed by accused persons, who have been convicted, revision petition has been filed under Sec.397 read with Sec.401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) by widow of the deceased who lost his life in the alleged occurrence. For the sake of convenience, accused persons are referred to as ‘A1, A2 etc.‘as they were arrayed as accused persons during trial. 2. Accused persons have been found guilty of offences punishable under Secs.143, 147, 148, 341, 324 and 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘I.P.C.‘) read with Sec.149 thereof. A2 and A7 are respondents 1 and 2 in the revision application. Except A2 and A7, all other accused were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. They were separately sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Sec.148 and simple imprisonment for one month for the offence punishable under Sec.341. In view of the sentence imposed for offence punishable under Sec. 148, I.P.C., no separate sentence was awarded in respect of offence punishable under Secs.143 and 147 I.P.C. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. A2 (first respondent in the criminal revision) was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Sec.148, simple imprisonment for one month for the offence punishable under Sec.341 and rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Sec.324, I.P.C. No separate sentence was awarded under Secs.143 and 147, I.P.C. So far as A7 (second respondent, in the criminal revision) is concerned, he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Sec.144, I.P.C. No separate sentence was awarded under Sec.143, I.P.C. It was made clear that accused persons were entitled to get set off for the period undergone by them in judicial custody under Sec.428 of the Code. 3. Prosecution version, as unfolded during trial, is as follows: Raghavan (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’) was an active worker of Communist Party. Later, he severed his connection with said party and joined Congress Party. All accused persons are workers of Communist Party. Due to certain political stand taken by the deceased, enmity developed in the minds of accused persons towards the deceased. There were several quarrels between them. Later, he severed his connection with said party and joined Congress Party. All accused persons are workers of Communist Party. Due to certain political stand taken by the deceased, enmity developed in the minds of accused persons towards the deceased. There were several quarrels between them. Deceased openly gave out that he will see that accused persons are apprehended by Police. Thereafter, enmity was aggravated which ultimately transformed into an intention to do away with life of the deceased. On account of said common object an unlawful assembly was formed and on 16.3.1993 at about 6 p.m., accused persons, armed with deadly weapons like iron rods, cycle chains, wooden sticks, handles of spades etc. accosted the deceased. Mohanan-A2 wrongfully restrained the deceased on the north of Chavarunada at Mathiracode on the panchayat road leading to Chennancode and Manambur from Njakkadu High School Junction, Sreenarayanapuram Desom, Ottoor village. He dealt a blow on the left hand of deceased with a cycle chain. On getting it, the deceased was wriggling in pain and cried loud. Babu (P.VV.2) tried to intervene. At that time, Madhavan-A7 beat P.W.2 on the backside of his head and on right hand with an iron rod and caused injuries. Deceased, with a view to escape from attack of accused persons, took out a knife from tucks of his dhothi and inflicted a stab injury on Mohanan-A2 just below his left breast and two stab injuries on Madhavan-A7 below his left armpit and below the chest. On getting said injuries, A2 and A7 took to heels by leaving weapons on the spot. Uthaman-A6 inflicted a blow on right hand of the deceased with an iron rod and on getting said blow, the knife in hands of the deceased fell down. He again inflicted two blows on right hand and right thigh of the deceased with the iron rod thereby causing injuries. Mohanan-A4, with a stick inflicted three blows on right knee, right armpit and right elbow of the deceased causing injuries. Babu-A8 with the iron rod inflicted a blow on right knee of the deceased. Devadas-A10 inflicted a blow on right shoulder of the deceased with an iron rod and caused injuries. Kumar-A12 inflicted a blow on right elbow of the deceased causing injuries. Babu-A8 with the iron rod inflicted a blow on right knee of the deceased. Devadas-A10 inflicted a blow on right shoulder of the deceased with an iron rod and caused injuries. Kumar-A12 inflicted a blow on right elbow of the deceased causing injuries. Raju-A1 took the iron rod left by Madhavan-A7 and inflicted three blows on left elbow and near left thumb and index finger of the deceased and caused injuries. Haridas-A9 inflicted a blow near the left ankle of the deceased with an iron rod and caused injuries. On getting these blows, deceased was forced to sit on the ground by bending forward. At that time, Haridas-A9 inflicted a blow below left knee of the deceased causing injuries, Raju-A1, while standing on the backside of the deceased, inflicted a forceful blow on his head with the iron rod and caused fracture and injury on the head. Blood started coming out from the injuries and the deceased fell on the ground. Kochumani-A 3, with the handle of a spade, inflicted 4 to 5 blows on the leg, back and on two shoulders of the deceased and caused injuries. Kochupodiyan-A5 took out cycle chain left by Kochumani-A3 and inflicted two blows on right knee and on the back of the neck of the deceased and caused injuries. Babu-A8 with an iron rod inflicted two blows on the left knee of the deceased and caused injuries. Haridas A-9 with an iron iron rod inflicting a blow on left thigh of the deceased and caused injuries. Devadas- A. 10 with an iron rod inflicted two blows below the right arm-pit and left side of the waist of the deceased and caused injuries. Babukuttan-A11 with an iron rod inflicted three blows on the right hand of the deceased and caused injuries. The deceased was taken to Taluk Headquarters hospital with serious injuries sustained and later on was taken to Medical College Hospital Thiruvananthapuram. He was admitted at Ward No.5 where he succumbed to the injuries at about 11.55 p.m. on the same night. Charge-sheet was originally filed before Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court, Varkala and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Thiruvananthapuram. Charges were framed under Secs.143, 147, 148, 341, 324 and 302, I.P.C. read with Sec.149 thereof against all accused persons. They pleaded innocence. 15 witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version and several documents were marked as Exhibits. Charges were framed under Secs.143, 147, 148, 341, 324 and 302, I.P.C. read with Sec.149 thereof against all accused persons. They pleaded innocence. 15 witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version and several documents were marked as Exhibits. Except A2 and A7, others pleaded that they have been falsely implicated. Case of A2 was that while he was returning from work, he heard a hue and cry at the bank of the pond and found that his wife, child and some other ladies were standing there. Deceased was uttering abusive and vulgar words. He advised the deceased not to utter such words and to allow the ladies to take their bath. Suddenly, questioning his authority to advice him, deceased took out a knife and stabbed on his chest. On getting said stab inquiry, he ran away from the spot. When he reached Nada, his hands and legs became tired and he collapsed there. Somebody gave him water. After sometime, a car came and 5 to 6 persons took him into the car. At that time, deceased came and obstructed the vehicle. Deceased hit on the car and did not allow it to move on. Thereafter, A7 was also stabbed by the deceased and he too was taken into the car and both were taken to the Medical College Hospital in the same car. Stand of A7 as reflected in his statement under Sec.313 of the Code is that when the deceased stabbed A2, he went towards A2 for enquiring regarding the incident. When he asked A2 as to what had happened, he answered that the deceased stabbed him. When he tried to lift A2 from the ground, the deceased inflicted two stabs on him. He and A2 were taken in the same car for treatment. Deceased came and obstructed movement of the vehicle by lying on the road. A witness, the doctor who treated them, was examined to prove about the injuries sustained by them. 4. Learned trial Judge found admitted position to be the deceased had died due to homicidal death; and point to be decided was the person responsible for it. It was noticed that postmortem report gave a vivid picture of the injuries sustained by the deceased. Post-mortem certificate was prepared by P.W.8, who was then working as Associate Professor of Forensic Medicine, Medical College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram. He found as many as 36 injuries. It was noticed that postmortem report gave a vivid picture of the injuries sustained by the deceased. Post-mortem certificate was prepared by P.W.8, who was then working as Associate Professor of Forensic Medicine, Medical College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram. He found as many as 36 injuries. According to P.W.8, injury Nos. 24, 28 and 36 were independently sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Other injuries are not likely to cause death individually. Injury Nos.24, 28 and 36 read as follows: “24. Contusion 8 x 5 x 2cm on the inner aspect of left leg 3 cm above ankle. Underlying tibia bone fractured. 28. Contusion 10 x 4.5 x 1cm oblique on the left side of back of chest 3cm to the left of midline and 5 cm below the shoulder blade. 10th rib underneath was fractured and the lung showed corresponding contusion 5 x 4 x 1. 36. Sutured lacerated wound 4 cm in length and 1.5 cm in depth oblique on the back of head just to the left of prominence of back of head. Subarachnoid haemorrhage present on both sides of brain.” 5. Babu (P.W.2) was one of the injured persons according to prosecution. But, he resiled from his statements made during investigation. Learned trial Judge found him to be untruthful. Thulasi (P.W.3) is another witness who was claimed to be an eye witness. Similarly, Sasidharan (P.W.4) was claimed to be an eye witness. Placing reliance on their evidence, learned trial Judge found accused persons guilt of the offences, convicted and sentenced them as aforesaid. 6. In support of the appeals, leaned counsel submitted that evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4 do not inspire confidence and evidence of P.W.3 was a parrot-like repetition of what he had given in his statement during investigation. He was a tutored witness. It is submitted that the scenario as described by prosecution is not sufficient to prove any application of Sec.302, I.P.C. read with Sec.149 in the case of all accused person except, may be, A1 and A10. Learned counsel for State, on the other hand, supported the judgment and submitted that ingredients necessary to bring in Sec.149, I.P.C. are clearly established and the object was translated into a reality when members of an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons beat up the deceased and caused injuries; to which he succumbed. Learned counsel for State, on the other hand, supported the judgment and submitted that ingredients necessary to bring in Sec.149, I.P.C. are clearly established and the object was translated into a reality when members of an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons beat up the deceased and caused injuries; to which he succumbed. Learned counsel for revision petitioner submitted that learned trial Judge should not have acquitted respondents 1 and 2 therein for accusations relatable to Sec.302, I.P.C. read with Sec.149 thereof. 7. We shall first deal with the question relating to acceptability of evidence tendered by P.Ws.3 and 4. Certain discrepancies were highlighted in their evidence, which learned trial Judge found to be minor. It has been stated that evidence is parrot-like and has to be discarded. So far as these discrepancies in the evidence are concerned, it has to be noted that every minor discrepancy does not affect credibility of prosecution case. While appreciating evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trival details. Several honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals. Cross-examination is sometimes an unequal duel between a rustic and refined lawyer. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is unnatural; if a case has some flaws, inevitably because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. We find that learned trial Judge has elaborately analysed evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4 and found it to be credible. We find no infirmity therein to take different view. 8. Other contentions relate to exercise of right of private defence and non-applicability of the theory of constructive liability. So far as plea relating to right of private defence is concerned, it is stated that the fact situation, as projected by prosecution, clearly shows that the deceased was the aggressor and in fact inflicted grave and serious injuries on two of the accused persons. Sec.96, I.P.C. provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. The section does not define the expression ‘right of private defence’. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right. Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person acted in the exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in so many words that he acted in self defence. If the circumstances show that the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the accused has not taken it, if the same is available to be considered from the material on record. If the circumstances show that the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the accused has not taken it, if the same is available to be considered from the material on record. Under Sec.105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ‘Evidence Act’), the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets of the plea of self-defence, and, in absence of proof, it is not possible for the Court to presume the truth of the plea of self-defence and it shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is not required to call evidence; he can establish his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from the prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case would be a question of assessing the true effect of the prosecution evidence, and not a question of the accused discharging any burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying the Court that the harm cause by the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The burden of establishing the plea of self defence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record. (See: Muashi Ram v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 702; State of Gujarat v. Bai Fathima, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1478; State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2226; Mohindra Pal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 577. Secs.100 and 101 of I.P.C. define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private defence of body under Sec.97, that right extends under Sec.100 to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the assault. Secs.100 and 101 of I.P.C. define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private defence of body under Sec.97, that right extends under Sec.100 to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the assault. The oft quoted observation of the Supreme Court in Salim Zia v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 391 runs as follows: “It is true that the burden on an accused person to establish the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the one which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need not establish the plea to the guilt and may discharge his onus by establishing a mere preponderance of probabilities either by laying basis for that plea in the cross-examination of the prosecution witness or by adducing defence evidence.” The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea. 9. The number of injuries is not always a safe criterion for determining who the aggressor was. It cannot be state as a universal rule that whatever the injuries are on the body of the accused persons, a presumption must necessarily be raised that the accused persons had caused injuries in exercise of the right of private defence. The defence has to further establish that the injuries so caused on the accused probabilise the version of the right of private defence. Non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance. But mere non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution case in all cases. This principle applies to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so, independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and credit worthy, that it far out-weighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. (See: Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2263. (See: Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2263. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have chance to inflict severe and moral injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. Sec.97 deals with the subject matter of right of private defence. The plea of right comprises the body or property (i) of the person exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; and the right may be exercised in the case of any defence against the body and in the case of offences of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass and attempts at such offences in relation to property. Sec.99 lays down right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Secs.95 and 98 and 100 to 106, I.P.C. is controlled by Sec.99, I.P.C. To claim a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he had a right of private defence which extended to causing of death. Secs.100 and 104, I.P.C. define the limit and extent of right of private defence of body. 10. Secs.102 and 105, I.P.C. deal with commencement and continuation of the right of private defence of body and property respectively. The right commences, as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt, or threat, to commit the offence, although the offence may not have been committed but not until that there is that reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 612, it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 612, it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence. Judged in the aforesaid background, it is clear that the protection afforded for an acts done in exercise of private defence is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as established on evidence. 11. Residual and the most important question is applicability of Sec.149, I.P.C. It is submitted by learned counsel for State that even if it is said, for the sake of argument, that Sec.149, I.P.C. is not applicable, yet by operation of Sec.34, I.P.C., almost all the accused persons can be roped in. Going into a body cannot be a decisive factor in inferring any object. Many other factors, for example, weapons used, nature of injuries as well as other surrounding circumstances have to be taken not of. In a given case, prosecution has to prove that accused was not only a member of an unlawful assembly but also shared common object of such assembly at all crucial stages. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means just what it says. It does not admit tangible possibility, but it does admit a high degree of cogency consistent with an equal high degree of probability. Primary question that arises for consideration is whether Sec. 149, I.P.C. has any application for fastening the constructive liability which is the sine qua non for its operation. The emphasis is on the common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and the accused was actuated by the common object and that object is one of those set out in Sec.141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved; the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Sec.149. The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Sec.141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved; the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Sec.149. The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Sec.141. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved against a person who is alleged to be a member of unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of Sec.141. The word ‘object’ means the purpose or design and in order to make it ‘common’, it must be shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual Constitution, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. The expression ‘in prosecution of common object’ as appearing in Sec. 149 have to be strictly construed as equivalent to ‘in order to attain the common object’. It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must be community of object and the object may exist only upto a particular stage and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may have community of object upto certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and the knowledge possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their command but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object and as a consequence of this the effect of Sec.149, I.P.C. may be different on different members of the same assembly. Intention is the volition of mind immediately preceding the act, while object is the end to which effect is directed, the thing aimed at and that which one endeavours to attain and carry on. Intention implies a resolution of the mind while object means the purpose for which the resolution was made. 12. “Common object” is different from a ‘common intention’ as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object. The ‘common object’ of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and language of the members composing it and from a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the members and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the same must be translated into action or be successful. Under the Explanation to Sec.141, an assembly which was not unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently become unlawful. It is not necessary that the intention or the purpose which is necessary to render an assembly an unlawful one comes into existence at the outset. The time of forming an unlawful intent is not material. An assembly which, at its commencement or even for sometime thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently become unlawful. In other words, it can develop during the course of incident at the spot co instanti. 13. Sec.149, I.P.C. consists of two parts. The first part of the Section means that the offence to be committed in prosecution of the common object must be one which is committed with a view to accomplish the common object. In order that the offence may fail within the first part, the offence must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was member. In order that the offence may fail within the first part, the offence must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was member. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may hit fall under Sec.141, if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed and this is what is required in the second part of the section. The purpose for which the members of the assembly set out or desired to achieve is the object. If the object desired by all the members is the same, the knowledge that is the object which is being pursued is shared by all the members and they are in general agreement as to how it is to be achieved, it becomes the common object of the assembly. An object is entertained in the human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence can be available and like intention, has generally to be gathered from the act which the person commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard and fast rule can be laid down under the circumstances from which the common object can be called out, it may, as indicated above, reasonably collected from the nature of the assembly, arms it carries and behaviour at or before or after the scene of accident; The word ‘knew’ used in the second branch of the section implies something more than a possibility and it cannot be made to bear the sense of ‘might have been known’. Positive knowledge in necessary. When an offence is committed in prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. That, however, does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases which would come within the second part but not within the first part. The distinction between the two parts of Sec.149 cannot be ignored or obliterated. That, however, does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases which would come within the second part but not within the first part. The distinction between the two parts of Sec.149 cannot be ignored or obliterated. In every case, it would be an issue to be determined, whether the offence committed falls within the first part or it was an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object and falls within the second part. (See Chikkarange Gowda and others v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 731). 14. Factual position, as highlighted by prosecution witnesses, rules out application of Sec.149, I.P.C. in the case of all accused persons. Question, therefore, is whether Sec.34, I.P.C. can be pressed into service. Said provision refers to a criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, as highlighted above. It embodies the common-sense principle that if two or more persons intentionally do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually. Constructive liability may arise in three well defined cases. A person may be constructively liable for an offence which he did not actually commit by reason of (i) the common intention of all to commit such as offence (Sec.34); (ii) his being a member of a conspiracy to commit such an offence (Sec.120-A) and (iii) his being a member of an unlawful assembly, the members of whereof knew that an offence was likely to be committed (Sec.149). Obviously, Sec.34 is framed to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. The apparent reason why all are deemed guilt in such a case is that the presence of accomplices give encouragement, support and protection to the person actually committing the act. Common intention implies coming in concert, existence of a pre-arranged plan which is to be proved either from conduct or from circumstances or from any incriminating facts. Sine qua non for application of Sec.34 is existence of a pre-concert. 15. On the evidence brought on record, which we found to be credible, it is clear that assaults by A 1 and A 10 can be linked to fatal injuries. Sine qua non for application of Sec.34 is existence of a pre-concert. 15. On the evidence brought on record, which we found to be credible, it is clear that assaults by A 1 and A 10 can be linked to fatal injuries. They are to be convicted under Sec.302, I.P.C. with the application of Sec.34, I.P.C. So far as rest of the accused persons are concerned, taking into consideration the nature of injuries sustained on account of their assaults, weapons used by them, they are liable to be convicted for offence punishable under Sec.326, I.P.C. read with Sec. 149, I.P.C. and not under Sec.302, I.P.C. read with Sec.149, I.P.C. In the circumstances, we uphold the conviction and sentence imposed in the case of A1 and A10. So far as other accused persons are concerned, their convictions are altered to Sec.326, I.P.C. read with Sec.149, I.P.C. Each one of them is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years with set off provided in law. So far as other convictions and sentences are concerned, they are maintained as the conclusions arrived at by learned trial Judge are well founded in that regard. 16. Criminal Appeal No.546 of 1998 is allowed to the extent indicated above. Criminal Revision Petition has been filed in respect of acquittal of A2 and A7. Criminal Appeal No.541 of 1998 has been filed by Mohanan-A2 and Madhavan-A7 questioning their conviction and sentence as imposed. Primary ground of challenge relates to acceptability of the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4. We have considered the plea in the connected appeal in Criminal Appeal No.546 of 1998. It is to be noted that even according to prosecution version, A-7 did not inflict any injuries on the deceased. But, other acts attributed to him have been amply proved by the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4. The plea has been rejected. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed. We find that the analysis made by learned trial Judge, by taking into account the role played by each one of them as described by prosecution witnesses, suffers from no infirmity to warrant out interference. Criminal Revision Petition is not entertained and is dismissed.