JUDGMENT - R.K. BATTA, J.:---Eviction proceedings were initiated against the appellant by the original applicants, now represented by their universal heir Allan Eurico Vales respondent No. 1. The eviction was sought on three grounds, namely :- (1) sub-letting a part of tenanted premises; (2) changing the user of the premises from residential to non-residential; and (3) that the appellant had acquired residential premises of his own. The Additional Rent Controller ordered eviction of the appellant on all the grounds vide judgment dated 20-9-1989. The appeal filed by the appellant before the Administrative Tribunal was summarily rejected. The appellant challenged the said order in Writ Petition No. 455/1991, which was disposed of by learned Single Judge of this Court vide Oral judgment dated 9-10-1996. The learned Single Judge set aside the eviction sought on the ground of acquisition of residential premises by the appellant since it was found that the appellant was already in possession of the premises much before coming into force of the Rent Act or for that matter, the lease agreement of 1974. However, the eviction on the grounds of sub-letting and change of user, was sustained. The learned Single Judge, in para (7) of the judgment, exercised superintendence jurisdiction under Article 227 while disposing of the writ petition as it is clear from para (7) of the oral judgment. The appellant challenges the same in this Letters Patent appeal. 3.Learned Advocate Shri R.G. Ramani argued on behalf of the appellant. Learned Advocate Shri M.M. Rao argued on behalf of the respondents No. 1 to 5. 4.Learned Advocate for the appellant cited a number of judgments to bring home the point that Letters Patent Appeal lies against the judgment in Writ Petition 455/91. However, it is not necessary, at this stage, to go into this question. We shall examine the matter on its merits. 5.In so far as the merits are concerned, learned Advocate for the appellant argued to start with that in view of the observations made by learned Single Judge in the last part of para (7) of the oral judgment, the learned Single Judge should have remanded the matter to the Rent Controller for decision. 5.In so far as the merits are concerned, learned Advocate for the appellant argued to start with that in view of the observations made by learned Single Judge in the last part of para (7) of the oral judgment, the learned Single Judge should have remanded the matter to the Rent Controller for decision. We are not inclined to agree with learned Advocate for the appellant on this argument, in view of the fact that the learned Single Judge was conscious that in normal course it would have been appropriate for the Court to remand the matter to the Controller for decision yet, the learned Single Judge found that it was too late in the day to remand the matter as the proceedings for eviction had been initiated sometime in the year 1981. The proceedings were pending for 15 years when the writ petition was disposed of by learned Single Judge and, as such, the learned Single Judge chose to consider the evidence already on record. In these circumstances, the contention advanced by learned Advocate for the appellant is without any merit. 6.On the eviction pertaining to sub-letting, it was urged by learned Advocate for the appellant that the burden to prove sub-letting is on the landlord and it is for the landlord to establish that the tenant had not only parted with possession, but it was for consideration. We have examined the contention of learned Advocate for the appellant with reference to the evidence on record. The case of the original applicants was that the appellant had parted with possession of one room of the tenanted premises one Diogo Fernandes who was exclusively occupying the said room. The appellant had, in fact, admitted in the course of his evidence that Diogo Fernandes was occupying one room of the tenanted premises for 7 to 8 months, but he had not stated exactly when Diogo Fernandes occupied the said room. However, according to the appellant, he had given the said room to Diogo Fernandes since he was his neighbour and he was in need of the same. The case of the appellant is that the said occupation of the room by Diogo Fernandes was not for consideration, but on account of humanitarian reason. However, according to the appellant, he had given the said room to Diogo Fernandes since he was his neighbour and he was in need of the same. The case of the appellant is that the said occupation of the room by Diogo Fernandes was not for consideration, but on account of humanitarian reason. In so far as holding of possession of the said room is concerned, not only the appellant had admitted this fact in his deposition, but the original applicants had examined Joaquim Pinto A.W. 3, who has stated that the tenanted premises consisted of a kitchen, two rooms and a verandah, all in a row; the first room, after verandah, was occupied by adjoining tenant's son by name Isidor Fernandes. (Diogo Fernandes is the father of Isidor Fernandes which is admitted by the appellant in his deposition) : that from the said room, there was direct access made to the adjoining division occupied by the said Fernandes and in the rest of the rooms, including the verandah there were some wooden boxes, other material and old tiles. He further stated that he could not enter the suit division from the front main entrance and the appellant did not have the key of the same and as such, he went inside the tenanted premises through the division occupied by the adjoining tenant Fernandes. Thus, parting of exclusive possession of the said room of the tenanted premises is duly established. The rulings of the Apex Court in (Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori Devi)1, 1984(2) Supreme Court Cases 590; (M/s. Delhi Stationers and Printers v. Rajendra Kumar)2, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1208 and Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in (Sh. Daudbhai Imranali Motorwala v. Ajij Yakub Tamboli and another)3, 1991(2) All India Rent Control Journal 56 and (Sudhir Brothers v. Delhi Development Authority and another)4, 1996(1) Supreme Court Cases 32 upon which reliance has been placed by learned Advocate for the appellant lay down that initial burden to prove sub-letting is on the landlord; parting of possession of the premises by tenant and exclusive possession of sub-tenant, is the essential ingredient to be proved by the landlord, in addition to the consideration for which possession was parted with. 7.On the question of consideration, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in (Smt. Rajbir Kaur another v. M/s. Chokosiri Co.)5, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1845. 7.On the question of consideration, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in (Smt. Rajbir Kaur another v. M/s. Chokosiri Co.)5, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1845. In this connection, it was held by the Apex Court that in a suit for eviction on ground of sub-letting if exclusive possession is established and the version of the tenant as to the particulars and the incidents of the transaction is found unacceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. Then, it would be for the tenant to rebut this inference. The Apex Court noted that the transactions of sub-letting in the guise of licences are in their very nature clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the sub-tenant and there cannot be direct evidence in respect of such transactions. Except for bare say of the appellant in the case under consideration, the said Diogo Fernandes or Isidor Fernandes were not examined in order to prove that the appellant did not receive any consideration. 8.The Administrative Tribunal had come to the conclusion that it was to be assumed that the said Diogo Fernandes was not occupying the said room free of charge, but was paying rent to the appellant. This conclusion drawn by the Administrative Tribunal and the learned Single Judge is on the basis of the evidence on record and added to that is the fact of non-examination of Diogo Fernandes or Isidor by the appellant who could have given first hand evidence on the question whether they were occupying the said room free of cost or on payment of rent. In these circumstances, the conclusion arrived at by the Administrative Tribunal and the learned Single Judge, which is based on the evidence on record, does not call for any interference. We are of the opinion that the sub-letting of part of the tenanted premises has been duly established and the eviction of the appellant on that ground does not call for any interference. 9.Coming now to the second ground of eviction, namely change of user, the main plank of the argument canvassed by learned Advocate for the appellant is that no reliance can be placed on unregistered document of lease. 9.Coming now to the second ground of eviction, namely change of user, the main plank of the argument canvassed by learned Advocate for the appellant is that no reliance can be placed on unregistered document of lease. It is also urged by learned Advocate for the appellant that the appellant was occupying the suit premises much prior to said alleged agreement of 1974 and the appellant had been using the suit premises for godown from the beginning. After placing reliance on (M/s. Bajaj Auto Limited v. Behari Lal Kohli)6, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1806, it was urged that since the lease deed was inadmissible, all Clauses of the same are inadmissible including the Clause which pertains to the use of the suit premises under the said lease and that the same cannot be used for any collateral purpose. It was also urged that the signatures of the appellant were obtained on the alleged lease deed of 1974 without disclosing the contents of the same to the appellant. 10.On the other hand, learned Advocate for the respondents No. 1 to 5 has urged before us that the appellant admits in the course of his deposition that the suit premises were given for residence and afterwards, he started using it for godown. 11.The lease agreement dated 22-10-1974 was produced by the original applicant No. 1 in the course of her deposition and the same was exhibited as Exhibit A-1. No objection was taken by the appellant to exhibiting of the said lease agreement. The signatures of the appellant were duly proved by applicant No. 1. It was suggested to applicant No. 1 in the course of her cross-examination that before constructing his own house by the appellant, the appellant was residing in the suit premises prior to seven years and this suggestion was accepted by the applicant, Aw. 1. This would go to show that the suit premises were occupied by the appellant for residence before he constructed his own house. Aw. 2 had stated that presently, the appellant was residing in his own building, but previously the appellant was residing in one of the divisions belonging to the applicant and that presently the suit premises is used by the appellant as godown. Aw. 2 had stated that presently, the appellant was residing in his own building, but previously the appellant was residing in one of the divisions belonging to the applicant and that presently the suit premises is used by the appellant as godown. A.W. 4 has stated that presently the appellant is staying in his own house, but prior to that he used to reside in Division No. 3 of the applicant in the building consisting of six divisions situated at St. Inez. Panaji. This witness has further stated in his cross examination that the suit premises was given to the appellant for his residence and that the appellant was residing in the suit premises. He denied the suggestion that the suit premises was used as godown by the appellant since beginning. It is pertinent to note that the appellant in his deposition has admitted that he was residing in the suit premises since 7 or 8 years before the lease agreement was signed. According to him, he was occupying the suit premises since his shop which was opposite to the suit premises had been demolished by the landlord. He reiterated in his examination-in-chief that in the suit premises he was residing and he was utilising the same as godown. He admitted his signatures on the lease agreement Exhibit A-1. He admitted in cross-examination that he did not obtain any permission from the applicants to start business in the suit premises or to use the suit premises as godown. RW. 2, Mhablu S. Chari examined by the appellant has also stated that the shop was being run in the outer room of the suit premises and the appellant along with his father was staying in the inner room of the suit premises. RW. 3, Shankar Mortu Naik, examined by the appellant has stated that the appellant was residing in the suit premises since Portuguese time. In the cross examination he has stated that the appellant's father was also residing in the same premises where he was running a shop. 12.The sum total evidence on record establishes that the appellant was utilising the suit premises for residence and part of it as shop/godown. The contention of the appellant that the suit premises was utilised right from the beginning as godown is, therefore, not borne out by the evidence on record, including the evidence led by the appellant. 12.The sum total evidence on record establishes that the appellant was utilising the suit premises for residence and part of it as shop/godown. The contention of the appellant that the suit premises was utilised right from the beginning as godown is, therefore, not borne out by the evidence on record, including the evidence led by the appellant. It is in this context that the lease deed dated 22-10-1974 can be looked into for collateral purpose and especially in the light of the evidence on record even though the said lease was not registered. Firstly, no objection was raised when the said lease was exhibited and in case the objection as to registration of the lease had been raised, the original applicants would have had further opportunity to lead oral evidence on the dispute as to whether the suit premises was let out for residential purpose or for godown. Be that as it may, the Apex Court in subsequent judgment in (Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla)7, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 744 has laid down that unregistered lease can be considered for determining whether lease is granted for residential or non-residential purpose. In fact, in the case under consideration, on the basis of evidence on record, even if the unregistered lease is totally ignored, it is established that the suit premises was used as residential premise and a part of it as godown. In any event, whichever way we look into the matter, there is change of user. If the lease is taken for residential purpose as stated by the original applicants, the suit premises was used as godown besides the residential purpose. In case, the lease is taken for the purpose of godown, there is evidence on record that the suit premises was being used for residential purpose as well besides the same being used as godown. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the original applicants had succeeded in establishing the change of user of the suit premises, as a result of which the eviction of the appellant is justified and does not call for any interference. 13.For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the appeal is, hereby, dismissed. 13.For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the appeal is, hereby, dismissed. If the possession of the suit premises is still with the appellant, the same shall be handed over to the respondents No. 1 to 5 within a period of three months from today. Appeal dismissed. -----