Judgment Iqbal Singh, J. 1. This order will dispose of Regular Second Appeals Nos. 835 and 836 of 1993 as the same are directed against a common judgment dated 20.3.1993 of learned Addl. District Judge, Ludhiana. 2. This case has a chequered history. The facts necessary to get hang of the controversy raised herein deserve to be noticed first. 3. The plaintiff firm M/s Jain Hosiery Factory, Ludhiana and its partners Sudarshan Lal, Swatanter Lal, Subhash Chander and Vipin Kumar filed a suit against Nand Lal and Raj Kumar Jain, respondents herein, for declaration to the effect that they (plaintiffs) were the tenants in possession of a building bearing Municipal No. B.IV 1985 (old) and B.IV 1902/2 (new) a four storeyed building situated in Dal Bazar, Ludhiana as fully described in the cause title and that the decree dated 25.1.1982 obtained by defendant No. 1 against defendant No. 2 in Civil Suit No. 3 of 1980 was not binding on their rights. As a consequential relief, the plaintiffs also prayed for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking possession of the said building in pursuance of the aforesaid decree. As per the averments contained in the plaint, Chuni Lal father of the plaintiffs formed a Joint Hindu Family with his sons i.e. plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 5 and his fifth son Raj Kumar Jain defendant No. 2. This Hindu Undivided Family (hereinafter to be referred as HUF) was doing the business under the name and style of M/s Raj Jain Hosiery Factory and Chuni Lal was its Karta. After the death of Chuni Lal, his eldest son Raj Kumar Jain became the Karta of the said HUF. This HUF had taken the building No. B.IV 1845 (old) and B.IV 1902/2 (new) on rent from its owner Nand Lal, defendant No. 1 for running the hosiery business. Since the year 1957, this HUF had been carrying on the hosiery business in these premises. In the year 1964, however, a partial partition of this HUF took place and the hosiery business was taken over by the partnership firm, named and styled as M/s Raj Jain Hosiery Factory, Dal Bazar, Ludhiana. Plaintiffs Sudarshan Lal, Swatanter Lal, defendant Raj Kumar and one Sat Pal became the partners of this firm constituted on 1.4.1964 when a deed of partnership was also executed. Plaintiffs Sudarshan Lal, Swatanter Lal, defendant Raj Kumar and one Sat Pal became the partners of this firm constituted on 1.4.1964 when a deed of partnership was also executed. Subsequently, plaintiffs Subash Chander and Vipin Kumar also joined this firm as partners. It was further averred that at all material times, plaintiffs Sudershan Lal, Swatanter Lal and defendant Raj Kumar Jain were the partners of this firm which was duly registered under the Partnership Act. After the constitution of the partnership firm, defendant Nand Lal had been collecting rent from this firm but he had not been issuing any receipt on that account. It was further alleged that defeant No. 1 with a view to let the building in dispute at a higher rent, invented a device to take possession of the building and thus, filed a suit for possession of the building against defendant Raj Kumar Jain by redemption of the mortgage of the building including stairs, Chobaras, Verandah and open courtyard but he did not disclose the extent of the property which he had mortgaged with defendant No. 2. According to the plaintiffs, they had initially taken a part of the property of Nand Lal on rent from him in the year 1957 at the rate of Rs. 90/- per month. Subsequently, Nand Lal leased out the remaining portion of the said building to them and the rent was increased to Rs. 150/- per month in the year 1965. Thereafter in the year 1970 the rent was further enhanced to Rs. 300/- per month. Defendant Nand Lal received rent from the plaintiffs upto the month of November, 1979 but he never issued receipts. When plaintiff Subhash Chander applied for installation of commercial electric connection in the building, defendant Nand Lal gave his consent in writing, thus admitting the plaintiff-firm to be his tenant in the disputed premises. When the disputed property and the other property was partitioned between defendant Nand Lal and his father, he filed an application before the Tax Superintendent of Municipal Committee, Ludhiana in which he admitted that the plaintiff firm had been in possession of the suit property as a tenant. It was further averred that even in the house tax record of the Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, the plaintiff-firm was recorded as a tenant. It was further averred that even in the house tax record of the Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, the plaintiff-firm was recorded as a tenant. It was specifically averred that defendant Nand Lal had no lucus standi to seek possession of said building by redemption of the mortgage from defendant No. 2 because this mortgage was sham, bogus and a paper transaction and the plaintiff firm had been in possession of the said building as a tenant. Defendant Nand Lal in execution of the decree dated 25.1.1982 for redemtpion of mortgage passed in civil suit No. 3 of 9.1.1980 started threatening the plaintiffs to take actual possession of the said building. Accordingly to the plaintiffs, the decree dated 25.1.982 was illegal, void and ineffective and thus not binding on their rights and that defendant Nand Lal could not dispossess them in execution of the said decree. 4. Defendant No. 2 Raj Kumar Jain filed written statement endorsing the case of the plaintiffs and later on withdrew from the suit and was proceeded ex parte. 5. The suit was, however, hotly contested by defendant Nand Lal who filed written statement denying material facts alleged by the plaintiffs. He denied that Chuni Lal or his sons constituted a Joint Hindu Family or that this HUF was doing the business under the name and style of M/s Raj Jain Hosiery Factory or that after the death of Chuni Lal, his son Raj Kumar defendant No. 2 became the Karta of this HUF. He also denied that in the year 1957 the plaintiffs took the disputed premises or the part thereof, on rent from him or that the HUF firm M/s Raj Jain Hosiery Factory was carrying on the business in it. He controverted the allegations that the initial rate of rent was Rs. 90/- per month or that subsequently the remaining part of the firm building was also given on rent by him to the plaintiff-firm or that the rent was enhanced to Rs. 150/- per month and then to Rs. 300/- per month. He controverted the allegations that he had been receiving rent from the plaintiff-firm or admitting them as his tenant and stated that the question of receiving rent from the firm or refusing to issue rent receipt to it, therefore, did not arise. 150/- per month and then to Rs. 300/- per month. He controverted the allegations that he had been receiving rent from the plaintiff-firm or admitting them as his tenant and stated that the question of receiving rent from the firm or refusing to issue rent receipt to it, therefore, did not arise. He specifically denied the allegation that he gave his "no objection" to the Punjab State Electricity Board when Sudarshan Lal plaintiff applied for obtaining a commercial electric connection in the disputed premises. He denied that he had applied to Municipal Committee, Ludhiana for partition of the property admitting the plaintiff firm to be tenant in possession of the disputed property. He rather asserted that he had mortgaged with possession the disputed building with Raj Kumar Jain, defendant No. 2 for Rs. 1000/- by a registered mortgage deed dated 7.6.1957 and at the time of mortgaging the property, it was only a two storeyed building with a Barsati on the second floor which was later on converted into a room and some additions were made by defendant No. 2 who claimed ownership and compensation for these additions in the previous litigation between him and defendant No. 2. He asserted that he had filed a suit for possession of the disputed building by redemption i.e. suit No. 3 of 1980 which was contested by Raj Kumar Jain defendant No. 2 and the said suit had been decreed by judgment and decree dated 25.1.1982 by the civil court. Since there was no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1, they had no locus standi to file the present suit and thus the present suit was not maintainable in the present form. Defendant Nand Lal further stated that the plaintiffs were estopped to file the present suit and the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata. While defending the decree dated 25.1.1982 passed earlier in his favour, defendant No. 1 prayed for dismissal of the present suit. 6. The plaintiffs filed replication controverting the allegations contained in the written statement and reiterating those averred in the plaint. The rival pleas between the parties gave rise to the following issues besides that of relief :- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to declaration prayed for ? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree for permanent injunction ? OPP. 3. The rival pleas between the parties gave rise to the following issues besides that of relief :- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to declaration prayed for ? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree for permanent injunction ? OPP. 3. Whether the decree dated 25.1.1982 obtained by defendant No. 1 against defendant No. 2 in civil suit No. 3 1980 is not binding on the plaintiffs ? OPP. 4. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit ? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form ? OPD . 6. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their act and conduct to file the present suit ? OPD. 7. Whether the suit is barred by the principle of res judicata ? OPD. 7-A. Whether the plaintiff firm is registered partnership firm and Shri Sudarshan Kumar is one of the registered partner, competent to file the present suit ? OPD. Issue No. 1 was decided against the plaintiffs whereas issues Nos. 2, 3 and 7-A were decided in favour of the plaintiffs. Issues Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 were decided against the defendants. Resultantly, the trial court dismissed the suit for the relief of declaration, by judgment and decree dated 30.5.1991. However, the trial court granted a decree for permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants restraining the letters from taking possession of the building in dispute from the plaintiff firm in pursuance of the decree dated 25.1.1982 passed in Civil suit No. 3 of 1980. 7. Both the parties felt aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Nand Lal defendant filed Civil Appeal 51 of 24.7.1991 challenging that part of the decree whereby a decree for permanent injunction was passed against him. The plaintiffs also filed Civil Appeal 52 of 24.7.1991 challenging the dismissal of their suit qua the relief of declaration prayed for in the suit. 8. Both the aforesaid appeals came to be assigned to Shri Beant Singh Bedi, Addl. District Judge, Ludhiana who disposed of the same together by a single judgment dated 20.3.1993. Appeal by filed the plaintiffs was dismissed with costs whereas the appeal filed by defendant Nand Lal was accepted and the judgment and decree of the trial court granting a decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs was set aside. District Judge, Ludhiana who disposed of the same together by a single judgment dated 20.3.1993. Appeal by filed the plaintiffs was dismissed with costs whereas the appeal filed by defendant Nand Lal was accepted and the judgment and decree of the trial court granting a decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs was set aside. It is in these circumstances the plaintiffs have filed these two second appeals, which as already stated, are being disposed of together by a single order. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties in detail and have also gone through the judgments of the courts below. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that Raj Kumar had taken on rent the premises in dispute as a partner of the firm and the decree is not against the firm but is against Raj Kumar in his individual capacity and, therefore, the same is not executable against the plaintiff firm. Learned counsel further argued that it is not clear from the record that under what circumstances Raj Kumar came into possession of the property in dispute. But after going through the records of the case, I find that the stand of the plaintiffs is that defendant "Raj Kumar had taken the premises in dispute on rent on behalf of the HUF and, thus had no independent right or interest in the property in dispute. On a consideration of the matter, I do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. As per the statement of Sudarshan Lal PW3, one of the plaintiffs, Chuni Lal father of the plaintiffs and defendant Raj Kumar constituted a Joint Hindu Family of which Chuni Lal was the karta and after the death of the latter, the eldest brother Raj Kumar became Karta of the Joint Hindu Family. The Joint Hindu Family took the disputed shop on rent from defendant Nand Lal on 1.6.1957 for running a hosiery business. On the other hand, Nand Lal defendant while appearing as his own witness as DW-3 stated that he had mortgaged with possession the disputed premises for Rs. 1000/- to Raj Kumar Jain by a registered mortgage deed dated 7.6.1957. A certified copy of the registered mortgage deed was produced and proved on record as Exhibit DW-3/6. On the other hand, Nand Lal defendant while appearing as his own witness as DW-3 stated that he had mortgaged with possession the disputed premises for Rs. 1000/- to Raj Kumar Jain by a registered mortgage deed dated 7.6.1957. A certified copy of the registered mortgage deed was produced and proved on record as Exhibit DW-3/6. He further stated that he delivered the possession of the disputed premises to Raj Kumar mortgagee simultaneously With the execution and registration of the mortgage deed. The execution of the mortgage deed was duly proved on record in accordance with law. There is thus little scope left to doubt the authenticity and correctness of what has been mentioned in this document. It had come in statement of PW-3 Sudarshan Lal that earlier their father was the Karta of the Joint Hindu Family who died in the year 1948-49 and, thereafter his eldest brother Raj Kumar became the Karta of the Joint Hindu Family. No doubt, there is no clear evidence on record led by any of the parties as to which member of the Joint Hindu Family negotiated about taking the disputed property on rent. However, in the normal course, it can well be presumed that it was the Karta of the Joint Hindu Family who negotiated the terms of the tenancy of the disputed property. It is thus clear from the record that in or during the period when the possession of the property was taken, Raj Kumar being the eldest amongst all the brothers was the Karta of the Joint Hindu Family. Not only this, it was rather averred in clear terms in para 7 of the plaint that Raj Kumar defendant No. 2 had taken the property on behalf of the Hindu Undivided Family. 10. In the above circumstances the primary controversy between the parties is whether Raj Kumar defendant No. 2 had taken the property on rent as Karta of the Hindu Undivided Family or that he had taken its mortgage with possession in his individual capacity. The lower appellate court dealt with this question elaborately and on thoroughly scrutinizing the evidence, observed as under :- "Now the plea of the tenancy of the J.H.F. or even that of Raj Kumar is not borne out by the evidence on record, whereas the plea of mortgage with possessor is fully supported by the contemporaneous registered mortgage deed Exhibit DW-3/6. To emphasize, the plaintiffs have not produced or proved any rent note or lease deed. According to the plaintiffs they had been paying rent for at least from 1.6.1957 to November, 1979 for a continuous period of about 22 years and five months. But it is passing strange that they never obtained so much as a formal rent receipt. In para No. 4 of the plaint, it is stated that the partial partition of the H.U.F. took place for income tax purposes and for these purposes the partnership firm of the plaintiffs was constituted. But it is passing strange, that for these 22 years, or more, not even a single entry of payment of rent was recorded in the books of account of the plaintiff firm, nor the rent was shown in the income tax returns. No reason is explained for this lapse. Therefore, it becomes difficult for me to hold that the plaintiffs firm was in occupation of the disputed premises as a tenant under Nand Lal defendant at any point of time. Resultantly, there is every justification for placing full reliance on the contemporaneous registered mortgage deed Exhibit DW-3/6 which has already stood the judicial scrutiny in the previous litigation between the parties, right upto the stage of Honble High Court." 11. In view of the above observations, the lower appellate court held that the conclusion is inevitable that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that either the H.U.F. or the plaintiffs were tenants in the disputed premises under defendant No. 1. I see no error of law in the finding recorded by the lower appellate court, more particularly, when it is not shown by learned counsel for the appellants that the aforesaid finding is based on no evidence on record or has been returned by ministerpreting the evidence or ignoring any part thereof. Learned counsel for the appellants, by reference to any evidence or record or otherwise could not show that this finding is legally not sustainable or that any other view could be possible. I have thus no option but to affirm this finding. 12. Another argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since they were not parties to the earlier litigation viz. Civil suit No. 3 of 1980, titled as "Nand Lal v. Raj Kumar", therefore, the judgment Exhibit DW-3/2 and decree DW-3/3 passed in that suit were not binding on them. 12. Another argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that since they were not parties to the earlier litigation viz. Civil suit No. 3 of 1980, titled as "Nand Lal v. Raj Kumar", therefore, the judgment Exhibit DW-3/2 and decree DW-3/3 passed in that suit were not binding on them. This contention was considered by the lower appellate court and was not accepted. The lower appellate court on a consideration of the matter came to the conclusion that the HUF or the plaintiffs firm by a unilateral act could not change the nature of the alleged tenancy, if at all one existed and the HUF even if it was tenant, could not unilaterally vest the tenancy rights in the partnership firm. It is the specific stand of the plaintiffs that on 1.4.1964 they constituted a partnership firm as a tenant in place of the alleged original tenant i.e. the HUF, but no notice of the doing so is shown to have ever been issued by the plaintiffs to defendant Nand Lal. This instance alone would lead to the conclusion that it is the original tenancy i.e. the HUF which still continued to be the alleged tenant, even though otherwise, it had not been proved. Moreover, on or about 7.6.1957, it was Raj Kumar defendant alone who made a representation to defendant No. 1 that he was competent to take the disputed property on mortgage with possession from him and acting on the correctness of what was said in the representation, defendant No. 1 mortgaged with possession the property in dispute to him and thus changed his (Raj Kumars) position to his detriment. In the circumstances, the lower appellate court held that both Raj Kumar as well as the plaintiffs, who essentially claim through Raj Kumar, were estopped from filing the present suit The findings of the trial Court, therefore, on issues Nos. 6 and 7 were reversed. In the circumstances as noticed, I see no reason to differ with the findings on these issues. I concur with the findings recorded by the lower appellant court and see no ground to interfere therewith. 13. No other point was urged before me. For the foregoing reasons, these appeals have no merit and the same are consequently dismissed, but with no order as to costs.