JUDGMENT - S.D. GUNDEWAR, J.:---This Civil Revision Application is heard finally at the stage of admission itself by the consent of the parties. 2. By the present Civil Revision Application, the applicant challenges the order dated 15-9-1999 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Umarkhed in Regular Darkhast No. 15/99, whereby the learned trial Judge rejected the objection (Exh. 12) raised by the applicant under section 47 of Civil Procedure Code. 3. A few facts leading to this application are as under :- The non-applicant, who is the real brother of the applicant, filed Regular Civil Suit No. 66/97 against the applicant for the recovery of possession of the house bearing Municipal House No. 43 situated in Ward No. 16 (Sadanand Ward) at Umarkhed, District Yavatmal along with mesne profits. In response to the suit summons issued in the said suit, the applicant appeared but did not file his written statement inspite of sufficient opportunity given to him by the Court and hence, the said suit proceeded without the written statement of the applicant. In support of his case, the non-applicant adduced oral as well as documentary evidence and the learned trial Judge after considering the same, decreed the said suit on 20-2-1999. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Umarkhed in the aforesaid suit, the applicant filed M.J.C. No. 26/99 before the Additional District Judge, Pusad which came to be dismissed on 26-8-1999 on the ground that it was barred by the limitation. While dismissing the said M.J.C. No. 26/99, the learned Additional District Judge, Pusad observed that the applicant was represented by a Counsel in the aforesaid civil suit and, therefore, his contention that he was unable to have a legal and proper advice in the matter cannot be said to be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. 5. After M.J.C. No. 26/99 came to be rejected, the applicant filed Regular Civil Suit No. 162/99 on 1-12-1999 against the non-applicant wherein he filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 2 read with section 151 of Civil Procedure Code for temporary injunction restraining the non-applicant from interfering with his possession and also for staying further proceedings in Regular Darkhast No. 15/99. The said application came to be rejected by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Umarkhed on 8-12-1999. The said application came to be rejected by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Umarkhed on 8-12-1999. In the meanwhile, on 31-8-1999 the applicant filed his objection (Exh. 12) before the Executing Court for setting aside the said execution proceedings. After considering the material placed before him and on the analysis thereof, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Umarkhed rejected the said objection raised by the applicant by the impugned order dated 15-9-1999. Hence, the present application. 6. Shri A.M. Ghare, the learned Counsel for the applicant, urged before me that in all the aforesaid proceedings, it was contended by the applicant that the suit property belongs to one Sk. Hyder Sk. Chand and the applicant has taken the said property on licence from the said Sk. Hyder. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the applicant that though the non-applicant alleged that he became the owner of the suit property by virtue of sale-deed dated 26-10-1964 executed by one Sk. Yusuf Sk. Rasool in his favour for a consideration of Rs. 200/-, the said property never belonged to Sk. Yusuf Sk. Rasool and, therefore, it cannot be said that the non-applicant has derived any title to the suit property under the aforesaid sale-deed but the courts below erred in not appreciating the aforesaid fact. 7. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the applicant that the learned trial Judge while deciding the objection (Exh. 12) raised by the applicant has clearly observed that the documentary evidence adduced by the applicant shows that the suit property belongs to Sk. Hyder but held that as the said Sk. Hyder has not come before the Court nor raised any objection, the applicant, who is admittedly not the owner of the suit property has no locus standi to raise any objection and on that basis rejected the objection (Exh. 12) raised by the applicant. According to the learned Counsel for the applicant, in view of the aforesaid observations made by the learned trial Judge in the impugned order that the suit property belongs to Sk. Hyder, it was necessary for him to allow the objection raised by the applicant vide Exh. 12 and to hold that the decree in question is inexecutable. However, the learned trial Judge failed to do so and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside by allowing the present Civil Revision Application. Hyder, it was necessary for him to allow the objection raised by the applicant vide Exh. 12 and to hold that the decree in question is inexecutable. However, the learned trial Judge failed to do so and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside by allowing the present Civil Revision Application. 8. As against this, Shri M.V. Samarth, the learned Counsel for the non-applicant, submitted that admittedly the applicant appeared in Regular Civil Suit No. 66/97 filed by the non-applicant against him but failed to file his written statement though sufficient opportunity was given to him. According to the learned Counsel for the non-applicant, the objection now raised by the applicant ought to have been raised by him in the aforesaid suit and as he failed to do so, the said objection cannot be entertained in execution proceeding. For this, he placed reliance on a decision in (Comunidade de Moira v. Vassudeva Ramachandra Aldonkar)1, reported in A.I.R. 1973 Goa, Daman Diu 29. 9. It is further submitted by Shri Samarth, the learned Counsel for the non-applicant, that if the decree is patently illegal, the Executing Court may refuse to execute it but if the alleged illegality is arguable and the judgment-debtor has failed to raise it in the earlier litigation, he cannot question the legality of the decree at the stage of execution. For this, he placed reliance on the judgment in (Bherusingh v. Ramgopal)2, reported in A.I.R. 1972 Madhya Pradesh 217. 10. It is also submitted by Shri Samarth that the objection raised by the applicant that the suit property does not belong to Sk. Yusuf from whom the non-applicant has purchased it was not raised by him before the Court which passed the decree in question and, therefore, the applicant is precluded from raising any such objection before the Executing Court as it amounts to constructive res judicata. In support of his aforesaid submission, Shri Samarth has placed reliance on a decision in (Jai Rout v. Sabitri Devi and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1993 Orissa 251. 11. It is thus well-settled that the decree obtained from the trial Court and upheld by the first Appellate Court cannot be allowed ordinarily and normally to be defeated at the executing stage because that would render all the previous efforts and exercise futile. 11. It is thus well-settled that the decree obtained from the trial Court and upheld by the first Appellate Court cannot be allowed ordinarily and normally to be defeated at the executing stage because that would render all the previous efforts and exercise futile. It is also well-settled that the decrees obtained from the Courts of competent jurisdiction cannot be allowed to be rendered paper-tigers; they have to be treated as alive and kicking. The only exception known to law in this regard is where a decree can be said to be a nullity, the reason for the same being that there would really be no decree to execute; and it is because of this that the Executing Court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree. Similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court in a decision in (Sunder Dass v. Ram Parkash)4, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1207. 12. In the case at hand, admittedly the applicant appeared in Regular Civil Suit No. 66/97 filed by the non-applicant against him for the recovery of possession of the suit property but instead of filing the written statement or raising the objection (now raised by him in the executing proceedings), he preferred to remain absent and thereby allowed the decree to be passed against him. As such, in view of a ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions cited on behalf of the non-applicant, the applicant is now estopped from raising the objection (Exh. 12). If really the applicant was aware that the suit property does not belong to Sk. Yusuf, the vendor of the non-applicant, then he ought to have contested the suit filed by the non-applicant against him and raised the said objection by adducing evidence in that regard but he has not done so for the reasons best known to him. In this view of the matter and considering the settled principle of law as laid down in the decisions cited supra, I am of the view that the learned trial Judge has rightly rejected the objection (Exh. 12) raised by the applicant and, therefore, in my opinion, the impugned order calls for no interference by this Court in exercising its revisional jurisdiction. 13. In the result, the Civil Revision Application stands dismissed with no order as to the costs. Civil revision application dismissed. -----