Judgment : 1. This first appeal is preferred against the decree and judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Chengalpattu dated 14.9.2984 made in O.S.No.190 of 21983 granting the reliefs as prayed for by the plaintiffs herein. Aggrieved against the same, the defendant therein, namely, the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Administration Department has preferred the present appeal. 2. The case of the respondents-plaintiffs as averred in their plaint is concisely stated as follows:- In respect of a dedication made in favour of Sri Subramaniaswami, one Chakrapani Naikker and his brothers had jointly endowed a site for construction of a temple by an endowment deed dated 30.12.1971. Under the said endowment, a place of vacant land measuring about 3550 sq.ft. was donated and the management of the Temple estate was initially vested in a Board of Trustees comprising of six members nominated by the donors as trustees for their life time. The authors of the endowment have specifically provided for the line of management of the temple contemplating two courses to be adopted in case of any vacancy by resignation, removal for misconduct, death or otherwise. In accordance with the terms contained in the deed the respondents-plaintiffs were coopted and nominated as trustees and holding the office in such capacity. Being entitled to obtain a declaration as laid down under Section 63 (b) of the Act 22 of 1959, with regard to their status as hereditary trustees as defined in Section 6 (11) of Act, an application was filed before the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Administration Department, Madras in O.A.No.108 of 1980. The Deputy Commissioner by his Order dated 3.11.1981 dismissed the petition on an erroneous ground that the scheme of succession provided for in the trust deed was not in force. Against the said order, an appeal in A.P.No.62 of 1982 was preferred before the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Administration Department, Madras under Section 69 (l) of the Act. By his order dated 6.7.1983, the commissioner dismissed the appeal on the ground that no hereditary right was specifically provided for by the donors and that Section 6 (11) and 63 (b) of the Act were not attracted. Hence, the suit for cancelling the order of the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. dated 6.7.83 and for consequential declaration, declaring the respondents-plaintiffs as hereditary trustees to the suit temple was filed. 3. Hence, the suit for cancelling the order of the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. dated 6.7.83 and for consequential declaration, declaring the respondents-plaintiffs as hereditary trustees to the suit temple was filed. 3. The appellant-defendant in their written statement have refuted the averments in plaint in the following manner: - The Endowment Deed dated 30.12.1971 does not specifically provide for any hereditary right as envisaged under Section 6 (11) read with Section 63 (b) of the Act and the allegation that the founders of the trust had specifically provided for the line of succession for the suit temple is disputed. As per the trust deed, the succeeding trustees would be nominated and appointed from among the Hindu Pubic Worshippers and the trust deed does not specifically provide for the succession of trustees in a specific geneology. The plaintiffs are only appointed as trustees by the donor for managing the temple to begin with but not as hereditary trustees. The appellant-defendant further averred that a vacancy was caused due to the resignation of G.Natesa Iyer on 17.7.1977 who was nominated under the Trust Deed and the vacancy has not been filled up sofar either under Clause 2 (ii) or Clause 2 (iii) of the deed of endowment. Moreover, there is no minutes of proceedings of the Trustees for co-option of first, second and fifth plaintiffs as such, as provided under Clause 2 (ii) of the Trust Deed dated 30.12.1971. Even if it were to be taken that a scheme of succession has been provided for by the founder of the Trust which is not admitted, even that has not been in force to attract and satisfy the definition of Section 6 (11) of Act 22 of 1959. 4. The other averments are only in the nature of repetition in some form or the other. 5. The Trial Court has on the basis of the above pleadings, both on facts and in law, framed two issues, namely, whether the plaintiffs are hereditary trustees of the suit temple and whether the order of the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Administration dated 6.7.1983 in A.P.No.63 of 1983 is liable to be set aside. On the side of the respondents-plaintiffs, the second plaintiff examined himself; P.W.1 and marked Exs.A.1 to A.5. On the side of the defendant, neither oral nor documentary evidence were adduced. On the side of the respondents-plaintiffs, the second plaintiff examined himself; P.W.1 and marked Exs.A.1 to A.5. On the side of the defendant, neither oral nor documentary evidence were adduced. The trial Court after considering the evidentiary materials placed before it decreed the suit in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs. 6. The issue involved in this appeal falls within a narrow compass as to the applicability of Section 6(11) of Act 22 of 1959 to the claim of the respondents-plaintiffs and their consequential right to seek for a declaration under Section 63 (b) of the said Act. The above aspect requires to be decided in the light of the provisions contained in the deed of Endowment which is marked as Ex.A.1. The second plaintiff who examined himself as P.W.1 has adduced documentary evidence by marking the minutes book maintained by the Trustees as Ex.A.2 which disclose that on 18.9.1972, one Ramasamy was appointed in the place of R.Srinivasa Iyer. Likewise, Ex.A.3 which in Page No.3 in the minutes book would also disclose that in the vacancy that arose after resignation of Ramamurthy, the first respondent-plaintiff was appointed as a trustee on 17.7.1977. It is also found that or; the resignation of G.Natesa Iyer on 17.7.1977, his vacancy has been filled up after the institution of the suit by appointing one Balakrishnan as the trustees. Similarly, on the resignation of R.Srinivasa Iyengar in the year 1976, the second respondent-plaintiff has been appointed by means of a resolution dated 17.7.1977 which is endorsed by Ex.A.3 and so also in the place of another trustee by name Saradha who had died in the year 1971, the fifth respondent- plaintiff has been co-opted by a resolution marked as Ex.A.4. The appellant on their behalf, have not chosen to produce any evidence either oral or documentary to controvert or dislodge the evidence placed by the respondents. Neither did they elicit anything in support of their stand in their cross examination of P.W.1. That being so, I find that the respondents have established their case especially with regard to the mode adopted for their appointment as trustees in the place of vacancies that arose for reasons stated above. 7. The only other question that requires to be considered is the scope and applicability of Section 6(11) of Act 22 of 1959. That being so, I find that the respondents have established their case especially with regard to the mode adopted for their appointment as trustees in the place of vacancies that arose for reasons stated above. 7. The only other question that requires to be considered is the scope and applicability of Section 6(11) of Act 22 of 1959. In order to appreciate the tenability of the contention raised by the appellant that the respondents are not hereditary trustees, the definition of hereditary trustees as contained in the Act is extracted here:- "hereditary trustee" means the trustee of a religious institution, the succession to whose office devolves by hereditary right or is regulated by usage or is specifically provided for by the founder, so long as such scheme of succession is in force." In sofar as the present case is concerned, by Ex.A.1., a deed of Endowment has been made and Clause 2 (ii) and 2 (iii) of the said deed provides for the line of succession to the office of the Trustees, in case of death, removal, resignation or otherwise. A bare reading of the above referred clauses, it is clear that if any office of the Trustee falls vacant either by resignation, removal for misconduct, death or otherwise, the remaining trustees may choose and appoint any person who is a Hindu and who is competent by reason of his faith, piety, religion, education and other educational attainments to discharge satisfactorily his functions as a trustee of the temple with devotion to the Deity installed therein and as a residuary course, Clause (iii) of the said deed also provides that if no such person is available as above to fill up the vacancy in the office of the Trustee as contemplated in Clause (ii) above, the worshippers of the temple assembled in meeting for the purpose at the locality convened after due notice of a week for such meeting, choose any person who fulfils the qualifications mentioned in clause (ii) above for the vacancy who according to their opinion can satisfactorily fill the office. 8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would contend in their memorandum of grounds of appeal that the respondents 1 and 2 were co-opted only on their application and they were not chosen as trustees by the other trustees. 8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would contend in their memorandum of grounds of appeal that the respondents 1 and 2 were co-opted only on their application and they were not chosen as trustees by the other trustees. There is a basic error in such a contention for the appellant seeks to lay undue emphasis on the application if any made by the respondents for appointing them as trustees. It does not matter whether the appointments are made on the basis of the application or by the trustees themselves so long as the qualifications prescribed in Clause II of the said deed is satisfied. It is also further contended that the scheme of succession is not in force. I find from the materials available before me, there is nothing in evidence to support such a plea or even as an indication for this Court to think otherwise. 9. The next contention rests upon the interpretation of Section 6 (11) of the Act defining hereditary Trustee. On the face of the said definition, there is every likelihood of the expression being viewed in a restricted manner as only meaning and referring to line of geneology as understood by the appellant. But it is not so and the legislature has provided for a wide meaning so as to include succession to an office of a trustee by devolution of hereditary right or as regulated by usage or as specifically provided for by the founder, but however, subject to the existence of such scheme of succession in force. The relevant clauses found in Ex.A.1 if viewed in the light of the above definition, it can be held beyond doubt that the case falls under category where the line of succession to the office is specifically contemplated by the founder. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant cited three decisions reported in S. Ramasamy Naidu and others v. Commissioner. H.R. & C.E. 1974 (II) MLJ 133 (DB) Pichai alias Chockalingam Pillai v. The Commissioner H.R. & C.E.) 1971 (1) MLJ 166 (DB ) and R.Mayaperumal and another v. Azhagappan Nadar (died) and Others, 1984 (II) MLJ 422 (DB). The questions involved in those decisions are not in any way connected or applicable to the subject in issue before me and I fail to understand the reason for citing the above decisions. The questions involved in those decisions are not in any way connected or applicable to the subject in issue before me and I fail to understand the reason for citing the above decisions. In view of the discussion, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the decision in The Commissioner for Hindu Religions And Charitable Endowments, Madras v. The Maligai and Shop Varthagar Sangham, Shevapeta, Salem 2. By Its Secretary A. Peram Chetty and others, 1976 (1) MLJ 17 which related to an issue regarding succession, regulated by usage is also not directly relevant, to support the case of the respondent. 11. For all the reasons stated above, the decree and judgment of the trial court deserved to be confirmed and the same is hereby confirmed and the appeal is therefore dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.