P. K. TRIPATHY, J. ( 1 ) ORDER dated 16-11-1996 in S. T. Case No. 6/50 of 1996 of the Court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Anandapur is under challenge in this revision. ( 2 ) THE aforesaid sessions case was registered as against opposite party No. 2-Tutu Swain, allegedly for kidnapping the victim girl and committing rape on her on 17th November, 1995 in the Tea stall of the petitioner. The victim girl is partially mentally retarded and also partially handicapped because of no having capability to speak clearly and fluently which in the vernacular and coloquial term in Orissa has been termed as 'jadi. ' After she was ravished, the blind father and the helpless mother of the victim sought for the intervention of the villagers which, as alleged, resulted in a decision in the Village Panchayat for marriage of the victim with opposite party No. 2. That marriage was performed but the father of the opposite party No. 2, as alleged, declined to accept the victim as the daughter-in-law. That resulted in lodging of the F. I. R. and investigation into the crime. It was alleged in the F. I. R. that besides the opposite party No. 2 another person i. e. , the owner of the Tea stall, where she was ravished, also committed rape on her. The statement of the informant and the prosecutrix before the Investigating Officer was to the effect that besides the opposite party No. 2, the petitioner also committed rape on her. Yet the officer-in-charge did not submit a charge-sheet against the petitioner. After commitment of the case during the course of trial evidence of the mother of the victim as P. W. No. 1 and the evidence of the victim as P. W. No. 4 also reveals the allegation of rape committed on her by the petitioner. Such evidence was recorded on 2nd and 3rd September, 1996. On 16-11-1996 the concerned officer-in-charge was examined as P. W. No. 11. During his examination-in-chief, on a query made by the Court, he stated that the victim made statement before him that the petitioner also raped her but he did not made the petitioner a co-accused (while submitting the charge-sheet ). On 16-11-1996 the concerned officer-in-charge was examined as P. W. No. 11. During his examination-in-chief, on a query made by the Court, he stated that the victim made statement before him that the petitioner also raped her but he did not made the petitioner a co-accused (while submitting the charge-sheet ). Thereafter, the trial Court in exercise of the power under S. 319 of the Code passed the impugned order to issue process against the petitioner to stand the trial for the offence order S. 376, I. P. C. ( 3 ) IT was argued on behalf of the petitioner that under the given facts and circumstances, exercise of the power under S. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge was wholly unwarranted and, therefore, liable to be set aside. It was also argued that when the Investigating Agency had excluded the petitioner from being charge-sheeted he does not come within the meaning of the term "any person not being the accused" and hence power under S. 319, Cr. P. C. could not have been invoked as against him. Learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 1-State of Orissa, however, supported the impugned order and argued that as the petitioner was not an accused in the case before the Courts below, therefore, he very much comes within the meaning of the term "any person not being the accused. " ( 4 ) TWO things remained undisputed at the stage of hearing argument that the power vested in a Court under sub-section (1) ofs. 319 of the Code is an extraordinary power and it should be used by the Court sparingly only in the interest of justice and not on the mere asking for it by the complainant or his witnesses or the Investigating Agency and that provision in S. 319 is an improved version of the corresponding provision in S. 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (i. e. the old Code ). ( 5 ) AS against the impugned order petitioner's grievance is that- (i) allegation of rape was made in her statement under S. 161 of the Code by the prosecutrix yet the Investigating Agency did not find that evidence to be sufficient to include him as an accused and in that respect the cognizance taking Magistrate having accepted the charge-sheet and committed the other accused, now the trial Court should not have passed the impugned order adding him as an accused, and (ii) once he was named in the proceeding; since he was not a witness nor the complainant, therefore, his status was that of an accused and, therefore, he does not come within the mischief of the term 'any person not being the accused. ' ( 6 ) IT, thus, appears that merit of the impugned order depends on describing the status of the petitioner i. e. , to say whether he was an 'accused' or whether he comes within the meaning of the term 'any person not being the accused. ' Though the term 'accused' is used in various provisions in the Code yet the said term has not been defined in the Code. In Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edn.) the word 'accuse' and the term 'accused' have been assigned the meaning as quoted below :-"accuse. To bring a formal charge against a person, to the effect that he is guilty of a crime or punishable offence, before a Court or Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into the alleged crime. ""accused. "accused" is the generic name for the defendant in a criminal case, and is more appropriate than either "prisoner" or "defendant". "in the law Lexicon, compiled and edited by P. Ramanath Aiyer (6th Reprint Edition, 1995) the word 'accused' has been assigned the following quoted meaning :-"accused, is one who is charged with a crime. . . . . . . . . . . . "the term "accused," in Criminal Procedure Code, S. 526, means a 'person over whom a Magistrate or other "criminal" Court is exercising jurisdiction. "in that connection, so far as the Chapter XII of the Code is concerned, at the stage of S. 157 prescribing the procedure for investigation, it has been provided for arrest of the offender. At that stage, the word "accused" has not been used. "in that connection, so far as the Chapter XII of the Code is concerned, at the stage of S. 157 prescribing the procedure for investigation, it has been provided for arrest of the offender. At that stage, the word "accused" has not been used. Similarly in S. 164 of the Code which relates to recording of confessions and statements the term "accused" has not been used relating to an offender. In sub-section (1) of S. 167, it has been provided that "when any person is arrested and detained in custody" and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information received against him is well founded relating to commission of an offence but the investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours fixed by Section 57, then, the 'accused' is to forward to the nearest Judicial Magistrate with a copy of the entries in the diary (the case diary ). In sub-section (2) also the word 'accused' has been used for such person who is arrested and forwarded in custody to the Court of the Magistrate. Thus, on a comparative reading of dictionary meaning of the word 'accused' and the manner in which that term has been used in the Court it leaves no room for doubt that until a person is arrested and forwarded in custody on the grounds of the Investigating Officer believing that there is ample evidence to connect him with the crime, he cannot be termed as an 'accused' in a case investigated by Police so as to get himself out of purview of S. 319. Similarly in a complaint though while describing the alleged offenders in the cause title the term 'accused' is being used but he does not become an 'accused' unless the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and issues process against the alleged offender in accordance with the provision in S. 204 of the Code. In the case of Sohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1990 SC 2158 : (1990 Cri LJ 2302) after referring to the various provisions in the Code, the Apex Court propounded that (at page 2305 of Cri LJ)-"19. Thus the words 'the accused' have been used only in respect of a case where there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded. 'information' and 'accusation' are synonymously used. Thus the words 'the accused' have been used only in respect of a case where there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded. 'information' and 'accusation' are synonymously used. " ( 7 ) IN the present case, admittedly the petitioner was not included as an accused. As noted above petitioner's contention isthat in the inquiry as provided under S. 209 of the Code i. e. , the commitment proceeding the cognizance taking Magistrate did not include him as an accused and, therefore, he is no more liable to be added as an accused. In that respect, it may be noted that in the case of Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1996) 11 OCR (SC) 139 : (1996 Cri LJ 2523), the Apex Court has held that-". . . . . . . . . As said before, the context requires the proceedings before a Magistrate to be formal, barely committal in that sense, and that any notion based upon the old state of law of its being an inquiry to which S. 319 could get attracted, has been done away with. Therefore, it would be legitimate for us to conclude that the Magistrate at the stage of S. 209, Cr. P. C. , is forbidden to apply his mind to the merit of the matter and determine as to whether any accused need be added or subtracted to face trial before the Court of Session. "the aforesaid ratio proposes of a formal act of commitment by the cognizance taking Magistrate and in view of that since the committing Magistrate is not to apply his mind to add or delete any person as an accused, the aforesaid argument of the petitioner is of no advantage to him. ( 8 ) SECTION 319 in plain and simple language confers jurisdiction on the trial Court to proceed against a person not being the accused if in the course of an inquiry or trial it appears from the evidence that such person has committed any offence for which he could be tried together with the accused facing the trial and may proceed against such person for the offence which appears to have been committed by him. In the case of Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 339 : (1979 Cri LJ 333), the Apex Court propounded that a person who has been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing his involvement in the offence comes before the Criminal Court, then, he can legitimately be included as 'an accused' to be proceeded against in accordance with the provision of S. 319 of the Code. Such is the view of the Apex Court in the cases of Sohan Lal (supra), Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, 1993 Cri LJ 1700 : (1993 AIR SCW 7711) and Girish Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1996 Cri LJ 2159 : AIR 1996 SC 3098 . In view of the clear provision of law and the principle settled by the Apex Court, the above-noted argument of the petitioner is not acceptable that since he was not charge-sheeted as an accused by the Investigating Agency and as he was not added as an accused in the committal enquiry by the Magistrate, therefore, he cannot be added as an accused under S. 319. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner further argued that evidence of the prosecutrix and her mother, in this case is neither credible nor sufficient to rope in the petitioner as an accused. On perusal of such evidence and prima facie appreciation of the same, without expressing any further opinion, this Court rejects that contention inasmuch as their evidence is sufficient to warrant an action under sub-section (1) of S. 319 of the Code. ( 10 ) AS noted at the outset of this judgment the requirement of law under sub-section (1) of S. 319 is not to be invoked unless the trial Court thinks it necessary in the interest of justice to proceed against such person by invoking the power under S. 319 of the Code because such power should be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and not in a casual or regular manner. In this case, the victim of rape, right from the date of her recovery made allegation against the petitioner and yet the petitioner could manage to escape the clutches of the law at the initial stage (i. e. at the stage of filing of final form ). In this case, the victim of rape, right from the date of her recovery made allegation against the petitioner and yet the petitioner could manage to escape the clutches of the law at the initial stage (i. e. at the stage of filing of final form ). A handicapped girl supported by a blind father and helpless mother cannot repose confidence in the criminal justice system if a person after exploiting her sexually is not included in the trial calling upon him to answer the charges. That is the exceptional circumstance where petitioner allegedly committed such an immoral or highly objectionable act of ravishing a handicapped girl in a cruel manner and, therefore, this Court is satisfied that there exists sufficient reasons to proceed against the petitioner. ( 11 ) THE aforesaid consideration of the matter prompted this Court to reject the prayer of the petitioner and accordingly the criminal revision is dismissed revision dismissed.