VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. ( 1 ) BY this order I propose to dispose of I. A. No. 8038/98 filed on behalf of Plaintiffunder Section, 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking the issuance of adirection to Defendants 2. and 3 to deposit the Court fee for drawing up the decree. l. A. No. 8039/98 has been filed on behalf of Defendant No. 6 and is a reproductionverbatim, of the other application. A Reply to I. A. 8038/98 has been filed on behalf ofdefendants 2 and 3. ( 2 ) THE objection raised on behalf of Defendants 2 and 3 is that the application isnot maintainable as the case has been decided on 7. 5. 1996. It has also been statedthat all the parties have filed appeals against the judgment passed, and these arepending before a Division Bench of this Court. It is further, submitted that thejudgment has varied the terms of compromise arrived at between the parties and hasincreased the liability of Defendants 2 and 3 against their consent. To this extent it ishonest. ( 3 ) THE question of the legality of the judgment, insofar as it is impermissible for thecourt to vary the consent terms, is a matter which is to be appropriately agitatedbefore the Division Bench which is seized with the Appeals. I would, therefore, notventure further into this province. Suffice it to mention that the following cases havebeen relied upon, namely, Kaluram Bheruji Vs. Bai Parvati. AIR 1982 Gujarat 233,which states that a decreed passed on the basis of a compromise altered by thecourt would be a nullity. In Pioneer Engineering Co. Vs. D. H. Machine Tools, AIR1986 Delhi 165, it has been held that the court cannot enlarge time fixed bycompromise between the parties. Similar pronouncements had earlier been made injaynal Haldar Vs. Khorsed Sheikh, AIR 1982 Calcutta 118. ( 4 ) IT is contended by learned counsel for Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 that the terms ofthe compromise have been varied unilaterally by the Court thereby enlarging the sumof Rs. 15,000. 00 to Rs. 1,25,000. 00. The contesting non-Applicants had recorded theirconsent keeping in view the sum of Rs. 15,000. 00. It is for this reason that the Court feehas not been paid. Reliance has also been placed on T. E. K. Muhammed Amiruddinvs. T. R. Muhammad lbrahim and Ors. 15,000. 00 to Rs. 1,25,000. 00. The contesting non-Applicants had recorded theirconsent keeping in view the sum of Rs. 15,000. 00. It is for this reason that the Court feehas not been paid. Reliance has also been placed on T. E. K. Muhammed Amiruddinvs. T. R. Muhammad lbrahim and Ors. , AIR 1957 Madras 667, in which it has beenobserved as under : "i may add that I agree that the direction in the further order of the lowercourt, dated 11. 2. 1954 making the Plaintiff liable to pay the additional courtfee of Rs. 500 in case this civil revision petition was not allowed, in spite ofthe suit being dismissed, as requested for by both sides, as not pressed, waswithout jurisdiction, as urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, thoughthe point is only of academic interest in the view I have taken. No Court cancompel any party t6 pay the additional court- fee, even if rightly levied, whenhe does not want to pay it, for whatever reason, and is willing to have the suitdismissed for such default. THE penalty for not paying the additional court-fee due is the dismissal of thesuit, even with the costs of the other side if it is on record and presses for it. After the dismissal of the suit for such default (and not on merits) there is nojurisdiction in the Court to levy the court-fee from him by coercive process, orto proceed against him for contempt for not paying the balance of court-feedue. The Court could have refused to dismiss it on request till court-fee waspaid and dismissed it for default of payment. In hundreds of cases, Plaintiffsand others fail to pay the additional court-fee really due, and the only penaltythey incur is the dismissal of their suit or proceeding and the forfeiture of thecourt-fee already paid. I have never heard of any coercive process being taken against a plaintiff forrecovering the additional court-fee by sale of his properties or by his arrest. The suit is simply dismissed for default of payment of the additional court-fee,even when it is really due. I have never heard of any coercive process being taken against a plaintiff forrecovering the additional court-fee by sale of his properties or by his arrest. The suit is simply dismissed for default of payment of the additional court-fee,even when it is really due. In a recent case, a Bench of this Court, to which Itoo was a party, has held that even where a Court has spent much time andenergy and passed an order in final decree proceedings in a partition suit,and that decree has to be drawn up stamp paper, in order to be executable the Court has no power to draw up the final decree and levy coerciveprocess, against the parties liable, for recovering that stamp amount, andthat the Court is only given the liberty not to draw up the final decree if therequisite stamp paper is not furnished. SO, the lower Court could have merely refused to dismiss the suit, on 11. 2. 1954, on the request by both the parties, unless the additional court-fee waspaid, and could have dismissed it for default of payment of the additionalcourt-fee if this civil revision petition had been dismissed, and the additionalcourt-fee was held to be due. It could never have resorted to coercive orcontempt proceedings to recover the additional court-fee, even if it was heldto be due in this civil revision petition. If is not a case akin to recovering thecourt-fee in a pauper suit for which there is a specific provision in the Civilprocedure Code, whereas there is no such provision for coercive recovery incases like these. " I am in respectful agreement with the ratio of this judgment. No orders of the natureprayed for in both these applications can be passed. If Court Fee is not paid the suitmay be dismissed. ( 5 ) BOTH the applications are rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.