GOPALA GOWDA, J. ( 1 ) IN these petitions similar facts and the question of law are raised by the petitioners though the petitioners are different, the respondents are one and the same and both these petitions were heard together and the impugned judgment is common passed by the first Additional city Civil Judge, who is the Appellate authority under the provisions of Public Premises of Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1971 and Rules framed thereunder (herein after referred as PP (EOUC) act and Rules for short ). Therefore this Court pass the following common judgment in this case. ( 2 ) THE petitioners in both these Writ Petitions have challenged the impugned orders passed by the second respondent-Estate Officer and the appellate authority in MA. Nos. 70 and 78/91 dated 12-08-1998 under the PP (EOUC) Act and Rules. ( 3 ) IN the first Writ Petition, the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent is dated 28-08-1991 and in the connected Writ petition, the impugned order passed by the Estate Officer is 28-3-1991. The appellate authority's common order is dated 28. 08. 1998 urging various facts and legal contentions. ( 4 ) THE relevant and necessary brief facts for appreciating and considering the respective parties cases are stated hereunder: the petitioner in W. P. NO. 28470/1998 running a training institute claims that it is a tenant under the Bank of India when the same was a Banking Company under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings Act, 1970) (hereinafter referred to bc (ATOU) Act) ever since from the date of construction of the building in the year 1963 continue to be tenant even after the said bank was nationalised under the provisions of the BC (ATOU) Act. It is further stated by the petitioner that the first respondent-Bank of india has invited the petitioner to occupy the premises. It is stated that the building in question where the petitioners were in occupation consists of four floors. The petitioner in the first petition is in accommodation of a portion of the second floor. There are other two tenants in the third floor of the building. The first floor of the building is occupied by the New India Assurance Company (hereinafter referred to Company' in short ). Except the petitioner and two other occupants and the 'company', the whole floor is occupied by the first respondent Bank. There are other two tenants in the third floor of the building. The first floor of the building is occupied by the New India Assurance Company (hereinafter referred to Company' in short ). Except the petitioner and two other occupants and the 'company', the whole floor is occupied by the first respondent Bank. ( 5 ) IT is further stated by the petitioner in the first petition that it is wholly and fully dependant on its office for operation in Bangalore for carrying on with the training activities. In so far as the petitioner in the connected Writ Petition is concerned it is also a company incorporated under the companies Act of 1956, having its registered office at Baroda. The petitioner's main office is situated in the building of the first respondent-bank at No. 11, K. G. Road, which is in occupation of a portion of the third floor measuring 213 sq fts. on rental basis. It is also contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this company is in occupation of the premises from the year 1963. Both the petitioners have stated that they have been regularly paying the rents towards the building which has been under their occupation to the first respondent Bank. ( 6 ) THE first respondent Bank has initiated the proceedings under the Provisions of the PP (EUOC) Act of 1971 against the petitioners. Prior to initiating the proceedings under the PP (EOUC) Act of 1971 the bank has issued a notice on 6-7-1990 to the petitioners terminating the tenancy of its occupation with effect from 6-7-1990 and further called upon it to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the respective portions of the premises to the Bank. The said notice was duly served on the petitioners and they have replied to the notices through their counsel. In the reply statement, it has been contended by them that the notices of termination of tenancies of the petitioners got issued by the bank to them is bad in law. The first respondent Bank not having satisfied with the explanation given to the notice of terminations served upon the petitioners. The second respondent initiated proceedings at the instance of the first- respondent Bank under the PP (EOUC) Act, 1971 and Rules referred to above by issuing the notices under Section 4 of the PP (EOUC) act to the petitioners. The first respondent Bank not having satisfied with the explanation given to the notice of terminations served upon the petitioners. The second respondent initiated proceedings at the instance of the first- respondent Bank under the PP (EOUC) Act, 1971 and Rules referred to above by issuing the notices under Section 4 of the PP (EOUC) act to the petitioners. ( 7 ) THE petitioners have submitted a detailed reply to the said show cause notice issued under Section 4 of the PPEUO Act, inter alia raising various contentions contending that the initiation of proceedings under the said Act is bad in law. They further contended that termination of their tenancy in respect of their respective portions of the premises was not proper and the assets of the bank having been vested with the Directors of the Bank under the provisions of the BC (ATOU) Act 1970, and therefore the issuance of notices to them through the Advocate of the first-respondent Bank was not legal and valid in law. They have further contended that the alleged need of the premises of the first respondent Bank which has been in occupation of the petitioners was totally non-existed and further if an order of eviction would be granted by the second respondent in the proceedings initiated by him, against them they would be put to irreparable loss and great hardship. ( 8 ) IN so far as allegations made in the show cause notice regarding the alleged sub-lease of the premises in respect of the petitioner in the connected Writ Petition which is in its occupation is also denied by it. The second respondent not having satisfied with the reply statement submitted to notice sent by him to the petitioners, he has proceeded to conduct an enquiry as contemplated under section 5 of the PP (EOUC) Act and relevant Rules thereunder. On 20-11-1990, the proceedings were conducted by the second respondent and the evidence of the petitioners was recorded by him. It is contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners that the first respondent's Bank counsel in both the proceedings against the petitioners has stated that it has no arguments to be advanced on behalf of the bank. It is further stated that the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners addressed arguments and time was given by the Estate Officer for the parties to file written arguments. It is further stated that the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners addressed arguments and time was given by the Estate Officer for the parties to file written arguments. In support of this contention, the proceedings of the Estate Officer at Annexure-C is produced. As per Annexure-D written arguments were submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. It is further stated in the written arguments, a specific contention was urged stating that there is no evidence of the bank on record before the Estate Officer to prove its requirements as had been held in the W. A. No. 2040/ 1989 by this Court. It is further stated that the Estate Officer, thereafter sent the copy of the affidavit of the Regional Manager mrs. Ranjana Kumar on behalf of the Bank to the petitioners, for which affidavit the petitioners submitted their objections as per annexure-E. It is stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that, despite serious objections filed by the petitioners to the said affidavit referred to above, the Estate Officer has taken into consideration of the said affidavit while passing the impugned orders by him against them without considering the statement of objection filed by them. It is further stated by the petitioners that the said orders of the second respondent were challenged by them by filing appeals in Misc. Appeal No 70/91 and 78/91 respectively before the First Additional City Civil Judge who is the Appellate Authority under the PP (EOUC) Act, 1971 urging various legal grounds in the appeals. ( 9 ) IT is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that during the pendency of the appeals before the Appellate Authority, the Government of India. In exercise of its powers issued certain guidelines under the BC (ATOU) Act, which were reiterated by reserve Bank of India, therefore is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the respondent-Bank without adhering to the guidelines has got proceedings initiated under the provisions of the pp (EOUC) Act and Rules against the petitioners and got orders passed through the Estate officer against them for evicting them from their respective portions of the premises. ( 10 ) IT is also further contended by them that, the constitutional validity of PP (EOUC) Act has been affirmed by the Constitutional bench of the Apex Court reported in the case of ASHOKA marketing LTD. ( 10 ) IT is also further contended by them that, the constitutional validity of PP (EOUC) Act has been affirmed by the Constitutional bench of the Apex Court reported in the case of ASHOKA marketing LTD. , vs PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ORS. It is contended by them stating that, after the pronouncement of the judgment in the aforesaid case, the Bombay High Court has taken a contrary view in that regard. This Court during the pendency of the litigation before the Apex Court, it has passed an order in the similar proceedings arising out of the Act following the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the Writ Petition of the year 1992 stating that the order directing the Proceedings to be concluded but eviction order passed against the occupants shall not be given effect to as the Constitutional validity of the PP (EOUC) Act is being further examined afresh by the Apex Court. Copy of the said Supreme court order is produced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in first petition vide Annexure-J. It is further contended by them that both the Estate Officer as well as the Appellate Authority have not considered and answered the legal questions raised in the Appeals with regard to the applicability of the provisions of the PP (EOUC) act and further, the first respondent-Bank has not applied the guidelines issued by the Government of India which guidelines have been reiterated by the Reserve Bank of India. Therefore, the second respondent and the Appellate Authority have failed to discharge their statutory duty while passing the impugned orders and further, urged the legal grounds contending that Section 8 of the BC (AOTU) Act of 1970 is mandatory on the part of the respondent-Bank to follow the guidelines in letter and spirit as the Government of India and the reserve Bank of India directed all public sector banks to follow and implement the guidelines strictly as the guidelines issued by the government of India have got statutory force. In support of this legal contention, strong reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel mr. M. S. Prasad for the petitioner in the first petition upon the judgements of the Apex Court reported in 1992 (2) SCC 672 , AIR 1996 SC 276 , AIR 1997 SC 1952 . In support of this legal contention, strong reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel mr. M. S. Prasad for the petitioner in the first petition upon the judgements of the Apex Court reported in 1992 (2) SCC 672 , AIR 1996 SC 276 , AIR 1997 SC 1952 . Further, specific plea was raised that termination of tenancy was not proper as the said notice was not got issued either under the instructions of the competent authority or the power of attorney holder of the competent authority as in the instant case, the termination of tenancy, notices were got issued by the Manager of the respondent-Bank. Elaborating his submission, it is contended that, Section 3 (g), 4 and 5 (1) of the BC (AOTU) Act of 1970, the authority for issuing termination of tenancy notice to the occupants vests with the Board of Director of the first-respondent bank, the termination notices were got issued by the Manager without producing the authority to get notices are issued on behalf of the bank, both the Estate Officer as well as the Appellate Authority have not given a specific finding with regard to this legal contention urged by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners. But they have proceeded to pass the orders presuming that the Manager has got the power for issuing the notices without there being any evidence on record in support of the said finding recorded by them. Therefore, it is contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners that, the notices of termination were not issued either by the Board of Directors or on its behalf by giving authority in favour of the Bank manager by executing a power of attorney to get the notices issued and served upon the petitioners as required "under law. Therefore, the initiation of the proceedings by the Estate Officer under the provisions of PP (EOUC) Act, to pass an order of eviction against the petitioners, are bad in law. Therefore, the impugned orders passed against the petitioners for evicting them from their occupation of their respective premises, are liable to be quashed. ( 11 ) IT is also very vehemently submitted by learned Counsel Mr. Therefore, the impugned orders passed against the petitioners for evicting them from their occupation of their respective premises, are liable to be quashed. ( 11 ) IT is also very vehemently submitted by learned Counsel Mr. M. S. Prasad that, the Estate Officer has further erred in recording a finding in the absence of the evidence in support of the plea of the Bank regarding want of accommodation for it, the termination of their occupation of the premises of the petitioners is not only bar in law but also the claim of other Bank that they have got meager accommodation is only make-believe statement as. there was sufficient accommodation available for the Bank. Therefore, the claim of the Bank is contrary to law laid down by this Court and further, the Estate Officer has taken into consideration of the affidavit purported to have beep filed by the Regional Manager of the Bank before commencement of the proceedings as adverted to by the banks's Advocate are available in the proceedings. Therefore, the estate Officer was clearly biased by her conduct against them and further, the appointment of the Estate Officer for the purpose of initiating proceedings under the PP (EOUC) Act, 1971 is also bad in law as the Estate Officer being the Officer of the first respondent-Bank was a Zonal Manager had the personal interest in the properties of the Bank therefore, the conduct of the proceedings by the Estate officer the second respondent herein are vitiated on account of bias. In support of this contention, reliance is placed by the learned counsel mr. M. S. Prasad on the Judgments of the Apex Court reported in the case of STATE OF PUNJAB vs RAM LUBHAYA BAGGA2, ILR 1990 Kar 2962, para 5, 8 and 16, AIR 1985 SC 1651 paras 9, 10 and 11, AIR 1987 SC 454 paras 11 and 16. Therefore, the initiation of proceedings by the Estate Officer from the beginning till passing of the impugned orders of eviction against the petitioners in respect of the premises which is in their occupation are vitiated in law and hence they have urged that the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. ( 12 ) FURTHER it is urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that all the above said legal contentions were urged before the appellate Authority under the Act. ( 12 ) FURTHER it is urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that all the above said legal contentions were urged before the appellate Authority under the Act. But he has failed to take into consideration of any one of the legal grounds referred to above and answered the same in the impugned Judgment passed by him. Therefore it is urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that he has not applied his mind to the legal contentions urged in the appeals and has failed to look into the records properly and passed the impugned order holding that the appeals filed by the petitioners are barred by time though the plea of limitation was not either raised by the office or the respondent-Bank and no argument was advanced in that regard. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the appeals filed by the petitioners were not barred by limitation as they were filed within 12 days from the date of receipt of the orders of the Estate Officer. The Appellate Authority has failed to consider the merits of the case and not answered the legal issued raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and simply he has endorsed the orders passed by the Estate Officer without considering the documents produced by the petitioners to show that, the Bank has not placed any material evidence to show that there was need for the additional accommodation by the Bank and further, the authority of the Manager of the Bank in getting the notices issued through its advocate was not with him and further, after the evidence was concluded, the Estate officer has furnished the copy of the affidavit of the Bank officer to the petitioners calling upon them to file their statement of objections for which the petitioners have filed a detailed objection statement traversing all the averments of the affidavit sworn to by the Officer specifically contending that the said affidavit was not available in the proceedings. Therefore, it has contended by the learned Counsel that the Estate Officer was biased in conducting the proceedings and further the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Alembic Chemicals Mr. Therefore, it has contended by the learned Counsel that the Estate Officer was biased in conducting the proceedings and further the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Alembic Chemicals Mr. G. S. Bhat submits that, the request was made on behalf of the petitioner to the Estate Officer to provide opportunity to cross-examine the said person who was the regional Manager who has sworn to the affidavit and to place evidence in support of its case which has not been given therefore, there is violation of principles of natural justice. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1986 SC 180 , air 1958 SC 1528 for the proposition that the proceedings conducted by the Estate Officer and Passing of the order by him are in blatant violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners would submit that, the impugned orders passed by the Estate Officer and the Appellate authority are liable to be quashed. ( 13 ) PER contra, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents Sri C. B. Srinivasan has sought to justify the impugned orders contending that the termination of notice is legal and valid for the reason that, after the respondent-Bank was Nationalised under the provisions of BC (AOTU) Act, 1970, under the authority of the manager of the first respondent-Bank the petitioners continued in occupation of their respective premises even after the application of the PP (EOUC) Act to trie immovable properties of the Bank. Therefore, it is urged on behalf of the bank that it is not open for the petitioners to contend that issuance of termination notices to them terminating their authority to continuation of the premises at the instance of the Manager of the Bank is not legal and valid. Therefore, it is urged on behalf of the bank that it is not open for the petitioners to contend that issuance of termination notices to them terminating their authority to continuation of the premises at the instance of the Manager of the Bank is not legal and valid. If that contention is accepted, the occupation of their respective premises in question would also be unauthorised as there was no authority given either by the Board of Directors of the Bank or by the power of attorney holder of the Board of Directors in favour of the Manager of the bank who has permitted the petitioners to continue their occupation and further it is contended that, reasons are assigned in the termination notice dated 6-7-1990 stating that, as a matter of fact, the original term of tenancy has long back expired. They stated that, the petitioners have continued to occupy the premises as a tenant holding-over by them from month to month occupation according to Gregarian Calendar. Further it is stated that the Bank is in need of the premises which are in occupation of the petitioners for its bona fide and reasonable occupation as there has been rapid growth in its Banking business and as it has got large number of branches than it had during the previous years. It is stated that the Bank required the entire premises for its use which was under the occupation of the petitioners therefore it is stated in the termination notice that Bank does not want to continue the petitioners occupation of the premises any more, therefore, their tenancy is terminated with effect from midnight of 31-7-1990. Further it is stated that, failure on the part of the petitioners to deliver the vacant possession of the premises to the Bank, they will be in unauthorised occupation in terms of Section 2 (g) of the PP (EOUC) Act and the bank would be compelled to initiate proceedings under the Act for their eviction as the premises in question is required for the Bank. It is also further stated that the-petitioners failure to vacate and deliver the vacant possession of their respective premises to the Bank, its banking activity in particular and the interest of the public would be affected. It is also further stated that the-petitioners failure to vacate and deliver the vacant possession of their respective premises to the Bank, its banking activity in particular and the interest of the public would be affected. Further it is stated that, the demands made by the Bank in the notices are not complied with by the petitioners and the payments that would be made by the petitioners will be accepted towards the damages for their use arid occupation and the Bank would be entitled for recovery of penal rent from them under the provisions of the Act from the date of unauthorised occupation. Further, these aspects of the matter have been taken into consideration by the Estate Officer and the orders have been passed by him against the petitioners. Further, the learned Counsel for the Bank submits placing reliance on the Judgments of this Court and the Apex Court that the reliance placed upon the guidelines by the petitioners counsel have no statutory force as the same have not been issued by the Govt. of india under the provisions of the PP (EOUC) Act. Even according to the petitioners, the said guidelines have been purported to have been issued by the Govt. of India in exercise of its powers under section 8 of the BC (AOTU) Act the same shall not take away the statutory provisions of the PP (EOUC) Act and the right conferred upon the Bank to initiate proceedings against the Unauthorised occupants of the public premises as defined under the Act and evict them from the premises either for its own requirement grant permission to other persons by way of license for their occupation for better license fee after inviting application against the public notification in the interest of public at large. Therefore, non-consideration of the guidelines either by the Appellate Authority or by the Estate Officer do not vitiate the orders passed by them against the petitioners, in respect of the premises which are in their occupation. ( 14 ) THE learned Counsel Mr. Therefore, non-consideration of the guidelines either by the Appellate Authority or by the Estate Officer do not vitiate the orders passed by them against the petitioners, in respect of the premises which are in their occupation. ( 14 ) THE learned Counsel Mr. C. B. Srinivasan placed reliance upon the judgments reported in, STATE OF PUNJAB vs RAM LUBHAYA bagga supra reliance is placed on paragraph 25 in this judgment to show that the policy of the Union of India with regard to eviction of unauthorised occupants of the public premises under the Act is the policy of the Government shall not be questioned by issuing the guidelines as the same would take away the right conferred upon the Bank for initiating the proceedings and evicting the unauthorised occupants from the public premises under the provisions of the pp (EOUC) Act, 1970 for the reasons stated supra. He has also placed reliance on the Judgments of the Apex Court reported in the case of UNITED BANK OF INDIA vs NARENDRA KUMAR AND ors. for the proposition that the law that the suits instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation like Bank, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality of issuance of the notices of termination are not by the Competent authority in law as contended by the petitioners. Further reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the respondents upon the judgment reported in the case of TELECOM EMPLOYEES CO-OPERATIVE housing SOCIETY LTD. vs SCHEDULED CASTES, SCHEDULED tribes, MINORITY COMMUNITIES AND BACKWARD CLASSES improvement CENTRE with reference to the guidelines interpreting Section 37 and 38 of The Bangalore Development authority Act, 1976 (herein after referred to BDA Act in short ). The division Bench of this Court has laid down the law, for the proposition of law holding that the Authority must exercise its power under the provisions of the Act. The division Bench of this Court has laid down the law, for the proposition of law holding that the Authority must exercise its power under the provisions of the Act. The State Government in exercise of its power under Section 37 of the BDA Act transferred the lands which is subject to the conditions not only to be imposed but also has provided to achieve the scheme in the Act, and further rebutting the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners with regard to the allegation of bias made against the Estate Officer at the stage of submitting explanation itself by the petitioners to the show-cause notices issued under Section 4 of the PP (EOUC) Act by him and also statement of objections filed to the affidavit furnished by the enquiry Officer to the petitioners before the matter was set down for submitting the written submissions. The learned Counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of A. M. ABDUL RAHMAN vs JAYARAM interpreting section 24 of CPC, dealing with allegation of bias, wherein this Court, has held that it is only the apprehension which right minded persons entertain against a Judge that can be regarded as a ground for holding that the Judge is really bias, that mere surmise or conjecture is not enough and there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the Judge favoured one side unfairly at the expense of the other. In this case, merely because the Estate Officer was the Regional Manager of the bank, therefore he will have interest in the immovable property of the Bank, and the allegation of bias cannot be attributed against him for the reason that Section 2 (b) of the PP (EOUC) Act 1971 defines 'estate Officer' as 'an officer appointed as such by the Central government under Section 3'. Section 3 of the PP (EOUC) Act states that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official gazette appoint such persons, being Gazetted Officer or Officers of equivalent rank of the Statutory Authority, as it thinks fit to be Estate officers for the purposes of this Act. Section 3 of the PP (EOUC) Act states that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official gazette appoint such persons, being Gazetted Officer or Officers of equivalent rank of the Statutory Authority, as it thinks fit to be Estate officers for the purposes of this Act. The Regional Manager being equivalent to the Gazetted Officer, the Central Government in exercise of its power has appointed him as the Estate Officer of the Bank for the purpose of the provisions of the PP (EOUC) Act. Further, the allegation of bias made against the Estate Officer with reference to the affidavit which was furnished to the petitioners counsel calling upon them to submit their statement of objection to the said affidavit cannot be entertained at this stage as the said affidavit was filed by the bank after the proceedings were concluded and the cases were set down for submitting their written submissions and further learned counsel would submits that even if the affidavit filed by the first respondent-Bank is excluded from the proceedings, the orders passed by the second respondent and the appellate Authority can be sustained and further the contention urged is that the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the Appellate authority had not applied its mind to the material evidence on record at the time of passing the order on the question of limitation is also not tenable in law. The learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submits, with regard to the contention of the petitioners that the appellate Authority has not passed a reasoned order while dealing with their case. Referring to this contention, the learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the question of limitation was not raised by the bank; despite the fact that the appellate authority has considered that aspect of the matter and therefore he would fairly made submissions that this Court can examine the case on merits on the basis of material evidence on record instead of remitting back the matter to appellate authority having regard to the fact the considerable time has been taken by the petitioners in agitating these proceedings at various stages and they have not allowed to conclude the proceedings to get the premises by the bank for its Banking business which is again the public interest is involved in getting the premises for the bank. The learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the orders passed by the Estate Officer and the appellate authority are in conformity with the PP (EOUC) Act, and further submits that the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and the respondents require judicial scrutiny of the impugned orders can be made by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary supervisory power and jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the learned counsel for the Bank would submits that the petitions are liable to be dismissed as the impugned orders passed by the second respondents and the Appellate Authority are legal and valid in law, which need not be interfered with by this Court. ( 15 ) IN these petitions this Court vide its order dt. 25-9-98, after issuing notice regarding rule, directed the respondent-Bank to file an affidavit stating that the Bank does not propose to rent out the premises in the occupation of the petitioners and that it has taken or taking steps for eviction of the occupants of the first floor. In pursuant to the direction of this Court the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has filed an affidavit of M. S. Bhanuprakash, S/o late M. Seetharamaiah, who is working as a Manager of the Bank, on 16-3-99 and by way of statement of objection on behalf of the bank sworn to by S. N. Shanbhouge, Assistant General Manager of the Bangalore Main Branch giving particulars at paragraph 3, the details of eviction of various tenants. At paragraph 4, it is stated after the eviction of the tenants from the second and 4th floors of the premises of the Bank of India has occupied by it. Further it is stated that the entire second floor is occupied by Banks Service branch, India Card Department High Tech, Union Office. The entire 4th floor is occupied by the Bank of India Drafts payable Section, stationery Room, Sports Room, and Staff Credit Society. Annexure-R1 is produced by the Bank to show the communication of Reserve bank of India to it stating that on 3-2-99, the Reserve Bank of India has issued licence authorising the Bank for opening Zonal Office in the Metropolitan Center in Bangalore and the licence is also produced at Annexure-R2. On 22-02-99 the zonal office has been opened. Annexure-R1 is produced by the Bank to show the communication of Reserve bank of India to it stating that on 3-2-99, the Reserve Bank of India has issued licence authorising the Bank for opening Zonal Office in the Metropolitan Center in Bangalore and the licence is also produced at Annexure-R2. On 22-02-99 the zonal office has been opened. A specific statement is made at paragraph 6 of the Bank referred to above stating that the first respondent does not propose to rent out the premises in the occupation of the petitioner. It proposes to occupy it for its own additional use and requirement. At paragraph 7, it is stated that, in respect of the premises occupied by the New India assurance Company (hereinafter referred to 'company' in short) the first respondent has been asking the said Company to vacate and deliver possession of the premises, by its letter dt. 5-7-88 vide annexure-R4. Again a request was made by the Bank on 4-8-88 as per Annexure-R5. No formal steps for eviction of the 'company' are initiated. The 1st respondent has again addressed a letter to the said company dt. 1-2-99 as per Annexure-R6, and further it is stated that the said company being public sector undertaking, administrative efforts are being made to secure possession of the premises without resort to eviction proceedings against the said company. Further, it is stated that inspite of reasonable requests made by the Bank the said company has not complied with the request of the first respondent therefore an appropriate legal action will be initiated against it and even that premises will be required for the use and occupation by the first respondent and it does not propose to rent out to any person which is in occupation of the 'company'. It is stated that the Bank has occupied 1st floor of Jyothi Mahal in an approximate area of 1225 Sq. Feet and it is paying a monthly rent of Rs. 10,584/- and other connected charged of Rs. 360/- every month. In the interim order of this Court, the petitioner-Datamatics corporation is paying rent of Rs. 379. 50/- only which is very meagre compared to the rent of Rs. 11,000/- paid by the bank to its land-lord whereas the petitioners are paying rent about Rs. 10,584/- and other connected charged of Rs. 360/- every month. In the interim order of this Court, the petitioner-Datamatics corporation is paying rent of Rs. 379. 50/- only which is very meagre compared to the rent of Rs. 11,000/- paid by the bank to its land-lord whereas the petitioners are paying rent about Rs. 950/- p. m. Therefore, the learned Counsel submits that in pursuant to the direction issued by this Court, an under taking is given to this Court by the Bank that the premises which is under occupation of the petitioners would be utilised for running its banking activity and further steps are being taken to evict the 'company' from the premises of the Bank. Therefore, the learned Counsel for respondents submits that viewing the case from this angle also this is not a fit matter for this Court to interfere with the impugned orders in exercise of its extraordinary and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. ( 16 ) IN these Petitions, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties were heard at length on the basis of the pleadings and legal submission made by the learned Counsel for the parties. The following points would arise for consideration of this Court to examine the legality and validity of the orders passed, by the Estate Officer and the Appellate Authority. 1. Whether the impugned orders passed by the Estate officer and Appellate Authority are vitiated for not having issued notice by the Board of Directors or any authorised person on this behalf as contended by the petitioners? 2. Whether the impugned orders are vitiated for not having applied the guidelines issued by Govt. of India, purported to have exercised its power under Section 3 and 8 of Banking Companies acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings, Act 1970 3. Whether the impugned orders passed by the Estate officer is biased or the same are in violation of the principles of natural justice as urged by the petitioners? 4. of India, purported to have exercised its power under Section 3 and 8 of Banking Companies acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings, Act 1970 3. Whether the impugned orders passed by the Estate officer is biased or the same are in violation of the principles of natural justice as urged by the petitioners? 4. What Order?i have perused the termination notices got issued by the 1st respondent-Bank to the petitioners, I have extracted the relevant factual aspects with regard to the occupation of the respective premises by the petitioners and the entire proceedings conducted by the second respondent and the legal submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties with regard to the various aspects which I have extracted extensively in the preceding paragraphs of this Judgment. ( 17 ) IT is an undisputed fact that both the petitioners are in occupation of the premises in question from in the year 1963. It is not the case of the petitioners that after the BC (ATOU) Act, 1970 was enacted, by the Parliament and first respondent was Nationalised the property in question has been owned by the 1st respondent-Bank. The PP (EOUC) Act of 1971 has come into force with effect from 23rd August 1971 and the provisions of this Act was made applicable to the Immovable property of the Bank. It is the case of the petitioners that they have been in occupation as tenants from the year 1963 and even after the PP (EOUC) Act of 1971 came into force. In pursuant to definition of Section 2 (e) of the Act referred above, the property in question is a public premises owned by the 1st respondent-Bank. It is not the case of the petitioners that Board of Directors have given authority to them to continue in occupation of their respective portions of the premises after the same was transferred to the 1st respondent-Bank in pursuant to the Provisions of the BC (AOTU) Act and it is also public premises as stated above. In pursuant to the permission accorded by the Branch Manager of the 1st respondent-Bank to the petitioners, they have continued in occupation and possession of their respective premises claiming that they are the tenants of the same. In pursuant to the permission accorded by the Branch Manager of the 1st respondent-Bank to the petitioners, they have continued in occupation and possession of their respective premises claiming that they are the tenants of the same. No doubt, the bank also stated that they are tenants, admittedly, in view of the law laid down by supreme Court reported in AIR 1991 SC 855 referred to supra the apex Court, interpreted the concept of tenancy and categorically stated in the said judgment, and the Apex Court has held that between Rent Control Act and the PP (EOUC) Act, 1971 the later act is a special enactment and the provisions of the said act are applicable to premises of the Bank as it is a public premises as defined under Section 2 (e) of the PP (EOUC) Act and further it is under the authority of the Manager of the 1st respondent-Bank, the petitioners have continued in occupation of the premises in question, therefore, it is not open for petitioners to turn round and contend at this length of time after 1971 till 1990 after 19 long years of period contending that the Manager of the Bank has no authority for getting notices of termination of their occupation issued through its counsel as the first respondent-Bank's Board Directors has not given Authority to him to get the notices issued to the petitioners for determining termination of alleged tenancy in respect of the premises in question in exercise of its power under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property act as per the directions issued by this Court in case of INDIAN bank vs BLAZE AND CENTRAL (P) LTD. , as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. This contention of the petitioners is not tenable for the following reasons. Section 2 (g) of the PP (EOUC) act of 1971, defines 'unauthorised occupation, in relation to any public premises, which means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. ' No doubt, no document is produced by the first respondent either before the Estate officer or before this Court to show that the Manager was duly authorised by the Board of Directors of the Bank to get notices issued to the Petitioners terminating the tenancy in respect of the premises in occupation of the petitioners, to determine the authority given to the petitioners, to continue in possession of the premises. The manager of the 1st respondent-Bank undisputedly has permitted the petitioners to continue in occupation of the premises after the said act of 1971 was made applicable to the premises in question for which the petitioners were regularly paying either rent, or licence fee or towards the charges of the occupation of the premises. The notices got issued through the Advocate of the Bank represented by its Manager either Under Section 106 of T. P. Act or Under Section 2 (g) of the PP (EOUC) Act may be a procedural irregularity which is a curable defect in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment at paragraphs 9 and 10 in case of UNITED BANK OF india vs NARESH KUMAR AND ORS. supra which judgment with all fours is applicable to the facts of this case. The said paragraphs are extracted as hereunder:"9. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporations public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable. ""10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name under Order 6 Rule 14 of code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the" pleadings on behalf of the company. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the" pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6, Rule 14 together with Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and dehors Order 29, Rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the Provisions of Order 6, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example, by the board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney befng executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer. "at paragraph 9 of the above said judgment, the Apex Court has made certain observations stating that suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. "at paragraph 9 of the above said judgment, the Apex Court has made certain observations stating that suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause and further observed that there is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure, that injustice is not done to any party, if such party shows a just case and further held that as far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable. Further the Apex Court with reference to Order 6 rule 14 of the CPC a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company under Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, therefore provides that in a suit by or against a Corporation the Secretary or any Director or other principal Officer of the Corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Considering the said provisions of CPC the Apex Court has stated that 'a person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company for example, by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the company had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer. The observation and law laid down at paragraphs 9 and 10 in the aforesaid judgment with all fours applicable to the facts of the case. The observation and law laid down at paragraphs 9 and 10 in the aforesaid judgment with all fours applicable to the facts of the case. Having regard to the facts of the case which are referred to above, the Apex Court as stated in the aforesaid judgment that public interest should not permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. At this stage, it is relevant to make an observation in this case that premises in question is a public premises owned by the respondent-Bank. The Apex Court in case of MAHESH CHANDRA vs REGIONAL MANAGER, U. P. FINANCIAL corporation AND ORS. interpreting provisions of Sections 24, 29 and 31 of SFC Act, 1951 has referred to, at paragraph 19, various judgments of the Supreme Court viz. , FERTILIZER CORPORATION kamgar UNION (REGD), SINDRI vs UNION OF INDIA, RAM AND shyam CO. vs STATE OF HARYANA and dealing with facts of the case with reference to inadequacy of bid amount, the Apex Court has held that 'that the State failed to discharge its administrative functions fairly and unfair treatment was meted out to the appellant violating the principles of fair play in action. Further, referring to the judgment's referred to above the Apex Court has laid down the law at paragraph 19 and 20 in MAHESH CHANDRA's case which are extracted as hereunder: "19. In fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri v union of India, (1981) 2 SCR 52 : ( AIR 1981 SC 344 ), this Court clearly said that, "we want to make it clear that we do do not doubt the bona fides of the Authorities, but as far as possible sales of public property, when the intention is to get the best price, ought to take place publicly. The vendors are not necessarily bound to accept the highest or any other offer, but the public atleast get satisfied that the Government has put all its cards on the table. " In Ram and. Shyam Co. The vendors are not necessarily bound to accept the highest or any other offer, but the public atleast get satisfied that the Government has put all its cards on the table. " In Ram and. Shyam Co. vs State of Haryana, 1985 supp (1) SCR 541: ( AIR 1985 SC 1147 ), this Court held that unilateral offer summarily made, not correlated to any reserve price made by the fourth respondent after making full settlement in the matter was accepted without giving an opportunity to the appellant to raise the bid, as also inadequacy of his bid, it was held that the State failed to discharge its administrative functions fairly and unfair treatment was meted out to the appellant violating the principles of fair play in action. In Sachidanand Pandey vs. State of West Bengal, (1987) 2 SCR 223 : ( AIR 1987 SC 1109 at p. 1133), this Court held that:"on a consideration of the relevant cases cited at the bar the following propositions may be taken as well established: State owned or public-owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the executive. Certain precepts and principles have to be observed. Public interest is the paramount consideration. One of the methods of securing the public interest, when it is considered necessary to dispose of a property, is to sell the property by public auction or by inviting tenders. Though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule. There may be situations where there are compelling reasons necessitating departure from the rule but then the reasons for the departure must be rational and should not be suggestive of discrimination. Appearance of public justice is as important as doing justice. Nothing should be done which given an appearance of bias, jobbery or nepotism". In Haji T. M. Hassan vs Kerala Financial Corporation, (1988) 1 SCR 1079 : ( AIR 1988 SC 157 at p. 161), this Court further held thus:-"the public property owned by the State or by any instrumentality of the State should be generally sold by public auction or by inviting tenders. This Court has been insisting upon that rule, not only to get the highest price for the property but also to ensure fairness in the activities of the State and public authorities. They should undoubtedly act fairly. Their actions should be legitimate. Their dealings should be above board. This Court has been insisting upon that rule, not only to get the highest price for the property but also to ensure fairness in the activities of the State and public authorities. They should undoubtedly act fairly. Their actions should be legitimate. Their dealings should be above board. Their transactions should be without aversion or affection. Nothing should be suggestive of discrimination. Nothing should be done by them which gives an impression of bias, favouritism of nepotism. Ordinarily these factors would be absent if the matter is brought to public auction or sale by tenders. ""20. In Lakshmanasami Gounder vs. C. I. T. Selvamani, (1991) 2 Scale 966 : (1992 AIR SCW 551, Para 3), this Court by a Bench to which one of us (R. Rangaswamy, J. was a member) in the context of sale of debtor's property for recovery of the Government dues, held that sale officer has statutory duty and the responsibility to have the date and place of sale mentioned in the notice and given due publication in terms of the Act and the Rules. Public auction is one of the modes of sale intending to get highest competitive price for the property. Public auction also ensures fairness in actions of the public authorities or the sales officers who should act fairly, objectively and kindly. Their auction should be legitimate. Their dealing should be free from suspicion. The fair and objective public auction would relieve the public authorities or sale officers from the charge of bias, favouritism, nepotism or beset with suspicious features and of their accountability. "the premises being a public premises, therefore public have got interest upon the property in question. No doubt, the property has to be managed by the 1st respondent-Bank the provisions of PP (EOUC) act are applicable to the public premises owned by the 1st respondent-Bank. "the premises being a public premises, therefore public have got interest upon the property in question. No doubt, the property has to be managed by the 1st respondent-Bank the provisions of PP (EOUC) act are applicable to the public premises owned by the 1st respondent-Bank. There are no statutory rules framed by the Central government for alloting premises by the Bank either on lease or licence in favour of the persons granting the Authority for their occupation in the public premises of the bank in the absence of statutory rules, the law laid down by the Apex Court with regard to procedure required to be followed for either alienation of its property or giving premises either by way of licence or lease shall be for a limited period in the public interest and the same shall be given by issuing notification inviting application for granting the rights of occupation of the public premises in public auction to get either fair license fee or rent from the occupants. The public interest is being prime consideration for the bank as it is a Central Govt. public sector banking Company, it must be notified to the public stating that the premises will be given in favour of the persons either on licence or on lease by inviting tenders. Further, the premises shall not be given in favour of any person for indefinite period, then the fair licence fee or the charges payable in respect of public premises for their occupation will not be obtained by the first respondent-Bank. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to by the Apex Court in Mahesh Chandra's case, are applicable to the facts of this case as it is a public premises in terms of Section 2 (g) of the Act, 1971 and for the reason that the premises in question which has been in continuous occupation of the petitioners for more than 19 years after the provisions of the PP (EOUC) Act has made applicable to the premises in question paying either very meagre rent or licence fee would definitely affect the interest of public' as the fair rent or license fee is not obtained by the Bank by auctioning the right of occupation in public auction periodically in favour of persons to get fair and reasonable amount towards the premises in the larger interest of public. This Court has taken these relevant and factual aspects of the case in the interest of the public. For the abovesaid relevant reason even if there is procedural irregularity on the part of the Bank in not issuing the notices to the petitioners by the Board of Directors of the Bank or by its agent or by its power of attorney holder, the proceedings are not vitiated for the reason that the action of the bank in issuing notices to the petitioners has been impliedly ratified by the Board of Directors. Further, the judgment in naresh Kumar's case referred to supra, with all fours is applicable to the facts of this case, therefore, this Court need not exercise its extra-ordinary and suprevisory jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India to interfere with the impugned order, as it would affect the public interest. In addition to the aforesaid reasons the petitioners are estopped from contending that the Manager has no Authority to get the notices issued for termination of the authority of the petitioners occupation in respect of the premises for the reasons that they have continued in occupation of the premises as permitted by the Manager when the BC (A and TU) Act 1970 and pp (EOUC) Act 1971 have come into force in respect of the property in question was transferred in favour of the Bank and it is a public premises after PP (EOUC) Act, 1971 came into force if the contention of the petitioners as urged by them is accepted, then their occupation of the premises in question after the Act 1971 came into force would be without Authority of law as they were not permitted to continue in the occupation of the premises by the Board of Directors of the bank. For this reason also the contention urged by the petitioners contending the issuance of the notices of termination by the Manager of the Bank is not tenable in law. Therefore, this Court has to answer the 1st point in favour of 1st respondent-Bank for the reasons stated supra. In my view the procedural irregularity 1n the initiation of the proceedings against the petitioners is a curable defect which action of the Manager has been impliedly ratified by the Board of Directors. Therefore, this Court has to answer the 1st point in favour of 1st respondent-Bank for the reasons stated supra. In my view the procedural irregularity 1n the initiation of the proceedings against the petitioners is a curable defect which action of the Manager has been impliedly ratified by the Board of Directors. There is no evidence on record, produced/shown by the petitioners, that the manager had authority to accord the permission to the petitioners to continue them in occupation of the premises in question as contemplated under Section 2 (g) of the PP (EOUC) Act, the said action of the Manager of the Bank in permitting the petitioners to continue in occupation of Public Premises after the Acts referred to above were made, applicable to the property in question was also ratified by the Board of the Bank therefore, the submission made in this regard by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is not tenable. Therefore the submissions of the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners is not well founded, and the same cannot be accepted by this Court. On the other hand the submissions of the learned counsel C. B. Srinivasan that the issuance of notices through the advocate of 1st respondent Bank either under Section 106 of T. P. Act or Section 2 (g) of PP (EOUC) Act is perfectly legal and justifiable in law as laid down in the case referred to above and the same is well founded, hence the same must be accepted by this Court. Accordingly the first point is answered in favour of the 1st respondent-Bank and against the petitioners. ( 18 ) WITH reference to second legal submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, during the pendency of the appeals before the Appellate Court certain guidelines were issued by Government of India purported to be in exercise of its power under Section 3 and 8 of the BC (AOTU) Act 1970 which has been reiterated by the RBI, have got binding effect on the 1st respondent-Bank. In support of this submission the number of authorities have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners which authorities have been referred to in this Judgment, while noticing their submissions. Per contra, the learned Counsel, Mr. In support of this submission the number of authorities have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners which authorities have been referred to in this Judgment, while noticing their submissions. Per contra, the learned Counsel, Mr. C. B. Srinivasan, appearing for the 1st respondent-Bank placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1998 SC 1703 at paragraph 25 and reported in ILR 1990 Karnataka 3320 judgment of this Court at paragraph 28 which relevant paragraphs are extracted as hereunder respectively. "25 Now we revert to the last submission, whether the new state policy is justified in not reimbursing an employee, his full medical expenses incurred on such treatment, if incurred in any hospital in India not being a Government hospital in Punjab. Question is whether the new policy which is restricted by the financial constraints of the State to the rates in AIMS would be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. So far as questioning the validity of governmental policy is concerned in our view it is not normally within the domain of any Court, to weigh the pros and cons of the policy or to scrutinize it and test the degree of its beneficial or equitable disposition for the purpose of varying, modifying or annulling it, based on howsoever sound and good reasoning, except where it is arbitrary or violative of any constitutional statutory or any other provision of law. When government forms its policy, it is based on number of circumstances on facts, law including constraints based on its resources. It would be dangerous if Court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits. The Court would dissuade itself from entering into this realm which belongs to the executive. It is within this matrix that it is to be seen whether the new policy violates article 21 when it restricts reimbursement on account of its financial constraints""28. Coming to question No. 2 viz. , whether the Govt. have power to issue directions to make bulk allotment under Section 65 of the Act, it has already been seen that under Section 65 the Govt. is enabled to give directions to the BDA as are necessary or expedient, for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Coming to question No. 2 viz. , whether the Govt. have power to issue directions to make bulk allotment under Section 65 of the Act, it has already been seen that under Section 65 the Govt. is enabled to give directions to the BDA as are necessary or expedient, for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In Writ Petitions 17234/88 and 13818/90 the respondents-Societies are armed with the orders of the Government. It is argued by Sri a. N. Jayaram appearing for the respondent-Society in WP 13818/ 90, that Section 65 is not subject to any restrictions while Section 38 is so subject, and it is merely an administrative law, Fifth edition, Page 313, even if not made in good faith, must be held to be valid. As we stated above, if the power of the Government is available to direct the BDA to carry out the purposes of the Act, certainly a direction in disregard of the statutory provision cannot be issued. Such a direction is not permissible in law. Therefore, the question of good faith does not arise. In Wade's Administrative law, page 313, Lord Radcliffe's observations in the leading case smith vs EAST ELLOE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL-25- (1956 ac 736 @ 769) are quoted as follows: an order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. "but we are not here on good faith or bad faith. We are on the power whether available to the Government. Therefore, we reject this argument of Mr. Jayaram. Mr. Sampath Kumar, appearing for the respondent-Society in wp 17234/88 would draw our attention to Mazwell on interpretation of Statutes and urge that a beneficial construction must be put so as to advance further the case of the respondents-Societies having regard to the fact that they have involved themselves deeply and practically burnt their bones by spending considerable amounts of money, and therefore, a construction most agreeable to justice and reason must be adopted. At page 93 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, XII Edn, it is stated as follows:"wilberforce J, has held (at page 792) that the words in section 105 (1) (a) of the Housing Act 1957, "purposes. . . . . . necessary or desirable for, or incidential to, the development of the land as a building estate" have "nothing exclusive about them. " he rejected the submission that the land could not be sold under the powers contained in the Section for ancillary purposes beneficial to other land, and held that, the language of the Section being quite general, it could not be said that the provisions of schools was something which should be excluded from its scope. "page 199"presumption against intending what is inconvenient or unreasonable-In determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one. "an intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available. " where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. The question of inconvenience or unreasonableness must be looked at in the light of the state of affairs at the date of the passing of the statute, not in the light of subsequent events. "page 208:"a sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to well-settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead to the selection of one rather than the other of two reasonable interpretations. Whenever the language of the legislature admits of two constructions and, if construed in one way, would lead to obvious injustice, the Courts act upon the view that such a result could not have been intended, unless the intention to bring it about has been manifested in plain words. Whenever the language of the legislature admits of two constructions and, if construed in one way, would lead to obvious injustice, the Courts act upon the view that such a result could not have been intended, unless the intention to bring it about has been manifested in plain words. "if the Court is to avoid a statutory result that flouts common sense and justice it must do so not by disregarding the statute or overriding it, but by interpreting it in accordance with the judicially presumed parliamentary concern for common sense and justice. " But the possibility of injustice which leads the Court to adopt a particular construction must be a real one: if the injustices suggested in argument are purely hypothetical, and may never or only rarely occur in practice; the Court will remain unmoved. "we are afraid that these principles will have no application because, if the power is wholly unavailable we cannot supply that in the guise of interpretation. He quotes Bengal Immunity co. vs State of Bihar-16- and particularly refers to Head-note (c) and we extract the same :"when an order or notice emanates from State Government or any of its responsible officers directing a person to do something, then, although the order of notice may eventually transpire to be ultra vires and bad in law, it is obviously one which prima facie compels obedience as a matter of prudence and precaution. A person placed in such a situation has the right to be told definitely by the proper legal authority exactly where he stands and what he may or may not do. "we are unable to find any relevance of this because, these observations came to be made in rejecting the contention that where an assessment was ultra vires the Article 286, the party should not have felt aggrieved and rushed up to the Court under article 226. Therefore, this has nothing to do with the present case. which are referred to in this order while referring to the submission made by the learned Counsel on behalf of the Bank. By reading the guidelines issued by the Govt. Therefore, this has nothing to do with the present case. which are referred to in this order while referring to the submission made by the learned Counsel on behalf of the Bank. By reading the guidelines issued by the Govt. of India, in the Circulars and in the official Memorandum upon which much reliance is placed by the petitioners in support of their case is very clear that 1st respondent bank was not required to obey guidelines as they are not issued for discharge of the functions by the first respondent Bank under the provisions of BC (AOTU) Act 1970, and also the same would be opposed to the Policy of the Government of India in Enacting the pp (EOUC) Act and also in regard to the matters of policy involving any public interest or the Central Government may, after consultation with Governor of Reserve Bank of India, issue either Circulars or official Memorandum in that regard. I have carefully read guidelines produced at Annexure-G issued by the Joint Secretary to the government of India. The said Official Memorandum has been issued with reference to the Act 1971, wherein it has been clarified resorting to PP (EOUC) Act, to vacate the public premises by the authorised tenants merely to secure possession of the premises to accommodate the PSU's employees or for commercial redevelopment or to open a branch cannot be agreed as it will be totally against the spirit of the guidelines for protecting interest of genuine authorised tenants. It has further stated that the Model Rent Control Legislation permit revision of present rents to the level of market rents over a period of an annual indexation of rents. After the State Government enacts the amendments, on the lines of the Model Rent Control Legislation, the PSU's can secure rent revision according to the new formula. As such, there is no justification for seeking eviction of original tenants by them merely to secure higher rents. After the State Government enacts the amendments, on the lines of the Model Rent Control Legislation, the PSU's can secure rent revision according to the new formula. As such, there is no justification for seeking eviction of original tenants by them merely to secure higher rents. After reading this circular, I have to record a finding that the said circular has not been issued in exercise of the powers under Section 8 of the BC (AOTU) Act by the Central Government as it must keep in mind, the public interest while issuing such directions or guidelines as stated supra for the purpose of discharging the functions by the bank and further either issuing the Circular laying down such guidelines of Official memorandum shall be issued by the Central Government only after consultation with Governor of RBI. ( 19 ) THE said guidelines laid down in the Circular and the Official Memorandum produced by the petitioners cannot take away the effect of the rights conferred upon the Bank, under the Act, 1971 as the premises in question is a public premises and the same are governed by the provisions of the Act referred to above and their eviction from the public premises is also governed under the provisions of the said Act. Even assuming that the Annexure-G series are issued by the Central Government purported to be in exercise of its power under Section 8 of the BC (AOTU) Act, the provisions of PP (EOUC) act must prevail over the Circular and the Official Memorandum as they cannot take away the effect of Section 8 of the BC (AOTU) Act either the guidelines and directions that would be issued by the central Government in discharge of the Bank's functions must be guided by such directions in regard to matters of policy involving public interest, after consultation with the Governor of RBI. The parliament has enacted the law called PP (EOUC) Act dealing with the public premises owned by either the Banking Company or Central government, corporations owned by the Government of India or as defined under Section 2 (e) of the Act the eviction of unauthorised occupants from the public premises the procedure is laid down under the provisions of the Act 1971. By reading Section 2 (g) read with sections 4 and 5 of the PP (EOUC) Act and Ruies, which provisions of the Act make very clear that Bank has got every power to evict the unauthorised occupants, who will be in 'unauthorised occupation' in relation to any public premises, as the occupation of such persons including the continuance in occupation of the public premises by the persons after the authority under which such persons would continue in occupation of the premises to continue in occupation of the public premises has either expired or has been determined by the Statutory Authority for any reason whatsoever. By reading the definition of unauthorised occupation as defined under Section 2 (g) of the PP (EOUC) Act, it makes it very clear that even during the period of Authority of a person to continue in occupation of a public premises the bank has got every right to determine the authority given in favour of such person. If the Provisions of the PP (EOUC) act are read carefully and closely keeping in view the law laid by the Supreme Court in Sachidanand's case which case is referred to in Maheshchandra's case which are referred to supra the primary duty of the Banking Companies are to manage its property properly in the interest of public and any transfer of property either by way of lease/licence, if any, be made by the Bank inviting tenders from public to auction the right of lease or license of a public premises in public auction. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court referred to supra the right conferred upon the 1st respondent-bank and the statutory obligations caste upon it for granting Authority in favour of a person for authorised occupation on fair and reasonable license fee or rent in the interest of public in respect of the public premises, the same cannot be taken away by the Central government by issuing either the Circular or Official Memorandum laying down the guidelines for evicting the occupants of the public premises of the Bank purported to have exercised its power under section 8 of BC (AOTU) Act, as the same would be contrary to the public interest and the public policy of the Nationalised Bank. Therefore the reliance placed upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the circulars at Annexure-G series, are not in confirmity with Section 8 of the BC (AOTU) Act as the same are opposed to the public policy of the Bank and shall not have overriding effect upon the provisions of PP (EOUC) Act as it is a special Act over the BC (AOTU) Act with regard to the public premises owned by the Bank. Therefore, the order passed by the Appellate Authority without referring to the Circular, and guidelines laid down by the central Govt. therein as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners does not vitiate the impugned orders passed by him for the reason that this Court has to record a finding that the guidelines laid down at Annexure-G series circulars and official memorandum issued by the Central Govt. runs contrary to the public interest and public policy, further the said guidelines are contrary to the rights and statutory obligations conferred and cast upon the Bank under the provisions of the PP (EOUC) Act. Therefore, this Court has to answer the second point also against the petitioners, as the legal submissions made by the learned Counsel or behalf of the petitioners with reference to the various judgments or this point which are noted in the paragraphs wherein the submissions of the learned Counsel are referred and the submissions that orders are not tenable in law and there is no force in the said submission and the reliance placed upon the various decisions by the learned Counsel for the petitioners are misplaced, as they have no application to the facts of this case, for the reasons elaborately recorded by this Court in the preceeding paragraphs of this judgment. Hence the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners are liable to be rejected as the same are not well founded and the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Bank are well founded and the same must be accepted. ( 20 ) THIS Court answers the 3rd point by assigning the following reasons: the learned Counsel Mr. M. S. Prasad and Mr. ( 20 ) THIS Court answers the 3rd point by assigning the following reasons: the learned Counsel Mr. M. S. Prasad and Mr. G. S. Bhat for the petitioners to substantiate the legal submission made with reference to the personal Bias of the Estate Officer, they have contended that their submission is two fold, one is personal Bias of the Estate Officer as he has permitted the Regional Manager of the Bank to file an affidavit to substantiate its case after the enquiry is concluded and he being the officer of the Bank is interested in the property of the bank, therefore his appointment as an enquiry officer is bad in law. They have placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court which are referred to in the earlier paragraphs of this order wherein their submissions are extensively referred, this Court after considering the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners and after carefully reading the Judgments upon which they placed reliance this Court is recording the following findings with reasons by answering the contentious issue raised by them. It is not disputed by the petitioners in these proceedings that the second respondent is appointed as an Estate Officer by the Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 3 of the PP (EOUC) Act 1971 for the purpose of the Act in respect of the public premises of the 1st respondent-bank and his appointment is not under challenge in these proceedings. Further, it is not the case of the petitioners that the second respondent was not either gazetted officer or equivalent to the rank of the gazetted officer of the Govt. of India and further that the second respondent is the Zonal Manager of the 1st respondent-bank is also not disputed by the petitioners. The second fold of submission of the Petitioners is that the second respondent being an officer interested in the properties of the 1st respondent-bank has got bias in conducting the proceedings against the petitioners, therefore, the orders passed by him are bad in law and further the petitioners have made allegations in this case contending that from stage of submitting their explanations to the show-cause notices issued to them and conclusion of the proceedings he was biased in favour of the bank therefore the enquiries were not conducted by him fairly, hence the orders were sought to be quashed. It is alleged that after the enquiry proceedings were concluded one mr. Ranjan Kumar, Regional Manager, of the first respondent Bank has filed an affidavit and the copies of the same were served upon the petitioners counsel to file their statement of objections in that regard, wherein it is stated in the affidavit that the premises of the bank of India in K. G. Road is required for opening of the Industrial finance Bank and bank also desires for expansion of the Bank for its branch office in the premises which are in occupation of the petitioners. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, in this regard is that there was no evidence adduced before the second respondent Estate officer in the enquiry proceedings before the affidavit of the 'regional Manager was filed. Therefore it is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that to substantiate the case of the 1st respondent bank an affidavit of the regional Manager came to be filed with an after thought after the proceedings were concluded. Therefore, it is urged by them that the 2nd respondent was personally biased against the petitioners in permitting the bank to introduce the documents after the proceedings were concluded to substantiate the bank's claim before him and he has received the same. The contention urged by the petitioners counsel of personal bias against the Estate officer has no merit and not withstanding this, the allegations of personal bias need not be examined in this case by this Court for the reason that even excluding the said affidavit of the Regional Manager on record there was sufficient material evidence before the 2nd respondent to pass orders of eviction against the petitioners evicting them from their respective portions of the premises under the provisions of the PP (EOUC) Act. In this regard the Bank has elaborately stated the reasons in the notices issued for determination of the right of occupants of the premises to the effect that they are required tot the use of the bank. Accordingly the Authority given in their favour lor occupation of the premises in question has been rightly terminated in exercise of the power under Section 2 (g) of PP (EOUC) Act. Accordingly the Authority given in their favour lor occupation of the premises in question has been rightly terminated in exercise of the power under Section 2 (g) of PP (EOUC) Act. A reading of the provisions of the Act makes it clear that the bank has got every right to determine the continuation of the petitioners in occupation of the public premises for the reason whatsoever. But in this case the reason assigned about the requirement of the premises for the bank has been specifically urged and it is a valid reason to put an end to the occupation of the premises of the petitioners. The Estate Officer has recorded his findings with valid reasons and passed the orders. The same have been rightly affirmed by the Appellate Authority. That being the position there is no scope for this Court to interfere with the same in the certiorari proceedings of this Court. ( 21 ) IN this regard, it is necessary to refer 10 the relevant paragraph of the judgment of this Court reported in the case of A. M. ABDUL rahman vs JAYARAMU to show that there was no personal bias on the part of the Estate Officer as alleged by the Petitioners, and the said legal contentions are wholly untenable in law. The relevant paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 of the above said judgment are extracted hereunder. "7. Sri S. Shekar Shetty, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently highlighted the above mentioned grounds and urged that the said grounds are sufficient to order transfer of the case in question "in the ends of justice. " He also Placed reliance on the following decisions: 1. LALITA RAJYA LAKSHMI AND ANOTHER vs STATE OF bihar AND ANR. ( AIR 1957 Pat 198 ) 2. THOUNAOJAM NINGOL INDRANI DEVI AND ORS vs THE municipal BOARD OF IMPHAL AND ORS. (AIR 1958 Manipur 27) 3. DR. G. SARANA vs UNIVERSITY OF LUCKNOW AND ORS. (AIR 1976 SC 2458) 4. JAGATGURU SRI,shankaracharya JYOTISH peethadhiswar SHRI SWAMI SWAROOPANAND saraswati vs RAMJI TRIPATHI AND ORS ( AIR 1979 MP 50 ) 5. DR. SUBRAMAANIAM SWAMY vs RAMAKRISHNA HEGDE (ILR 1980 KAR 182)"8. (AIR 1958 Manipur 27) 3. DR. G. SARANA vs UNIVERSITY OF LUCKNOW AND ORS. (AIR 1976 SC 2458) 4. JAGATGURU SRI,shankaracharya JYOTISH peethadhiswar SHRI SWAMI SWAROOPANAND saraswati vs RAMJI TRIPATHI AND ORS ( AIR 1979 MP 50 ) 5. DR. SUBRAMAANIAM SWAMY vs RAMAKRISHNA HEGDE (ILR 1980 KAR 182)"8. In my opinion, the last of the above mentioned five decisions cited by Sri S. Shekar Shetty, has no direct bearing on the facts of the case on hand as transfer of a suit is sought in that case under Section 25 C. P. C. which empowers the Supreme court to transfer suits from a High Court or a Civil Court in one state to any other State if the Supreme Court is satisfied that an order under Section 25 is expedient in the ends of justice. It is significant to note that the words "in the ends of justice" are not used in Section 24 CPC under which the petitioner has sought the transfer of the eviction case referred to above. The principles uniformly laid down in the other four decisions referred to above is that a case has to be transferred if there is reasonable apprehension of a party to a suit that he might not get justice in the Court where the suit is pending and in order to decide whether the facts and circumstances of a given case are sufficient to raise such a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party applying for transfer the Court should put himself in such a party's armchair. It is observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. G. Sarana that: "one of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that - in case of quasi judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposing parties must be one without bias by which is meant an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious towards one side or the other in the dispute. ""16. G. Sarana that: "one of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that - in case of quasi judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposing parties must be one without bias by which is meant an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious towards one side or the other in the dispute. ""16. It is seen from the passage in Lord Denning's book "the discipline of Law" extracted in paragraph-6 supra that it is only the apprehension which right minded persons entertain against a judge that can be regarded as a ground for holding that the judge is really biased, that mere surmise or conjecture is not enough and there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the Judge favoured one side unfairly at the expense of the other. So tested, I am of the opinion that all the four grievances complined of by the petitioner in the instant case against the trial Judge are baseless. "the law laid down in the aforesaid case with Reference to number of decisions of the various High Courts is applicable to the facts of this case and therefore the allegation of personal bias on the alleged ground that she had received the affidavit of the Regional Manager of the Bank in support of its case is misconceived and there is no merit in the ground urged by the petitioners and therefore this Court has to reject the Submission in this regard as the same is wholly untenable in law. ( 22 ) IN this view of the matter and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the premises in question is being public premises, and the bank has allowed the petitioners to continue in occupation for more than 19 years, alter the PP (EOUC) Act came into force, on meagre rent, which license fee when compared to the rent which has been paid by the 1st respondent-bank to their landlord for their occupation in the rented premises for carrying on with its business. Therefore it is not open for the Petitioners to question the need and requirement of the premises in question of the bank and therefore it has determined the authority of the petitioners occupation of the premises by getting the notices issued to them is perfectly legal and valid in law. Therefore it is not open for the Petitioners to question the need and requirement of the premises in question of the bank and therefore it has determined the authority of the petitioners occupation of the premises by getting the notices issued to them is perfectly legal and valid in law. Further, the 1st respondent bank is a public sector under taking. ( 23 ) PURSUANT to the direction of this Court during the pendency of these petitions an affidavit is filed by the; responsible officer undertaking that the premises which ate in occupation of the petitioners would be exclusively used by me 1st respondent bank for their banking business and the same will not be leased in favour of others. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, since the premises in question are required for the bank as stated in the notices issued to the petitioners, it is not open for the petitioners to contend that there is no such need or requirement for the respondent bank. Of course, in Ashoka Marketing Ltd's case referred to supra the Apex Court has made an observation placing reliance upon the DWARKADAS AND MARFATIA AND SONS vs board OF TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF BOMBAY the relevant portion in the said paragraph is extracted which reads thus:"69. . . . . "every activity of a public authority especially in the background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys immunity from the rigour of the Rent Act must be informed by reason and guided by the public interest. All exercise of discretion of power by public authorities as the respondent, in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which they have been treated separately and distinctly from other landlords on the assumption that they would not act as private landlords must be judged by that standard"in the said judgment what is stated by the Apex Court is that every activity of the public authority especially in the background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys immunity from the rigour of the Rent Act must be informed by reason and guided by the public interest. In view of the observations made by the Apex court in the case referred to supra it is too much on the part of the petitioners to contend that the bank has acted in an arbitrary manner under the immunity which it enjoys under the provisions of the pp (EOUC) Act. Of course, the estate officer and the appellate authority have not assigned all these reasons exhaustively answering the legal contentions urged by the petitioners in the impugned order passed by them, however this Court has supplemented the additional reasons to the impugned orders, because the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and respondents have raised so many legal contentions in these petitions. In the background of the legal contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, this Court has examined the impugned orders on the basis of the record and the law laid down by the Apex Court referred to supra. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and also the legal contentions raised in this case, this Court has taken into consideration the undisputed facts and legal submissions urged in this case, after considering the same this Court has to record a finding that the finding recorded by the estate officer on the basis of the material evidence on record before him that the premises in occupation of the petitioners is required by the Bank for expansion of opening its branch Office, the termination of the Authority of the petitioners to continue in occupation of the premises is lega! and valid and further the occupation of the petitioners in respect of the premises in question after their termination of Authority have become unauthorised occupants as contemplated under Section 2 (g) of the act as they did not comply with the demand made by the first respondent in the notices issued to the petitioners and determining their Authority of continuing in occupation of the premises and they were demanded to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the bank but they have not complied with the demand made by the bank. Therefore, the Estate Officer has rightly recorded the findings in the orders passed by him assigning valid and cogent reasons holding that the petitioners occupation is unauthorised and an order of eviction was passed against the petitioners after conducting enquiry as contemplated Under Section 5 of the Act and rules, which orders are rightly confirmed by the Appellate Authority. Therefore having regard to the facts and circumstances which are referred to above and the reasons given by this Court by supplementing its reasons to the impugned orders of the Estate officer as well as the appellate Authority in this view of the matter at no stretch of imagination either the Appellate Authority or by this court can be said that the impugned orders passed by the Estate officer and the findings recorded by the estate officer on the basis of evidence are tainted with personal bias of him. The submission made on behalf of G. S. Bhat appearing for petitioner in the connected writ Petition regarding the allegation of bias and violation of principles of natural justice and the reliance placed by him on various judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, the point No. 3 is answered against the petitioners. ( 24 ) IT is not the case of the petitioners that they have not been given opportunity to state their case before the Estate Officer and in fact they were examined themselves before the Estate Officer in the proceedings to substantiate their case, from their evidence on record it is not shown to this Court that the findings recorded by the Estate officer are erroneous in law, hence the contention urged in this regard by the learned counsel for the petitioners must also fail. The petitioners have also not shown in these proceedings that they are not unauthorised occupants and therefore they are not liable to be evicted from the public premises in question and the reasons stated in the notices for determining the authority of the petitioners to continue in occupation of the premises in question and the reasons for determination of occupants of the premises by the Bank are not arbitrary as contended by them. For having recorded the findings on the points framed by this Court in favour of the Bank and in view of the provisions of the PP (EOUC) Act, 1971 the bank has neither exercised its immunity under the Act of 1971 arbitrarily or unreasonably as held by the Apex Court in ASHOKA MARKETING ltd case referred to supra. ( 25 ) THE learned Counsel Mr. C. B. Srinivasan for the Bank further submitted that it has to be noticed the petitioner Alembic Chemicals has given a portion of the premises in favour Darshak Limited, and to M/s Sierra Investments Ltd. by sub-letting the same. In support of this contention two photographs have been produced on 27. 10. 99 by the learned Counsel for the Bank. The said petitioner was directed to produce the memorandum and Articles of Association of Darshak ltd. An affidavit of Mr. Bhanuprakash is filed stating various facts and denying that the premises in question was not sub-let in favour of Darshak Ltd. and Sierra Investments Ltd. It is not the case of this petitioner that the premises has been given by way of license by the 1st respondent-bank in favour of M/s Darshak and Sierra investments Ltd. For this reason also this Court has to record a finding that M/s Alembic Chemicals has unlawfully sub-let the premises which was given to it. In this view of the matter M/s Alembic chemicals is not entitled for the relief in this petition. In this petition further submission was made on behalf of the Bank that interim order has not been complied with by M/s Alembic Chemicals with regard to payment of enhanced rent as directed by this Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioner G. S. Bhat, placed reliance under the provisions of Section 194-I of the Income Tax to rebut the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Bank wherein he has stated that the petitioner has credited the rent payable towards the income tax payable by the 1st respondent-bank. After perusing section 194-1 of Income Tax Act this Court has to record a finding that the action of this petitioner in crediting the amount to the Income tax Department payable towards the rent to the Bank in respect of the premises in question as directed by this Court by means of interim order is not legal and valid in law. Therefore, the petitioner shall be directed to pay the revised rent as directed by this Court to the Bank within two weeks from the date of receipt of this order. It is open for M/s Alembic Chemicals Ltd. , to ask for reimbursement of the amount credited by it to the account of 1st respondent bank towards alleged income tax payable by the bank, by filing necessary application before the Income Tax Department. ( 26 ) FOR the reason stated supra and the observations made in this order the petitioners are not entitled for any relief in this petition. Hence, I pass the following Order. Writ Petitions are dismissed. ( 27 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, at this stage, after dismissing the petitions, submitted that the petitioner may be granted reasonable time to vacate the premises and deliver vacant possession to the Bank. ( 28 ) THE submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is reasonable. It would be proper and appropriate for this Court, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case that they are in the premises from 1963 till now, the petitioners are given time till 31st May, 2000 to vacate the premises which is in their occupation and deliver vacant possession to the first respondent-bank subject to condition that the petitioners filing an undertaking within a week from receipt of this order. The petitioners shall not put any other person in occupation of the premises in question and shall pay rents/ license fee regularly without any default as directed by this Court by way of interim order. --- *** --- .