JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J: - Judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge; Kullu, dated March 27, 1993 in Civil suit No.41 of 1989 is under challenge in this second appeal. 2. This appeal was admitted on March 14, 1996 on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the court below erred in holding that Civil Courts jurisdiction is not barred in such matters in view of the decision of Full Bench of H.P. High Court in Chunihaya -v- Jindu Ram and others reported in 1991(1), Simla Law Cases page 223. 2. Whether the court (lower appellate Court) has misintrepreted the law. 3. Whether the learned lower appellate court has misread and misappreciated the evidence on record both oral and documentary which resulted in setting aside the judgment and decree of learned trial court. 4. Whether the learned lower appellate court erred in holding that the appellants are not tenants over the suit land and that the proprietary rights have been wrongly conferred. 5. Whether the findings are based on mere conjectures and surmises. 3. In order to appreciate the controversy and the questions involved, necessary facts may be noticed. One Smt. Kali was the owner in possession of the land comprised in khasra number 876 measuring 2-2 bighas situate in village Phati Khokhan, Kothi Khokhan of Tehsil and District Kullu, ("suit land" for short). Smt. Kali transferred this land to the original plaintiff Jindi during her life time. Shri Govind, original defendant, is son of real brother of the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff is that defendant Govind, exercising his influence, in connivance with his relatives in the Revenue Department, and taking undue advantage of the poverty and illiteracy of the plaintiff, got his name recorded in the column of possession in the revenue record behind the back of the plaintiff. It is the further case of the plaintiff that defendant exercising his influence in the Department of Revenue, further got a mutation number 1565, conferring proprietary rights on him, and attested on July 16, 1983. This mutation was attested behind the back of the plaintiff and against law. Defendant was never inducted as tenant in the suit land nor was he ever in occupation of this land. The mutation conferring proprietary rights on the defendant was against the law and facts and is non-est. The plaintiff is not bound by such mutation. This mutation was attested behind the back of the plaintiff and against law. Defendant was never inducted as tenant in the suit land nor was he ever in occupation of this land. The mutation conferring proprietary rights on the defendant was against the law and facts and is non-est. The plaintiff is not bound by such mutation. It is inconceivable, pleaded plaintiff, that she would induct son of her real brother as tenant. The defendant managed to secure the wrong entries in column of cultivation, due to his influence. Mutation conferring propnetary rights having been attested behind the back of the plaintiff has no legal sanctity. According to the plaintiff, she came to know about the attestation of mutation only on May 28, 1986 when the defendant threatened to dispossess her. In this background, plaintiff prayed for a declaration that defendant v/as never inducted as tenant nor he occupied or possessed the suit land or any part thereof in any capacity and the revenue entries to the contrary are wrong. Consequently, the plaintiff is not bound by the mutation conferring proprietary rights on the defendant. Plaintiff also prayed for restrain on the defendant from interfering with her possession over the suit land. In the alternative, the plaintiff prayed that in case defendant forcibly dispossesses her during the pendency of the suit, then a decree for possession on the basis of title may be passed in her favour. 4. Defendant resisted the suit. Allegations were controverted. Jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit was disputed. On merits, it was admitted that the plaintiff, on transfer of the suit land by Kali, became owner of the same. The case of the defendant was that father of the defendant was non-occupancy tenant of the suit land and after the death of his father, he stepped into the shoes of his father and became tenant and had acquired proprietary rights under Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The mutation conferring proprietary rights on him, according to the defendant, was rightly attested. In view of the conferment of proprietary rights, the defendant is owner in possession of the suit land. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court settled the following issues. 1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land as alleged? OPP. 2. In view of the conferment of proprietary rights, the defendant is owner in possession of the suit land. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court settled the following issues. 1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether entries showing defendant to be in possession as a tenant at will in the revenue records, is wrong, against facts, as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the defendant has acquired proprietary Act as a tenant in possession and this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit? OPD. 4. Whether; the plaintiff is estopped from her deed and conduct to file the present suit? OPD. 5. Relief. 6. Learned trial court found the plaintiff is not owner of the suit land and defendant has acquired proprietary rights in view of the provisions of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and the suit was accordingly dismissed. 7. During the pendency1 of the suit, Jindi, the plaintiff, died and she was substituted by Smt. Durgi as her legal heir. 8. Dis-satisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, plaintiff fried an appeal before the District Judge which was allowed by the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Additional district Judge, Kullu. 9. Learned First Appellate Court found that defendant Govind was never inducted as tenant and entries showing the defendant as tenant are wrong and illegal. It was also found that mutation conferring proprietary rights on the defendant was not attested in accordance with the procedure as contemplated under the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and therefore, does not confer any title on the defendant. The judgment and decree of the trial .Court was, accordingly, set-aside. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed the plaintiff was declared to be owner in possession of the suit land. 10. It may be appropriate to notice that during the pendency of the first appeal, defendant Govind died and he was substituted by his legal representatives. 11. Dis-satisfied, the substituted defendants filed this second appeal. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Question No. 1 and 2. 13. 10. It may be appropriate to notice that during the pendency of the first appeal, defendant Govind died and he was substituted by his legal representatives. 11. Dis-satisfied, the substituted defendants filed this second appeal. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Question No. 1 and 2. 13. The contention of Shri Prem Goel, learned counsel for the appellants, is that Govind was conferred proprietary rights under Section 104 of the Tenancy Act and, therefore, civil courts have no jurisdiction to go into the question of correctness of the grant of proprietary rights. Section 112 and 115 of the Tenancy Act, submits Shri Goel, specifically bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in these matters. Section 112 of the Tenancy Act may be reproduced for convenience: "112. Bar of jurisdiction-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Chapter, the validity of any proceedings or orders taken or made under this Chaptershall not be called in question in any Civil Court or before any other authority". Section 115 of the Act reads: "115. Bar of jurisdiction- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Chapter, every order made by the Collector, Commissioner or Financial Commissioner’ shall be final, and no proceedings or order taken or made under this Chapter, shall be called in question by any Court or before any officer or authority". 14. The perusal of sections 112 and 115 shows that the validity of the proceedings taken under Chapter X of the Act including conferment of the proprietary rights cannot be called in question in any civil Court. Similarly, section 115 of the Act specifically mandates that every order made by the Collector, Commissioner or Financial commissioner shall be final and cannot be called in question in any court or before any authority. 15. It may be noticed that where any dispute arises whether a person is a tenant or not under Chapter X of the Act, then such a dispute is contemplated to be decided by the Land Reforms Officer in his capacity as Assistant Collector 1st Grade in accordance with the provisions of the Land Revenue Act as contemplated under rule 29 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Rules ("Rules" for short). 16. Rule 27 of the rules deals with the procedure to be followed for conferment of proprietary rights. 16. Rule 27 of the rules deals with the procedure to be followed for conferment of proprietary rights. Rule 28 contemplates that the Patwari will enter mutation of ownership in the mutation register in favour of the non occupancy tenant on whom the proprietary rights, under rule 27 vested and thereafter the revenue officer will decide the mutation in the presence .of the parties. Rule 29 provides for the determination of the dispute under sub section (4) of Section 104. Rules 27,28 and 29 read: . - "27. Procedure for conferment of proprietary rights on tenants covered by sub-section (3) of section 104- All rights, title and interest in the tenancy land of land-owners who have already under their personal cultivation 3 acres un-irrigated or 1-1/2 acres irrigated land shall vest in the non-occupancy tenants with effect from the commencement of these rules. Similarly, the proprietary rights of tenancy land of the non-occu- .pancy tenants on Government land shall also vest in the tenants from the commencement of these rules. 28. Attestation of mutations. - (1) The Patwari will enter the mutation of ownership in the mutation register in favour of the non- occupancy tenants on whom proprietary rights under rule 27 vested and the Revenue Officer will attest the mutation in the presence of parties. (2). Where a part of a field number is vested in a tenant tatima shajra of such part will be prepared on the body of the mutation sheets. (Emphasis supplied). 29. Determination of disputes under sub-section (4) of Section 104. - If there is a dispute regarding the entries of the land records, the Land Reforms Officer, in his capacity as an Assistant Collector of the First Grade, shall decide the dispute under sub section (4) of Section 104 in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, or the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954, as the case may be. The disputes of such cases will be determined on a summary inquiry on the files. Where a tenancy is in a part of a field number, tatima shajras of that part will be prepared". 17. The disputes of such cases will be determined on a summary inquiry on the files. Where a tenancy is in a part of a field number, tatima shajras of that part will be prepared". 17. It thus is manifest that if any dispute arise regarding conferment of the proprietary rights on a person or a question about his being tenant is raised then such dispute or the question is necessarily to be decided by the Land Reforms Officer and the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction. 18. Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Counsel submits that jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is excluded only in the cases where relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted and in cases where such relationship is disputed, the civil courts will have the jurisdiction to try such dispute or the question. 19. The question regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts stands concluded by a Full Bench of this Court in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram and another, 1991(1) Shimla Law Cases 223. 20. After going through the entire Scheme and the provisions of the Act, the Full Bench answering the question whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction in respect of the order of conferment of proprietary rights under Section 104 of the Act concluded in para 64 of the judgment: (a) (b) The civil court has no jurisdiction to go into any question connected with the conferment of proprietary rights under Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, except in a case where it is found that the statutory authorities envisaged by that. Act had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or where the provisions of the Act had not been complied with". (Emphasis supplied) 21. Dealing with the question that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court . would be excluded only if the person in possession is admitted or proved to be tenant of the land, the Full Bench in para 46 and 47 of the judgment, speaking through Mehrotra, J.. Observed: "Several decisions were brought to our notice by learned counsel. Only some of them merit mention. would be excluded only if the person in possession is admitted or proved to be tenant of the land, the Full Bench in para 46 and 47 of the judgment, speaking through Mehrotra, J.. Observed: "Several decisions were brought to our notice by learned counsel. Only some of them merit mention. In Bhura v. Bhagirath etc., ILR 1981 HP 238, V.P. Gupta, J. took the view that: "If the status of a person as a non occupancy tenant is disputed, then it cannot be said that he is admitted to be a tenant of the suit land and in that case the provisions of Chapter X of the Act will be inapplicable to a case where the status of the person claiming to ba tenant is in dispute, therefore, section 112 of the Act will not become applicable. The plaintiffs have definitely a right to seek the protection and invoke the jurisdiction of civil court for getting a declaration to the effect that the defendant is not a tenant of the suit land. 47. We are unable to share the view expressed in the ease. True it is as observed by the learned Judge in Bhura that the person who is to acquire the ownership rights in the land possessed by him should be a "tenant" of the land and that section 104 would be applicable only if the person in possession is admitted or proved to be a tenant of the land, yet, the scheme of the Act rules out any approach to the civil court for a determination of the question whether the person in possession is a tenant of the land or not. The matter is to be decided with the fore corners of the Act itself. 22. It, thus, is manifest that irrespective of the fact whether the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted nor not, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the question or dispute arising out of the orders passed under Section 104 of the Act. 23. Ruling that in sch cases Civil Court has no jurisdiction, the Full Bench in para 39 and 40 of Chuhniya case observed: "39. 23. Ruling that in sch cases Civil Court has no jurisdiction, the Full Bench in para 39 and 40 of Chuhniya case observed: "39. True it is that Rule 29 contemplates determination of disputes of the nature contemplated by section 104(4) of the Act on a summary inquiry on the file, yet, it cannot be over-looked that the dispute is envisaged about the question whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner, is a tenant or not; as is clear from the language in which section 104(4) is couched. The Legislature must be deemed to know its own mind when enacting a provision of this nature. It is not possible to say, as was convassed before us by Shri B.K. Malhotra, that section 104(4) only lays down a rule of evidence when it says that "the burden of proving that such a person is not a tenant of the land owner shall be on the latter" whenever a dispute arises whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner is a tenant or not. It is implicit in sub section (4) of section 104 that the Legislature envisaged that a dispute may arise whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner is a tenant or not, when proceedings were in progress under Chapter X and provided that it shall be decided by the authorities contemplated under this Chapter who shall require the landowner to establish that a person cultivating his land is not a tenant. 40. Any enquiry by a Civil Court on the question was barred by the Legislature by specifically provided in sections 112 and 115, both occurring in Chapter X, that the validity of any order made under the Chapter shall not be called in question in any court and that the order shall be final except as expressly provided in the Chapter. The Legislature knew its mind fully well. Whether it "wanted a dispute to be determined by the Civil Court, it provided so in Chapter X itself. One has only to look at sections 107 and 109 (2). Not only that the Legislature ruled out any determination by a Civil Court, by necessary implication, of other matters, it expressly said so in sections 112 and 115". 24. Whether it "wanted a dispute to be determined by the Civil Court, it provided so in Chapter X itself. One has only to look at sections 107 and 109 (2). Not only that the Legislature ruled out any determination by a Civil Court, by necessary implication, of other matters, it expressly said so in sections 112 and 115". 24. The rational for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is discussed in para 44 of the judgment in the following words: "The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in the matter of determination of the question whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner is his tenant or not for purpose of Chapter X, is both reasonable and understandable. Permitting such a question to be determined by the Civil Court also would have introduced ah element of unpre-dictablity spread over a long period while the matter was under adjudication before the civil court at the trial or an appellate stage, which could have made the effective implementation of measures of land reform aimed at by the Act, uncertain. The Legislature could legitimately think of ruling out such a situation. It has done so by excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court expressly in that matter". 25. The situation will be different, if it is shown by the plaintiff that Statutory Authority that is, the Assistant Collector or the Revenue Officer (Land Reforms Officer) did not act in conformity with the fundamental judicial procedure or the rules had not been complied with. The Civil Court in such case will then be clothed with the jurisdiction to go into the legality of the conferment of the proprietary rights. 26. Rule 28 of the rules directs that the mutation conferring proprietary rights shall be attested by the concerned Revenue Officer in the presence of the parties. In other words, the mutaiton shall only be attested after due notice to the parties concerned. In the present case, there is a categorical assertion of the plaintiff that mutation no. 1565 was attested by the concerned Revenue Officer behind her back and without notice to her. The relevant part of the pleadings in para-6reads: ..."Even otherwise, the mutation has been attested behind the back of the plaintiff against law and facts and she is not bound by the same". 27. The assertion is reiterated in Para 7 of the plaint. 1565 was attested by the concerned Revenue Officer behind her back and without notice to her. The relevant part of the pleadings in para-6reads: ..."Even otherwise, the mutation has been attested behind the back of the plaintiff against law and facts and she is not bound by the same". 27. The assertion is reiterated in Para 7 of the plaint. The defendant in his reply has not controverted or denied this assertion. The defendant merely stated that he had "become owner in possession of the suit land after the attestation of the mutation conferring proprietary rights" on him. In the circumstances, the inevitable conclusion is that mutation number 1565 conferring proprietary rights in respect of the suit land on defendant Govind was attested without any notice to the plaintiff and behind her back. 28. Learned First Appellate Court dealing on this aspect of the case observed: ..."There is a reference of mutation No.1565 on the jamabandi for the year 1976-77 (Ex.D7) and subsequent to it, regarding the conferment of proprietary rights, but the defendant did not make any attempt to place the mutation aforesaid on record to show that it was accepted and attested in accordance with the HP. Tenancy Act and Rules framed thereunder to show that the revenue officer had not acted in contravention of the said law". 29. The concerned Revenue Officer, evidently, did not act in accordance with the fundamental judicial procedure as he attested the mutation conferring proprietary rights on the defendant without notice to the plaintiff and behind her back. This was also violativeofrule 28 of the rules. In these circumstances, civil courts had the necessary jurisdiction to go into the question whether or not Govind was tenant in respect of the suit land and consequent legality of conferment of proprietary rights on the defendant in this case. Questions No.3, 4 and 5. 30. So far the question of Govind being tenant of the suit-land is concerned, learned First Appellate Court has critically examined the entire evidence on record and concluded that Govind was not tenant of the suit land. The reasoning of the learned Judge cannot be faulted with. He noticed that defendant Govind as DW1 stated that the suit land was cultivated by his father and mother Chetan Dassi and Chetan Dassi was tenant on the suit land. The reasoning of the learned Judge cannot be faulted with. He noticed that defendant Govind as DW1 stated that the suit land was cultivated by his father and mother Chetan Dassi and Chetan Dassi was tenant on the suit land. He further stated that Chetan Dassi used to pay rent ("galla batai") to the plaintiff. He also stated that after the death of his mother Chetan Dassi, he used to pay galla batai to the plaintiff Jindi though, in cross-examination, he contradicted himself and stated that it was Sukh Ram, his father, who cultivated the suit land till his death and thereafter he succeeded him. He was confronted with his previous statement before the trial Court that he never met Smt. Jindi for the last over 50 years but he could not explain that statement satisfactorily. It cannot be said that the learned First Appellate Court misread the evidence or ignored any material evidence. The defendant heavily relied upon the entries in the revenue record. The persual of jamabandi for the year 1945-46 (Ext.Dl) shows Jindi to be owner of the suit land and Chetan Dassi in possession of the same in capacity "tabe marji". In the column of rent, the entry is "bashahra khata bila lagan". In other words, Chetan Dassi was in permissive possession of the suit land without payment of any rent. To similar effect is the entry in the jamabandi for the year 1953-54 (Ext.D2), 1957-58 (Ext.D3) and 1961-62 (Ext.D4). However, suddenly in jamabandi for the year 1966-67 though was entry regarding permissble possession of the suit land was maintained but the entry in the column was changed to "bashahra malkaan" and this entry was carried out in the jamahandi for the year 1971-72 (Ext.D6), 1976-77 (Ext.D7) and 1981-82 (Ext.D8i. Now payment of rent is necessary incident of a tenancy. No rent was payable by Chetan Dassi. Thre is no evidence of payment of any rent except the self-serving statement of defendant Govind. As noticed by the learned First Appellate Court defendant though states that rent receipts were issued to him by Jindi bnut such rent receipts were not produced in the Court Adverse in was rightly drawn by the learned Additional District Judge. 31. This apart, the name of defendant Govind, as noticed by the First Appellate Court, appeared for the first time in the jamabandi for the year 1976-77 (Ext.D7). 31. This apart, the name of defendant Govind, as noticed by the First Appellate Court, appeared for the first time in the jamabandi for the year 1976-77 (Ext.D7). Now khasra girdawari prior to this jamabandi (Ext.P2) shows Smt. Jindi to be owner in possession of the suit land from the year 1972 to 1977. Jamabandi for the year 1976-77 (Ext.D7) was required to be prepared on the basis of khasra-girdawari Ext.P2. Any change could only be effected after inquiry under Section 36 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act this apart Rule 10A of the rules specifically provides that entry of succession of tenancy rights cannot be made in the revenue record save and except by way of mutation. Learned First Appellate Court was right, in the absence of any inquiry by the competent Revenue Officer, in holding that entry in the revenue record showing the name of defendant Govind in the column of cultivation was not in conformity with the law. Trie evidence on record negatives the tenancy of the defendant on the suit land. 32. In the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the learned First Appellate Court misread or misappreciated the evidence on record and erred in holding that Govind was not non-occupancy tenant over the. suit land. The questions are accordingly answered. , 33. No other point is urged before me. 34. In result, appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed