Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2000 DIGILAW 333 (KER)

Ajantha Travels v. Government of India

2000-06-28

A.V.SAVANT, K.S.RADHAKRISHNAN

body2000
Judgment :- A.V. Savant, C.J. Heard all the learned counsel; Mr. T.P. Kelu Nambiar (Sr. Advocate) and N. Haridas for the appellants/original petitioners and Mr. K. Ramakumar, Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondent. 2. These appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated 3rd September, 1992 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing a batch of Original Petitions filed by travel agents who were "recognized" in accordance with the guidelines "Consolidated Administrative Criteria for recognition/renewal of Travel Agencies 1991". The said criteria was laid down by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Respondent No. 1, for regulating the issuance of passports under the Passport Act, 1967 read with the Rules framed thereunder. What was challenged in all the Original Petitions was the circular dated 24th July, 1992 issued by Passport Officers in different Cities working under the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Since the very circular has been challenged in all these appeals, we find it convenient to reproduce it verbatim: "Ministry of External Affairs has revised the rules relating to recognition of Travel Agencies etc. It has been decided that with immediate effect the entire system of recognising Travel Agents to deal with Passport work stands withdrawn. With immediate effect all Travel Agents shall be free to deposit application forms at Passport offices like any other individual. The completed Passports shall be dispatched to the applicant at the address given in the application form by Registered post acknowledgment due or they will be handed over to the applicant himself. No completed passport shall be handed over to any third person. These orders come into effect from 27.7.1992" 3. The result of the above circular was that the entire system of "recognised" travel agents to deal with the passport work stood withdrawn with effect from 24th July, 1992. Irrespective of the question whether a travel agent was recognised or not, any travel agent was free to deposit the application form at the passport office like any other individual citizen. The result of the above circular was that the entire system of "recognised" travel agents to deal with the passport work stood withdrawn with effect from 24th July, 1992. Irrespective of the question whether a travel agent was recognised or not, any travel agent was free to deposit the application form at the passport office like any other individual citizen. It appears that in order to prevent the mischief and the undesirable practices which led to serious security problems, to which we will advert later, a decision was taken that the completed passport shall be despatched to the applicant, at the address given in the application, by Registered post acknowledgement due or in the event of the applicant approaching personally, the passport should be handed over to the applicant. Care was to be taken to ensure that no completed passport was handed over to any third person. This was to prevent one passport being misused by more than one person and the passport of a genuine applicant being misused by some unscrupulous persons who indulge in various crimes. 4. In the petitions that were filed, it was alleged that the first respondent had initially introduced the system of recognising travel agents and guidelines for recognition/ renewal of travel agencies were issued which were effective from 1st June, 1991. It appears that several thousand travel agents who claimed to be eligible to function as such had applied for recognition and initially when the system was introduced, only 750 travel agents were recognised in the country. It was only the recognised travel agents who were authorised to submit applications for passports in the passport office, comply with the necessary formalities and collect the passports themselves on behalf of the applicants. This was done by the recognised travel agents obviously as a regular business charging their fees/ service charges to the applicants. Appellants claim to be rendering useful service to the society and it was alleged that the system was working satisfactorily. They claim to have invested large amounts for establishing offices and providing necessary infrastructure to comply with the guidelines for recognition. They have employed the necessary staff. They alone were, therefore, the privileged group of people who could handle the work of submitting applications for passports, processing them, and collecting them on behalf of the applicants. They claim to have invested large amounts for establishing offices and providing necessary infrastructure to comply with the guidelines for recognition. They have employed the necessary staff. They alone were, therefore, the privileged group of people who could handle the work of submitting applications for passports, processing them, and collecting them on behalf of the applicants. Their grievance was that the sudden withdrawal of the system of recognition a year after it was introduced was wholly arbitrary and hit by the provisions of Art.14 of the Constitution of India. 5. Appellants further contended that they are protected by the doctrine of promissory estoppel and having introduced the system of recognition on 1st June, 1991, relying upon which they have made large investments, the respondents were estopped from withdrawing the said system a year later. The result is that any one could now submit an application for passport and the agents were not able to collect the passport which had to be sent to the applicant for reasons which we have briefly stated-at the outset and which we will elaborate later. Lastly, appellants relied on the doctrine of legitimate expectation. It is contended that the system of recognition introduced on 1st June, 1991 gave rise to legitimate expectation in their minds that it would be continued for ever and this has placed a limitation on the power of the respondent to withdraw the system. The withdrawal of such a system of recognition without any notice to them was therefore, characterised as arbitrary and hence violative of the provisions of Art.14 of the Constitution. 6. The third respondent has filed the counters. In O.P. No. 9595 of 1992, Mr. A.R. Radhakrishnan, Passport Officer, Kozhikode has filed the counter. He has contended that the Passports Act, 1967 does not provide for any privilege to travel agents to deal in passports. Passport is a valuable security and under S.17 of the Passports Act, a passport is a travel document to remain at all times, the property of the Central Government. Withdrawing the system of recognition did not result in appellants ceasing to carry on business as travel agents. All that happened was that, as against a privileged group of 750 travel agents in the country who were recognised, many others would now be entitled to function as such. Withdrawing the system of recognition did not result in appellants ceasing to carry on business as travel agents. All that happened was that, as against a privileged group of 750 travel agents in the country who were recognised, many others would now be entitled to function as such. It is stated that out of 750 such agents, 250 were operating in Bombay alone and the others in the remaining part of the country. The recognised travel agents were concentrating their business activities only in big cities. This resulted in the people of remote areas being deprived of the benefits of the system of recognition. The system had become obviously discriminatory creating a privileged class of recognised travel agents. It is specifically averred in the counter that the system was being exploited. Several instances were brought to the notice of the Government where the facility was misused by a few recognised travel agents. Foreign citizens who look like Indians had applied for passport on the ground that they were Indian citizens and such passports were misused for various illegal activities. It is further alleged that having regard to the activities of militants and extremists in the country and the disturbing situation prevailing in various parts of the country, Government thought it fit to insist that when a passport is issued in the first instance, it must reach the person who applied for the passport. Either the applicant can collect it personally, or it must be sent to him by registered post acknowledgement due on the address mentioned in the application. This was to ensure that the applicant was a person genuinely residing at the stipulated address and that he secured only one passport. 7. It is then contended in the counter that withdrawal of recognition did not result in imposing any unreasonable restriction on the right of the appellants who continue to carry on their business with many others and cease to be a privileged class. With the emerging scope for deployment of various skilled and semiskilled workers in Gulf countries through Manpower Recruiting Agents and Travel Agents, there was increase in the number of applicants for fresh passports. It transpired that some of the travel agents had submitted applications in fictitious names and addresses and fraudulent and forged documents were submitted for securing passports. It was not possible to verify as to who was the real applicant. It transpired that some of the travel agents had submitted applications in fictitious names and addresses and fraudulent and forged documents were submitted for securing passports. It was not possible to verify as to who was the real applicant. There was also a complaint that recognised travel agents used to charge exorbitant service charges, exploiting the needs of some applicants. In many cases, same person had obtained several passports through different recognised travel agents for indulging in anti-national and smuggling activities after giving fictitious addresses in different parts of the country. During enquiry, such passport holders as well as the travel agents pleaded total ignorance. Police verification and enquiry revealed that many unscrupulous and anti-national persons had obtained passports more than one. It was because of this, the Government thought it fit to insist on the first passport reaching the applicant directly. 8. The counter then states that there is no question of termination of recognition of the appellants or derecognising or preventing them from carrying the business as travel agents. The system of recognition has been discontinued. Nevertheless, the appellants can carry on their business like any other individual or any other travel agent. They can render useful services to people desirous of obtaining passport and travel anywhere. The renewed passport could also, in certain cases, be handed over to the travel agents though it was preferred to handover the passport to the person who had deposited the same. Fresh passports, in lieu of passports which had completed their 10 year validity, could be given to travel agents or to any other individual who had initially submitted the applications on behalf of the applicants. The result of withdrawal of the system of recognition can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to prevent the appellants from carrying on their business. It only prevented the exploitation of persons who were at the mercy of the recognised travel agents and had to submit to the dictates of such travel agents. 9. Respondents contended that the new system, as a result of withdrawal of recognition, provides that the first passport directly reaches the person who had applied for the same, eliminating the possible mischief which was inherent when travel agents used to collect the passport. Several travel agents collect more than one passport in the name of very same person giving fictitious addresses in different parts of the country. Several travel agents collect more than one passport in the name of very same person giving fictitious addresses in different parts of the country. It was on these grounds that the counter states that there is no question of arbitrariness in the withdrawal of recognition which is in the larger interest of society and to prevent anti national and criminal activities. The withdrawal of the system of recognition is based on valid grounds. The Government has considered relevant materials and having applied its mind, there is only a change of policy in the larger interest of the country. A system which had existed for the benefit of a privileged group has been done away with in the larger interest of the country. A change of policy, which is left to the wisdom of the executive, cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. There was neither any arbitrariness nor is there any allegation of mala fides. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has no application in the facts of the present case. Appellants still continue to carry on their business. May be, they face more competition as against the earlier system, when there was a handful of recognised travel agents. The doctrine of legitimate expectation must yield to the larger public interest mentioned above. It is on these grounds the petitions were opposed by the respondents. 10. The learned Single Judge, under the impugned judgment, considered the question as to whether the guidelines issued earlier introducing a system of recognition were enforceable and came to the conclusion that the said guidelines were not statutory in character and were, therefore, not judicially enforceable. The impugned circular does not affect the right of appellants to carry on business. The scope of judicial review was very limited in matters of such guidelines. Learned Judge then referred to the-scheme of rules under the passports Act, viz. Passport Rules, 1980 and observed that under R.3, the passport authority had the right to regulate the exercise of his jurisdiction in respect of applications for passports. The impugned circular dated 24th July, 1992 did not in any manner affect the right of the appellants. He upheld the reasoning given in the counter for insisting that passport issued in the first instance must be handed over to the applicant and not to a third party. The impugned circular dated 24th July, 1992 did not in any manner affect the right of the appellants. He upheld the reasoning given in the counter for insisting that passport issued in the first instance must be handed over to the applicant and not to a third party. The contention that the appellants were put to considerable disadvantage and loss since only a portion of the service charges was collected initially and balance was collected at the time when the passport was handed over to the applicant, was held to be not a ground to affect the validity of the circular that was impugned. It was, therefore, concluded that impugned circular withdrawing the system of recognition of travel agents did not affect any right of the appellants. At the most, it only amounted to withdrawal of a privilege which they had enjoyed. There was no question of any right, much less a fundamental right, being violated. Therefore, the Original Petitions were dismissed. 11. Mr. Kelu Nambiar and Mr. Haridas, the learned counsel appearing before us have assailed the said judgment and have raised the same contention which were raised before the learned Single Judge. In the first place, it was contended that the impugned circular has been issued arbitrarily, and is wholly unreasonable. Second contention is that the circular withdrawing the system of recognition was issued without considering their individual cases and was wholly unsustainable. Thirdly, it is contended that the appellants were entitled to claim benefit of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and having introduced the system of recognition on the 1st of June, 1991, the respondents were estopped from withdrawing the same by circular dated 24th July, 1992. Lastly, it is contended that the system of recognition introduced on 1st June 1991 had given rise to legitimate expectations in the minds of the appellants that it would be continued for ever and the impugned circular had defeated that legitimate expectation and had adversely affected their business prospects. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Ramakumar, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the change in the policy was necessitated by valid considerations of national security and safety of citizens. It was found that the earlier system was being misused and exploited by a privileged few. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Ramakumar, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the change in the policy was necessitated by valid considerations of national security and safety of citizens. It was found that the earlier system was being misused and exploited by a privileged few. Government had reconsidered the matter in the larger public interest having regard to the increased menace of militancy, terrorism and various illegal activities including smuggling. It was on these valid and germane grounds that there was a change of policy simpliciter. At any rate, it was contended that there were neither any mala fides nor unreasonableness in the Government changing its own policy and, no right of the appellants under Art.14 of the Constitution was violated. Counsel for the respondents contended that the appellants had no legal right, much less a fundamental right, to insist on carrying on the business as recognised travel agents. The Passports Act and the Rules framed thereunder do not recognize any such system. On a review of the working of the system, it was found that it was being misused and exploited and hence, the Government in its wisdom, decided to change its policy. The impugned circular being purely in the realm of executive action of change of policy, was beyond the scope of judicial review. 13. It was then contended by Mr. Ramakumar that the result of withdrawal of the system of recognition was not that the appellants were prevented from carrying on the business. They continued to carry on the business, albeit with many other travel agents. They continued to render services for obtaining passports and extending other facilities. In certain circumstances, they can collect the passport, except in cases where it was issued for the first time. Therefore, there was no question of promissory estoppel. There was not even a contract between the appellants and the Government. There was no promise under a statute or even under a contractual document. The whole relation between the parties was non statutory and not even contractual. The question of promissory estoppel, therefore, does not arose. Lastly, it was contended that doctrine of legitimate expectation had no application to the facts of the present case. Where the executive changes its policy in the larger public interest, it is well settled that legitimate expectation of a citizen must yield to the larger public interest. The question of promissory estoppel, therefore, does not arose. Lastly, it was contended that doctrine of legitimate expectation had no application to the facts of the present case. Where the executive changes its policy in the larger public interest, it is well settled that legitimate expectation of a citizen must yield to the larger public interest. We will examine these contentions in detail. 14. At the outset it must be stated that the appellants place heavy reliance on the decision in Selvi Travels v. Union of India, AIR 1993 Madras 216. It is true that the very circular dated 24th July, 1992 was challenged before the Madras High Court by a travel agent who claimed to be a recognised travel agent. Since the earlier order passed by the Ministry of External Affairs on 23rd July, 1992, was not produced, the Madras High Court reproduced the said order, which is as under: KINDLY REFER TO THE CIRCULAR LETTER No. VII/415/2/19/91 DATED 21.5.91 WHEREIN THE CRITERION FOR RECOGNISING TRAVEL AGENCIES TO DEAL IN PASSPORTS WAS LAID DOWN. "IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY ALSO KINDLY REFER TO CIRCULAR LETTER No. VI/401/40/91 DATED 6.11.91 WHEREIN BEEN CLARIFIED THAT ANY INDIVIDUAL CAN SUBMIT A PASSPORT APPLICATION ON BEHALF OF ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL AND IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE APPLICANT TO HIMSELF SUBMIT HIS APPLICATION FORM. 3. THE QUESTION OF THE PROCEDURES TO BE ADOPTED FOR SUBMISSION OF APPLICATION FORMS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT THE ENTIRE SYSTEM OF RECOGNISING TRAVEL AGENTS TO DEAL WITH THE PASSPORT WORK STANDS WITHDRAWN. WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT ALL THE TRAVEL AGENTS SHALL BE FREE TO DEPOSIT APPLICATION FORMS AT PASSPORT OFFICES LIKE ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL. 4. THE COMPLETED PASSPORTS SHALL BE DESPATCHED TO THE APPLICANT AT THE ADDRESS GIVEN IN THE APPLICATION FORM BY REGISTERED POST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DUE OR THEY WILL BE HANDED OVER TO THE APPLICANT HIMSELF. NO COMPLETED PASSPORT SHALL BE HANDED OVER TO ANY THIRD PERSON". 15. After the initial order was issued on 23.7.1992, the clarification was issued on 28.7.1992, i.e., after the impugned circular dated 24th July, 1992. We have already reproduced the impugned circular dated 24.7.1992 in para 2 above. NO COMPLETED PASSPORT SHALL BE HANDED OVER TO ANY THIRD PERSON". 15. After the initial order was issued on 23.7.1992, the clarification was issued on 28.7.1992, i.e., after the impugned circular dated 24th July, 1992. We have already reproduced the impugned circular dated 24.7.1992 in para 2 above. It is necessary to reproduce the clarification that was issued on 28th July, 1992 which reads as under: KINDLY REFER TO CIRCULAR TELEX DATED 23RD JULY WHEREIN IT HAD BEEN INDICATED THAT FINISHED PASSPORT WOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THE APPLICANT HIMSELF OR SENT TO HIS ADDRESS BY REGISTERED POST acknowledgement due. MANY PASSPORT OFFICERS HAVE RAISED QUERIES AND IT IS HERE BY CLARIFIED AS FOLLOWS: THE PROCEDURE CONTAINED IN MY CIRCULAR TELEX DATED 23RD JULY RELATES TO FRESH PASSPORTS I.B. WHEN AN APPLICANT IS APPLYING FOR A PASSPORT FOR THE FIRST TIME THE PASSPORT SHALL BE HANDED OVER TO THE APPLICANT OR SENT RAD POST AND NOT HANDED OVER TO ANY THIRD PERSON. IN THE CASE OF MISC. SERVICES I.E., CHANGE IN DATE OF BIRTH, RENEWAL AFTER FIVE YEARS, ENTRY OF NAMES AND DELETION ETC., THE PASSPORT MAY BE HANDED OVER TO THE SAME PERSON WHO DEPOSITS WHETHER OR NOT HE IS THE APPLICANT HIMSELF. "IF A TRAVEL AGENT DEPOSITS APPLICATIONS FOR RENEWAL AFTER A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS, ENTRY OF MINOR CHILDREN ETC. PLEASE PROCESS AS USUAL BUT ENSURE THAT AFTER GIVING MISC. SERVICE THE DOCUMENT IS HANDED OVER TO THE SAME PERSON WHO DEPOSITED IT. I TRUST THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS ARE CLEAR THAT ONLY IN CASE OF FRESH APPLICATION FOR A PASSPORT FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE COMPLETED PASSPORT SHOULD NOT BE HANDED OVER TO ANY THIRD PERSON". 16. It will-be clear from the third order dated 23rd July, 1992 that as far as submitting the application for passport is concerned, anyone namely the applicant or a person on his behalf can submit such an application. The system of recognition of travel agent was discontinued. All travel agents were free to deposit the application for passport like any other individual. The emphasis is that the completed passport which is being issued to a person for the first time has to be sent to the person at the address mentioned in the application by registered post acknowledgement due to ensure that the passport reaches the person who applied for the same. The emphasis is that the completed passport which is being issued to a person for the first time has to be sent to the person at the address mentioned in the application by registered post acknowledgement due to ensure that the passport reaches the person who applied for the same. Such a person collecting the passport himself is, of course, permissible. The clarification issued on 28th July, 1992 reiterates the safeguard in insisting upon the applicant himself collecting the passport or receiving the same which ensure personal verification. However, in the case of miscellaneous services being rendered, such as change of date of birth, change of address etc., it is possible that travel agents could pursue the matter and collect the document. 17. However, in the affidavit that was filed before the Madras High Court, only three reasons were assigned on behalf of the respondent viz., (i) existing system has created a privileged group of people, (ii) there were cases of misuse of passport by people who are neither Indians nor resident in India, (iii) passports issued on application deposited by travel agents and sent to the individuals concerned to the addresses given in the applications have returned undelivered with the endorsement that there are no such addressees. In the facts of the case before the Madras High Court it was held that first reason was unintelligible. The second reason did not find favour with the High Court on the ground that the Government had not given details as to a particular travel agent having misused the passports in which case, the authorities had to hold an enquiry and take requisite action in accordance with law if it was found that a passport was misused. The third reason was found not to have been substantiated on the facts of the case before it. It was in these circumstances that the learned judge came to the conclusion that the impugned circular was vitiated by arbitrariness and was thus hit by Art.14 of the Constitution. It was also held that withdrawal of the system of recognition without giving an opportunity of being heard, had defeated the appellants' legitimate expectation which was not permissible. In the result, the petition was allowed by the Madras High Court. 18. It was also held that withdrawal of the system of recognition without giving an opportunity of being heard, had defeated the appellants' legitimate expectation which was not permissible. In the result, the petition was allowed by the Madras High Court. 18. On the pleadings that we have summarised above, and having regard to the subsequent pronouncements of the Apex Court on the various aspects dealt with in the Madras judgment, with respect, we find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken by the Madras High Court. Our reasons are as under. 19. A passport is issued by the Government in exercise of its sovereign executive power to control foreign relations. A passport is a document of identity as a prima facie evidence of nationality. In modern times, it not only controls exist from the country, but without it, with few exceptions, it is not possible to enter another country. It has become a condition of free travel. In this backdrop, let us consider the scope of judicial review in the facts of this case. 20. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumarsheth, AIR 1984 SC 1543, the Apex Court considered the scope of judicial review in matters which were in the realm of subordinate legislation. It was held that so long as the body entrusted with the task of framing rules or regulations acted within the scope of authority conferred on it, in the sense that the rules or regulations made by it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose of the statute, the Court should not concern itself with the wisdom or efficaciousness of such rules or regulations. It is always exclusively within the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine, as a matter of policy how the provisions of a statute can best be implemented and what measures, substantive as well as procedural would have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act. It was emphasised that it is not for the Court, in exercise of the powers of the judicial review, to examine the merits and demerits of a policy decision. The scrutiny has to be limited to the question as to whether the impugned action is within the scope of the power conferred on the authority. It was emphasised that it is not for the Court, in exercise of the powers of the judicial review, to examine the merits and demerits of a policy decision. The scrutiny has to be limited to the question as to whether the impugned action is within the scope of the power conferred on the authority. (The relevant observations are to be found in para 14 of the judgment at pages 1529 and 1530). We must bear in mind these limitations on our power of judicial review in a case involving a mere change in the policy framed by the executive. 21. In Council of Civil Service Unions and Ors. v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All.E.R.935, the House of Lords considered the question of judicial review of the action taken by the Minister for the Civil Service to revise the terms and conditions of civil service at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which was a branch of the civil service whose main function was to ensure the security of the United Kingdom military and official communications, and to provide signals intelligence for the British Government. The revision of the service condition was to exclude membership of any Trade Union other than a departmental staff association approved by the Director of GCHQ. The appellants namely, Council of Civil Service Unions, a Union official and five civil servants employed at GCHQ applied for judicial review of the Minister's instruction on the ground that it was invalid because Minister had acted unfairly in removing their fundamental right to belong to a Trade Union without having consulted them. Learned trial judge had granted the application on the ground that Minister ought to have consulted the staff before issuing the instruction. The Minister appealed to the Court of Appeal contending that (i) prerogative powers, and instructions given under a delegated power emanating from the prerogative, were discretionary and not open to review by the Courts, and (ii) requirement of national security overrode any duty which the Minister otherwise had to consult the staff. The court of Appeal allowed the Minister's appeal on the ground of national security. The appellants appealed to the House of Lords. It was held that though the appellants had a legitimate expectation arising from the existence of regular practice of consultation, where the Government sought to rely on reasons of national security to justify a decision or. The court of Appeal allowed the Minister's appeal on the ground of national security. The appellants appealed to the House of Lords. It was held that though the appellants had a legitimate expectation arising from the existence of regular practice of consultation, where the Government sought to rely on reasons of national security to justify a decision or. action, the question whether the decision or action was in fact necessitated by the requirement of national security was not justiciable. It was held that executive was the sole judge of what national security required and it alone has access to the information to enable it to form the judgment as to what was required. If the Minister had produced evidence that the decision was taken for reasons of national security, it would override any right to judicial review which appellants had, arising out of denial of legitimate expectation of consultation. In the result, the appeal was dismissed by the House of Lords. 22. Nearer home, in P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 268, the question was of change of export policy for readymade garments. Government had earlier introduced a system for the year 1994-95. This was introduced under a notification. However, it was found that this had resulted in some unscrupulous traders masquerading as exporters. Resultantly, the export of clothing was adversely affected. Government, therefore, decided to change the policy and abolished the system which was introduced in 1994-95. A new export policy was introduced withdrawing the previous policy. Petitioners who were exporters of readymade garments challenged the change of policy in the Madras High Court. They pleaded promissory estoppel and contended that Government could not resile from the promise so as to be detrimental to their legitimate expectations. The Madras High Court dismissed the petition. Dismissing the S.L.P., the Apex Court held that in a given set of facts, the Government may, in appropriate cases, be bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. But the question resolved on the validity of withdrawal of previous policy and introduction of new policy. The question was whether the Government was bound by its earlier policy and could it not revise the policy in view of changing potential foreign market and the need for foreign exchange. But the question resolved on the validity of withdrawal of previous policy and introduction of new policy. The question was whether the Government was bound by its earlier policy and could it not revise the policy in view of changing potential foreign market and the need for foreign exchange. It was held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation required to be angulated namely, whether the policy was revised in public interest in which case it was held that Government was within its right to revise the policy and lay down new policy. Petitioners could not claim a vested right under a policy which existed earlier. The Court, therefore, could not bind the Government under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The power to lay down a policy by executive decision or by legislation includes the power to withdraw or change the policy unless it is a mala fide exercise of power or the decision is taken in abuse of power. It was further held that doctrine of legitimate expectation plays no role when the appropriate authority is empowered to take decisions under the executive policy. The Court must leave the authority to decide its full range of choice within the executive or legislative power. In such matters of policy, it is settled law that the court gives a larger leeway to the executive. A prior policy decision cannot bind the Government for all times to come. If the Government is satisfied that change in policy was necessary in public interest, it was undoubtedly entitled to revise the policy and lay down a new policy. The Court would therefore, prefer to allow the Government free play in such matters particularly when the change in policy is in public interest. (These observations are to be found in paras 3, 4 and 5 of the judgment at Pages 271 and 272). The ratio applies to the facts of the case in hand. 23. In Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 1801, the Apex Court again examined the doctrine of legitimate expectation in great details in the context of challenge based on Art.14 of the Constitution. The question as to whether substantive and legitimate expectation can be defeated if it is justified by Wednesbury reasonableness was also considered. The relevant discussion is to be found in Point No. 2 in para 26 at Page 1808. The question as to whether substantive and legitimate expectation can be defeated if it is justified by Wednesbury reasonableness was also considered. The relevant discussion is to be found in Point No. 2 in para 26 at Page 1808. The Apex Court referred to the principle at a root of doctrine of legitimate expectation namely, the rule of law which requires regularity, predictability and certainty in Governments' dealing with the public. The principle of legitimate expectation is at the root of rule of law and requires regularity, predictability and certainty in Governments' dealing with the public. The Court then examined the observations of the learned author, Dicey on Constitutional Law. A reference was made to the decision in Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601 and to the decision of House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions, which we have referred to above. The Apex Court also considered the decisions of foreign courts and observed in para 37 at page 1813 as under: "37. The above survey of cases shows that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been accepted as part of our law and that the decision maker can normally be compelled to give effect to his representation in regard to the expectation based on previous practice or past conduct unless some overriding public interest comes in the way. The judgment in Raghunathan's case (1998 AIRSCW 2954): (AIR 1998 SC 2279) requires that reliance must have been placed on the said representation and the representee must have thereby suffered detriment." 24. In the said case of Punjab Communication Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court then considered the question as to whether the decision maker can sustain a change in policy by applying the principle of Wednesbury reasonableness or whether the Court can go into the question whether the decision maker has properly balanced the legitimate expectation as against the need for a change. In the latter case, the Court would obviously be able to go into the proportionality of the change in the policy. In para 39 of the judgment, the Court considered the observations in R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte judgment, upon Thames Lodon BC (1994) 1 WLR 74, where the following observations were made by the learned judge. In para 39 of the judgment, the Court considered the observations in R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte judgment, upon Thames Lodon BC (1994) 1 WLR 74, where the following observations were made by the learned judge. "The Court is not the judge of the merits of the decision maker's policy.... the public authority in question is the judge of the issue whether 'overriding public interest' justifies such a change in policy.... But that is no more than saying that a change in policy, like any discretionary decision by a public authority, must not transgress Wednesbury principles". In Para 40 of the Apex Court summed up the discussion in the following words: "The result is that change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on a Wednesbury reasonableness. We have noticed that in Hindustan Development Corporation case (1993) 3 SCC 499:1994 AIR SCW 643): AIR 1994 SC 988) also it was laid down that the decision maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy. It is therefore, clear that the choice of the policy is for the decision maker and not for the Court. The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change in policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made." In view of the above legal position, it was held on facts that substantive legitimate expectation was not contravened and change in policy of the Government was not irrational or perverse according to Wednesbury principle. In our view, these principles apply to the case in hand. 25. In District Collector v. B. Suresh, (1999) 5 SCC 612, question arose whether a fair price shop dealer could insist on a right of being heard when the State Government decided, as a matter of policy, to bifurcate the shops and reduce the number of cards which the fair price shop dealer had. The licence of the fair price shop dealer was not cancelled and what was done was that, there were others who could also hold a number of cards resulting in the reduction of number of cards held by the fair price shop dealer. The licence of the fair price shop dealer was not cancelled and what was done was that, there were others who could also hold a number of cards resulting in the reduction of number of cards held by the fair price shop dealer. It was held that such an action as a result of the policy decision of the Government did not violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19(l)(g). The Government as a policy decision, decided to reduce the number of cards per dealer and it was not possible to contend that the dealer must be given prior notice of the impugned decision of the State Government. 26. In our view, the ratio of the four decisions discussed in para 20 to 25 is fully applicable to the facts of the case before us. Appellants' right to carry on the business as travel agents is not taken away. It is not as if their recognition has been cancelled or withdrawn so as to cast any stigma on them. There is only a change in policy. The policy of recognition of travel agents itself has been given a go by for reasons which we have mentioned earlier. 27. In the light of the above discussion, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the change in policy is based on valid grounds and on germane considerations. We have already summarised the counter affidavit filed in one O.P.No. 9595/92. Allegations of misuse of passports reaching persons other than the genuine applicants cannot be ruled out. The fact that militancy and extremist activities need stringent action being taken to ensure that passport reaches the applicant personally when it is issued for the first time is a very relevant consideration which is undoubtedly in public interest. Indeed, it is in the interest of national security that such insistence should be permitted. To ensure that the passport reaches the applicant personally, when it is issued in the first instance, is in our view, a very valid ground which outweighs other considerations including those of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, if any. The fact that appellants are still in a position to carry on business as travel agents and render several miscellaneous services is not disputed. It is no body's case that they are thrown out of business. The fact that appellants are still in a position to carry on business as travel agents and render several miscellaneous services is not disputed. It is no body's case that they are thrown out of business. Instead of a privileged group of 750 people, out of over 6000 in the year 1991, the result of the change in policy under the impugned circular is that all those who want to deal in these matters of handling passport applications would be welcome. Citizens are undoubtedly free to make their own choice. If agencies like the appellants claim some expertise and are well equipped with infrastructure and manpower, those who can afford their services will still continue to engage their services and pay their service charges. There are several others who belong to the lower economic strata, who live in villages, who may prefer to deal on their own in the matter of applying for passport and receiving the same. There may still be travel agents, other than the privileged class of erstwhile recognized travel agents, who may be charging lesser fees in small cities and villages, and cater to the needs of people who cannot go to big cities and afford the services offered by a privileged group like the appellants. In our view, these considerations, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be unreasonable so as to be violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. There is no arbitrariness in what has been pleaded as change in policy. In our view, change in policy is in the larger interest of the public, apart from serving the national security for reasons indicated above. The ground of violation of Art.14 must, therefore, be rejected. 28. As far as the contention of promissory estoppel is concerned, in the first place, the circular is in the realm of policy making. Secondly, this is purely a non-statutory relationship between the appellant and the respondent Union of India. The guidelines which were issued on 1st June, 1991 were admittedly non statutory. They are merely in the form of an executive policy. There is not even a concluded contract between the appellants and the respondent. It appears that the guidelines were issued on 1st June, 1991 for what was then thought as a convenient way of dealing with the application for passport and issuing passports. They are merely in the form of an executive policy. There is not even a concluded contract between the appellants and the respondent. It appears that the guidelines were issued on 1st June, 1991 for what was then thought as a convenient way of dealing with the application for passport and issuing passports. A change in such policy for the reasons which are indicated above cannot be attracted on the ground of promissory estoppel as stated by the Apex Court in P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. (supra). The Government must be given requisite latitude in the matter of framing its policy. The Government has aright to frame and change its policy. If the Government is satisfied that the change in policy was necessary in public interest it is not possible to assail the same on the ground of promissory estoppel. Appellants were not thrown out of business. There is no stigma attached to them. Their recognition is not withdrawn. They are not blacklisted. They will carry on their business. All that has happened is that, perhaps, they are facing greater competition; that would be inevitable in any field of business or activity. Moreover, as held by the Apex Court in District Collector v. B. Suresh (supra), if as against a few recognised agents there are many more who are now making applications for passports and processing them, no objection can be taken on the ground that appellants' volume of business will be adversely affected. In our view, therefore, there is no question of principle of promissory estoppel being applied to the facts of present case. None of the factual requirements necessary for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel arise in the facts of this case. Hence, we have no hesitation in rejecting the plea that mere change in the executive policy of the first respondent, for reasons of larger public convenience and national security is vitiated on account of the principle of promissory estoppel. The contention is therefore rejected. 29. The last contention of legitimate expectation must also be rejected in the light of what we have already stated above. We have already referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service union case (supra). The contention is therefore rejected. 29. The last contention of legitimate expectation must also be rejected in the light of what we have already stated above. We have already referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service union case (supra). Though it was held by the House of Lords that judicial review was permissible, it was held that larger public interest would over ride the doctrine of legitimate expectation of the appellants. Similar are the observations of the Apex Court in the case of P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. (supra). We have already reproduced the relevant conclusion in paragraph 22 above. In our view, the change in the policy was necessitated by larger public interest. Guidelines were introduced only on 1st June 1991. The impugned change was effected from 24th July, 1992. It is not as if there was a long standing practice by which appellants had acquired certain rights and therefore, they claim the benefit of doctrine of legitimate expectation. In the facts of the case, where the practise of recognised travel agents existed just over a year, we do not think that the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked. The appellants are carrying on their business and as indicated above, if they claim some expertise, infrastructure facilities and manpower, they will continue to flourish. However, even assuming that the plea of legitimate expectation is available to the appellants, in the larger public interest which necessitated the change in executive policy, we do not think that the change is vitiated on account of appellants' legitimate expectation being defeated. In the circumstances, the ground of legitimate expectation is also rejected. 30. It was not claimed before us that the appellants have any fundamental right to carry on the business as recognised travel agents. The provisions of the Passports Act, 1967 and the Rules framed thereunder do not recognise any such claim. Leave alone a fundamental right, appellants cannot claim even such an ordinary statutory right. There is therefore, no question of corresponding duty on the respondent to honour such a right. What is done is that a privilege granted for a brief period - a little over one year - has been withdrawn. Leave alone a fundamental right, appellants cannot claim even such an ordinary statutory right. There is therefore, no question of corresponding duty on the respondent to honour such a right. What is done is that a privilege granted for a brief period - a little over one year - has been withdrawn. As indicated earlier, withdrawal of the system of recognition is purely on the basis of change in policy, which is strictly in the realm of executive action and not vitiated by mala fides or arbitariness or non-application of mind or even reasonableness, leave alone Wednesbury unreasonableness. There is no substance in the appellants' contention that they had a right, much less a fundamental right under the Constitution to carry on such business and that right has been taken away. The appellants still continue to carry on their business. 31. In the view we have taken, there is no substance in any of the contentions raised in the appeals. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.