BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is at the instance of an applicant under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act ("act") and is directed against order dated September 14, 1993 passed by the learned Chief Judge, Small Causes Court at Calcutta in P. W. Appeal No. 2 of 1992 thereby setting aside order dated January 20, 1992 passed by the authority appointed under the Act in P. W. Application No. 160 of 1977. ( 2 ) ON August 13, 1977 the petitioner filed an application before the authority under the Act thereby claiming refund of Rs. 5,943. 90 paise which according to him was illegally deducted from his wages for certain periods. The petitioner also claimed compensation at the rate of 10 times the amount of illegally deducted wages. ( 3 ) IT may be mentioned here that as the said application was filed beyond the period of limitation it was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay and the authority by exercising power under second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act allowed such application on contested hearing. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, after condonation of delay, the proceeding under Section 15 {2) of the Act was finally heard on September 7, 1991 and by the order dated January 20, 1992 the authority below awarded a sum of Rs. 5,943. 19 paise along with equal amount of compensation. ( 5 ) ON depositing of the awarded amount of Rs. 11,950/- with the authority below, the opposite party preferred an appeal against such order before the learned Chief Judge, Small Causes Court at Calcutta being P. W. Appeal No. 2 of 1992. The petitioner also filed a cross-objection in the said appeal on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the petitioner was entitled to get compensation to the maximum limit of 10 times the amount illegally deducted. ( 6 ) THE said appeal was ultimately disposed of by the appellate authority below and by the order impugned herein, the appellate authority set aside the order passed by the authority below. Being dissatisfied, the employee has come up in revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) MR. ( 6 ) THE said appeal was ultimately disposed of by the appellate authority below and by the order impugned herein, the appellate authority set aside the order passed by the authority below. Being dissatisfied, the employee has come up in revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) MR. Moitra, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has firstly submitted that the appellate authority below acted without jurisdiction in dismissing the application under Section 15 (2) of the Act by interfering with the earlier order passed by the authority below by which such authority had condoned the delay in preferring such application Mr. Moitra contends that under Section 17 of the Act, an employer is given authority to prefer appeal only against a direction passed under Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (4) of Section 15 of the Act but the employer by preferring such an appeal cannot challenge the correctness of an order earlier passed by the authority below by exercising its power under second proviso to Section 15 (2) of the Act. Mr. Moitra points out that such kind of order can be challenged only by the employee if the same goes against him. ( 8 ) MR. Moitra next contends that the petitioner preferred a cross-objection in connection with the appeal before the appellate authority claiming maximum compensation but the appellate authority while allowing the appeal preferred by employer did not enter into the merit of the cross-objection as appellate authority was of the view that the application under Section 15 (2) of the Act ought not to have been entertained by the authority below after condonation of delay. Mr. Moitra thus prays for setting aside the order impugned. ( 9 ) MR. Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the employer has on the other hand supported the order passed by the appellate authority and has contended that in an appeal against an order passing direction under Section 15 (3) of the Act an appellate authority is entitled to see whether the application under Section 15 (2) of the Act was entertained after properly condoning delay in preferring such application. Mr. Mr. Banerjee, submits that in such an appeal it is within the competence of the appellate authority to scrutinise the propriety of the order condoning delay in presenting the application under Section 15 (2) of the Act as done by a civil appellate Court by exercising power under Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of such contention Mr. Banerjee relies upon the following decisions: a) Sheo Prasad v. Additional District Judge, Moradabad. b) Divisional Superintendent v. Hukum Chand, ; c) Chunder Doss v. Boshool Lal, ILR 8 Calcutta 251. d) Hajari Ram v. The Mantri, Khadi Mandir. ( 10 ) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record I am of the firm opinion that an order condoning delay in preferring an application under Section 15 (2) of the Act being an order passed by exercising right conferred upon the authority below by virtue of second proviso oi Section 15 of the Act, such order must be held to be an order 'under' Section 15 (2) of the Act and as such in view of clear language employed in Section 17 of the Act such decision can be impugned only by the employee but not by an employer. Therefore, an order allowing an application for condonation of delay in preferring an application under Section 15 (2) of the Act cannot be touched by an appellate authority in an appeal filed by an employer while challenging a direction passed under Section 15 (3) of the aforesaid Act. In such an appeal, the appellate authority must restrict his scrutiny to the question whether in the fact of the case direction passed under Section 15 (3) of the Act was justified. ( 11 ) MOREOVER, even if I assume for the sake of argument that an order condoning delay in preferring an application under Section 15 (2) of the Act is not an order under Section 15 (2), such delay having been condoned on contested hearing by a separate order, in an appeal preferred against a direction under Section 15 (3) of the Act such order cannot be challenged. As pointed out by the Special Bench of this Court in the case of Mamuda Khateen v. Beniyan Bibi, when a proceeding is presented along with an application for condonation of delay, so long delay is not condoned, the proceeding should be presumed to be 'non est'. Only after the delay is condoned the proceeding is registered. Therefore, the moment delay was condoned, it was the duty of the employer to challenge such order before appropriate forum according to law; otherwise after submitting to the jurisdiction of the authority and inviting the authority to enter into the merit the employer cannot complain before the appellate authority that the delay ought not to have been condoned. ( 12 ) MOREOVER, as pointed out earlier, right of appeal at the instance of employer is restricted only to an order passed under Section 15 (3) and Section 15 (4) of the Act. Therefore, the appellate authority acted without jurisdiction in setting aside the order allowing prayer for condonation of delay and thus dismissing the application under Section 15 (2) of the Act. ( 13 ) I now propose to consider the decisions cited by Mr. Banerjee. In the case of Sheo Prasad v. Additional District Judge (supra), a learned Judge of Allahabad High Court was considering a case where an application under Section 15 (2) of the Act was filed on March 1, 1956 before a Magistrate who had no authority to entertain such application. Subsequently it was presented before the appropriate authority which allowed the claim in part on June 14, 1958. An appeal was preferred against such order and the appellate authority set aside the order of the Commissioner on the ground that the Commissioner improperly condoned the delay in preferring the claim. The employee moved High Court against such order. Although the exact date of refiling the application with the prayer of condonation of delay is not available from the reported judgment, but as it appears from paragraph 8 thereof, His Lordship relied upon the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act as it stood prior to the amendment of 1957 which came into force on April 1, 1958. Therefore the Court was considering the scope of Section 17 of the Act as it stood prior to amendment. Therefore the Court was considering the scope of Section 17 of the Act as it stood prior to amendment. At that point of time, an appeal at the instance of the employer against an order under Section 15 (2) of the Act was not barred. Therefore the said decision, based on interpretation of Section 17 of the Act prior to amendment of 1957 cannot be of any assistance to the fact of the present case. ( 14 ) IN the case of Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway v. Hukum Chand (supra) the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court followed the decision of Sheo Prasad v. Additional District Judge (supra) and in particular relied upon the principles laid down in Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure in concluding that in an appeal against final order, any error, defect or irregularity in "any order affecting the decision of the case" may be challenged. Their Lordships were of the view that an order improperly allowing an application for condonation of delay which has the effect of reviving a right or remedy, which but for that decision, would no longer be enforceable must be regarded as "affecting the merit of the case. " With great respect to those learned Judges of the Division Bench, 1 am unable to accept the aforesaid proposition of law as a sound one. ( 15 ) SO far as this High Court is concerned. it is the consistent view at least from 1925 that an order setting aside abatement of a suit for not filing an application for substitution within the period of limitation cannot be challenged in an appeal against final decree by taking aid of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure as such an order is not an order "affecting the merit of the case. " (See Mohammad Nuru Amin v. Monolzar Saran Deb Mahanta and Ors. , reported in AIR 1925 Cal 473 (D. B.); Sayama Bibi v. Madhu Sudhan Manta, reported in AIR 1925 Cal 766, Mairajan Bibi v. Abdul Sek, reported in AIR 1933 Cal 498 ). " (See Mohammad Nuru Amin v. Monolzar Saran Deb Mahanta and Ors. , reported in AIR 1925 Cal 473 (D. B.); Sayama Bibi v. Madhu Sudhan Manta, reported in AIR 1925 Cal 766, Mairajan Bibi v. Abdul Sek, reported in AIR 1933 Cal 498 ). Thus, in my view, an order allowing the prayer for condonation of delay in preferring an application under Section 15 (2) of the Act cannot be challenged in an appeal against a direction under Section 15 (3) or Section 15 (4) of the Act by taking assistance of the principle mentioned in Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The position would have been however different if the authority concerned passed any direction under Section 15 (3) or 15 (4) on an application under Section 15 (2) thereof presented beyond the period of limitation and which was not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. In such a situation the right of the concerned authority to pass such direction on a barred application can be disputed on the ground that in the absence of an order of condonation, the authority concerned could not entertain such application. Thus, I am unable to follow the principles laid down in the case of Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway (supra ). ( 16 ) IN the case of Hajari Ram v. The Mantri, Khadi Mandir (supra) a learned Judge of Rajasthan High Court has simply followed the aforesaid two decisions of the Allahabad High Court and also of an earlier decision of the said Court in the case of Divisional Personal Officer, Northern Railway v. Regional Labour Commissioner, reported in 1965 Raj. LW 210 and came to the conclusion that propriety of an order allowing application for condonation of delay can be challenged in an appeal under Section 17 of the Act. No separate reason has been assigned by His Lordship in the said decision. ( 17 ) IN the case of Chunder Doss and Ors. v. Boshool Lal Sookul (supra), the learned District Judge admitted an appeal which was barred by limitation and sent the same to a learned Subordinate Judge for disposal. The learned Subordinate Judge to whom the appeal was sent for disposal, after hearing the parties dismissed the same as barred by limitation. v. Boshool Lal Sookul (supra), the learned District Judge admitted an appeal which was barred by limitation and sent the same to a learned Subordinate Judge for disposal. The learned Subordinate Judge to whom the appeal was sent for disposal, after hearing the parties dismissed the same as barred by limitation. In a second appeal before this Court it was contended that the learned District Judge having admitted the appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge ought to have heard the appeal on merit. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal holding that the learned District Judge wrongly admitted the appeal after the period of limitation. ( 18 ) IN my view, the aforesaid decision is of no avail to the opposite party. I have already indicated earlier that an order passing direction on a time barred application under Section 15 (2) of the Act can be challenged in an appeal under Section 17 of the Act; but propriety of an order condoning delay by exercising power under the second proviso of Section 15 (2) cannot be challenged in an appeal against an order under Section 15 (3) of the Act. Therefore, I find no substance in the objections raised by Mr. Banerjee. ( 19 ) I have already mentioned that the petitioner preferred before the appellate authority a counter appeal claiming enhancement of compensation and the appellate authority did not enter into the merit of the said cross appeal. Under the aforesaid circumstances I set aside the order impugned and remand the matter back to the appellate authority below to consider the appeal preferred by the employer and also the counter appeal filed by the employee on merit. Since the proceeding is pending for a long time, the appellate authority is directed to dispose of such proceedings positively within a month from the date of communication of this order. ( 20 ) WITH the above observation, this revisional application is allowed. No costs.