JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.(Oral:- This revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the order dated 1.9.1999 passed by the learned Sub Judge, Una in Execution Petition Nos.49 of 1990 and 4 of 1993 whereby the said execution petitions, both file by the petitioner, two applications under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, another application on the same grounds and one more application under Section 148/151, Code of Civil Procedure had been disposed of in as much as the execution petitions had been dismissed. 2. Brief facts leading to the presentation of this petition are that a suit for specific performance of the agreement between the parties was compromised by them and the trial court in terms of the compromise, decreed the suit on 29.6.1990 as follows:- "As per agreement the suit of the plaintiffs for the execution of the sale deed of the suit property as per agreement dated 12.7.1996 in favour of the plaintiffs only in case the sale is not prohibited under any law is decreed." 3. An application for amendment of the above operative part of the order was allowed by the trial Court on 6.11.1990 thereby amending the above order as follows: "The time within which sale deed is to be executed is not mentioned in the decree. It is an accidental omission. Such an omission can be rectified under Sections 151,152 C.P.C. as per the decision given in AIR 1976 Andhra Pradesh page 50. So the application is allowed and the respondent to execute the sale deed on or before 5.12.1990. The decree be amended accordingly." 4. The petitioner preferred Civil Revision No.27 of 1991 against the aforesaid order allowing amendment of the decree which was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court by judgment dated 3.8.1992, the operative part whereof reads as under: "In the result, the revision petition is accepted and impugned order dated 6.11.1990 is modified to the extent that the sale deed will be executed within a period of four months from today. It is expected that the respondents-defendants will not oppose the application of the petitioners-plaintiffs for permission to purchase the suit land filed by the petitioners-plaintiffs before the competent authority. However, if any objection has already been filed on behalf of respondents-defendants, it will be decided by the competent authority in accordance with law. It is expected that the respondents-defendants will not oppose the application of the petitioners-plaintiffs for permission to purchase the suit land filed by the petitioners-plaintiffs before the competent authority. However, if any objection has already been filed on behalf of respondents-defendants, it will be decided by the competent authority in accordance with law. The revision petition is disposed of accordingly. There is no order as to costs." 5. In the meanwhile, the petitioner/Decree Holder had already filed the aforesaid execution petition and application except execution petition No.40 of 1993 which was filed after the passing of the above order whereby the time for execution of the sale deed was extended subject to the conditions specified therein. 6. The respondents (Judgment-debtors before the executing Court) opposed the execution of the decree on the ground that it was rendered inexecutable because of the expiry of the time fixed and in view of the provisions of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. The petitioner also moved an application under Sections 148/151 CPC for extention of time on the ground of non-cooperation by the respondents who, in turn, filed application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act. 7. On the basis of the aforesaid petition/application and replies thereto, the executing Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the execution of the decree has become inexecutable in view of the order of the Honble High Court dated 3.8.1992. OP JD. 2. Whether the agreement dated 12.7.86 is liable to be rescisioned U/S 28 of the specific Relief Act read with Section 151 CPC? OP JD. 3. Whether the period of limitation fixed by this court and further extended by the Honble High Court is liable to be extended as alleged? OpDH. 4. Whether the execution petition is not maintainable in view of the application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act? 5. Whether the D.H. is not competent to purchase the suit land as alleged? OPJD. 6. Relief." 8. Parties led evidence. After hearing the parties, the executing court (learned Senior Sub Judge, Una) decided Issue Nos.l and 5 in favour of the respondents, Issue Nos 2 and 4 were decided against the respondents whereas Issue No.3 was held against the petitioners. As a result, the execution petitions were dismissed. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the records. 10. As a result, the execution petitions were dismissed. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the records. 10. It is not in dispute that in view of the orders passed by the High Court, the sale deed was to be executed on or before 3.12.1992 subject to the petitioner getting sanction for purchase of the suit property from the competent authority. However, the said deed was not executed within the time extended by this Court. It is admitted by Satish Kumar Syal (One of the petitioners and Special Power of Attorney of other petitioners) that as and when the Decree Holders had been visiting the Office of the Tehsildar (Sub Registrar) for getting the sale deed executed, they did not have the requisite sanction to purchase the suit land. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners belong to Punjab, therefore, could not and cannot purchase landed property in Himachal Pradesh in view of the bar created by Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. It is established on lecord that sanction was accorded to the petitioners to purchase the property from the respondents vide Exts. DHW1/B to DHW1/F valid for 180 days w.e.f. 1.12.1992... It is however,, not their case nor proved on record that they ever attempted! to gat tie sale deed executed on the basis of the said sanctions within the time limit, as, provided vide order dated 3.8.1992 supra of this Court. Thus, the decree in question had been rendered inexecutable after 3.12.1992 and the execuuting court has rightly held that such decree is inexecutable 11. It was contended by tie learned counsel for the petitioners that in the facts and circumstances of the case the executing court ought to have extended the period for execution of the sale deed as was prayed for vide application under Sections 148/151 CPC by die petitioners. Since refusal to extend the time by the executing court has resulted in miscarriage of justice, therefore, this Court may extend the period execution of the sale deed. 12. Be it stated that the time limit fixed by a superior Court, while acting on judicial side, for compliance/execution of any order/direction or due performance of any act or obligation or for other purpose, whatsoever is binding on the parties as also on the subordinate Court. 12. Be it stated that the time limit fixed by a superior Court, while acting on judicial side, for compliance/execution of any order/direction or due performance of any act or obligation or for other purpose, whatsoever is binding on the parties as also on the subordinate Court. Such a time limit can be extended only by the court which fixed it or by a Court superior to the Court fixing such time limit. A subordinate Court has no power and jurisdiction to extend such time linritt far any reason whatsoever. 13. In Gurmeet Singh V Labhu Ram(AIR (39) 1952 Pepsu 42 (C.N.25), it has been held as undtar: "The next question is whether the Sub-Judge in view of these facts could extend the time and fix a date by which the amendment could be made. It is contended by Shim Daya Sarup, the learned counsel for the respondent, that since the time had been originally fixed by the District Judge, it could not be extended fey the Sub-Judge and the contention appears to be correct. Order 6 Rule ISCPC makes it clear that the amendment has to be made within the time fixed or extended by the Court that allows amendment. It is also general rule that direction contained in the mandate of the appellate Courts are beyond the judicial discretion of the lower court and Maes: must be implicitly followed. Where time to do a certain thing is fixed % am appellate court in its order or decree, it is not competent to a subordinate Court to extend that time. The natural consequences is that contention of the appellate that since the amendment was made within the time subsequently fixed by the Sub-Judge it should fee held to be legal and properly made, loses all its force and must be repelled " 14. The above quoted proposition fully supports the view, I have taken hereinabove. Thus, the time limit fixed by this Court for execution of the sale deed could not have from extended by the executing Court and it has been rightly held by the said court. 15. The prayer of the learned counsel for the petitioners for extension of time for execution of the sale deed by this Court deserves rejection. Thus, the time limit fixed by this Court for execution of the sale deed could not have from extended by the executing Court and it has been rightly held by the said court. 15. The prayer of the learned counsel for the petitioners for extension of time for execution of the sale deed by this Court deserves rejection. When time has been provided by court to the parties to perform their respective obligations under a decree the party seeking extension of such time should apply before the expiry of the time already provided because after expiry of such time a valuable night may accrue to the opposite party. Therefore, the court will not and should not in an a manner which may destroy a vested right of a party for no fault on its part, lit any case, the appropriate Court must be approached for extension time provided by it within reasonable time failing which the extension may be refused on the ground of inordinate delay alone. 16. In the present none of the above conditions enabling a party to seek extension of time is satisfied. 17.A perusal of the impugned order and the material on record clearly shows that the impugned order does not suffer form want of jurisdiction or exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity resulting in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the impugned order does not call for any interference. 18. Resultantly, this revision petition merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed