P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, J. ( 1 ) NOTICING conflict of views in two Division Bench decisions in S. Narayana v. State of A. P. , (1990) 1 ALT 237 Y. Subba Reddy v. Commissioner of Endowments (1998) 1 ALT 579 , the learned Judges who initially heard the appeals directed the Registrar to place the papers before the Hon ble Chief Justice for "constituting an appropriate Bench". The learned Chief Justice in turn has directed the cases to be placed before this Full Bench. Accordingly, the appeals have come up before us. ( 2 ) THE question posed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench at whose instance, the matter has been referred to the Full Bench is "whether S. 75 of the A. P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 prevails over the Andhra Tenancy Act or whether it is subject to the provisions of Andhra Tenancy Act?" The question as formulated above does not strictly arise in the instant case as we shall point out later. At the same time, we deem it necessary to consider the question of correctness of the decision of this Court in Y. Subba Reddy s case ( 1998 (1) ALT 579 ) (supra) so as to dispel any misconceptions as regards the applicability of the provisions of the Tenancy Act to the Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions. We would also like to indicate at the outset that the central question which needs to be ultimately answered in the course of adjudication of these appeals is whether the suit schedule lands of which the respondent plaintiff claims to be a perpetual tenant, are excluded from the purview of A. P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act by reason of S. 18 thereof. ( 3 ) THE three appeals arise out of the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 82 of 1980 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Ramachandrapuram. The suit was instituted by the plaintiff in the year 1978 in the District Court and later on transferred to the Sub-Court. Defendants 1 and 2 in the suit are the appellants respectively in A. S. Nos. 1108/1985 and 2055 of 1984. The plaintiff filed A. S. No. 1698 of 1985. His appeal is limited to the relief of damages which were not granted by the trial Court. Defendants 1 and 2 in the suit are the appellants respectively in A. S. Nos. 1108/1985 and 2055 of 1984. The plaintiff filed A. S. No. 1698 of 1985. His appeal is limited to the relief of damages which were not granted by the trial Court. ( 4 ) THE facts giving rise to the appeals are the following : An extent of about 43 acres of agricultural lands which were endowed to National High School, Ramachandrapuram, East Godavari district by a philanthropist and which was placed under the management of the then Taluk Board initially and thereafter its successive bodies viz. , District Board and Zilla Parishad constitute the plaint schedule lands. They were leased out to the plaintiff in the year 1959 for a period of six years. It is not in dispute that these lands which were given or endowed to the National High School which later became a Junior College come under the description of charitable Endowment governed by the provisions of A. P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Endowments Act (hereinafter referred to as "endowments Act" ). It is also not in dispute that the lands have been under the management and control of the District Board when the lease was initially granted to the plaintiff in the year 1959 which was succeeded by the Zilla Parishad. It may be mentioned that Zilla Parishad is an institution of local self-governance created under statute and it takes care of primary and secondary education. ( 5 ) AFTER expiry of the lease period, the plaintiff continued to remain as a tenant and became a tenant by holding over. Eviction Petition under the provisions of A. P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as Tenancy Act) was filed by the Zilla Parishad on the ground of default in payment of rent. The Tahsildar dismissed the eviction petition. The Zilla Parishad (D. 1) preferred an appeal i. e. I. A. No. 3 of 1966 to the Sub-Collector, Rajahmundry. The appeal was allowed and eviction was ordered. The plaintiff questioned the eviction order in a writ petition. The writ petition was allowed in favour of the plaintiff. W. A. No. 477 of 1969 was preferred by Zilla Parishad against the said judgment. The appeal was disposed of in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties. The appeal was allowed and eviction was ordered. The plaintiff questioned the eviction order in a writ petition. The writ petition was allowed in favour of the plaintiff. W. A. No. 477 of 1969 was preferred by Zilla Parishad against the said judgment. The appeal was disposed of in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties. According to the terms of compromise, the first defendant (Zilla Parishad) agreed to grant lease for a period of six years from 1-4-1972 to 31-3-1978 on enhanced rent and the plaintiff agreed to give vacant possession on the expiry of lease period. On the footing that the period of lease granted to plaintiff had expired, the Zilla Parishad granted the lease in favour of 2nd defendant (which is the appellant in A. S. No. 2055 of 1984 ). A lease deed in this behalf was executed on 24-8-1978 vide Ex. B. 23, the lease period being 6 years. There is some controversy on the question as to when the possession was handed over to the lessee, 2nd defendant. On this aspect, the learned trial Judge found that the first defendant put the 2nd defendant in possession after 13-5-1978 subsequent to the dismissal of injunction petition filed by the plaintiff pending the suit. The suit which was originally filed for permanent injunction restraining the first defendant Zilla Parishad from leasing out the plaint schedule lands to any other party during the subsistence of the plaintiff s tenancy was later on converted into a suit for recovery of possession of plaint A schedule property from defendants 1 and 2 and for award of damages - past and future. The 2nd defendant was impleaded as a party on 25-2-1981. ( 6 ) 13 issues were framed in the suit. The most important issue is whether the plaintiff is a statutory tenant under the provisions of the Andhra Tenancy Act after the expiry of previous lease dt. 31-3-1978 and is entitled to continue in possession till he is evicted through due process of law as per the said Act. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the plaint A Schedule lands, is another important issue. There was also an issue whether the parties can contract out of the statute so as to deny the benefits of the Tenancy Act to the plaintiff. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the plaint A Schedule lands, is another important issue. There was also an issue whether the parties can contract out of the statute so as to deny the benefits of the Tenancy Act to the plaintiff. Yet another issue was whether the plaint schedule lands partake the character of lands held by the Government so as to exclude the provisions of the Tenancy Act. These issues were answered in favour of the plaintiff. The Court also ruled that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit because the relief for recovery of possession cannot be granted by the authorities functioning under the A. P. Tenancy Act. The suit was decreed directing the defendants to put back the plaintiff in possession of the plaint schedule lands and also restraining the first defendant from leasing out the lands to any third party, before termination of the plaintiff s statutory lease by due process of law. The relief for damages was however negatived. Aggrieved by this judgment, the present appeals are filed. It is stated across the Bar that the lands are no longer in the possession of the 2nd defendant and they are being cultivated by some third parties. However, we are not concerned with that aspect. ( 7 ) THE main defence taken by the first defendant - Zilla Parishad was that the right and interest in the land vests with the Government by virtue of the resolution passed by the Zilla Parishad on 10-10-1969 (marked as Ex. B. 27) expressing its consent to hand over the properties of the National High School to the State Government in compliance with the conditions laid down by the Government in G. O. 2049, Education Dept. dt. 23-8-1969 (Ex. B. 2) while according permission for conversion of National High School into a Junior College. The lands in question are therefore excluded from the purview of the Tenancy Act by reason of clause (c) of S. 18 thereof. This aspect was discussed under issue No. 4 by the trial Court. The learned Judge rightly held that there was nothing to show that these trust lands were transferred to the Government along with the school buildings in pursuance of the resolution. DW. 2 admitted that only buildings with laboratory etc. , were handed over to the District Educational officer and the agricultural lands were not handed over. The learned Judge rightly held that there was nothing to show that these trust lands were transferred to the Government along with the school buildings in pursuance of the resolution. DW. 2 admitted that only buildings with laboratory etc. , were handed over to the District Educational officer and the agricultural lands were not handed over. He further admitted that the Management of the suit lands continued to be done by the Zilla Parishad only and the land revenue is being paid by the Zilla Parishad. The lease deed Ex. A. 11 dt. 24-8-1978 in favour 2nd defendant does not indicate that the lease was given by Zilla Parishad was on behalf of the Government. ( 8 ) THE other defence taken by the defendants was that the terms of the compromise recorded in W. A. No. 477 of 1969 and the order of the High Court based on the compromise estops the plaintiff to claim tenancy rights in perpetuity u/s. 10 (3) of the Tenancy Act. Both the parties are bound by the terms of compromise culminating into a consent order in the writ appeal. The learned trial Judge rejected this contention of the defendants on the ground that the statutory rights of the tenant cannot be divested by an agreement and the principle that the tenant cannot contract out of the benefits of the Tenancy Act has to be applied. Whether or not this conclusion is correct is debatable. Much can be said against the view taken by the trial Court which was discussed under issue Nos. 1 and 2. In the view we are going to take it is not necessary for us to dilate on this aspect and record our conclusion one way or the other. ( 9 ) THE question that has been referred to the Full Bench has arisen on account of events subsequent to the filing of the appeal viz. , the enactment of A. P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act (for short endowments Act ) in the year 1987 (Act 30 of 1987) and the decisions rendered in the context of that Act. We may mention at the outset that there is no specific averment or a finding that the plaint schedule lands are in the nature of charitable endowment. We may mention at the outset that there is no specific averment or a finding that the plaint schedule lands are in the nature of charitable endowment. However, it is not disputed by any of the counsel that it is a charitable endowment within the meaning of Act 30 of 1987. The concession apart, we would like to see whether the plaint schedule lands leased out to the plaintiff come within the purview of Act 30 of 1987. 1966 Act was repealed by the Act of 1987. But the definitions remain to be substantially same. The Act applies to all public charitable institutions and endowments whether registered or not other than Wakfs. The Explanation clarifies that the expression "public Charitable Institutions and Endowments" shall include every charitable institution or endowment the administration of which is for the time being vested in any department of Government or Civil Court, Zilla Praja Parishad, Municipal authority or local authority or any company, society, organisation, institution or other person. The Act also applies to all Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Endowments. charitable endowment is defined as :under 1966 Act : charitable Endowment means all property given or endowed for any charitable purpose;explanation : Any property which belonged to, or was given or endowed for the support or maintenance of, a charitable institution or which was given, endowed or used as of right for any charitable purpose shall be deemed to be a charitable endowment within the meaning of this definition, notwithstanding that before or after the commencement of this Act, the charitable institution has ceased to exist or ceased to be used for any charitable purpose or the charity has ceased to be performed. "under 1987 Act :" charitable Endowment means all property given or endowed for any charitable purpose :explanation I : Any property which belonged to or was given or endowed for the support or maintenance of a Charitable Institution or which was given, endowed or used as of a right for any charitable purpose shall be deemed to be a charitable endowment within the meaning of this definition, notwithstanding that before or after the commencement of this Act, the charitable institution has ceased to exist or ceased to be used for any charitable purpose or the charity has ceased to be performed. Explanation II : Any Inam granted to a service holder or to an employee of a Charitable Institution for the performance of any charity or service in connection with a charitable institution shall not be deemed to be a personal gift to the service holder or to the employees notwithstanding the grant of ryotwari patta to such service holder or employee under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956, but shall be deemed to be a charitable endowment. ( 10 ) IN the light of these definitions and even on the basis of scanty evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the plaint schedule lands given to the National High School, Ramachandrapuram fall within the purview of the said Acts. According to the written statement of the 1st defendant, the plaint schedule property is part of trust property of National High School, Ramachandrapuram. However, the Trust Deed or any other document executed by the previous owner has not been filed. But, we get it from the unrebutted evidence of DW. 2 - Revenue Officer of Zilla Parishad that late Sri K. Perraju Panthulu donated the lands to the National High School, Rama-chandrapuram for the upliftment of the school and the land was handed over to the Taluk Board which was managing the High School. On the abolition of the Taluk Board, the District Board took over the management and thereafter, the successor body i. e. Zilla Parishad took over the School together with the lands. He also stated that the management of the land by Zilla Parishad was meant for the benefit of the School. Whether late Sri Perraju donated the land or created a trust for proper administration and management of the land is not known. The irrefutable fact however, is that the donation or trust was for advancing the cause of education which is a charitable purpose. The agricultural lands were endowed exclusively for the development of the High School and thereby subserving the cause of education. It is therefore a charitable endowment which has eventually come under the management of the Zilla Parishad, East Godavari. Thus if the plaint schedule property comes within the purview of the Endowments Act of 1966, the next question is whether the provisions of A. P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act are excluded. It is therefore a charitable endowment which has eventually come under the management of the Zilla Parishad, East Godavari. Thus if the plaint schedule property comes within the purview of the Endowments Act of 1966, the next question is whether the provisions of A. P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act are excluded. The Tenancy Act does not provide for exclusion or exemption of the lands given to and held by any Charitable religious Institution or endowment as held by this Court in Narayana s case ( 1990 (1) ALT 237 ). On the other hand, sub-sec. (2) of S. 18 makes it clear that the exclusion is only partial. Sub-sec. (2) lays down that Ss. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 shall not apply to any lease of land belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or religious institution or endowment falling within the scope of sub-sec. (1) of S. 74 (1) of the Act 17 of 1966. It is further laid down that the other provisions of other Sections of the Act shall apply to every such lease subject to the modification of the term rent as specified in clauses (1) and (2) thereof. ( 11 ) NOTWITHSTANDING this clear legal position, a cloud is cast on the and operation of the protective umbrella of S. 10 (3) of the Tenancy Act to the lands held by Charitable Religious Institutions or endowments by reason of the decision of this Court in (1998) 1 ALT 579 which was rendered on 27-12-1995. That was a case where the lessee of the endowment lands whose renewed lease period expired, challenged the auction proposed to be held by the Management of the Institution governed by Act 30 of 1987. The learned single Judge declined to grant the relief in the writ petition. On appeal, the Division Bench speaking through Mishra, C. J. relied on S. 75 of Act 30 of 1987 and refused to grant relief in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226. The Division Bench dealt with the question after assuming in favour of the appellant that the Tenancy Act had application. The learned judges then posed the question "can he for the purposes of the Act claim that he has become a cultivating tenant?". The answer was given in the negative. The Division Bench dealt with the question after assuming in favour of the appellant that the Tenancy Act had application. The learned judges then posed the question "can he for the purposes of the Act claim that he has become a cultivating tenant?". The answer was given in the negative. The learned Judges referred to and relied on S. 75 of the Act 30 of 1987 (corresponding to S. 70 of 1966 Act), which reads as under :"75. Lease, sale of inams to be void in certain cases :- (1) Any Lease for a term exceeding six years and any gift, sale, exchange or mortgage of an inam land granted for the support or maintenance of charitable or religious institution or endowment or for the performance of a religious or public charity or service, shall be null and void unless any such transaction, not being a gift, is effected with the prior sanction of the Government. (2) Such sanction may be accorded by the Government where they consider that the transaction is - (i) necessary or beneficial to the institution or endowment; (ii) in regard to the land which is an uneconomical holding for the institution or endowment to own and maintain; and (iii) the consideration thereof, is adequate and proper. (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 12 ) THE learned Judges then held :"with the expiration of the first lease, thus, the appellant continued his possession under the second lease (renewal, so called by learned counsel for the appellant ). The validity under the above provision of law was for a period of six years only. If he is holding over after the expiry of the said period of six years, he is doing so illegally. " ( 13 ) IT was further observed :"we are satisfied that proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot be allowed to be used by persons who intend to perpetuate their possession upon a property in respect of whcih there is a clear command of law that persons concerned shall execute a lease for a period of not more than six years and if it is going to be for a period more than six years, it should be done with the prior sanction of the Government. If a tenancy right is allowed in such a person beyond the period of the lease it will make the prior sanction of the Government wholly redundant and without prior sanction of the Government by continuous lease for a period of six years, the claim will be that it is a lease for an indefinite period. " ( 14 ) WITH those observations, the writ appeal was dismissed. ( 15 ) OBVIOUSLY, the learned counsel for the appellant Zilla Parishad relied on this decision when the matter came up before the learned single Judge and the Division Bench whereupon the learned Judges found that the said decision goes counter to earlier Division Bench judgment in (1990) 1 ALT 237 . We should therefore express our view as regards the correctness of the decision in Y. Subba Reddy s case (1998) (1) Andhra LT 579) (supra), though in the view we are taking, strictly speaking, this question need not be decided. The matter having been referred to the Full Bench, we do not want a state of uncertainty enveloping this branch of law. Hence, we would like to express our view on the correctness or otherwise of this decision. ( 16 ) SECTION 75 of 1987 Act and S. 70 of 1966 Act declare that any lease for a term exceeding 6 years and any gift, sale, exchange or mortgage of an inam land granted for the support or maintenance of charitable or religious institution or endowment or for the performance of a religious or public charity or service, shall be null and void unless any such transaction not being a gift, is effected with the prior sanction of the Government. The marginal heading of S. 75 is "lease, sale of inams to be void in certain cases". The prohibition as implicit from the language employed in S. 75 is in respect of inam lands. Section 76 which is no longer on the Statute Book, purports to nullify the rights of a grantee of a ryotwari patta in respect of any inam land given to a surplus holder or other employee of Charitable or Religious Institution or Endowment and the transferees from such patta holders. Section 76 which is no longer on the Statute Book, purports to nullify the rights of a grantee of a ryotwari patta in respect of any inam land given to a surplus holder or other employee of Charitable or Religious Institution or Endowment and the transferees from such patta holders. Section 77 provides for resumption of inam lands under the situations envisaged by the said provision, one of the situations being that the holder of inam land has entered into a transaction which is nullified under S. 75. The corresponding Section in 1966 Act is S. 71. There is some controversy on the question whether S. 75 and old 71 is confined to inams directly granted to the temple or religious institution or whether it includes personal inams burdened with service. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that S. 75 which was called in aid by the Division Bench in Y. Subba Reddy s case, ( 1998 (1) ALT 579 ), only governs the inam lands. Apparently, this aspect has not been noticed by the leanred Judges. In fact, we have called for the original record in the writ appeal in order to see whether the land in respect of which the tenancy rights were claimed by the appellant therein was inam land. But, we find no averment nor indication to that effect anywhere. That is one aspect. Secondly, although the Division Bench proceeded on the assumption that the Tenancy Act has application nevertheless expressed the view that the appellant could not become a cultivating tenant under the Tenancy Act in view of the embargo contained in S. 75 of the Endowments Act and therefore, he had no right to remain in lawful possession after the expiry of a period of six years. This conclusion is wholly inconsistent with the provisions of the Tenancy Act and virtually overlooks the provisions of the Tenancy Act. As already noticed, the Tenancy Act applies to lands held by Religious and Charitable Institutions or Endowments as is made clear in sub-sec. (2) of S. 18. ( 17 ) VIEWED from another angle, there is no provision in the Endowments Act which precludes the application of Tenancy Act to the lands held by the Religious or Charitable Institutions/endowments. As already noticed, the Tenancy Act applies to lands held by Religious and Charitable Institutions or Endowments as is made clear in sub-sec. (2) of S. 18. ( 17 ) VIEWED from another angle, there is no provision in the Endowments Act which precludes the application of Tenancy Act to the lands held by the Religious or Charitable Institutions/endowments. By incorporating S. 82 in the Endowments Act, 1987, the Legislature made a bid to regulate and even abrogate the leases of agricultural lands. S. 82 (1) enjoined that any lease of agricultural lands belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of an Institution or Endowment shall notwithstanding anything contained in other land for the time being in force, stand cancelled, if it is held by a person who is not a landless poor for a period of six years or more; sub-sec. (2) ordained that such lessee shall have the right to purchase the lands for consideration of 75% of the prevailing market value to be paid in four equal instalments and if such person fails or is unwilling to purchase the land, the lease shall be deemed to have been terminated. The Constitutional validity of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 82 came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Jeevan Reddy and U. L. Waghray, JJ. in (1990) 1 ALT 237 . The learned judges struck down both the sub-secs. (1) and (2) as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned Judges said :"it is in the light of the above discussion that the question whether S. 82 (1) is violative of equal protection clause, has to be decided. Can it be said that singling out the tenants of the lands held by such institutions/endowments for the purpose of putting an end to their tenancy rights, is a reasonable classification? Can it be said that such classification, even if assumed to be reasonable, has any nexus to the object sought to be achieved? We think not. In the absence of any legislative indication that these lands will not be leased out again, the exercise is a purposeless one. We have already held that operation of tenancy Laws to future leases is not excluded. We think not. In the absence of any legislative indication that these lands will not be leased out again, the exercise is a purposeless one. We have already held that operation of tenancy Laws to future leases is not excluded. There is no guarantee that all the incoming tenants would be angels; that they would not claim the benefit of Tenancy Acts;that they would cooly pay the rent as may be stipulatted, notwithstanding that it is more than the rent payable accoridng to law, nor is there any guarantee that they would quietly vacate the land at the end of the year without claiming the benefit of the Tenancy Acts. In the very nature of things, no persons would normally forego the rights and protection extended to him by a statute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Suffice it to say that, as it now stands, S. 82 cannot be saved from the wrath of Art. 14. We reiterate that, in the absence of exclusion of the application of Tenancy Acts altogether vis-a-vis the lands held by institutions/endowments sub-section (1) suffers from the vice of discrimination. It cannot be said that singling out leases of the lands of these institutions/endowments for putting an end to their leases, is a reasonable classification. It also fails to achieve the objective supposedly underlying S. 82. " ( 18 ) WITH regard to sub-sec. (2), the learned Judges held that it falls along with sub-sec. (1 ). Having noticed an apparent contradiction in sub-sec. (2), the learned Judges observed"thus, in effect sub-sec. (2) puts an end to the tenancy rights of the landless poor person too though, in name sub-sec. (1) purports to save from the cancellation. "another feature of discrimination in sub-sec. (2) is highlighted in paragraph 18. Thus the endeavour of the Legislature to nullify the subsisting leases of agricultural lands belonging to or given to any Institution or Endowment except those held by the landless poor persons, could not be translated into action in view of the judgment of this Court in Narayana s case ( 1990 (1) ALT 237 ) (supra) striking down sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 82. the correctness or otherwise of the said decision does not fall for consideration here. the correctness or otherwise of the said decision does not fall for consideration here. We would however be content with saying that prima facie, the reasoning of the Division Bench in Narayana s case appeals to us. If sub-sec. (1) of S. 82 of the Endowment Act by which the leases for more than six years were sought to be extinguished so as to exclude them from the purview of the Tenancy Act, is held to be invalid, resort to Tenancy Act should necessarily be had. In such a case, the lands held by religious Institutions or Endowments will still be governed by the Tenancy Act. The Division Bench in Y. Subba Reddy s case ( 1998 (1) ALT 579 ) did not consider these relevant aspects including the provisions of the Tenancy Act, and the decision in Narayana s case striking down sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 82 of the Endowments Act. ( 19 ) FOR all these reasons, we are of the view that the decision in Subba Reddy s case ( 1998 (1) ALT 579 ) must be regarded as per incuriam and does not lay down the correct legal position. The learned Judges erroneously assumed that on the expiry of lease for a term of six years, the tenant who obtained the land on lease from Religious or Charitable Institution/endowment has to vacate the same and his continuance will be illegal. As already discussed, it amounts to ignoring the provisions of the Tenancy Act. We are therefore constrained to overrule the decision in Y. Subba Reddy s case. Suffice it to clarify that the impact of S. 75 of Endowments Act on the provisions of Tenancy Act need not be answered as we are not concerned here with inam lands. However, we clarify that the Division Bench decision in Y. Subba Reddy s case insofar as it purports to apply S. 75 of the Endowments Act, 1987 in order to negate the claim of the lessee in that case does not lay down the correct law and we further clarify that the provisions of the Tenancy Act do apply to the leases of the agricultural lands belonging to or held by the Charitable Institutions/endowments. We shall not be understood to have expressed any view as regards the leases of inam lands falling within the purview of the S. 75 of the Endowments Act. We shall not be understood to have expressed any view as regards the leases of inam lands falling within the purview of the S. 75 of the Endowments Act. ( 20 ) THE controversy does not rest with the clarification of the legal position on the question referred to the Full Bench. The controversy has assumed a different dimension with the counsel for the appellant Zilla Parishad invoking the exclusionary clause in 18 (e) of the Tenancy Act and thereby building up the argument that the Tenancy Act has no application to the land in question. ( 21 ) AS already noticed, S. 18 (c) enjoins that nothing contained in the Act shall apply to the lands owned by the Central or the State Government. Clause (e) of S. 18 enacts yet another exception to the applicability of the Act. The opening part of S. 18 which is a saving provision read with clause (e) reads as follows :" (1) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (e) to lands held by any Corporation established by or under a Central or Provincial or State Act, or any Government Company as defined in S. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956) or any Port Trust. " ( 22 ) BASED on this provision, it is contended by the learned counsel for appellant that the Zilla Parishad is a Corporation within the meaning of clause (e ). The plaint-schedule lands being held by the statutory Corporation, the plaintiff or any lessee is not entitled to the protection under Tenancy Act. No doubt, this argument was not put forth before the trial Court and it is a new argument. However, as it is purely a legal question which goes to the root of the case, we felt that in the interest of justice this contention should be allowed to be raised, more so for the reason that we are hearing First Appeals. In all fairness, it must be said that the learned counsel for the respondents did not voice any serious objection for consideration of this argument for the first time. Hence, we proceed to consider the same on merits. In all fairness, it must be said that the learned counsel for the respondents did not voice any serious objection for consideration of this argument for the first time. Hence, we proceed to consider the same on merits. ( 23 ) THE twin questions that arose for consideration in the context of S. 18 (1) (e) are whether the Zilla Parishad is a Corporation established by or under a State Act and whether the lands are held by such Corporation. We are of the view that both the criteria are satisfied and the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the Zilla Parishad ought to be upheld. There is a direct authority of this Court in support of the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the Zilla Parishad. A learned single Judge of this Court K. Ramaswamy, J. in Surapa Raju v. District Judge, West Godavari, (1988) 1 ALT 671 held that the lands which were gifted to a Committee constituted to establish a High School and were under the management of Zilla Parishad which leased out the lands to the petitioners therein for a perid of three years, were excluded from the purview of the Tenancy Act by virtue of S. 18 (1) (e ). The learned Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 973 and held as follows on the first question :sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 declared the Zilla Parishad to be a body corporation with perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire hold and dispose of the property etc. No doubt, the Government is given by operation of sub-sec. (1) of S. 36 of the Parishads Act power to constitute a Zilla Parishad to a district by a notification. What is declared in sub-sec. (2) is being made a statutory declaration by exercise of the power under sub-sec. (1 ). No doubt, the Division Bench has drawn a distinction in the Indian Bank s case (AIR 1983 Andh Pra 347) between a corporation created under a statute and a corporation created by a Statute. In that case, the question was to exclude the applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Relief Act from the purview of the Banking Regulations Act. No doubt, the Division Bench has drawn a distinction in the Indian Bank s case (AIR 1983 Andh Pra 347) between a corporation created under a statute and a corporation created by a Statute. In that case, the question was to exclude the applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Relief Act from the purview of the Banking Regulations Act. The Division Bench was called upon to consider the question of the effect of S. 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of undertakings) Act, 1970. In that context, the Division Bench has drawn the distinction between a Corporation created by or under a statute. But that distinction falls into little significance in this case for the reason that S. 18 (1) (e) itself provides both contingencies, namely, established by or uder a State Act. Therefore, the question whether it is established under sub-sec. (2) of S. 36 or established by a notification under sub-section (1) of S. 36 becomes one of little significance for the reason that it was constituted by or under the statute. Therefore, the Zilla Parishad, West Godavari, is a corporation established by or under the Parishads Act whcih is now replaced by the Andhra Pradesh Mandala Praja Parishads, Zilla Praja Parishads and Zilla Pranalika Abhivruddi Mandals Act, 1986 (Act No. 31/1986) (for short the Mandals Act ), by S. 43 thereof. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that it is a Corporation established by or under the Mandals Act, for the purpose of S. 18 (1) (c) of the Amendment Act. Therefore, the lands are got excluded from the Amendment Act". ( 24 ) THE learned Judge answered in the affirmative to the question whether the properties are vested in the Zilla Parishad. The provisions relating to vesting of assets and liabilities on the abolition of the District Board has been relied upon in support of the conclusion that the properties of the High School vested in the Zilla Parishad. The learned Judge also observed that in view of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, the lessees are estopped from denying the title of the landlord. We are in full agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge on the first question. However, as regards the second question, though our conclusion is broadly the same, our approach is some what different. We are in full agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge on the first question. However, as regards the second question, though our conclusion is broadly the same, our approach is some what different. We seek support as the learned single Judge did in the above case from the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 973 . There, the question was whether a Co-operative Society registered or deemed to be registered under the provisions of Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, is a Corporation within the meaning of Article 31 (A) (1) (c) of the Constitution holding that the requirement of public interest and proper management of the Corporation envisaged by Article 31 (A) (1) (c) requires the expression to be given a broad interpretation. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench proceeded to examine what a Corporation means ordinarily and in the constitutional setting. After referring to the definition of Corporation admitted in Halbury s Laws of England and the decision in board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College Delhi v. State of Delhi, AIR 1962 SC 458 , the Constitution Bench concluded that"there cannot therefore be the slightest doubt that a co-operative society is a Corporation as commonly understood". Then a question was posed thus : "does the Scheme of the Constitution make any difference?". It was followed by an emphatic answer - "we apprehend, not". Though the question was approached from the angle of the Constitutional Scheme and collocation of the words occurring in Entry 43 of List I and Enry 32 of List II, some of the observations made and the dicta laid down apply with equal vigour to the question we are concerned with. In paragraph 6, it was observed :"we have already extracted S. 30 of the Punjab Act which confers on every registered co-operative society the status of a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property, enter into contracts, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purpose for which it is constituted. There cannot, therefore, be the slightest doubt that a co-operative society is a corporation as commonly understood. " ( 25 ) THE ratio discernible from the above passage equally applies to the question at issue in the instant case. There cannot, therefore, be the slightest doubt that a co-operative society is a corporation as commonly understood. " ( 25 ) THE ratio discernible from the above passage equally applies to the question at issue in the instant case. ( 26 ) REPELLING the argument that expression corporation was only referable to Companies, the Supreme Court observed :"the more generic expression "corporations" was used so that all companies, statutory corporations and the like may be brought in. There is no indication that notwithstanding the use of the generic expression "corporations", the expression was intended to exclude corporations other than companies and statutory corporations". ( 27 ) THE case of Board of Trustees ( AIR 1962 SC 458 ) (supra) is of utmost relevance to the issue which we have to resolve. The first question was whether the Board of Trustees registered under the Societies Registration Act which was administering the Tibia College and the attached hostel was a Corporation. The discussion is prefaced by the following question :"the first and foremost question is whether the old board was a corporation in the legal sense of that word. " ( 28 ) THE discussion then follows :"what is a Corporation? Corporations may be divided into two main classes, namely, corporations aggregate and corporations sole. We are not concerned in the present case with Corporation sole. A Corporation aggregate has been defined as a collection of individuals united into one body under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its institution, or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation or at any subsequent period of its existence". (Halsbury s Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 9, page 4 ). A Corporation aggregate has therefore only one capacity, namely, its corporate capacity. A Corporation aggregate may be a trading Corporation or non-trading Corporation. The usual examples of a trading Corporation are (1) charter companies, (2) companies incorporated by special acts of parliament, (3) companies registered under the Companies Act, etc. Vol. 9, page 4 ). A Corporation aggregate has therefore only one capacity, namely, its corporate capacity. A Corporation aggregate may be a trading Corporation or non-trading Corporation. The usual examples of a trading Corporation are (1) charter companies, (2) companies incorporated by special acts of parliament, (3) companies registered under the Companies Act, etc. non-trading corporations are illustrated by (1) municipal corporations, (2) district boards, (emphasis supplied) (3) benevolent institutions, (4) universities etc. An essential element in the legal conception of a corporation is that its identity is continuous, that is, that the original member or members and his or their successors are one. In law the individual corporators, or members, of which it is composed are something wholly different from the corporation itself; for a corporation is a legal persona just as much as an individual. Thus, it has been held that a name is essential to a corporation; that a corporation aggregate can, as a general rule, only act or express its will by deed under its common seal; that at the present day in England a corporation is created by one or other of two methods, namely by Royal charter of incorporation from the Crown or by the authority of Parliament that is to say, by or by virtue of statute. There is authority of long standing for saying that the essence of a corporation consists in (1) lawful authority of incorporation, (2) the persons to be incorporated, (3) a name by which those persons are incorporated, (4) a place, and (5) words sufficient in law to show incorporation. No particular words are necessary for the creation of a corporation; any expression showing an intention to incorporate will be sufficient. " ( 29 ) AFTER referring to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, their Lordships continued the discussion in para 11. We quote the relevant portion :now, the question before us is regard being had to the aforesaid provisions was the Board a corporation? Our conclusion is that it was not. The most important point to be noticed in this connection is that in the various provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, there are no sufficient words to indicate an intention to incorporate, on the contrary, the provisions show that there was an absence of such intention. Our conclusion is that it was not. The most important point to be noticed in this connection is that in the various provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, there are no sufficient words to indicate an intention to incorporate, on the contrary, the provisions show that there was an absence of such intention. It was then observed at para 13 :"it is clear from the aforesaid decisions that provisions similar to the provisions of Ss. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 were held not to show any intention to incorporate; on the contrary, the very resort to the machinery of trustees or the governing body for the time being acquiring and holding the property showed that there was no intention to incorporate the society or union so as to give it a corporate capacity for the purpose of holding and acquiring property. It, appears to us that the legal position is exactly the same with regard to the provisions in Ss. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. They do not show any intention to incorporate, though they confer certain privileges on a registered society, which would be wholly unnecessary if the registered society were a corporation. Sections 13 and 14 do not carry the matter any further in favour of the petitioners. Section 13 provides for dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs. It says in effect that on dissolution of a society necessary steps shall be taken for the disposal and settlement of the property of the society, its claims and liabilities, according to the rules of the society; if there be no rules, then as the governing body shall find it expedient provided that in the event of any dispute arising among the said governing body or the members of the said society, the adjustment of the affairs shall be referred to the Court. Here again the governing body is given a legal power somewhat distinct from that of the society itself; because under S. 16 the governing body shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted. Here again the governing body is given a legal power somewhat distinct from that of the society itself; because under S. 16 the governing body shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the provisions aforesaid do not establish the main essential characteristic of a corporation aggregate, namely, that of an intention to incorporate the society. Again in para 16, their Lordships observed at para 16 :"a society registered under the Societies Registration Act may have characteristics which are analogous to some of the characteristics of a corporation; yet it is not incorporated and remains an unincorporated society. As soon as it is held that it is an unincorporated society, it must come under the second part of entry 32 of List II. " ( 30 ) THE Supreme Court then proceeded to identify the status of the new Board of Trustees constituted under the impugned Act and held that the new Board has a Corporate status. The reasoning of their Lordships is found in para 18 :"sub-SECTION (2) of S. 3 says in express terms that the new Board constituted under the impugned Act is given a corporate status; in other words, the new Board is corporation in the full sense of the term does the impugned legislation still come within entry 32 of List II. We think it does and for these reasons. We have held that the old Board was not a corporation, even though it was registered under the Societies Registration Act. When, therefore, the Delhi State Legislature passed a law dissolving the old Board, it was really dealing with an unincorporated society or association. By the impugned legislation, however, it gave the new Board a corporate status, but at the same time so delimited the powers and duties of the new Board as to confine them to the State of Delhi only. " ( 31 ) THUS, as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy J. in Daman Singh s case ( AIR 1985 SC 973 ) the learned Judges arrived at the conclusion that the new Board was a Corporation on the basis of sub-section (2) of Section 3. " ( 31 ) THUS, as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy J. in Daman Singh s case ( AIR 1985 SC 973 ) the learned Judges arrived at the conclusion that the new Board was a Corporation on the basis of sub-section (2) of Section 3. In the A. P. Panchayat Samithies and Zilla Parishad Act, 1959, we have a provision similar to sub-section (2) of Section 3 which has been referred to by K. Rama Swamy, J. in Surapa Raju s case (1988 (1) ALT 671 ). Section 36 of the said Act, 1959 provides "the Government may by notification constitute a Zilla Parishad for a district with effect from such date as may be specified therein". Sub-section (2) of Section 36 lays down :"every Zilla Parishad shall by the name of the District for which it is constituted be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to enquire, hold and dispose of the property and to enter into contracts and may by its corporate name sue and be sued". ( 32 ) THE corporate character of the body known as Zilla Parishad is spelt out in no uncertain terms by Section 36 (2 ). The corresponding provisions are to be found in the successor Act also. The fact that certain executive functions of the State are entrusted to the Zilla Parishad or it is a unit of local self governance, does not detract from its character of a statutory Corporation. It is immaterial that the Act of 1959 does not by itself constitute the Zilla Parishad. But, it enables - nay obligates the Government to constitute a Zilla Parishad for a District. Both the Corporations established by or under or State Act are within the meaning of clause (e) of Section 18 of the Tenancy Act. That is why, in Surapa Raju s case (1988 (1) ALT 671) the learned single Judge rightly pointed that the ratio in Indian Bank s case AIR 1983 Andh Pra 347 has no application. ( 33 ) THERE is another weighty reason for reaching the conclusion that the lands held by a Statutory Corporate body like Zilla Parishad are comprehended within the sweep and ambit of clause (e) of Section 18 (1 ). ( 33 ) THERE is another weighty reason for reaching the conclusion that the lands held by a Statutory Corporate body like Zilla Parishad are comprehended within the sweep and ambit of clause (e) of Section 18 (1 ). Clause (c) and clause (e) put together disclose the apparent legislative policy to exempt not only the Government s lands, but also the lands held by the Statutory Corporations and bodies as well as public sector companies. When it is the avowed policy of the Government even to exclude the lands held by commercially oriented Government Companies. There is no good reason why the statutory bodies like Zilla Parishads (now Zilla Praja Parishads) should be within the ambit of the Tenancy Act provisions. When the expression corporation is used in juxta-position with the expression government Company and Port Trust, we are of the view that it should receive a broader connotation so as to encompass the bodies exercising statutory powers. The meaning of the word corporation ought not to be adjudged from an a priori notion that a statutory body is not known as a Corporation. The contextual setting coupled with the objective underlying the exclusionary provisions contained in clauses (c) and (e) of Section 18 should dissuade the Court from placing a narrow or restricted construction on the expression corporation established by or under a Central or State Act, the judicial precedents apart. ( 34 ) WE are now confronted with the questions : Whether the lands can be said to be held by the statutory Corporation namely, Zilla Parishad? What is the meaning of the expression held or to hold ? Does it mean that the ownership should vest with the Corporation? Whether the Zilla Parishad can be legitimately regarded as holding the plaint schedule land. These are the questions which have engaged our attention in the light of the arguments advanced. ( 35 ) THE expression held or holds has different shades of meaning both in legal and common parlance. It is not necessarily synonymous with ownership. Exclusive and absolute title to property is not always meant by the expression holds . In AIR 1966 SC 1191 , the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the word holds in Sections 12 and 13 of Assam Agricultural Income-Tax Act. It is not necessarily synonymous with ownership. Exclusive and absolute title to property is not always meant by the expression holds . In AIR 1966 SC 1191 , the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the word holds in Sections 12 and 13 of Assam Agricultural Income-Tax Act. Subba Rao, J. speaking for the Supreme Court held that the expression holds includes two fold idea of the actual possession of a thing and also of being invested with a legal title though some times, it is used only to mean the actual posession of a thing. In the context in which the expression was used in those two Sections, the Surpeme Court considered the word holds as equivalent to holding by legal title. ( 36 ) ANOTHER decision of the Supreme Court which is relevant to the point is that of Budhan Singh v. Babi Bux, AIR 1970 SC 1880 . In that case, the Supreme Court took the view that the word hold in Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as lawfully held . The following observations in paras 11 and 12 are worth noting :"it is true that according to the dictionary meaning the word "held" can mean either lawful holding or even a holding without any semblance of a right such as holding by a trespasser. But, the real question is as to what is the legislative intent?. . . . . . "it is true that the legislature could have used the word "lawfully held" in place of the word "held" in S. 9 but as mentioned earlier one of the dictionary meanings given to the word "held" is, "lawfully held". In Webster s New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Second Edition), it is stated that in legal parlance the word "held" means to possess by "legal title". In other words the word "held" is technically understood to mean to possess by legal title. Therefore by interpreting the word "held" as "lawfully held", we are not adding any word to the section. We are merely spelling out the meaning of that word. " ( 37 ) IN State of A. P. v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin, AIR 1982 SC 913 the expression held was interpreted to connote both the ownership as well as possession. Therefore by interpreting the word "held" as "lawfully held", we are not adding any word to the section. We are merely spelling out the meaning of that word. " ( 37 ) IN State of A. P. v. Mohd. Ashrafuddin, AIR 1982 SC 913 the expression held was interpreted to connote both the ownership as well as possession. It was pointed out that in the context of the definition in A. P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings and Regulation) Act, it is not possible to interpret the term held only in the sense of possession. It was observed for example, if land is held by a owner and also by a tenant or by a person in possession pursuant to a contract for sale, the holding will be taken to be the holding of such persons. " It obviously means that a owner who is not in actual possession will also be taken to be holder of the land. Thus, a very wide interpretation has been placed on the expression held . But, it was in the context of the definition and the provisions contained in the said Act. The ratio of that decision may not therefore furnish a solution for resolving the question in the light of the Section 18 (1) (e) of the Tenancy Act. ( 38 ) WE are inclined to think that the expression held in Section 18 (1) (e) connotes possession or control backed up by legal title. In the instant case, the Zilla Parishad has undoubted legal authority to manage the lands and to lease them out. The first defendant - Zila Parishad may or may not be a trustee because there is no definite evidence in this regard. In paragraph 12 of the main judgment, the role of Zilla Parishad is described as a trust Board at one place and as assignee of Trust Board in another place. These observations are not based on any evidence on record. It is more in the area of surmise as Trust deed has not been filed. Still, even if the Zilla Parishad is not in the position of a Trustee vis-a-vis the trust property. Undisputably, it has been in effective possession, management and control of the lands. The fact that it has legal authority to manage the lands to lease out the lands is not at all in dispute. Still, even if the Zilla Parishad is not in the position of a Trustee vis-a-vis the trust property. Undisputably, it has been in effective possession, management and control of the lands. The fact that it has legal authority to manage the lands to lease out the lands is not at all in dispute. It has been in possession of the lands actually or constructively and exercising rights thereon as much as the absolute owner of the land would exercise. The very suit of the plaintiff proceeds on the foundation that Zilla Parishad is the landlord and let out the lands in exercise of its powers of management. In fact, for all practical purposes, the Zilla Parishad is recognised to be the ostensible owner by all concerned. In this fact situation, applying the test indicated in the aforementioned decisions, we are driven to the irresistible conclusion that the plaint schedule land is held by the Zilla Parishad. We cannot accept the extreme contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the expression held must be construed as owned and nothing short of that. ( 39 ) THERE is yet another reason which we can press into service in support or our conclusion. The definition of landlord in Section 2 (f) denotes that not only the owner of holding, but also a person deriving rights through such owner is a landlord if such person is entitled to evict the cultivating tenant. The Zilla Parishad may not be owner in its own right, but there could not be a semblance of dispute that it has derived its rights through the owner, be it a trustee or the beneficiary. It is in the capacity of the landlord that the land has been leased out to the plaintiff as well as the 2nd defendant. Thus in the face of admitted jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the Zilla Parishad and the plaintiff, it would be doing violence to common sense and the law alike if it is interpreted that the Zilla Parishad does not hold the land. ( 40 ) WHILE winding up the discussion on the scope of clause (e) of Section 18 (1) of the Tenancy Act, we must take note of the difference in the language between the clause (c) and clause (e ). ( 40 ) WHILE winding up the discussion on the scope of clause (e) of Section 18 (1) of the Tenancy Act, we must take note of the difference in the language between the clause (c) and clause (e ). Whereas clause (c) refers to the lands owned by the Government, clause (e) refers to the lands held by a statutory Corporation. Should it therefore be held that the expression held in clause (e) is used in a narrow sense connoting owership and nothing less than that? Otherwise, what is the rationale behind extending the amplitude of exemption to the lands held by statutory Corporation and Government Companies though they do not own the lands? One answer is the very fact that the legislature used a different and wider expression held when clause (e) was introduced in the year 1979, denotes that the legislature did not want to confine and narrow down the width of exemption only to the lands over which such Corporations and Companies have ownership rights. It is a different matter that the Legislature could have changed the expression owned to held in clause (c) also. But the failure to do so, may be intentional or unintentional, does not lead to the inference that the expression held occurring in clause (e) of S. 18 should be given a restricted meaning. It may be that the Legislature felt that there was no need to amend the clause (c) so as to introduce held instead of owned for the apparent reason that by far, the instances of Government holding the agricultural lands otherwise than as Proprietor are rare. ( 41 ) WE are therefore of the view that the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act do not govern the lease given to the plaintiff under Ex. A. 1 and A. 4 and the plaintiff is not entitled to claim the statutory protection under Section 10 (3) of the Act. The lease period under Ex. A. 4 having expired, the plaintiff was liable to quit the land and deliver the possession. There was nothing illegal in leasing out the plaint schedule lands to the 2nd defendant whose lease period had also expired long back. The suit ought not to have been decreed by the trial Court. The appeal filed by the Zilla Parishad A. S. No. 1108 of 1985 is therefore, allowed. There was nothing illegal in leasing out the plaint schedule lands to the 2nd defendant whose lease period had also expired long back. The suit ought not to have been decreed by the trial Court. The appeal filed by the Zilla Parishad A. S. No. 1108 of 1985 is therefore, allowed. The appeal No. 2055 of 1984 has practically become infructuous. In view of the dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff by this judgment, no relief need be granted to the appellant/2nd defendant. Recording the same, the said appeal is disposed of. Appeal No. 1698 of 1985 filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. In view of the fact that the legal contention regarding the applicability of Section 18 (1) (e) has been raised for the first time, we do not consider it a fit case to award the costs. Order accordingly.