JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C J. (Oral):- Mr. Rahul Mahajan, learned counsel for the petitioner states that respondent No.l is the original plaintiff and is contesting respondent. No effective relief is claimed by the petitioner against respondent Nos. 2 and 3. In fact, they are proforma respondents original defendant Nos. 2 and 3 respectively in the suit. He, therefore, prays that names of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 may be permitted to be delted from the array of the parties. Prayer granted, names of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are ordered to be delted from the array of the parties. Respondent No. 1 will now is the sole respondent. Necessary correction be made in the cause title. 2. Admitted Mr. Ramakant Sharma appears and waives service of notice of admission on behalf the respondent. In the facts and circumstances, the matter is taken up for final hearing today. 3. This petition is filed by the petitioner, original defendant No.2, in Civil Suit No. 159 of 2000 and CM. A. No. 172 of 2000, pending in the court of Sub Judge, 1st Class (II), Nurpur, District Kangra, against respondent No. 1, original plaintiff. Her prayer is to quash and set aside all actions taken by the Court in Civil Suit No. 159 of 2000 as also CMA No. 172 of 2000. 4. Respondent No. 1 - plaintiff was working as Junior Librarian in Army School, Kandrori. On April 7, 2000, she filed a suit for permanent injunction against the petitioner and defendant Nos. 1 and 3. It is, however, the case of the petitioner that the said suit was unconditionally withdrawn by the plaintiff on June 26,2000. On June 28, 2000, another suit, being Civil Suit No. 159 of 2000 (present suit) was instituted by the plaintiff for declaration and consequential relief’s. Along with the plaint, an application, (CMA No. 172 of 2000) was also filed under the provisions of Order 39, Rules 1 ad 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") for temporary injunction. It was stated in the application that the defendants were threatening the plaintiff that they would not allow her to work as Junior Librarian in Army School, Kandrori. It was stated in the application that the defendants were threatening the plaintiff that they would not allow her to work as Junior Librarian in Army School, Kandrori. She, therefore, prayed for the grant of ex-parte and interim injunction restraining the defendants from interfering, in any manner whatsoever, in performing her duties as Junior Librarian in the Army School, Kandrori, and further restraining them from with-holding any of the benefits to the applicant. On June 28,2000, the Court granted ex- parte and interim injunction. They were further restrained from with- holding benefits to the applicant as Junior Librarian, such as salary, etc. till next date of hearing. Notice was made returnable on August 1,2000, at 10.00 A.M. 5. On the returnable date i.e. August 1,2000, the petitioner (defendant No.2) submitted a reply raising preliminary objections as well as objections on merits. In paragraph 3 of the preliminary objections, it was stated; "3. Territorial Jurisdiction: The honourable Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Respondent No.2 is situated at Nangal Bhur, Teh- Pathankot, District Gurdaspur. The registered address of respondent Nos. 1 and 3 is false and fictitious and not complete. None of the respondents is located within the territorial jurisdiction of honourable court. The order of termination was served/communicated at Nanagal Bhur, District Gurdaspur. The cause of action accrued beyond the territorial jurisdiction of honourable court. Respondent No. 1 is located at New Delhi. Respondent No.3 comes under the technical and operational control of HQ Northern Command." 6. Similarly, another application was also filed under Order 6, Rule 14A of the Code for staying suit against defendant Nos. 1 and 3 wherein also it was mentioned by the petitioner (defendant No. 2) that the plaintiff with mala fide intention and ulterior motive had given wrong addresses of defendant Nos. 1 and 3. It was stated that defendant No. 1 was located at Delhi. It was also stated that Union of India was a necessary party. A prayer was, therefore, made that since the registered addresses of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 were false and fictitious, as tendered by the plaintiff, the suit was required to be stayed. 1 and 3. It was stated that defendant No. 1 was located at Delhi. It was also stated that Union of India was a necessary party. A prayer was, therefore, made that since the registered addresses of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 were false and fictitious, as tendered by the plaintiff, the suit was required to be stayed. It may also be stated that immediately after grant of ex- parte and interim injunction on June 28, 2000, an application was made by petitioner defendant No.2 in the Trial Court on July 5, 2000, under order 39, Rule 4 read with Section 151 of the Code complaining about abuse of process of law by the plaintiff by requesting the Court to recall and/or discharge earlier order dated June 28,2000. It was also stated as to how there was concealment of facts by the plaintiff and no ex-parte and interim injunction could have been granted. The grievance of the learned counsel for the, petitioner (defendant No. 2) is that no order was passed by the Court on that application. Meanwhile, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 94 of the Code to commit petitioner-defendant No.2 to civil prison and also for attachment and sale of her property for disobedience of order of and interim injunction passed by the Court on June 28, 2000. That application was filed on July 3 I/August 1, 2000. It was stated in this petition, that the case was listed on August 16,2000, for consideration of an application under Section 94 of the Code. Though the petitioner had moved an application under order 39, Rule 4 read with Section 151 of the Code for vacation of interim order on July 5, 2000, no order was passed on that application and the Court proceeded to hear application under Section 94 of the Code- and in these circumstances, the petitioner has been constrained to approach this Court by filing the present petition. 7. Initially, on September 12, 2000, notice was issued and it was made returnable On September 28, 2000. Further proceedings in civil Suit No. 159 of 2000, pending in the Court of Sub Judge, 1st Class (II), Nurpur, were also stayed. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time. Affidavits and further affidavits have also been filed. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 9. Further proceedings in civil Suit No. 159 of 2000, pending in the Court of Sub Judge, 1st Class (II), Nurpur, were also stayed. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time. Affidavits and further affidavits have also been filed. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 9. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was suppression of material facts by the plaintiff. In the present suit, (Civil Suit No. 159 of 2000) the fact about filing and withdrawal of earlier suit (Civil Suit No.62 of 2000) has not been mentioned. It was also submitted that services of the petitioner were terminated by an order dated April 10, 2000, whereas the preset suit was instituted only on June 28,2000 i.e. after more than two months. The fact regarding termination of service of the plaintiff was neither disclosed in the suit nor in the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. In the circumstances, no interim order could have been passed by the trial Court. A grievance was also made by the learned counsel that the Court of Sub Judge, 1st Class (II), Nurpur, has no territorial jurisdiction in the matter on the ground that defendant No. l was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court in the State of Himachal Pradesh (which was seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff relying upon the registered address of the School Committees). It was also urged that the registered address of defendant Nos. 1 and 3 was of Delhi and there was deliberate and conscious abuse of process of law by the plaintiff in not showing their correct addresses. It was submitted that when an application was made by the petitioner (defendant No.2) for recalling and/or discharging and interim injunction order on the ground of want of jurisdiction, it was incumbent on the Court to decide the question of jurisdiction at the initial stage and it ought not to have proceeded with application under Section 94 of the Code. On all these grounds, the petition deserves to be allowed. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent (original plaintiff), on the other hand, supported the order passed by the trial Court. He submitted that there is no concealment of material fact from the trial court. On all these grounds, the petition deserves to be allowed. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent (original plaintiff), on the other hand, supported the order passed by the trial Court. He submitted that there is no concealment of material fact from the trial court. Two suits, first being Civil Suit No.62 of 2000 and second being Civil suit No. 159 of 2000, were instituted for different purposes. Whereas previous suit was for permanent injunction, subsequent suit was for declaration and consequential reliefs. He also submitted that since the plaintiff was not allowed to perform functions and discharge duties, she could pray for interim relief, which was granted. Once the court granted and interim relief, it was obligatory on the petitioner to comply with the order. No appeal was filed against the said order passed by the Court. The petitioner defendant No.2 could not have ignored the direction issued by the court. When the order was disobeyed, it was open to the plaintiff to file an application under Section 94 of the Code which was done by her. If the court proceeds to hear such application, there is no jurisdictional error which deserves to be corrected by this Court in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the constitution. He, therefore, prayed that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. Since the matter is pending before the Trial Court, it is neither desirable nor advisable to express any opinion one way or the other on merits which may cause prejudice to either patty. At the same time, however, the grievance voiced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is well-founded that when it was seriously disputed that the Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit as also that in the facts and circumstances, ex-parte and interim injunction order should not have been passed which prima facie appears to be I mandatory in nature, the Court ought to have considered the objections. To recall, | it was the case of the petitioner that services of the plaintiff were terminated as early as on April 10,2000. The second suit was instituted as late as on June 28, 2000, i.e. after more than two months. In my opinion, it would have been proper had the court issued notice before granting ex-parte and interim injunction. To recall, | it was the case of the petitioner that services of the plaintiff were terminated as early as on April 10,2000. The second suit was instituted as late as on June 28, 2000, i.e. after more than two months. In my opinion, it would have been proper had the court issued notice before granting ex-parte and interim injunction. Again, when on July 5,2000, an application was filed under rule 4 of Order 39 read with Section 151 of the Code, raising preliminary objections, including the objection that there was abuse of process of law on the part of the plaintiff and the address supplied by the plaintiff were not correct and that the defendants I were not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, the Court ought to have j considered the application and decided whether it had jurisdiction, before j proceeding with an application under Section 94 of the code. 12. My attention, in this connection, was invited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, to a decision of the Supreme court in Industrial Credit and Investment corporation of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries ltd. and others,[{ 1999) 4 SCC 710], wherein also the Apex Court, relying upon its earlier decision in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, [(1999) 4 SCC 225], indicated that, ordinarily, no ex- parte ad interim relief of a mandatory nature should be granted when there is some dispute about jurisdiction of the court. In the instant case, several questions were required to be considered by the trial court, such as to whether it has territorial jurisdiction in the matter; whether the cause of action wholly or in part could be said to have arisen within the local limits of jurisdiction of the Court; whether all the defendants actually and voluntarily reside or carry on business; or personally work for gain with the territorial jurisdiction of the Court; or one of the defendants, namely defendant No. 2 (present petitioner) actually or voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and that other defendants who do not reside, carry on business or work for gain acquiesce in the institution of the suit; whether services of the plaintiff were terminated on April 10,2000, as contended by the petitioner and the said fact was concealed/suppressed by her; and whether , ex-parte and interim injunction of mandatory nature could have been granted. Hence, the grievance of the petitioner that before proceeding with and deciding application under Section 94 of the code, the Court should have considered all the above questions is well-founded and must be upheld. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, in my opinion the petition deserves to be allowed and is, accordingly, partly allowed. The Trial court will now decide objections of the petitioner (defendant No.2) about territorial jurisdiction and legality or otherwise of grant of exparte and interim injunction on June 28, 2000, before proceeding with the application under Section 94 of the Code filed by the plaintiff. 14. I may, however, state that I wish to express no opinion on merits of the matter. As and when the case comes up for hearing before the trial Court, all questions will be decided by it on their own merits without being influenced or inhibited by the observations made by me herein above, as they have been made for the purpose of deciding this application. 15. The petition is, accordingly, allowed to the extent indicated above. 16. On September 12, 2000, and interim relief was granted. The said and interim relief will not survive in view of the final order as the trial Court will have to decide the question of jurisdiction of the Court and till then the suit will not proceed. -