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2000 DIGILAW 337 (KAR)

G. v. RONAD VS STATE OF KARNATAKA

2000-05-24

R.GURURAJAN

body2000
R. GURURAJAN, J. ( 1 ) A Judicial Officer is before this Court challenging the order dated 25-7-1996 Annexure-A and for consequential relief of reinstatement with all benefits on the following facts. ( 2 ) FACTS. Petitioner was selected as a Munsiff in the year 1987. He completed his probationary period of his service and posted to various places in the state of Karnataka. Petitioner was working as Munsiff and Judicial magistrate First Class at Kudligi between 25-2-1991 and 15-9-1992. At the relevant point of time, the local Bar developed hostile attitude towards the petitioner and in particular its President. The Local Bar was also hostile even towards the earlier judicial officers who worked at kudligi and also complained against the petitioner. Petitioner was kept under suspension by an order dated 23-4-1993 on the basis of the preliminary report dated 29-10-1992 by the Registrar (Vigilance ). Articles of charge as per Annexure-B was thereafter followed. Several charges were framed against the petitioner in the charge-sheet. A detailed written inquiry was conducted by a District Sessions Judge, Bellary, on various counts. Petitioner had the benefit of an Advocate in the inquiry held by the Enquiry Officer. He submitted a report and in the report he found the petitioner guilty of Charge No. 3 and Charge No. 5. He held that all the remaining charges were not proved in his report submitted by him on 16-2-1995. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued with a show-cause notice dated 22-4-1995 along with the report and required him to show cause as to why the said finding should not be accepted. Petitioner submitted a representation 15-5-1995. Thereafter he was issued with another show-cause notice dated 20-2-1995, requiring him to show cause as to why a penalty of dismissal from service should not be imposed on him. Petitioner submitted a representation on 4-9-1995 to the said notice. Thereafter, petitioner received an order bearing No. LAW 32 LAC 96, dated 25-7-1996 imposing the penalty of dismissal on him. It is this order that is challenged before me by the petitioner on various grounds. ( 3 ) RESPONDENTS have entered appearance and justify their action by filing a detailed counter statement. Respondents state that a person holding the judicial office has to maintain absolute integrity. Judicial functions are sovereign functions and persons holding judicial posts are holding public post and not employees of the Government. ( 3 ) RESPONDENTS have entered appearance and justify their action by filing a detailed counter statement. Respondents state that a person holding the judicial office has to maintain absolute integrity. Judicial functions are sovereign functions and persons holding judicial posts are holding public post and not employees of the Government. The trust of the public is necessary for the people to have faith in the judiciary. Respondents have stated that the petitioner was involved in certain serious charges which has been proved in the inquiry. They say that the petitioner was provided with all opportunities and thereafter the Full bench of the High Court resolved to impose the penalty of dismissal. They recommended the said punishment of dismissal to the Governor and thereafter, the Governor has issued the present order. The respondents justify the dismissal. ( 4 ) SRI K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the petitioner and argued at great length on several days. He took me through the pleadings of the case to contend that the petitioner should not have been penalised by the respondent. He argued that as against several charges only two charges have been proved. Even the findings on these two charges are not based on acceptable evidence. The evidence of the president of the Bar Association and the evidence of Mr. Gowda cannot be accepted on the facts of this case. He raises a legal plea that the High court has recommended as could be seen from the impugned order to the Governor. The said recommendation has not been made known to him. This has caused prejudice to him in the matter. He further argued that no doubt a dishonest officer requires no place in judiciary but honest officers are to be protected from unscrupulous litigants and lawyers. He relies on various judgments which I shall be dealing in the course of my order in support of his submission. ( 5 ) PER contra, Sri M. H. Motigi, learned Government Advocate elaborately argued to convince me that the facts of the case do not warrant my interference. It is his argument that the petitioner being a judicial officer ought to be honest and any act on his part touching integrity cannot be tolerated. He says that the sufficiency of the material is basically the function of the inquiry authority and not that of the writ Court. It is his argument that the petitioner being a judicial officer ought to be honest and any act on his part touching integrity cannot be tolerated. He says that the sufficiency of the material is basically the function of the inquiry authority and not that of the writ Court. He says that now communication of recommendation does not in any way affect the case on hand. In conclusion he says that to maintain purity in judiciary Courts should view such cases with care and caution and not to interfere in a proved case. ( 6 ) AFTER hearing both the Counsel, I pass the following order. The admitted facts as I see from the pleadings are that the petitioner was holding a judicial office at Kudligi. He was issued with as many as 8 charges and two charges were proved in the enquiry. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to notice only the relevant charges which were taken note of by the respondents for imposing the punishment. The two proved charges against the petitioner are Charge Nos. 3 and 5 which are found at pages 27 and 28. For convenience sake they are reproduced. "charge No. 3. That in G. C. No. 297 of 1987, on your file, in which one Sri R. Mallikarjuna Gowda of Ulavatti was one of the accused, you demanded bribe of Rs. 5,000/- to decide the case in his favour, from the said Sri R. Mallikarjuna Gowda, that after bargaining, you agreed to receive Rs. 3,000/- from the accused, that you did receive Rs. 3,000/- from the said Sri R. Mallikarjuna gowda as settled, and that after receipt of the said amount of Rs. 3,000/-, you thus failed to maintain absolute integrity, and your conduct is unbecoming of a judicial officer within the meaning of rule 3 (l) (i) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966. Charge No. 5. That inspite of the fact that Sri Panchak sharaiah, and Sri Sadaksharaiah are parties to the proceedings before you viz. , O. S. No. 164 of 1991, you maintained close contact with them, moved above with them and stayed in their house, that you thus acted in a manner unbecoming of a judicial officer within the meaning of Rule 3 (l) (iii) of the Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966". Petitioner has participated in the enquiry. Witnesses were examined and cross-examined by the petitioner. Petitioner has participated in the enquiry. Witnesses were examined and cross-examined by the petitioner. Petitioner had the benefit of legal counsel in the enquiry. The respondent examined 17 witnesses and 20 documents were produced in the enquiry. The Inquiry Authority based on the evidence available on record found the petitioner guilty of only two charges which I have referred to above. With regard to other charges he has been given a clean chit to the petitioner. The High Court accepted the said findings and issued a notice with regard to the acceptance of the report and thereafter issued another notice with regard to the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. It is also an admitted fact that a recommendation is made as required in law to the Governor but the same has not been informed to the petitioner. ( 7 ) IN the light of these admitted facts Sri K. Subba Rao, learned senior Counsel raises the following three contentions. (a) Contention No. 1. The facts of the case would prove that an innocent judicial officer is being penalised at the instance of the local bar. Alternatively, he contends that there is no evidence available on record to find the petitioner guilty of these charges. (b) Contention No. 2. The non-communication of recommendation is in violation of the accepted rules of natural justice. (c) Contention No. 3. The honest judicial officer has to be protected by the High Court as otherwise unscrupulous litigants and lawyers would ruin the carrier of judicial officers. ( 8 ) CONTENTION No. 1. The petitioner was charged with 8 charges out of which only 3 and 5 were held to have been proved by the Inquiry officer. Charge No. 3 is with regard to the petitioner demanding a bribe of Rs. 5,oooa to decide the case in favour of one Sri R. Mallikarjuna gowda. He after bargaining agrees to receive Rs. 3,000/- from Mr. Gowda. He did receive Rs. 3,000/ -. This act on the part of the petitioner is unbecoming of a Judicial Officer in terms of the rules. In support of this charge P. W. 1-Vivekananda, a lawyer from Kudligi and P. W. 11-Sri r Mallikarjuna Gowda was examined. He (Mr. Gowda) has stated that he is a native of Ulavatti Village and a criminal case was filed against him in the Munsiffand Judicial Magistrate First Class Court at Kudligi. In support of this charge P. W. 1-Vivekananda, a lawyer from Kudligi and P. W. 11-Sri r Mallikarjuna Gowda was examined. He (Mr. Gowda) has stated that he is a native of Ulavatti Village and a criminal case was filed against him in the Munsiffand Judicial Magistrate First Class Court at Kudligi. One Maqdum, SDA and one Chandraiah, Daffedar told him to get disposed of the case after paying the amount. He met the petitioner in his chambers and he demanded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- for disposal of the case and he agreed to give Rs. 3,000/-, and he paid a sum of Rs. 2,000/- to the petitioner in his chambers. The balance amount of Rs. 1,000/- was paid in his house. His case was also decided in his favour. He was subjected to cross- examination. In the cross-examination of this witness nothing has been suggested to disbelieve the say. The defence of the petitioner as i see is that some disgruntled litigants might have submitted false allegations against the petitioner. No motive as such is attributed to this witness. The Advocate Mr. D. M. Vivekananda has also spoken about the factum of Mr. Gowda telling him of the payment made to the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer after noticing these facts has come to the conclusion that Charge No. 3 is proved. Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel argues that the evidence of Mr. Vivekananda and Mr. Gowda cannot be relied upon "to use the expression of the Counsel that their evidence cannot be said to be "credible evidence". I am unable to accept this argument. When two witnesses come and speak about a factum of an incident which has been believed by the Inquiry Officer, I am not justified in sitting in appeal with regard to that finding of fact in a writ petition. The law is well-settled that if there is some evidence a writ court is not justified in substituting its judgment or re-appreciating that evidence on record. Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel states that the statement of Mallikarjuna Gowda being an unnatural statement cannot also be accepted on the facts of this case. In this connection I may usefully refer to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of High court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v Shashikant S. Patil and Another. Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel states that the statement of Mallikarjuna Gowda being an unnatural statement cannot also be accepted on the facts of this case. In this connection I may usefully refer to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of High court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v Shashikant S. Patil and Another. The Supreme Court has laid in para 16 as under:"the Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole Judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution". In the light of this judgment, I am of the view that it cannot be said that the present case is the one of a decision by consideration of extraneous evidence warranting my interference or a capricious finding as understood in law. The enquiry is not attacked by the petitioner. The present set of facts in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court do not warrant any interference particularly when there is some evidence which has been believed by the Inquiry Officer. The said finding cannot said to be a finding that no reasonable person would come to such condition. The Supreme Court has ruled in the same judgment as under. The said finding cannot said to be a finding that no reasonable person would come to such condition. The Supreme Court has ruled in the same judgment as under. "while it is imperative for the High Court to protect honest judicial officers against all ill conceived or motivated complaints, the high Court cannot afford to bypass any dishonest performance of a member of the subordinate judiciary. Dishonesty is the stark antithesis of judicial probity. Any instance of a High Court condoning or compromising with a dishonest deed of one of its officers would only be contributing to erosion of the judicial foundation. Every hour we must remind ourselves that the judiciary floats only over the confidence of the people in its probity. Such confidence is the foundation on which the pillars of the judiciary are built". ( 9 ) HOWEVER, Sri K. Subba Rao, Learned Senior Counsel placed strong reliance of the Judgment in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde v State of maharashtra and Another, to contend that a writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can look into the evidence also for the purpose of its satisfaction. He relied on the passage at para 51 at page 766 in his support. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court has noticed the contentions of the Government with regard to the power of the writ Court with regard to reappraisal of the evidence. The Supreme court in the very judgment has stated, reading as under:"the law is well-settled that if the findings are perverse and are not supported by evidence on record or the findings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person would have reached it would be open to the High Court as also to this court to interfere in the matter". The Supreme Court in the very para has noticed further as under:"it was observed that the power of judicial review available to a high Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and the Courts can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse". A careful reading of the judgment would show that this Court can interfere with the conclusion if there is no evidence to support the findings or that no prudent man can come to such conclusion. In the case on hand the evidence of Mr. Gowda, is clear enough to show that amount was exchanged for favoring a judgment by the petitioner. There is absolutely no motive attributed to this witness. It is very rare that litigants come and depose with regard to a shaddy deal they had with a judge in the matter of obtaining a favourable judgment. In the case on hand a litigant has appeared before a committee and has given his evidence. His evidence is supported by the Counsel of the litigant in the pending case before that Judge. Moreover, no materials are placed before the authorities to disbelieve his evidence. This case in my opinion cannot said to be of a case of no evidence to support the findings. The findings by the inquiry Officer cannot also said to be a finding that could not have been arrived at by an ordinary prudent man. In the circumstances, I am unable to accept the arguments of Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior counsel that on the facts of this case, I can interfere with the findings. In the light of the material placed before me I have to reject the contentions of Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel with regard to the findings of the Inquiry Officer in respect of Charge No. 3. So also in respect of Charge No. 5 there is a material placed before the Inquiry authority. In support of Charge No. 5, P. W. 15 has spoken with regard to the factum of the charge. In addition several documents were also been filed before the authority. P. W. 12 has also supported the evidence of this witness. P. Ws. 13 and 14 have also spoken about the incidence. The Inquiry Officer has after analysing these materials has ruled that the charges levelled against the petitioner is proved. As I mentioned earlier, this is not a case of no evidence as held by the Hon'ble Supreme court. Therefore, what applies to the Charge No. 3 is equally applicable to Charge No. 5 also. The Inquiry Officer has after analysing these materials has ruled that the charges levelled against the petitioner is proved. As I mentioned earlier, this is not a case of no evidence as held by the Hon'ble Supreme court. Therefore, what applies to the Charge No. 3 is equally applicable to Charge No. 5 also. In the circumstances, I am unable to appreciate the arguments of Sri K Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel that notwithstanding this material I should interfere in the matter. In the circumstances, the first contention is rejected. ( 10 ) CONTENTION No. 2. Sri K Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel argued at great length complaining about the denial of a reasonable opportunity. His argument is that a report was sent to him and the say of the petitioner was also obtained. What is Contended before me is that the recommendation made by the High Court to the Governor has not been made known to him and that has caused a violation according to the Counsel. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Khem Chand v Union of India and Others. He states that a reasonable opportunity as understood in law is denied. He referred to para 19 with regard to violation on account of the non-availability of the recommendation. The Second Judgment relied upon by Sri K. Subba Rao, learned senior Counsel is that the. judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of high Court of Punjab and Haryana through R. G. v Ishwar Chand Jain and Another. He also referred to the judgment in the case of Registrar, high Court of Madras v R. Rajiah, with regard to the recommendation to the Governor. ( 11 ) IT is true that an opportunity was given with regard to the inquiry report and also with regard to the proposed punishment. In the case on hand, the High Court has to recommend the penalty to the governor and the Governor has to act on the said recommendation. Therefore, the argument of Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel is that the said recommendation has not been made available and hence his client is prejudiced on that account. I am unable to appreciate this contention for two reasons. What is recommended is only the punishment for dismissal. Therefore, the argument of Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel is that the said recommendation has not been made available and hence his client is prejudiced on that account. I am unable to appreciate this contention for two reasons. What is recommended is only the punishment for dismissal. The said punishment of dismissal is already made known to the petitioner and his say obtained by the High Court. Hence, the mere non-availability of the recommendation to the petitioner by itself does not result in any violation as contended by Sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel. However to satisfy myself I have seen the recommendations made to the Governor and the said recommendation is nothing but a factual details and the penalty of dismissal proposed to the petitioner and his reply in the matter. Since the petitioner has already been made known the same material (proposed punishment) as i see from the record, the non-availability of the recommendation has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner. Therefore, this argument is not available to the petitioner on the facts of this case. Therefore, the second contention is also rejected. ( 12 ) CONTENTION No. 3. Non-judicial officer has to be protected by the High Court and if such punishments are implemented on the basis of the evidence of Mr. Vivekananda and Mr. Gowda, it would result in failure to protect its judicial officers by not ignoring ill motivated complaints that are made by unscrupulous litigants and lawyers. He strongly relies on Yoginath D. Bagde's case, supra, in this regard. He argued that though the High Court has control over the subordinate courts, the Governor is the ultimate authority in the case on hand. According to him, the High Court could not record this punishment on the basis of these complaints at the instance of lawyers and litigants. He also refers to this case to contend that certain elements who come to court have to come with clean hands. He refers to the earlier transfer of judicial officers at the instance of Kudligi Bar. To consider this plea of sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel there must be some material to show that the complaint is motivated etc. Unfortunately, in the case on hand there is no such factual foundation available either before the inquiry Authority or before this Court for such contention. To consider this plea of sri K. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel there must be some material to show that the complaint is motivated etc. Unfortunately, in the case on hand there is no such factual foundation available either before the inquiry Authority or before this Court for such contention. When the high Court relying on the reports submitted by the Sessions District judge recommends to the Governor to order dismissal of the petitions to maintain the purity of judicial system, it cannot be said that the High court has ignored the honest judicial officer as contented by the Counsel. In the case on hand the act of dishonesty is proved by evidence and the same has been accepted. Therefore, the contention of motivated complaint etc. , are not available to the petitioner on the facts and circumstances of this case. ( 13 ) MR. Motigi, learned Additional Government Advocate has argued as mentioned earlier that the judicial officer has committed certain serious action and the High Court has rightly recommended his dismissal. In this connection I would be failing in my duty if I do not refer to the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of High Court of judicature, supra. The Supreme Court in para 22 has noticed the very contention of motivated complaint etc. , and has ruled that the High court cannot afford to bypass any dishonest performance of a member of the subordinate judiciary. This is what Supreme Court observes in this judgment in paras 22, 23 and 24:"22. It is the Full Court of all Judges of the High Court of Bombay which has authorised the Disciplinary Committee of five judges of that High Court to exercise the functions of the High Court in respect of punishment of judicial officers. Such functions involve exercise of the powers envisaged in Article 235 of the Constitution. It is the constitutional duty of every High Court, on the administrative side, to keep guard over the subordinate judiciary functioning within its domain. While it is imperative for the High Court to protect honest judicial officers against all ill-conceived or motivated complaints, the High Court cannot afford to bypass any dishonest performance of a member of the subordinate judiciary. Dishonesty is the stark antithesis of judicial probity. While it is imperative for the High Court to protect honest judicial officers against all ill-conceived or motivated complaints, the High Court cannot afford to bypass any dishonest performance of a member of the subordinate judiciary. Dishonesty is the stark antithesis of judicial probity. Any instance of a High Court condoning or compromising with a dishonest deed of one of its officers would only be contributing to erosion of the judicial foundation. Every hour we must remind ourselves that the judiciary floats only over the confidence of the people in its probity. Such confidence is the foundation on which the pillars of the judiciary are built. 23. The Judges, "at whatever level they may be, represent the state and its authority, unlike the bureaucracy or the members of the other service. Judicial service is not merely an employment nor the Judges merely employees. They exercise sovereign judicial power. They are holders of public offices of great trust and responsibility. If a judicial officer "tips the scales of justice, its rippling effect would be disastrous and deleterious". A dishonest judicial personage is an oxymoron. We wish to quote the following observations made by Ramaswamy, J. , in High Court of judicature at Bombay v Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil and another, at para 16: "the lymph nodes (cancerous cells) or corruption constantly keep creeping into the" vital veins of the judiciary and the need to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its self-imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under the doctrine of control enshrined in articles 235, 124 (6) of the Constitution. It would, therefore, be necessary that there should" be constant vigil by the High court concerned on its subordinate judiciary and self- introspection". 24. When such a constitutional function was exercised by the administrative side of the High Court any judicial review thereon should have been made not only with great care and circumspection, but confining strictly to the parameters set by this Court in the afore-cited decisions. In the present case, as per the judgment under appeal the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court appears to have snipped off the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court as if the Bench had appeal powers over the decision of the five Judges on the administrative side. In the present case, as per the judgment under appeal the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court appears to have snipped off the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court as if the Bench had appeal powers over the decision of the five Judges on the administrative side. At any rate the Division Bench has clearly exceeded its jurisdictional frontiers by interfering with such an order passed by the High Court on the administrative side". ( 14 ) BEFORE concluding, I must also refer to a very illuminating judg- ment in the case of Kazi Mohd. Muzeebulla v High Court of Karnatakcr. In para 7, the speech of Sir Winston Churchill in the following words is quoted in the said judgment which reads as under. That the Judges are required to confirm to standards of life and conduct far more severe and restricted than that of ordinary people. Indeed their constitutional obligation to do justice without fear or favour, affection or ill will, is a high moral command and exacting demand on their conscience. If "you are what you wear" you have to keep up certain manner of conduct, which puts you in a category beyond the members of bureaucracy and politicians. Judges, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion". Again in para 24, The learned Judge quotes the observations made by justice Krishna Iyer in his book "justice at Cross Roads" reading as under:"judge power is vast and strong in the keeping of those who are fearless and flawless surrogates of public justice. But the judiciary as a fiduciary must pay a price they must be clean in public and private life, on the bench and off the bench and be worthy to be watch dogs, not lap dogs sentinels, not sycophants". ( 15 ) IN para 8 in the same judgment the learned Judge notices the code of conduct for officers in judicial service both written and unwritten. Respectfully following the law laid down by the Apex and this Court in this matter. I am of the view that in the case on hand rather unfortunately the petitioner by his conduct has failed to maintain the expected degree of judicial discipline. Such lapse on the part of a judicial officer cannot be tolerated and in my opinion it cannot be said that any injustice is done to the petitioner on account of the present order. Such lapse on the part of a judicial officer cannot be tolerated and in my opinion it cannot be said that any injustice is done to the petitioner on account of the present order. On the other hand, justice is done to the respected system by passing the present order, thereby removing a throne in the administration of justice pure and simple. In conclusion I reject all the contentions raised by the petitioner and dismiss the writ petition. No costs. --- *** --- .